
Politics, Capstone Documents, and Major Naval Operations 1981-2011
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1 Introduction

“The U.S. Navy is the world’s most lethal, flexible, and capable maritime force. As they have throughout our Nation’s history, every day our Sailors operate forward to provide American leaders with timely options to deter aggression, assure allies, and respond to crises with a minimal footprint ashore.”

Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert (Chief of Naval Operations), Navy Program Guide 2013, p. iii

“America is a maritime nation [...].”

Leon E. Panetta (U.S. Secretary of Defense 2011-2013), Navy Program Guide 2013, p. 9

What exactly constitutes a maritime nation, and why is the United States of America one? Why is it that the U.S. Navy is such a self-esteem maritime force?

Research into U.S. politics and policies cannot ignore the particular role of America’s sea services and the application of sea power to attain defined political and military ends. Sea power (two words), the exploitation of the opportunities of the sea, is the foundation for American hegemony. The study of the nation, U.S. influence abroad, and the underlying world view cannot be conducted without a sound appreciation for the maritime roots and the seapower (one word) status of the United States.¹ But, as Robert Jervis (1995: 44) pointed out, “Outsiders find navies especially hard to comprehend and while they are likely to enjoy photogenic rides on ships they rarely know what fleets do under everyday situations, let alone how they will operate in a crisis.” The true scope of sea power, therefore, often escapes the understanding of the individual. However, there are at least two ways in which salt water impacts human evolution. For one, the sea’s natural character – tides, storms, weather etc. – are noteworthy. The other, more lasting influence is the way people have used the oceans. Kearsley (1992: xii) noted, “For it is through using the maritime arena as a conduit of power and as a generator of that power (exploiting the ocean’s resources) that mankind has affected its own history.” He also pointed out that states, as the dominating agents in the global system, were the ones to exercise such power. If power is understood as attaining influence over events, then all states with access to the sea will have some form of maritime power.² It is important to acknowledge that maritime power is a relative, not an absolute concept. In fact, it is up to

¹ This semantic issue will be further developed and explained in this study. This study uses “sea power” to speak of the functional use of maritime and naval assets, whereas “seapower” describes the institutional quality. The German word for both is Seemacht. Many authors use the terminology indiscriminately.

² Even landlocked countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Luxemburg in Europe and many others have proxy maritime interests through military, political, or economic ties to world trade and active foreign-policy engagement in the international system.
each state in each given situation to assess the maritime power that is required. Thus, maritime power is a constantly moving framework (Kearsley 1992: xii). Even the semantic terminology begs differentiation and description, for it has to be clear what is meant by the various words and descriptions. As Geoff Till reminds us,

“Some of [the words analysts work with] are adjectives without nouns (‘maritime’, ‘nautical’, ‘marine’), others are nouns without adjectives (‘sea’, ‘seapower’). Sometimes there are nouns that have adjectives (‘ocean/oceanic’, ‘navy/naval’) but they tend towards greater specificity. […] The ‘power’ part of the word ‘seapower’ itself has generated enormous attention in academic analysis of international politics. What does power actually mean? […] Power can be either potential, or consequential – or, commonly, both! […] It has to be seen both as an input and an output.” (Till 2009: 20-21, emphasis in original).

Seeking an answer to the question what these maritime, or more precisely naval in- and outputs are in an American context drives the academic and scientific interest of this dissertation. The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, as the three inherently maritime and sea-going branches of the U.S. armed forces play a significant role in buttressing American foreign policy goals. They project and protect American power in some of the remotest regions of the globe. Clearly, the study of the employment of naval forces to attain foreign policy goals is more than just counting gray warship bows in a given region. Instead, it must focus on the overarching concepts of a military service and their particular relationship to the political and operational context from which they originate, and to the political goals they are meant to serve.³ After all, “The influence of the sea, through its ability to bestow and convey elements of maritime power, should not be ignored” (Kearsley 1992: 187). In the political realm, consequently, such measures are often codified in strategies. The very connection of ways, means, and ends is a significant subject area worthwhile of deeper consideration. It is especially important if one wishes to arrive at an understanding of the broader utility of naval forces for U.S. foreign and security policy.

Whereas the abstract art of strategy - which “seeks synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success” (Yarger 2006: 1) - has been a favorite subject of numerous deliberations, many articles and books (particularly with the trending of the term “strategy” in virtually every field of the business and service world), it quickly becomes apparent that there are various degrees of appreciation for the matter. More precisely, there are differing understandings of the subject altogether. In essence, strategy can mean all kinds of

³ The assessment of the relative merit of seapower has drawn intense academic interest. For a quantitative study, see Brian Crisher/Mark Souva (2012): Power At Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 1865-2011.
things to all kinds of people. Therefore, regarding the political use and application of strategy, one must be clear and concise in defining the term under consideration.

Unsurprisingly, there is a host of factors that inform, restrain, or otherwise influence security policy and corresponding strategy. These are, in no particular order, national interests, institutional checks and balances, military service interests, inter- and inner-service rivalries, grand strategic ideas, defense budgets, public opinion, domestic political dynamics and majorities, past experiences good and bad, strategic thinking proficiency, international events and the context of the world system, military and technological developments, enduring ideas about the reasons for going to war and how to prevent it, etc. In addition, these issues often interact with each other.

The study of modern naval strategy in general and U.S. Navy strategy in particular has surprisingly attracted relatively few researchers, given the Navy’s fairly prominent but often somewhat underestimated role in U.S. foreign and security policy. Conversely, there have been very few attempts to discern and explain naval strategy and the analysis of naval force employment in the broader perspective of the strategic studies. Some may hold that the U.S. Navy is about operations, not about strategy. This is valid, in that lengthy overseas deployments were established after World War II as a standard practices. It led the institutional knowledge to become almost exclusively operational and experiential. Haynes (2013: 7) and Jervis (1995: 44) argue that operations, not strategy or the strategic difference the Navy could make, thus became the lens by which the service and its officer corps looked at the world. The complex demands of naval operations and advanced ship and sensor technology have historically left little room in the careers of naval officers to contemplate the Navy’s purpose beyond operations and the political ends to which their service (and perhaps their life) is required. Conversely, modern contemporary naval strategy has attracted relatively little interest with political scientists. There have been few attempts – in particular by outsiders – to discern and explain naval strategy and the analysis of naval force employment in the broader perspective of strategic studies. In addition, it appears that in government circles and the academy, research and teaching of strategic matters is widely underappreciated and often underfunded.4

There are five broad political developments that warrant a study of U.S. Navy strategy in this day and age. First, the current fiscal situation in the United States (brought about by the massive debt collected over more than a decade of costly foreign interventions, the effects of a

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4 This is certainly the case for Germany. For a discussion on the lackluster state of strategic studies in Germany, see Krause (2010).
global economic crisis, and the stop-gap spending process dubbed sequestration) demands a re-assessment of military and security policy objectives. The concurrent role of the joint force\(^5\) in light of on-going modernization and recapitalization measures in the military must also be taken into account.

Second, the end of the combat operations in (and subsequent withdrawal from) Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014), as well as the death of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden (2011), have appeared to ring in a period of transition regarding the commitment of American land forces abroad. Such a move has comprehensive consequences for operational priorities and political objectives. This is very likely leading away from land-centric forces engaged in extended counterinsurgency or state-building missions, perhaps toward a greater emphasis of the maritime and naval parts of the joint force (Mazarr et al 2013: 15).

Given the rising importance of the Pacific and Indian Oceans on the strategic tableau of the decision-makers in Washington, D.C. (especially in the White House), the third broad development, most prominently displayed by the furiously debated rebalancing of strategic focus, resources, and forces to the Asia-Pacific region emerges. Undoubtedly, that area is of a most genuine maritime nature where naval forces will play a very important role in the overwhelming number of possible future contingencies. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region is a strategic crossroad, not least for several littoral states that are increasingly procuring and operating capable naval forces themselves.

Hence, it appears that more and more U.S. military operations will be fundamentally maritime in nature. These joint tasks will need to be supported by solid naval capabilities.\(^6\) For the U.S. and its Navy then, this spells a deeper investment into its own force to retain its dominant edge. Seth Cropsey, former Undersecretary of the Navy during the Reagan and Bush administrations, cautioned (2013: 31) that “If dominant U.S. seapower were to vanish, substantially diminish, or find a significant challenge from a competitor that seeks to achieve peer status as a naval power, the consequences would be profound and impossible to ignore.”

\(^5\) Coined in light of the Goldwater-Nicols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (which will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the 1980s), this term refers to the efficient and economical inter-service cooperation between the branches of military in all areas of interest, from research and development to operational planning, to the actual use of force. Joint strategy interposed another level between single-service and national military strategy.

\(^6\) Cobble, Gaffney and Gorenburg pointed out that the number of (all) U.S. forces’ response to situations was steadily on the rise between 1970 and 2003, especially in overseas operations. Even more importantly, only 6 percent of military operations in that timeframe were actual combat operations, thus pointing towards the utility and versatility of the military, and the Navy in particular (Cobble et al. 2005: pp 1-11).
Fourth, the nature of sea power and the employment of naval force have always been subject to changing political and relatively stable geographic positions. The value of established 19th and 20th century ‘old-school’ seapower theory constantly needs to be assessed. The importance of decisive battles at sea as the central determinant of victory and defeat, for example, has decreased steadily. Instead, more complex and comprehensive uses of naval forces can be observed. This complexity mandates, in turn, a coherent strategy if one wishes to use naval force successfully because “strategy now refers not only to the direct application of military force in wartime but also to the use of all aspects of national power during peacetime to deter war and win” (Owens 2007: 112).

Fifth, an effort is currently underway to revise and update key U.S. strategic documents. A successor to the 2007 “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” has yet to published (as of July 2014, when this dissertation was formally submitted). The steady stream of official strategic documents includes, at the latest, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published in March of this year. To frame and understand these documents from a strategic, naval point of view, a study of the very recent history of U.S. naval strategy is imperative. How a strategy comes about must also be taken into account.

This study provides a deeper understanding of the crafting of U.S. Navy strategy since the end of the Cold War, its framework setting, and its application. To that end, the work bridges the gap between the thinking of American naval officers and planners on the one hand and academic analyses of Navy strategy on the other hand. It also seeks to provide some outlook on what the future may hold by identifying trends in the use of naval force for foreign policy objectives and into strategy-making in the American policy context. As such, it spans the recent history of internal U.S. Navy thought and external strategic theory. Perhaps with a grain of salt, it must be stated that future developments and the resulting policy demands realistically remain speculative and often sketchy at best. After all,

“Strategy is such a plaything of technology and geopolitical shifts that one can never say with complete confidence that any particular area will always be of low strategic salience. The news headlines of the years since 1945 have been peppered with the names of unfamiliar places, about which most people know little, but which were suddenly and often tragically thrust into importance.” (Booth 1985: 107)

However, if one accepts the premise of a decline in land-centric and a rise in maritime- or naval-centric issues described above, it follows that these developments occur in an increasingly chaotic world. This is most recently demonstrated by the events unfolding around the collapse of the Westphalian, state-centric order in some of the Mediterranean and Black Sea
littoral states. The events following from them mandate allied cooperation, political and diplomatic huddling, and perhaps even military power projection. As Ronald O’Rourke noted, the U.S. military is structured with such force elements as significant naval forces, long-range bombers and airlift that enable it to cross vast expanses of ocean and air space and then orchestrate sustained military campaigns upon arrival. The U.S. is the only country in the Western hemisphere willing and able to do just that (O’Rourke 2012). It also follows that the need for sound understanding and making of strategy will be in higher demand in the future, both in the U.S. and in its allied countries. To frame maritime and naval responses, this analysis studies the past three decades and explains how the Navy was tasked to make strategic differences. The dissertation thus contributes to an understanding of the value of naval forces for U.S. foreign and security policy, and points out guiding principles and decisive trends of U.S. naval power.

From a German perspective, the United States remains an indispensable security guarantor and shaper of international order, bolstered by a strong military and a global presence. The Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, the current key German defense policy guideline, states that the engagement of the United States of America for the security of Europe, most visibly and effectively in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), remains of vital interest to Germany and its European allies. Thus follows the task and obligation to preserve the unique quality of transatlantic relations, to foster the connections and exchanges and, by way of a responsible division of labor, to further develop the partnership with the United States (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2011: 8). This fundamental security relationship is uninhibited by the current turmoil in transatlantic relations over intelligence collection and spying.

1.1 Outline
This study uses the concept of seapower as a framework to explain the military and political application of sea power and naval force for the United States of America. It will address the context in which strategy – and in particular U.S. Navy strategy – evolves. This has economic, military, constabulary, diplomatic, international and national dimensions. The war-fighting application of military might is but one optional employment, after all. Cropsey (2013: 34) points out that “Wide-ranging seapower is not so much an instrument of force – although that it is – as a condition of stable commerce, effective diplomacy, and regional influence.” Using the first iteration of “The Maritime Strategy” in 1982 and the publication of “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” in 2007 as cornerstones, this study shows how U.S. Navy
strategy was developed and framed in the international, domestic, and inner-service contexts. It will explain what drove and constrained U.S. Navy strategy. It will look at selected instances of where American sea power was directed in support of U.S. defense and security policy ends – and whether that could be tied to what a given strategy proposed. It will discuss if documents had lasting influences in the strategic mindset, the force structure, and other areas of American sea power. Problems associated with comparing documents of such significant levels of ambition notwithstanding, the study at hand also assesses the documents’ (relative) successes and shortcomings within the context of their time. As previously noted, this dissertation aspires to serve as a contribution to the deeper understanding of how U.S. Navy strategy evolved over the course of three decades.

First, to this end, after a review of existing literature and a description of the puzzle, it will discuss the theoretical foundations of seapower. Afterwards, this study embeds naval strategy in the setting of general U.S. policy. One cannot understand the role of the Navy in national policies without understanding that framework setting. In untangling the complex web of a bureaucracy, the study will shed a light on who (and what) makes and influences U.S. Navy strategy. This is ultimately desirable because there are still few monographs available which discuss the framework of seapower and strategy-making in the American context and which take a broader perspective. This study is a step toward narrowing that gap.

Second, the dissertation will explain the development of U.S. Navy strategy over the course of some three decades. In the 1980s, marked by the deepening of Cold War tensions just before the Warsaw Pact quickly and surprisingly crumbled, containing and deterring the Soviet Union was the dominant way of thinking. It led to a global, forward, offensive-minded strategy that confronted the Soviet Union, while the Navy as well as U.S. security policy as a whole was engaged in a number of limited wars. In the 1990s, the administrations of George H.W. Bush and William J. “Bill” Clinton sought to remake and redefine foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era. This not only sent the U.S. Navy scrambling to re-frame its narrative. An increasingly reluctant U.S. security policy met with the enduring hopes of an enlargement of the international democratic community. In the 2000s, after the turn-of-the-century terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States was faced with a growing number of international commitments intended to address old and new threats. A globalization of goods and services was flanked by a globalization (and renewed immediacy) of threats. The Navy, once again, had to position itself accordingly and provide options for U.S. leaders.
1.2 Research Design and Puzzle

A look at history reveals that the 1980s versions of “The Maritime Strategy” were the first *expressive verbis* strategic documents for the employment of naval forces since World War II. At the same time, the strategy cannot be seen as isolated from the developments of the 1970s which substantially contributed to its making. “The Maritime Strategy”, a document that went through a number of versions, thus provides a unique starting point without which the development of strategies in the 1990s and 2000s cannot be understood. The objective of this survey is the study of the *strategic* development of U.S. Navy strategy, and the broader application of sea power for U.S. national security interests, rather than of the development of a singular *strategy*, which would require a different methodology altogether.

This dissertation addresses the following issues as reflected by the U.S. Navy’s declaratory capstone strategies. Such is the five-fold research puzzle:

- How can seapower and sea power be analyzed in the American context?
- Which factors govern the utility of the Navy for U.S. foreign and security policy as a whole?
- What policies, programs, factors, and actors must be considered for each decade to arrive at a sound and highly diagnostic assessment regarding the evolution of documents and strategic concepts?
- How, where, and why was the U.S. Navy used between 1981 and 2011? Do these naval operations reflect well the naval missions which strategic documents prescribed?
- What recurring themes and lessons can be drawn from three decades of Navy strategy making and application of U.S. sea power?

Numerous dimensions of the subject matter – sea power theory and practice, tactics and operations, history, defense analysis, makers, and shapers – emerge at a closer look. At the end of the day, it is difficult to simply quantify the value of sea power for national security. A coherent, limiting research design is thus imperative in order to stay within the acceptable boundaries of a PhD thesis, while still arriving at a satisfying answer to the overarching research questions and a more qualified result.

First, the timeframe is large enough to allow a coherent analysis and pattern-seeking exercise for U.S. seapower and sea power. Second, it is within living memory of current theorists and practitioners. Source accessibility is favorable while an academic desideratum is still signifi-
cant. Third, research has demonstrated that enduring principles and conditions shape Navy strategic thinking and consecutive documents. It is thus prudent to consider a longer period of time. Fourth, and perhaps most important, the period contains reinvigorated Navy strategic statements in light of geopolitical shifts and changes, all with considerable scope and significance. Accordingly, this study goes beyond the isolated discussion of how the Navy developed and implemented one certain strategy. Instead, this dissertation takes the concept of seapower as a setting, explaining who (and what) makes, shapes, and factors in on American sea power and, consequently, on its Navy’s strategy. It will also spend time discerning the semantics, discussing the place of strategy in the larger framework of the state, and identifying differences and similarities in selected Navy capstone documents. That approach is embedded in a discussion of naval force theory, naval missions, and the particulars of the maritime domain.

Therefore, it is not a simple discourse analysis. Nor is it a re-telling akin to a popular history of how a certain strategy came about. Conscious of the historiographic task of political science and strategic studies, it relates pragmatically the Navy’s strategies to its strategic culture and to the political, strategic and military context at the time of publication. Spanning three decades of U.S. Navy strategy and the employment of naval forces for foreign and security policy means, it is also an analysis of the larger sea power theme in U.S. security policy, and the utility of naval forces as postulated in strategic documents and as underlined in selected operations.

The selection of the documents was guided by three principles:

(1) A desire to pick high-level documents (including the signatures of the Chief of Naval Operations and/or the Secretary of the Navy as the highest uniformed/civilian leaders of the service) that reflect strategies spanning the decade, respectively;

(2) Provision of some scope and sense where the Navy is coming from, where it found itself at certain times, and a postulation of where it was going;

7 The starting point in 1981 marks the beginning of the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The endpoint 2011 is selected as to allow an inclusion of the trajectory of the Barack Obama presidency. The analysis can thus touch upon U.S. (Navy) strategy on the eve of the U.S.-led (Navy/Marine Corps/Air Force) military operations against Libya in the context of the developing “Arab Spring”. 2011, in many respects a pivotal year in international relations, also saw the killing of Osama Bin-Laden (in May) a decade after 9/11, the death of North Korean dictator Kim Yong-II, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq (both in December) (Bruns 2012b).

8 Early in the selected timeframe, the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) established the national defense posture that is in essence still valid today, thus allowing analytical references to current events.
And finally, a workable indication of American sea power, as reflected in strategies and selected operations, for the timeframe 1981-2011.

For this, the dissertation rests on three major pillars. First, it unsurprisingly draws on the relevant literature and the available sources and documents. Second, it employs a number of partially standardized interviews with key senior decision-makers involved in making and executing Navy strategy between the 1981 and 2011. Third, the analysis draws substantially from the experiences of the author as the 2010/2011 German Marshall Fund of the United States/American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow in Washington, D.C. Beyond the usual exposure to the political and politicized environment of the capital, the fellowship allowed for authoritative insights into policy-making on Capitol Hill and the Pentagon. Serving Representative Todd Young (a Republican Party member from Indiana), a former naval officer and a member of the United State House Committee on Armed Services in the 112th Congress, the author was privileged to gain substantial experiences and insights into the ‘engine room’ of U.S. military and defense policy (and contribute in/participate in policy-making processes himself).

Supplemental input for the dissertation is drawn from the extensive familiarization with naval forces over the course of many years, specifically with the U.S. Navy, but also with the German Navy by providing numerous briefings, publications, and participating in relevant conferences and events. Aspects pertaining to the subject were presented to a larger public at academic conferences.

1.3 Survey of Relevant Literature and State of Subject Matter Research

Naval force and sea power have led to a considerable amount of studies and monographs. Journal essays, policy papers, conference reports, blog posts, and other publications complement the roster. However, very few of these take a closer look at the evolution of U.S. Navy

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9 These conversations were conducted in Washington, D.C., Arlington, VA, Norfolk, VA and Mons, Belgium, and were graciously supported by grants of the U.S. Department of Defense/Department of the Navy (Washington, D.C.) and the Michael-Freund-Gesellschaft (Kiel). Moreover, in two cases interviews were also facilitated via the online communication software Skype. A comprehensive list of interviewees can be found in the bibliography.

10 For a review of the fellowship, see Sebastian Bruns (2012a).

11 The selection by the German Navy Chief of Staff to participate in a naval exercise for civilians (including temporary promotion to O-3 equivalent, or Oberleutnant zur See) in October 2010 served as hands-on exposure to the inner workings of a naval force.

strategy and American sea power over a longer period of time. The correlation of strategy-making, force employment, ship-building, and the political context seems to escape students of U.S. defense policy and followers of the strategic studies discipline.

In fact, the U.S. Navy as a subject for political science research still enjoys a fairly subordinate place among those that seek to understand and explain the course of American defense policy. It is often overshadowed by studies that focus on the presidential or congressional levels of driving the country’s policies. Hundreds of essays and think tank papers constitute a canon of often heated debate, but there is a marked lack of monographs and studies written about the role of naval power in U.S. policy. This is remarkable given the availability of original documents – the U.S. strategies themselves – is broader than one would initially expect.

However, there is a lack of literature on the relationship among seapower/sea power, strategy, and politics. Many of the books that are available are military history works, many of which concentrate on selected issues in great detail. While some recount a history of a conflict or an individual admiral, others unfold detailed blueprints of weaponry and shipbuilding. Still others may offer thoughts and insights into the strategic value of naval force, and the costs and benefits that come with it, but remain abstract. Specifically for the U.S. Navy, one of the largest and most capable naval forces worldwide and part of the foreign policy and defense toolbox of the world's preeminent power, this is unsatisfactory.

It appears that this remarkable research gap has its roots in ‘sea blindness,’ or the inability in large parts of a population to appreciate the value and use of naval forces. Consequently, few resources are devoted to the research and study of a field that demands a better understanding. One need not call upon today’s standard claim that 90% of world trade travels by sea, 80% of the world’s population lives at or within a reaching distance to the sea, and 70% of the globe is covered with water. It is the influence that navies – especially the U.S. Navy – have attempted to provide to political decision-makers throughout history that warrants a naval focus.

‘Sea blindness’ and methodological challenges of analyzing naval force efficiency and effectiveness had discouraging effects on the study of the U.S. Navy. That is certainly the case

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13 The question of how to best analyze a naval force or, more broadly, sea power, is subject to debate. While operational analysis, quantitative and qualitative approaches, systems analysis and historical study all have their merits, methods to determine the relative strategic effectiveness of sea power and the successes and shortcomings of navies are hard to come by. As a consequence, much interest has been raised by the metric of counting ships and other assets in an effort to bolster an argument with facts. Such qualitative schools of thought can have very real political ramifications as they can easily mislead by taking numbers (such as fleet inventory) as the sole
for Germany, one of the United States’ most important NATO allies, in the Cold War a country sorely dependent on safe and reliable sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the event of conflict. Nowadays a nation that engages on the Seven Seas and heralds upholding maritime security as an important policy goal, the small community of strategists and historians has largely navigated around tackling the multifaceted area of the study of naval force in general and the U.S. Navy in particular. Therefore, it is disappointing but hardly surprising that, for example, Eckardt Opitz’s edition Seestrategische Konzepte vom kaiserlichen Weltmachstreiben zu Out-of-Area-Einsätzen der Deutschen Marine (2004) contains six essays on naval strategic thinking in selected foreign navies, but a chapter on the U.S. Navy is noticeably absent.

More dramatically, the long-term analysis of U.S. Navy strategy also has not been a favorite subject among people in the Anglo-American academy, save for a handful of scholars. The reasons for this can only be speculative at best. A degree of ‘sea blindness’ coupled with a reluctance of outside researchers to embark upon the somewhat sealed issues of the military (and in particular a service that is out at sea and thus often out of sight) certainly cannot be ruled out. The complexities of foreign and security policy may also discourage some from tackling such a subject. The vast array of institutions involved, policy subjects to consider, and defense/military fields to cover render it difficult to keep track of dynamics.

Given such assumptions, it is hardly surprising that the first structured analysis of U.S. Navy strategy development was not developed in the U.S. until recently. Peter Swartz, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), circulated the first iterations of a voluminous slideshow on U.S. Navy capstone strategies and concepts from 2005. In preparation for what would become “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, the Navy tasked the CNA with an overview study of heritage capstone documents. There simply had not been a concerted analysis of previous U.S. Navy strategies over the long haul. The study, to which this author was fortunate to provide some minor input, went through several iterations between 2005 and 2011. The unclassified brief eventually morphed into a multivolume slideshow backgrounder – still not a monograph – that was made available to the public via the CNA’s website. These briefings motivated and influenced the dissertation at hand, including framing of its research question

determinants of effective sea power. A future collection of the range of methodologies for the particular field of measuring navies’ effects, perhaps in form of a handbook, is therefore highly desirable (for sample discussions, see Vego 2011, Hooper 2013, and Holmes 2014).

The author provided comments from a German perspective on earlier iterations of the draft study. His input is acknowledged in the final product (Swartz 2011b: 107, slide 213). This dissertation is mentioned as a work-in-progress on the base of the final CNA product (ibid: 8, slide 16).
(although Swartz also is a ‘crown witness’ because of his leading role in the drafting of the earlier versions of “The Maritime Strategy” while still on active Navy duty).

Broadly speaking, there are at least seven categories of relevant academic books and scientific articles from the field of social sciences that are relevant to this work. Although some of them predate or go beyond the timeframe of interest, and in some cases, even beyond the particular concentration on the U.S. Navy itself, they have been of value to familiarize with the issues at hand and given some of the enduring trends and certain universal principles of seapower. The selection of works as well as their categorization is obviously subjective. The following section would turn into a full-fledged annotated bibliography, if one would also include analyses of the overarching national security and defense guiding documents (insofar as they are unclassified and related to the research interest of this dissertation). The seemingly endless stream of policy papers, think tank publications, and source material from inside and sometimes outside the Beltway and (since the mid-2000s) authoritative military blogs is complemented by the academic journals and magazines from the United States and abroad, which also cover aspects of interest to this dissertation. Therefore, the

16 Due to a “revenge of geography”, as Robert Kaplan would perhaps so gallantly put it, this dissertation principally rests on English- and German-language sources, both due to the complexity of the subject and for the simple derivation of the transatlantic area of interest and this author’s background. As such, it is also a “revenge of culture” in that there is no use of – potentially available, but impossible to comprehend – i.e. Japanese, Russian or Chinese original material.
17 Examples include the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), the National Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the National Defense Strategy. Further intelligence can be gathered from secondary documents and open-source publications such as the annual Navy Program Guide, and semi-official statements of purpose such as Congressional testimony, speeches, or publications by the independent, but pro-service Navy League of the United States organization.
18 The highway which circumcises the capital of the United States has become synonymous with all things political in America. Among the most naval-force minded public institutions in the larger Washington, D.C. area are the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Alexandria, Virginia; the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.; the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS), Washington, D.C.; the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.; the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Washington, D.C; the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), Washington, D.C. On Capitol Hill, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), as independent research organizations, substantially support many policy decisions by the Congressional committees in charge of naval and maritime affairs. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), New York City, New York, and the U.S. Naval War College (USNWC) in Newport, Rhode Island reside outside the Beltway. The online think tank Stratfor can be considered an example of a virtual security and military think tank, with a special focus on strategic issues. Beyond the German-American realm, one needs to consider the work of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College (London), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) - most notably for their regular publications on “The Military Balance”, and various other think tanks, university research institutes, and public analyses institutions. The list is not exhaustive, and it must be cautioned that some of these analyses are ‘politicalized’ rather than academically-motivated.
19 Among the most professional naval-force minded military blogs with discussions of U.S. Navy strategy etc. are InformationDissemination.com, the U.S. Naval Institute’s blog, Steeljawscribe, and James Holmes’ The Naval Diplomat. Among the journals and professional magazines consulted in the course of this study were U.S.
following literature review can merely serve as a starting point. The existing literature can be grouped into works on naval strategy theory, highly-encyclopedia naval platforms and weapons books, literature on naval strategic culture, areas of operations, naval wars and conflicts, biographies of senior leaders, and actual U.S. Navy strategy analysis (of concepts, documents, and development).

Inevitably, the seminal theoretical works by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett must be included in any consideration of the subject of Navy and naval strategy.20 Naval force strategic theory from the era of the World Wars is useful for context of this work, as is the substantial mid-Cold War literature on the issue.21 An indispensable resource on the relationship between naval forces and foreign policy, even 35 years after publication, remains Ken Booth’s Navies and Foreign Policy (1979), in which the author highlights the specific uses of naval forces to attain foreign policy ends. Paul Ryan, in First Line of Defense – The U.S. Navy Since 1945 (1981), provided an important analytical stepping stone for the relationship between the state and the sea service from an American perspective. In 1974, Dieter Mahncke and Hans-Peter Schwarz edited a comprehensive book on Seemacht und Aussenpolitik for the relationship between sea power and foreign policy from a German perspective.22

With the advent of “The Maritime Strategy” and due to a growing concern over the Cold War, the 1980s witnessed a more intensive debate over the role of naval forces and their application. For example, Colin Gray submitted his analysis in Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and

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20 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890/1892) – the German translation of which, Der Einfluß der Seemacht auf die Geschichte 1660-1812 (1967), edited by Gustav-Adolf Wolter, was used primarily in preparation for this dissertation – and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911) are the starting point for anyone who aspires to understand the relevant theoretical roles, missions and functions of naval forces in a political and strategic context. However, as has been remarked, “If theory won battles, theory would be a state secret” (Hughes 2000: 244).

21 See Bernard Brodie (1941, 1943), L.W. Martin (1967), and Liddell Hart (1967). More contemporary, Sergej Gorshkov’s The Sea Power of the State (1976) was a much-read book in which the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy detailed Moscow’s strategic understanding and aspirations of using the sea for military purpose. For an exemplary Western view of the Soviet Navy, one and a half decades on, see Geoffrey Till/Bryan Ranft (1989).

22 The contributions sketch the significance of naval forces in the strategic thinking after World War II and the Cold War roles and missions, and the elements of sea power and maritime force. Other essays discuss legal problems and economic expenditures as well as rising technological trends. The nexus of naval forces and air forces is also under review. A third section of the book deals with selected fleets and relevant operating areas, while the final chapter looks at sea power as a foreign policy tool. Naturally, at the time of publication, the strategic setting decisively influenced the approach that this book took. It is NATO-centric and thus also covers some aspects of the U.S. Navy, especially regarding the conflict with the Soviet Union. What makes it noteworthy are the theoretical discussion of the role of naval forces for foreign policy objectives – and the fact that it would remain the only German-language book of its scope for more than three decades.
the Defense of the West (1986). Eric Grove’s The Future of Sea Power (1990) was the first sea power book to be published after the fall of the Berlin Wall and amidst the thawing superpower conflict. The British naval historian eloquently weaved considerations of sea power in the modern world with thoughts on maritime strategy, the use of the sea as an economic and military medium, and the evolving technological, political, and legal environments to entertain a good, forward-looking sea power concept. Its complementary piece, Colin Gray’s The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power (1994), was the first to present a comprehensive post-Cold War strategic usage of sea power and naval forces in book form. His deliberations on the utility of maritime power not versus land (and air) power, but complementary to it, remain very convincing.

A superb resource continues to be Globalization and Maritime Power (2002a), edited by Sam Tangredi. The essays contained within touch on a vast number of subjects of the 21st century with maritime dimensions such as the emerging security environment (Thachuk/Tangredi 2002, Bowdish 2002), the nexus of economic issues and maritime strategy (Looney 2002, Coulter 2002), legal problems (Moran 2002, Kugler 2002), naval operations (Holland 2002, Friedman/O’Brasky/Tangredi 2002, Mattonen 2002), and force structure (Binnendijk/Stewart 2002, Gaffney 2002). This survey of politics, economics, strategy and naval operations in an age of globalization has lost little of its instructiveness even if the economic and political integration of the globe has accelerated dramatically. A good theoretical discussion of strategy in the present-day context can be found in Strategy in the Contemporary World (4th edition, 2013), edited by John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin Gray (this study largely draws on the 3rd edition, which was published in 2010). John Mearsheimer’s concept of offshore balancing, as

23 An illustrative example from the German perspective for the time is Der Einsatz von Seestreitkräften im Dienst der Auswärtigen Politik (1983). It contains the presentations from the venerable Historisch-Taktische Tagung der Flotte 1981, and is useful for two chapters on the interdependency of naval forces and foreign policy, by Lennart Souchon and Wilfried Hofmann, respectively. One of the last enduring works on naval strategy in German is from 1999, namely the collection of essays entitled Seemacht und Seestrategie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (edited by Jörg Duppler and the Military History Research Institute). For this study, Duppler’s own contribution Seemacht, Seestrategie, Seeherrschaft on the theory of seapower and maritime might, and Geoffrey Till’s Die Ursprünge des maritimen Verhaltens der Großmächte: Die Zeit des Kalten Kriegs und die Jahre danach on the interplay of naval forces and their operational and political environment in light of short-term and long-term factors governing naval strategy decision-making and force employment were instructive.

24 Two years prior to that, Gray published The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (1992), a much more historically minted overview of the use of naval forces in armed conflicts, from the age of galley warfare to the nuclear age.

25 Very helpful contemporary handbooks on the practical application of strategic theory are John Collins’ highly recommendable books Military Geography for Professionals and the Public (1998) and Military Strategy. Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives (2002). Whereas the former one discusses geographic features of the global terrain and sheds some light on the political and military ramifications — certainly important in the formulation process and subsequent application of strategy — the latter gives a very good overview of the framework of military strategy in a state and the relevant fundamentals.
outlined in his 2001 book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (along with the essays by Samuel Huntington [1954] and Barry Posen [2003])\(^\text{26}\) constitute the basis of contemporary maritime theory (Scholik 2013: 142). To date, the indispensable resource on seapower is Geoffrey Till’s remarkable *Seapower – A Guide for the 21st Century* (now in its 3rd edition, 2013). Till’s extremely captivating and insightful book, developed from previous works of a similar thrust, is the standard work on the application of sea power in the course of modern history and contemporary maritime strategy. Very recent additions to the literature include Christian Le Miére’s *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century; Twenty-First Century Seapower. Cooperation and Conflict at Sea*, edited by Peter Dutton, Robert Ross, and Øystein Tunsjø; and Ian Speller’s *Understanding Naval Warfare* (all 2014). In 2015, a handbook of naval strategy and security for the 21st century will be published by Joachim Krause and the author of this study.

Nevertheless, it appears that the technological scope of naval platforms and weaponry has fascinated far more authors. For a very substantial discussion of modern warships, their tasks and technological developments in platforms, weaponry, propulsion, sensors and tactics, and survivability, as of the early 1980s, Norman Friedman’s *Warships* remains one of the better sources.\(^\text{27}\) It is quite striking that one of the most detailed and comprehensive reviews of American warships and systems comes from the late German U.S. Navy specialist Stefan Terzibaschitsch.\(^\text{28}\) A more contemporary and up-to-date version is Paul Silverstone’s *The Navy of the Nuclear Age 1947-2007* (2009). As opposed to many of his counterparts, Silverstone does not attempt to keep the ship register up to minute detail. That is often an effort quickly doomed to fail given the rapid changes in the inventory of the U.S. Navy. Procurement and decommissioning of individual units and whole classes render such a ship-counting exercise

\(^{26}\) Barry Posen’s Article *Command of the Commons* is a groundbreaking analysis (2003) on the military foundations of U.S. hegemony. Samuel Huntington’s 1954 landmark article *National Policy and the Trans-Oceanic Navy*, published in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings. Huntington, who would much later coin the idea of a “clash of civilizations”, described the key elements defining an armed branch of the military. According to Huntington, “a military service may be viewed as consisting of [1] a strategic concept which defines the role of the service in national policy, [2] public support which furnishes it with the resources to perform this role, and [3] organizational structure which groups the resources so as to implement most effectively the strategic concept” (Huntington 1954; emphasis added). These three aspects ring true until today and also inform the approach that this dissertation is taking.

\(^{27}\) The German translation, *Seerüstung heute. Entwurf und Konzeption moderner Kriegsschiffe* published in 1981 was used for the purpose of this dissertation.

\(^{28}\) With their impressive attention to detail, his works, although outdated by now, are a valuable starting point for anyone wishing to involved themselves in the matters of the U.S. Navy. His books *Seemacht USA. Rüstung, Organisation, Dislozierung, Entwicklung* (2 volumes, 1981/1997), *Kampfsysteme der U.S. Navy. Waffen und Elektronik auf amerikanischen Kriegsschiffen* (2001) and *Die Schiffe der U.S. Navy* (2002) provide unique coverage of U.S. Navy platforms, systems and organizational structures. Regrettably, they shy away from any discussions of the strategic or larger political dimension of the Navy’s role for the United States.
out-of-date within a couple of years. Silverstone therefore takes five decades as a whole when
providing his comprehensive data on warship life cycles.29 Seapower by John Gresham and
Ian Westwell (2008) is another richly-illustrated reference book that weds details on platforms
with high-resolution photographs. For naval weapons systems, see Norman Friedman’s The
for data on all of the inventory of the U.S. Navy remain the voluminous The Naval Institute
Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet by Norman Polmar, now in its 19th edition
(2013), and Eric Wertheim’s The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Ships of the World, 16th
dition (2013).30

Although only of peripheral concern to this dissertation, tactical and operational issues de-
serve mentioning because they are instrumental for an understanding of the relationship be-
tween the different levels of warfare at sea; the symbiotic association with the constraints and
opportunities of policy; and, the latter’s implications for naval strategy and operations.31 An
instructive book on the particulars of the strategic culture of a Navy and the ramifications for
thinking about the employment and strategic role of a naval force is Roger Barnett’s Navy

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29 The indispensable source for the current state of naval forces is Jane’s Fighting Ships. It analyses current
trends and developments in the international navies, and review fleet strengths and technological innovation. The
IISS Military Balance, drawing from comprehensive sources, outlines snap-shots of the numerical strengths of
the U.S. Navy and practically all other naval forces worldwide. The website of the U.S. Navy is a secondary
source, along with the listings of the Navy History and Historical Command.

30 A separate sub-category within this field contains works on specific platforms, most prominently the aircraft
carrier, of which the U.S. Navy operates the most units worldwide. It appears that the focus on the aircraft carrier
in many publications reflects the rise of this type of warship to be the largest and most visible combatant plat-
form, relieving the battleship and its associated representation in the academic literature. Examples of these less
academically inspired, but often very insightful works include Stefan Terzisbatschits’s comprehensive
Flugzeugträger der U.S. Navy/Flottenflugzeugträger und Geleitflugzeugträger (1999), famed novelist Tom
Clancy’s descriptive work Carrier: A Guided Tour of An Aircraft Carrier (1999), David Jordan’s
Flugzeugträger. Von den Anfängen bis heute (2002), and Björn Trotzki’s Carrier Power (2013). The aircraft
carrier has certainly also been subject to more detailed academic studies which also make note of the political
value of such a platform; examples include Jacquelyn Davis’ Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in
the Twenty-First Century (1993) and, as a recent example from the University of Kiel, Tore Wethling’s Die
Transformation der Rolle von Flugzeugträgern in der U.S. Navy (2012). Often, the detailed discussion of the
aircraft of the U.S. Navy inventory has also been subject of these works. It should be noted that other platforms
of the U.S. Navy – such as cruisers or submarines – have led to books on these kinds of warships as well. Exam-
les include Submarines of the US Navy (1991), Die letzten Giganten der Meere. Die Schlachtschiffe der IOWA-
Klasse (1996), Zerstörer der U.S. Navy. Von der Farragut- bis zur Forrest Sherman-Klasse (1998b) and Kreuzer
der U.S. Navy. Von der OMAHA-Klasse bis zur LONG BEACH (1998a) by Stefan Terzisbatschitsch, and William
example, is a forthcoming Naval War College book on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

31 Representative works include Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (2nd edition, 2000) by Waynes Hughes and
Command At Sea (5th edition, 1998) by William Mack and James Stavridis. The former sheds some light on the
relationship of tactics and missions to strategy: after all, tactics are what young sailors are taught (Hughes 2000:
xvii), and in contrast to dramatic changes in policy and strategy, tactics did not change as much over history
(Hughes 2000: 3). Milan Vego sought to further the understanding of the fundamentals of naval warfare in his
2009 book Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice. For a general introduction on characteristics and
types of naval operations, decision making and planning as well as operational design, ideas and their subse-
tequent execution, see Milan Vego’s Major Naval Operations (2008).

An attempt to discern the strategic relevance of naval forces in a particular region would highlight the need to look at certain areas of operations, conflicts and wars, or perhaps operational or political challenge, the use of a certain task group/force (or any larger accumulation of warships), or even down to an individual ship or unit. Unfortunately, many of these lack a broader discussion connecting American strategic interests and U.S. Navy strategy in a given theater of operations. One book that focuses the perspective on the implications of naval strategy on operations in shallow or confined seas is Milan Vego’s Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas, currently in its 2nd edition (2003). Naturally, the concurrent areas of interest for the U.S. Navy – the Pacific, the Persian Gulf – draw a significant amount of academic attention. In the fall of 2014, a forthcoming book by Heinz Dieter Jopp on Maritime

32 The otherwise instructive book, which also details the Maritime Strategy of 1986, unfortunately closes on a reactionary note when the author denies the integration of women and homosexuals in the Navy, partially on biological grounds. Therefore, Barnett’s article sans that twist, Strategic Culture and Its Relationship to Naval Strategy, published in the Naval War College Review in 2007, is also to be recommended.

33 For the German perspective, Wolfram Höpker surveyed the South Atlantic as an area of operations in light of U.S. interests and the aftermath of the Falklands War 1982, in Südatlantik. Machtvakuum der Weltpolitik (1983). Soon thereafter, for the German market, this was complemented by a collection of essays on another area of naval operations: Nordeuropa. Ausfalltor der Sowjetunion zu den Welmeeren (1985), and the proceedings of a conference on Seemacht Sowjetunion (1986), the major antagonist of the U.S. Navy and its allies at the time. These works would remain to be the among the last German-language books on contemporary naval operations for quite some time, perhaps until Nikolaus Scholik’s 2011 doctoral thesis on the geostrategic and geopolitical relevance of maritime choke points, Zur geopolitisch-geostrategischen Bedeutung von Seeweiten: Die Strassen von Hormuz, Malakka und die Nordwestpassage. A broader cultural and historical look at the Indian Ocean as an area of interest for the United States is Robert Kaplan’s Monsoon. The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (2010)

34 The widely-perceived rise of the asymmetric threats in recent years – piracy, maritime terrorism, etc. – has led to some publications on these subjects (examples include Martin Murphy’s instrumental book on maritime threats, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World [2008] or Daniel Sekulich’s more popular Terror of the Seas. True Tales of Modern Day Pirates [2009]. Stefan Eklof’s Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders is a good introduction to maritime organized crime from the 1970s to the 1990s). Unfortunately, they also lack any discussion on how these phenomena are related to U.S. Navy strategy, and what naval forces specifically can do to counter such threats.

Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert (another much-desired addition to the German-language literature on strategic maritime studies) will shed some light on worldwide case studies again.\footnote{This author’s contribution Der Atlantik: Vom strategischen Schachbrett des Kalten Krieges zur Prototyp-Region für postmoderne maritime Sicherheit will be found within.} Perhaps the best starting point for a comprehensive overview of the use of naval forces (U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps) in the realm of crisis response in the Cold War era is Adam Siegel’s 1991 study on the subject, The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era. U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990. Particular to our timeframe of interest, and more relevant, is Eugene Cobble’s, Hank Gaffney’s and Dimitri Gorenburg’s For the Records: All U.S. Forces Responses to Situations, 1970-2000 (with additions covering 2000-2003), a study from the year 2005.\footnote{For a German perspective on the state and strategy of the U.S. Navy, see Bruns (2013a).} The particulars of an expeditionary-minded military that includes forward-stationed warships have, to date, warranted two official histories on the 5th Fleet (Robert Schneller’s Anchor of Resolve. A History of U.S. Naval Force Central Command/Fifth Fleet, 2007) and 7th Fleet (Ed Marolda’s Ready Seapower. A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, 2012). A third volume on the 6th Fleet – also by Bob Schneller – is a work in progress and is slated to be published soon.

The highest decision-making level of government is a traditional focus area of analysis for many policy researchers. Consequently, biographies, autobiographies and other studies about American presidents and their tenures abound. These can be helpful to support the argument that Navy strategy does not happen in a vacuum. Instead, it is shaped and often fundamentally driven by a president’s explicit and implicit policies.\footnote{The presidents Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have been subject to numerous biographies. They have also written down their own experiences, published their papers, or provided other memoirs after they left office. It was especially the presidency that, in the post-Cold War world, has attracted through literary interest. Many autobiographies are self-serving and omit details while over-stating others. This is not to say that biographies by third persons would not sometimes suffer from similar biases, although they provide valuable insight into processes. Note the interviews-based works of Bob Woodward on the decision-making processes of the George W. Bush administration regarding the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq: Bush at War (2002), Plan of Attack (2004), and The War Within (2008). Woodward, a prolific author, has also written on the Obama administration in Obama’s Wars (2010).} Additionally, many other leaders have published memoirs, which, as all such recollections, should be taken with professional distance by the analyst.\footnote{Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s On Watch (1976) was the last memoir a Chief of Naval Operations penned to date (a more recent biography is Larry Berman ((2012)), Zumwalt: The Life and Times of Admiral Elmo Russell “Bud” Zumwalt, Jr.). James Holloway’s Aircraft Carriers at War (2007) contains some autobiographical aspects on his time as CNO. Hyman G. Rickover, one of the most opalescent admirals of the Navy, was subject to at least one full-length biography by Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover. Controversy and Genius (1981). The only recent Secretary of the Navy to write a memoir is John Lehman (2001). Secretaries of Defense to reflect on their tenures (from the time of interest to this study) with full autobiographies/memoirs include Casper Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (1990), Dick Cheney, In My Time (2011), Don-}
histories stem from the lack of accessible and diverse sources. Understandably so, because much of the material that they are interested might still be held in a classified status and/or the individuals involved are still in around. That has not discouraged some authors from compiling histories that touch on contemporary issues, e.g. the voluminous Seemacht edited by Admiral (ret.) Chester Nimitz and E.B. Potter (1982), first published as Sea Power in 1960 (although it arguably is a comprehensive history of sea power and naturally covers contemporary issues towards the end), and the more recent encyclopedic volume Weltgeschichte der Seefahrt - Seeherrschaft III, Seekriege und Seepolitik von 1914 bis 2006 by Helmut Pemsel, an Austrian author (2006). Instrumental U.S. Navy histories for this dissertation were Robert Love’s two-volume of History of the U.S. Navy (1992), covering 1942 through 1991, respectively, George Baer’s indispensable One Hundred Years of Seapower. The U.S. Navy 1890-1990 (1996), and the more encyclopedic U.S. Navy. A Complete History by M. Hill Goodspeed (2003). On the particulars of the 1980s, see Frederic Hartmann’s Naval Renaissance. The U.S. Navy in the 1980’s (1990). On the history of the U.S. Navy in a theatre over a longer period of time within the larger political confrontation – namely against Iran – see David Crist’s critically acclaimed The Twilight War. The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (2012).40


Hattendorf’s 2004 book also contains a very insightful discussion of the text-book processes of Navy strategy-making.

Until now, only a handful of books have been written on the strategic development of U.S. naval power application. Remarkably, two of these works were written by German scholars. On is Wilfried Stallmann’s doctoral dissertation *Die maritime Strategie der USA nach 1945: Entwicklung, Einflußgrößen und Auswirkungen auf das atlantische Bündnis* (2000).\(^{43}\) Another study on U.S. seapower and naval arms control is *Amerikanische Seemachtspolitik und maritime Rüstungskontrolle unter Carter und Reagan* (1990) by Peter Rudolf.\(^{44}\) This dissertation is the third study on U.S. Navy strategy by a German scholar.

Finally, at the heart of the resource canon for this study is not a book, but rather a comprehensive output by the think tank Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). The works of Peter Swartz on U.S. Navy capstone documents and strategies emitted from an internal U.S. Navy strategy workshop in 2005. The original request to analyze three strategies (“The Maritime Strategy”, “… From the Sea”, and “Forward… From the Sea”) soon morphed into a multi-volume slideshow, “the lingua franca of the practicing US Navy strategy and policy community, and those who support & comment on US Navy policy & strategy” (Swartz 2011b: 12, slide 23).

The compilation pointed out that much work would have to be done around this framework to strengthen the understanding of the development of U.S. Navy strategy and to provide academic and scientific analyses for the broader strategic studies and political science communities. Aside from influencing the genesis of this dissertation and informing its contents, the Swartz Reports have thus far spawned three other PhD dissertations:\(^{45}\)

- Larissa Forster from Switzerland published her empirical thesis on *Seaborne Crisis Response* in 2013;\(^{46}\)
- Peter Haynes’ dissertation *American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence of a Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007* was also published

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\(^{43}\)Stallmann’s study, which partially overlaps with the timeframe of this dissertation but otherwise focuses strongly on the NATO context, was never published as a book. It thus provides an instructive example of “sea blindness” in Germany. The author of this study wishes to acknowledge the support that Dr. Stallmann provided in obtaining a digital copy of the manuscript.

\(^{44}\)The author looks at the Presidential administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and their arms-control efforts. In order to arrive at an understanding “The Maritime Strategy”, Rudolf uses a comprehensive model similar to this study, although his professional background is more in the peace and conflict studies sub-section of Political Science. Just as his book was published, the Cold War was ending, with the U.S. Navy coming out of the superpower confrontation. Its timely focus and its methodological approach make the study very worthwhile.

\(^{45}\)It should be noted that, to the knowledge of this author, these four remain the only contemporary academic books at post-graduate level on the subject of contemporary U.S. Navy strategy.

\(^{46}\)See also Forster’s article *Trust Cannot Be Surged. Challenges to Naval Forward Presence* (2011).
in 2013, but focuses strongly on intellectual processes and the development of ideas inside the service (as an active Captain of the U.S. Navy, Hanyes is a crown witness to these processes).\textsuperscript{47}

- Amund Lundesgaard from Norway will submit his thesis on U.S. Navy strategy in 2015 (with a focus on the force structure of the service), tentatively.\textsuperscript{48}

This goes to show that the emerging research on the subject matter at hand complements each other and the complexity of the subject offers complimentary perspectives and methodological approaches.

1.4 Limits and Constraints of this Study

This dissertation, as previously noted, is submitted in the field of political science. More precisely, it is a contribution to the sub-discipline of strategic studies. Strategic studies are less concerned with fundamental research but rather focus on trends and developments in a policy-prescriptive, hands-on, and operational manner. Thus, the study also includes aspects of neighboring disciplines such as military history, geography, and cultural studies. In using some methods from those fields, it employs an interdisciplinary approach designed to allow more than a strictly theoretical debate that is so often an end in itself in the social sciences. While such a marching direction does in part reflect the author’s academic background, this dissertation should not be confused with an original study in military history.

First, with the understanding of being a ground-breaking work, this study must show the broad scope and application of sea power in a U.S. context in order to underline the role of the Navy in U.S. foreign and security policy. This is the desirable original contribution to the strategic studies.

Second, returning to the problem of semantics discussed earlier, the study must define carefully what is actually meant by the term (Navy/ naval/maritime) strategy. Even cursory research shows that the “U.S. Navy [is] never rigorous in its approach to policy/strategy/concepts terminology. Definitions [are] considered dull, unimportant [and] individual idiosyncratic approached abound (and change over time)” (Swartz 2011b: 23, slide 45). The Navy has referred to its capstone documents – and in fact labeled them as – white papers, doctrines, concepts, strategic concepts, concepts of naval operations (CONOPS), principles, missions, strategic plans, and simply strategies. Some were capitalized, others not. Some

\textsuperscript{47} The study was distributed widely via e-mail. This author holds a copy.

\textsuperscript{48} See also Lundesgaard’s essay US Navy strategy and force structure after the Cold War (2011).
played with ellipses, others were bureaucratic acronym behemoths. Clearly, there is more in strategy than a simple branding suggests.

Third, there must be an appreciation as part of this study as to what the original sources can supply in meaningfulness, and where they perhaps fall short in the overall assessment of sea power application and Navy success. Determining such – relative – value of one U.S. Navy document over another can be undertaken, for instance, through the prism of their alignment with national policies and Navy strategic culture, sustained convincing of political appropriators, and persuasiveness of friends, allies, and potential adversaries. Such comparisons come at a high price because a strict comparison will hardly yield more resilient results. Quantifying capstone documents, at the end of the day, remains speculative at best. Ultimately, only qualified general statements of a document’s prevailing impact can be derived in order to describe emerging patterns. Therefore, the study aims at identifying recurring themes and processes in U.S. Navy strategy and strategic sea power application rather than comparing individual capstone documents with each other.

Last but not least: As an analysis of a subject with expansive U.S. national security ramifications, this study can only draw upon such material that was unclassified and openly accessible at the time of writing. Accordingly, findings and policy recommendations of this study need to be seen in light of those constraints.
2 Political and Military Power by Sea

2.1 The Sea

The sea is a central determinant in human development. For one, it is an indispensable source of food and nutrition. Seafood and desalinated water can provide against malnutrition, hunger, and thirst. More importantly, the sea serves as a trade route for businesses and the fostering of relationships with other peoples. It is an area for the exploitation of resources, a site for recreation and tourism, a medium of political dominion, and an area for the exchange of information. It is also a formidable element and a potentially life-threatening force of nature that man has attempted to conquer and command for larger political and economic rationales.

Seafaring and the capability of using the sea for political purposes have influenced world history decisively. Examples for these civilizing developments can be found in the days of the Roman Empire and Athens, in Mediterranean Venice, or the Hanseatic League in northern Europe. The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and certainly Great Britain are more contemporary examples that global political aspirations – or Weltpolitik – and the quest for power status go hand in hand with oceanic command and the control of the seas. In any larger regional, and certainly any global struggle for power, command of the seas played a vital role (Wegener 1974: 37).

If it holds true that “seapower is the product of an amalgam of interconnected constituents that are difficult to tease apart” and “these constituents are attributes of countries that make it easier or harder for them to be strong at sea” (Till 2009: 83), then it behooves to also look at these components and the actual use and usage of the sea for political purposes. The sea as a domain of defense and security is of substantial strategic importance, when one or more parties to a conflict rely on the uninhibited use of the sea lanes for transportation, provision of troops and equipment, or desire maritime resources. Command and control of the maritime arena are also of significance to deter land powers. The appreciation for one’s own dependence on the uninhibited use of the sea must never be lost (McDonald 1984: 62). According to Eric Grove, one can distinguish a military, a diplomatic, and a constabulary role for the use of the maritime domain.49

49 Grove’s assessment builds on the analysis by Ken Booth on the role of naval forces in foreign policy, where the latter designed a similar, albeit less ambitious triangle (Booth 1979: 16).
Illustration 1: The ‘use of the sea’ triangle (Grove 1990: 234).

There are three principal security-political uses of the sea. The military use includes the projection of power ashore, sea control, and sea denial. The diplomatic use includes showing of the flag and various forms of gunboat diplomacy. The constabulary use includes maintenance of sovereignty and good order, safeguarding of national resources, and peacekeeping. Navies principally have the largest role in all of these, although coast guards, state-owned civilian-crewed vessels, harbor police units, and other institutions can use the sea (in particular in a diplomatic or constabulary role) as well. How does the United States, as an heir to the sea powers of the past (Nimitz 1982: xiii), thus stand in this line, using the sea for the roles outlined here?

2.2 Seapower & Sea Power

For reasons of their physical topography and political geography, most states in most eras of their history have either displayed a clearly continental or decisively maritime imprint of their strategic posture and culture (Gray 1992: 2). In all major conflicts and wars that were not exclusively fought by land powers, sea power played a role in various stages, albeit to differing degrees (Scholik 2011: 91).

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50 Even non-state navies such as the Sea Tigers (the naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam during the Sri Lankan civil war), Greenpeace, and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (a militant marine conservation organization) can use the sea utilize the roles of the sea within their means.
For a state, the utilization of the sea for political purposes is an incentive for seeking prosperity and the preservation of the integrity of the sovereign (this can certainly stem from a significant dilemma such as the dependence on functioning maritime trade in the face of a lack of indigenous resources). In other words, a government can purposely execute maritime might to consolidate power and seek to embellish it on a grander scale. It must be made clear that as a concept, it is something that particular countries have. Therefore, sea power (two words) is to be understood as a functional application of power at, from, above, or across the sea. A seapower (one word) is a maritime-minded institution (a nation-state) with a given number of prerequisites to exercise sea power successfully toward larger objectives: “‘Seapower’ […] is something that particular countries, or sea powers, have” (Till 2009: 21). The U.S. is arguably a seapower in the systemic and institutional understanding of the term (as will be further discussed in chapter 7), and it certainly fields sea power. The classic application of sea power is a military one (Wegener 1974: 25). The use of military might is usually for one, or a combination, of three political ends: deterrence, coercion, and defense. If military power is employed against a state or a non-state actor, a state does so because it seeks to prevent that adversary from doing something (deter it), to force that adversary to change its behavior (coerce or compel it), or to protect itself against some harmful action that the adversary threatens or has taken (defend itself) (Art 2003: 4-5).

2.3 Theories on Sea Power

To the Greek philosopher Thucydides (c. 460-c. 395 BC), whose writings on the Peloponnesian War addressed guarding maritime trade to foster security and prosperity, sea power provided an indispensable guarantee for the achievements of political objectives in war (Duppler 1999: 14-15). This held true as long as certain geographic criteria were given or could be turned to one’s favor using available means. Thucydides meritoriously also underscored that neither sea power nor seapower could not be improvised, but had to be masterfully crafted and continuously developed in order to serve the varying needs of a state in the different stages of peace, crisis, and war (ibid.: 15). In other words, a seapower is not a disembodied concentration of armed vessels, intelligence, communication, or related competencies to launch and sustain great fleets. In fact, it resembles a living and breathing organism empowered by commerce, animated by a substantial merchant fleet, in possession of bases, and fortified by naval power (Cropsey 2013: 168-169).
A crucial differentiation of such ideas on the level of the state did not occur until the theoretical reflections of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) at the end of the 19th century. Mahan, a Navy captain at the time who later rose to Rear Admiral, provided a vindication of the utility of sea power for future grand strategic applications of such might (Scholik 2011: 91-92). Mahan, according to one of his biographers not a military strategist or navalist in any sense of the word, but rather a world politics analyst and historically-minded strategy theorist (Schössler 2009: 495), laid the foundation for naval force application in the machine age. At that time, the United States was largely inward-looking and concerned with reconstruction and reconciliation after the devastating bloodshed of the Civil War (1861-1865). Mahan looked outward. He concerned himself with a theory that remains one of the central starting points for maritime military and strategic thinking, not least because it occurred at a time when political science emerged as a separate academic discipline. All aspects of the causal chain from Mahan to the theories of geopolitics and the various schools of realism have incorporated maritime perspectives in their considerations and theories (Scholik 2011: 92).

According to Mahan, the United States, in essence, was to command the seas and guard its maritime trade using armed and armored ships. Sea power from its inception was a truly military term. A close reading of Mahan will reveal that in his view there was a functional meaning of the term sea power that describes the capacity to exert power in support of national interest at/across the sea as well as an institutional sense of seapower. The latter described a form of government, whose overarching interests are geared toward the oceans and seas as an area of exerting economic and political influence (Duppler 1999: 15).

Mahan developed principal conditions that govern the institutional seapower of nations: geographic position, natural resources and climate, extent of state territory, population, and the character of the people and government (Tangredi 2002b: 119). When these terms were prin-

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51 Even though Mahan was hardly the first even in the American context, but perhaps the most vocal and simply the right voice at the right time. As Cropsey (2013: 62) points out, an intellectual such as John Adams, 2nd President of the United States (1797-1801) "laid down four of the most fundamental ideas: (a) the importance of geography to seapower; (b) the inflexible requirement of defending seapower trade [...] (c) the strategic imperative of being able to transport troops and military equipment by sea; and (d) the pivotal role of ports or, more broadly understood, bases, in maintaining seapower", thus preceding Mahan.

52 Examples for technological-military innovation include the development of the steam engine, the propeller, the armament of warships, and the first attempts of subsurface - or submarine – warfare, some of which already had to prove their worth in various armed conflicts and wars of the 1800s.

53 Prior to that, sea power application and seapower study was largely “Realpolitik over theory” and there was no academically useful political science disciplinary foundation (Scholik 2011: 90).

54 Both would be translated into German as Seemacht, rendering a semantic distinction obsolete. In this dissertation, it is attempted to make a conscious differentiation between the two, focusing on American sea power as wielded by America, the seapower. In practical usage however, both variants exist, often without any deliberate distinction. Once again, semantic rigorousness should not constrain the intellectual debate.
cipally maritime the likelihood for a state to claim seapower status and display a willingness to defend such aspirations rose significantly. However compelling these terms are, they can only partially be supported with empirical data. It may be relatively easy to assess geographic position and conditions, and the extent of territory, on the basis of geographic (and geospatial) data. For questions of character, especially in a population, this is much more difficult. Seapower, according to Mahan, was thus not something that could be calculated easily using mathematical formulas.

In its functional variant, sea power means the control and influence of international trade, war at sea, and the use of naval forces as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and political interaction in the absence of major war (ibid: 114). According to Mahan, functional sea power required maritime thinking, a capable and efficient industry including shipyards, docks, qualified personnel, and a favorable geographic position. Elements of sea power are the naval forces, bases, and a potent fishery and trade (or, in the broader sense, maritime as opposed to just naval) fleet. The latter underscores the nexus of maritime might, state prosperity, and social welfare (Duppler 1999: 15). Only if the elements of sea power are sensibly orchestrated and integrated, can security and well-being be guaranteed. Safeguarding of maritime trade and oversea resources, according to Mahan, in principle required a capable fleet and bases (at the time principally coaling stations at home and around the world) that could secure that trade, sustain the force and, if necessary, engage competitors out to disturb that flow of goods.

Sea power as a means of exercising power, at least for a territorially constituted state, can be expressed in a formula according to the late Edward Wegener (1904-1981), in his last rank Konteradmiral (RADM) of the German Bundesmarine. According to Wegener (1974: 29, 1982: 1085-1086), seapower can be expressed by the following formula:

\[ \text{Seapower} = \text{Fleet} \times \text{Bases} \times \text{Maritime Thinking} \]

However, this equation, as Wegener and likeminded fellows readily admit, is only a finding of relative value. While fleet size and number of bases can be counted, maritime thinking is hardly quantifiable. Moreover, sea power as a whole is dependent on a state’s political objectives, i.e., what it intends to use its seapower for, as well as its geographic position. The product is therefore not to be taken as a mathematical value. Seapower is not the sum, but rather the product of the formula shown above. If one factor goes towards zero, the product is also zero (Duppler 1999: 19). This approach to assessing seapower quickly strikes boundaries, especially in the more contemporary consideration of the constituents. At the same time, Ma-
han’s institutional framework for seapower has been the point of departure for many studies. Naval historian Eric Grove, for example noted conditions when a state would be likely to attain seapower status. According to Grove, economic strength, technological prowess, socio-political culture (factors of the first order), geographical position, sea dependence in terms of seaborne trade, merchant marine, shipbuilding, fish catch, offshore zone, and government policy and perception (factors of the second order) would principally affect the sea power of nations (Grove 1990: 221-232). Thus, Mahan’s theory was not radically abolished, but rather developed to reflect the post-1945 realities. The conceptual return to Mahan’s thinking shows some of the enduring constants of determining sea power. Along with geography, such lasting concepts provide intellectual underpinning for the military and geo-economic understandings of seapower and sea power (Tangredi 2002: 114). Whereas the application of strategic principles to any given situation might be complex, the basics of strategy are relatively constant – a downright “Clausewitzian observation” (Boorman 2009: 92).

Sea power is to guarantee command of the seas, which is the comprehensive control of relevant maritime areas (seas, oceans, lines of communication) for policy objectives (Wegener 1974: 36). With a proactive, offensive approach, states that seek to challenge the indivisible control of the sea shall be forced into decisive battle at sea in the sense of concentration of forces (Crowl 1986: 456), a concept based on the Swiss strategic thinker Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) (Stahel 2013: 40-44). From this, Mahan made an argumentative case in point for powerful high seas forces tasked with safeguarding maritime trade and ready to fight a battle against similar forces should the need arise (a so-called blue-water navy). The idea that a superior naval battle force conducting offensive operations at sea was at the core of maritime strategy gained lasting popularity (Till 2009: 54).

Given the fact that complete command of the sea is impossible due to the physical conditions of the oceans and frankly unnecessary given the vast expanse of the globe, a group of French naval officers (Jeune École) developed a strategic theory that challenged Mahan’s preconceptions. They developed the more defensive concept called sea denial, or the partial disturbance

55 Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian general and military theorist, most renowned for his groundbreaking work “On War”. For an introduction to his work, see Paret (1986). For a short essay on the conceptual relationship between the works of Clausewitz and Mahan, see Preuschoft (1998).
56 Analogous to the color of the water, the very broad distinctions between high seas naval forces (blue-water navy), coastal navies (green-water navy) and simple coastal and riverine forces (brown-water navy) has become popular. Blue and green have, in a U.S. military context, also the connotation of Navy (blue) and Marine Corps (green) for the color of their service dress. There is an academic desiderate to return to the subject of ranking navies in a separate chapter; for an instructive classification of navies by their capabilities, see Grove 1990: 236-241.
of aspirations to command the seas. They advocated the use of torpedoes, mines, submarines, blockades, and targeted attacks on trading routes. Sea denial disrupted and restricted command of the seas. In marginal seas and other geographically defined areas it could even make it impossible for the numerically larger and more capable navy to exercise command of the sea altogether. This approach rested on the technological innovations of the 19th and early 20th century and signaled the evolution of classic sea power concepts. In addition, the *Jeune École* proposed raiding an opponent’s commercial fleet to drain his supply and resources. Reflecting this emerging shift in thinking, command of the sea appeared to be widely anachronistic. By the 1970s it had been substituted by the more appropriate term ‘sea control.’ The change in terminology may appear to be minor but it is a deliberate attempt to acknowledge the limitations of ocean control in an age of multi-dimensional warfare at sea. As opposed to ‘command of the sea,’ which insinuated total control of the seas for one’s own purpose or total denial to an enemy, the new term ‘sea control’ pointed out the more realistically achievable control in limited areas and for limited periods of time (Till 2009: 145-152).

The value of military means should be measured in terms of their contribution to a state’s grand strategy. Mahan’s work lacks the firm embedding of sea power in the larger political context (Stallmann 2000: 3). Naval forces serving as an instrument for the policy of a state must consequently be geared toward achieving political objectives, not striving for absolute dominion of the seas as an end itself. The major foreign policy effect of sea power that rests on the ability to control (rather than command) seas in times of peace is its potential application in times of war (Wegener 1974: 25). It has been noted that sea power is dependent on time, geography, and the political-military objective in question, policy, politics between the states concerned, and the international constellation in general (Mahncke 1974: 18). In sum, sea control can be understood as the control of maritime lines of communication by naval force means with the goal of keeping them open for one’s own military and economic uses, while denying such to the enemy. It is not an absolute, but rather a relative variable in power politics. The sea, as opposed to territory ashore, cannot be conquered, occupied or controlled in any such fashion. Whereas armies are designed and trained to control territory, navies are tasked with securing access to territory, international maritime routes, and trade (Tangredi 2002b: 130).

The development of nuclear weapons since the 1940s dramatically changed the world of naval warfare and sea power as Mahan and his contemporaries knew it. A vastly expanded complexity of warfare at and from the sea forced the re-assessment of sea power in the face of the
possibility of a devastating nuclear war. World War II had, in the meantime, demonstrated the trend toward increasingly more joint (different branches of the military integrating) and combined (different countries’ militaries increasingly working together) operations. The war also highlighted the utility of new platforms and tactics in novel naval missions, for example antisubmarine warfare (ASW). It provided the impetus for the aircraft carrier and naval aviation to replace the battleship as the capital unit of the fleets. Against this background, the gradual supersession of Mahan’s central argument of decisive battle at sea by other strategic functions below the threshold of general war became increasingly plausible and popular.

The multidimensionality of the operating space (surface, subsurface, air, and more recently the electromagnetic spectrum, space and cyber), the absence of defined geographic borders and fronts, the sheer size of the playing field (about three quarters of our globe are covered with navigable water), the indispensability of a functioning logistics tail, and the challenge of obtaining a correct operational situational picture are some further aspects that should be included in a more contemporary approach to sea power (Allen 1996).

Mahan’s assumptions on the functional use of naval force by way of decisive battle have been developed further in the course of the 20th century toward a broader, more comprehensive understanding of the value and use of sea power. In the age of the Cold War, which underlined the utility of naval forces on the spectrum of conflict below general (nuclear) war, it was apparent that the understanding and exercise of that sea power had to be reconsidered (Hattendorf 2004: 5). The following illustration shows the contemporary spectrum-of-conflict model that was developed in conjunction with “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s. It displays the three generic phases of international engagement (peacetime presence, crisis response, and war) and shows the correlation between the probability of occurrence and the level of violence involve. It also marks a number of political-military operations. Sea power, the reasoning went, can be utilized on the whole spectrum und thus offer unparalleled utility to policy-makers.

57 See also Testimony of Admiral Thomas Hayward before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 25 February 1982.
At the same time, the fundamentals of naval force application have remained constant, thus informing the making of strategy on how to apply sea power. Strategy can be understood as the attempt to systemize planning and conduct of wars by providing a coordination of the objective, the means, and the ends (Wagener 2010: 4). Frank Uhlig has pointed out that despite the variety of conflicts that navies were engaged in during the past two centuries and the vast changes in their instruments, there is a remarkable constancy in how they go about their business. In the overwhelming cases, navies have been employed for

“(1) The strategic movement of troops (and now, of armies and air forces alike); (2) The acquisition of advanced bases as close as possible to the scene of the action, by either military force or civil means; (3) the landing of armies on a hostile shore and their support then and thereafter by means of fire and logistics; (4) the blockade, and (5) the struggle for master of the local sea.” (Uhlig 1997: 96)

The persistence of naval utility is thus decidedly noteworthy. Its independence from most changes in political dynamics makes it an interesting tool for statecraft. As H.P. Willmot pointed out, “Sea power is a rational instrument of state power and […] a long-term phenomenon […]” (cited in Gray 1994: 86). This comes at a certain price, though. Pointing toward the need for a grand design and thus a distinguished strategic approach, Colin Gray (1994: 86) notes that, “Ships, design teams, industries, and, above all, experience cannot be improvised.”
This is the basis for the need for strategy, which in the political and military realm is usually understood as the declaratory path of how to connect ways, means, and ends with (naval) power. Such strategies must contribute to the overall goals of a state. They must inform decision-makers, preferably while offering a long-term perspective, in the political, military, and industry spheres. Preferably, they also inform the public because the tax-payer is ultimately the financier of such strategies and the underlying materiel.

Strategy is the *conditio sine qua non* without which a seapower could not exercise its sea power effectively. A targeted application of power under the conditions of insecurity and given finite resources can therefore only be made through a coherent, reliable, but still flexible strategy, which is understood here as the art of directing maritime capabilities to attain political ends (Grove 1990: 11). It is imperative to understand strategy as an interdisciplinary approach. One must include political, economic, geographic, technological, and perhaps even a sociological and psychological perspectives. Military force structure, operations, and tactics are of note as well (Baylis/Wirtz 2010: 5) if one attempts to dissolve the ritualized character of blunt force in conflicts and replace it with a higher degree of rationality (Wagener 2010: 4). While the desire for strategy is apparent, it is often nonetheless the level of the military construct that in the eyes of many decision-makers warrants the least attention.

Illustration 3, printed in a 2005 study about the challenges of fighting a global insurgency, points to the setting of strategy in the U.S. military construct. It criticizes that the focus of the military’s financial, intellectual, and human resources is often rather at the bottom of the pyramid, namely at the tactical level and, to a lesser degree, at the operational level.
According to the author, the modern U.S. military is characterized by an overwhelming focus on doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities weighted heavily toward the tactical level (the large base of the triangle) with proportionally less investment in the operational and strategic levels. Accordingly, defense spending – both, procurement and future research and development – heavily centers on tactical-level requirements. Tanks, helicopters, fighter planes, individual body armor, assault amphibians, cruise missiles, munitions of all sorts, unmanned aerial vehicles, and littoral combat ships all provide the combat power to fight and win battles at the tactical level. These are immediate demands often justified by wartime needs, but they are hardly rationalized by tying them to strategy (Barno 2005: 17-18).

In terms of how to grasp the tactical level through doctrine, the military services (a function of their strategic culture) fundamentally part ways. For the Navy, doctrine is essentially an unwritten set of convictions, principles, and understandings that was acquired experientially and passed down more or less orally. All of these aspects were thoroughly understood by other (Navy) practitioners. To the Army and the Marine Corps, however, written doctrine is fundamental because it fuses their operational planning, organizational structure, training, tactics, and resource decisions. It coordinates artillery, infantry, armor, and air units, creating the reality of ‘combined arms’ (Haynes 2013: 152-153).

The model, representing a common view of modern warfare and a visual reflection of the institutionalized paradigm, is notable for its addition of the political level. It underlines that a
distinct political level is often omitted from the pyramid, although it would belong to the apex of the figure as the grand-strategic driver. Therefore, any study of war must go beyond the purely military character of war and at the war's intended results, which are in all cases political in nature. Overlooking such relationships by students of war, policy-makers, and military professionals alike yields unsatisfying results at best and at worst (for a policy-prescriptive approach) can have severe consequences.

How one arrives at teasing apart the different levels and the concurrent objectives for political planning is the subject of the next chapter. This is important in order to underline the merits of strategy and underscore how reckless an unbalanced focus can be. Strategy is not politically expedient, as Liotta and Lloyd (2005: 121) cautioned. Rather, it is a long-term instrument that supports shaping the future environment. In the absence of strategy, there is not a reliable direction for policy and planning. There may be several routes to the goal but enduring crises and changes along the way will be painful teachers.
3 From Grand to Military to Maritime and Naval Strategy

"'Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?'
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the Cat.
'I don't much care where—' said Alice.
'‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,' said the Cat.
'--so long as I get SOMEWHERE,' Alice added as an explanation.
‘Oh, you’re sure to do that,' said the Cat, ‘if you only walk long enough.'"
(Lewis Carrol – Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 1865; emphasis in original)

3.1 American Grand Strategy

At best, strategy is only an approximate exercise. It will get the strategist somewhere near where he or she intends to go. Strategy grants a systematic approach to dealing with change, with both what should and should not stay the same. Strategy, in short, is the application of existing means to secure desired ends (Liotta/Lloyd 2005: 122).

The indispensable point of departure for an endeavor as opaque and challenging as formulating strategy is the overarching national interest. Those pluralistic interests form the abstract, amalgamated bases of the foreign-policy decision-making processes. They are an ex-post category, stemming from history and national imagination, and are chaperoned by the elected government of the sovereign (when the responsibility to defend the national interests is vested in elected officials, it constitutes a primary reasoning and motivation for political action). It follows that the definition of national interests is the prerogative of the executive branch, but is subject to the ‘checks and balances’ of a political system of shared power (Maull 2006: 64-65). For the United States, therefore, the following overarching maxims of foreign policy can be derived:

- First, the need to prevent an attack on the American homeland is the indispensable objective for national survival;
- Second, the prevention of great-power war in Eurasia and the underlying security competition that makes these outbreaks of destabilizing violence more likely;
- Third, preservation of acceptably-priced and secure oil supply;
- Fourth, fostering of a friendly, competitive international economic order;
- Fifth, the advancement of democracy and human rights abroad in an attempt to prevent civil wars, genocide, and mass atrocities; and,
- Sixth, the protection of the environment from the adverse effects of global warming and climate change (Art 2003: 7).
It must be noted that there is an inherent struggle to prioritize and categorize these overarching interests against each other, and dispatch finite resources to attain these ends (ibid: 45-47). This process shapes how the United States makes strategy under the condition that they are, in fact, planning for uncertainty. They influence what role America seeks to play in shaping the global environment and the course of history. According to Theodore Lowi et al. (2010: 697-698), there have been four principle roles that the United States has played in international relations in the past. These are, in no particular order:

- a Napoleonic strategy in which a powerful nation seeks to prevent aggressive actions against it by improving the internal state of affairs of a particular country even if that implies encouragement of a revolution in that country;
- a Holy Alliance strategy in which a strategy of a super-power to prevent any change in the existing distribution of power among states is pursued, even if it means intervention into another country’s internal affairs;
- a balance-of-power strategy, in which a concert of powers is carefully balanced in alliances with one or more states in order to counterbalance the behavior of other, usually more powerful nation-states; and,
- the economic expansionist role which is a grand strategy pursued by capitalist countries to adopt foreign policies that will maximize the success of domestic corporations in their dealings with other countries.

### 3.2 Security and Military Strategies

When one connects these idealist roles with selected national interests in the security realm, it is possible to identify at least eight distinct strategies with strong military strategic implications. These are

- dominion to rule the world;
- global collective security, to keep the peace everywhere;
- regional collective security, to keep the peace at some places;
- cooperative security, to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting the offensive military capabilities of states;
- containment, to hold the line against a specific aggressor state;
- isolationism, to stay out of most wars and to keep a free hand for the United States;
- offshore balancing, to do that and, in addition, to cut down any emerging Eurasian hegemon; and,
• selective engagement, to do a selected number of tasks deemed critical (Art 2003: 82).

Domestic, foreign policy, economic, psychological and military aspects must be considered in strategy-making as well (Ruge 1960: 424-425). However, states as a general rule do not have a single strategy, but rather a topical, measured system of synchronized strategies which relate to and act upon one another. In accordance with the level of decision-making, contents, and scope, these sub-strategies will have different military, diplomatic, or economic objectives (Wagener 2010: 6). The corresponding institutional terms, conditions, and resources must be made available. At the same time, democracies often have a difficult time thinking strategically, for the decision-making timeframe is severely constrained by the time between regularly-held elections rendering decade-long outlooks improbable for the policy-maker who has to deal with much more immediate issues.

Democracies tend to be uneasy in the use of military force for political ends in the first place (Gray 1994: 61), but a strategy without some sort of enforcement tools amounts to wishful thinking at best and hara-kiri at worst. Finally, democracies by virtue of their nature, are more consensual and compromise-oriented; a factor which often limits the velocity of decision-making. Strategy is the attempt to frame and control these processes (Boorman 2009: 93), and to hold those individuals or institutions who are engaged in them accountable. Through the orchestrated use of power, a country attempts to control situations or areas using military force to achieve larger ends. Control is a highly volatile construct – “What is there to control? How? To what end? How long? To what degree? etc.” (ibid: 103) – but it is the raison d’être of strategy. A strategic concept, therefore, is “a verbal statement of (a) What to control, (b) For what purpose, (c) To what degree, (d) When to initiate control, (e) How long to control, and (f) in general, how to control in order to achieve the strategic objective” (Hattendorf 2004: 5). As such, strategy must deliver on a comprehensive motif, a topic, and a fitting political approach. There may be global, regional, or functional strategies (Kugler 2006: 66-69). The ideal synthesis of these sub-strategies is a product that is very near to grand strategy.58

Security strategy is an integral part of grand strategy. It contains both a military and a diplomatic strategy (recalling two of the three uses of the sea), which in turn are influenced by geography and geostrategic considerations of a state. Security strategy serves the continuous security of a state’s well-being, its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the functioning of its political system, and the safety and security of its people and goods. The goal of a security

58 But, as Michael Gerson noted in the opening remarks of a CNA-sponsored conference on seapower in Washington, D.C.’s Army-Navy Club on 4 August 2011, “Grand Strategy is not always great strategy.”
strategy is the applicability of military and diplomatic power in peace, crisis, and war (Wagener 2010: 6). Military strategy, then, is derived from this canon. The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military (2002: 274) defines it as “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.” For the United States this commonly includes missile defense, expeditionary forces and stability operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering trans-national threats, facilitating information operations, and environment shaping operations (McGuinn et. al. 2002: 66). It also includes a focus on persistent military modernization and innovation to retain a leading edge.

Thus, military strategy is a sub-category of security strategy, in which the various branches of a military have a shared responsibility (Wagener 2010: 6). In conjunction with diplomatic and geostrategic measures, military strategy can contribute to keeping an enemy at bay and moreover help attain the political objectives of armed conflict (Kugler 2006: 102). Liddel Hart (1967: 322) reminds us that “Whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning military victory, grand strategy must take the longer view – for its problem is winning the peace.” As a subset of security strategy, military strategy has an important role to play in peacetime. Its function is to prevent belligerent conflicts in the first place, and if it does come to a military conflict, it seeks to reduce damage to a minimum (Stallmann 2000: 1-2). Military strategy informs force posture, deployments, and tactical actions, all for a larger political objective.

At the same time, force posture decisions, deployments, and the tactical use of force can have strategic implications as well (Art 2003: 5). Deterrence, coercion, and defense have political-military ramifications that transcend the tactical use of force. They are intended to change the political behavior of the state or non-state actor who is subject to the force. Military power can also be used to reassure allies or coerce antagonists by dispatching troops near their territory (peacetime presence). It can be committed to punish those who commit aggression through systems of collective security and defense. It can serve as the tool for forceful interventions to prevent mass atrocities, ethnic conflicts, and genocide (humanitarian interventions). It can also interposition itself between warring parties to keep an agreed-upon peace between them (peacekeeping). Intervention in civil conflicts to impose peace (peacemaking/peace enforcement) or the occupation of a territory to provide stability in rebuilding the political structure and seed good governance practice (nation-building) are further options. Targeted limited use of military force can include quick and decisive intrusion to rescue for-
eign nationals (rescue operations), to exact revenge for harm done (punitive operations), and highly directed use of force to prevent supplies and war materiel from reaching a given destination (interdiction).

Naval forces seem particularly useful to serve such objectives and the underlying political goals of applying military force. They are inherently more flexible and mobile than land or air forces, given the political and legal context of the sea as an operating space. Their presence, and the threat of the kinetic force that they could potentially leverage, can be a central contribution to achieving these ends. Other branches of the military do not offer such a comparable luxury (Tangredi 2002b: 133). It follows from the relatively slow speed of deploying naval forces – a very mobile Army unit can deploy within days (depending on readiness and distance to theatre), whereas an Air Force unit can often deploy within hours – that a degree of forward presence is imperative for sustained global engagement (Fischbock 1982: 2). Historically, the U.S. Navy has been forward-operating and forward-deployed from its inception.59 Sea power can only bring to bear its inherent mobility, versatility, agility, and deterrent value when it is forward-deployed or present instead of lingering in home port. Thus, presence becomes a value of its own right. This holds true militarily (casualties strongly depend on the degree of readiness, force disposition, and deployment), as well as politically in the spirit of the overarching goals. It is instructive to once again look at the setting of strategy and its relationship to the other two commonly used intellectual concepts: operations and tactics. Illustration 4 shows that all three levels are intimately connected and responsibilities are designated. There is a logical chain that connects the large, overarching strategies and policy directives to the smallest tactical military engagement. To make sense of that connection is a supreme duty of the political leadership. They must offer a compelling explanation. At the same time, military services must provide doctrine and an upward narrative that displays to political leaders how their tactical and operational actions have desirable strategic consequences.60


60 Doctrine, another commonly used (and misused) term in this realm, is by definition of Oxford’s Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military (2002: 121) the collection of “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.” It is crucial to understand that it “is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” Doctrine commonly connects operational and tactical levels.
Although engagements and battles occur on the tactical level, they are intimately related to the operational plans of major operations, campaigns, and wars. In turn, these arrangements are part of larger theater campaign plans which feed into and from the overarching strategy. The chain goes up to the national security strategies and policy directives. In theory, a coherent picture emerges where every single engagement and battle is an expression of national security and military strategy. This holds true for land warfare and naval warfare, although for the latter there are some qualifications.

### 3.3 Maritime and Naval Strategies

It must be cautioned that putting Navy strategy (or naval) on par with maritime strategy is misleading. The history of this semantic disarray is a long one, particularly since naval force strategists have sometimes opted to call their strategies maritime, naval, Navy – or something
Maritime power is a broader term, usually not confined to a navy and naval infantry, but often includes Coast Guards, merchant marine, and the corresponding industrial base. It holds true that,

“[…] the understanding of the naval aspects of an overall maritime strategy and of the creation and wide employment of naval forces is vitally important. Maritime power is but one of the elements of overall national power and of national strategy. ‘Maritime power is indispensable to the attainment and employment of purposeful great power,’ [Henry] Eccles wrote. ‘Seapower cannot be understood save as a component of maritime power, and thus, naval strategy cannot stand alone.’” (Hattendorf 2004: 6)

The “Maritime Strategy” (capital ‘M’) of the 1980s is a case in point for the potential for semantic confusion. It was a capstone document driven by the Navy and the Marine Corps and could easily be perceived as a simple Navy/Marine Corps plan to contribute to Allied victory in Europe should war with the Soviet Union occur. Naval strategy therefore is understood as that part of the American military strategy, which principally draws on the contributions of the U.S. Navy to national defense and security. Naval insinuates involvement of the U.S. Marine Corps. It is also part of the broader maritime (lower-case ‘m’) strategy (i.e., Coast Guard, seaborne trade, maritime ecology, etc.) of the nation.

With the U.S. Marine Corps’ unique position in the American context (integrated with, but strategically-minded separate from the Navy), there is another complicating factor at hand for the analyst concerned with teasing apart semantics. At times in the past, the USMC was part of a Navy/naval/maritime strategic document (i.e. the Commandant of the Marine Corps [CMC], its highest-ranking uniformed soldier, would co-sponsor and co-sign a strategy). Sometimes, the Marine Corps would not partake in strategies and on occasion even issued its own capstone documents. The use of the terms “maritime” and “naval” in the context of this dissertation must therefore transcend too rigorous semantics. In this context the use of the

61 Similar confusion plagues the recent German contributions to the subject. Lacking a linguistic distinction between the terms safety and security (both translate into German as Sicherheit), “Maritime Sicherheit” has become a catch-all term to encompass all sorts of naval activity, not just maritime security operations. This often blurs the arguments of naval officers, politicians, and the academia alike (see Bueger 2013).

62 From the perspective of this dissertation (preempting the analysis of the respective documents in chapter 8 of this study), “The Maritime Strategy” was a deliberate wording to offer an complementary alternative to the continental school of thought that had dominated security affairs in the West at the time (it did not claim to be the sole strategy, just the maritime component of overall U.S. strategy). It was also a global approach and hence necessarily maritime in nature from a U.S. point of view. It offered the other services an extended hand so they could link in (it listed a number of roles, missions, and task for the Air Force and the Army; to what degree they accepted that is another question). In addition, the wording tracked better with senior decision-makers (if the documents had been called “The Naval Strategy”, it probably would have required more explanation). In short, “The Maritime Strategy” was a maritime strategy – with heavy naval ownership.
either term signals U.S. Navy ownership in a certain capstone document, and/or the use of the Navy alone or in conjunction with sister services and allies to U.S. policy ends.\textsuperscript{63}

As discussed previously, sea power and seapower as concepts encompass many more premises and characteristics than simply the number of warships, men, or materiel. If one were to understand maritime strategy exclusively as a component of military strategy or even as an end in itself, an important, even decisive factor for measurement would be omitted. After all, a Navy’s strategy and success are determined not only by tactical capabilities or operational tasks, but by the political context in which strategic planning and execution occur (Grove 1990: 159). If anything, defense needs can only be established sensibly when measured against the threat, deciding on an acceptable level of risk, conceiving a strategy that addresses both risk and threat, and then building the forces that the strategy requires. Thus, naval strategy succeeds when the Navy complements and makes possible the execution of a coherent, overarching national security strategy (Cropsey 2013: 16).

The simple application of sea power, whether predominantly militarily, diplomatically, or in any other form, will likely not be felt on land if it is not aligned to the larger context. In other words (Hart 1967: 353), “grand strategy should control [military] strategy.” That makes the strong case for a sound configuration of grand strategy so that subordinate civil and military organizations can provide their upwards and downwards mobile documents of strategic intent.

Grand strategies have four distinct functions. They guide the allocation of scarce resources, help complex organizations coordinate their activities, communicate interests to others (potential adversaries, allies, and friends), and permit criticism, correction, organized public discourse as well as an opportunity for policy evaluation (Posen/Ross 1996). Grand strategy also has an auxiliary function for a nation going to war. In this view, grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain their fighting services and further social prosperity (Hart 1967: 322, Wagener 2010: 5).

Julian Corbett (1854–1922), the noted British naval historian and strategist, warned of analytical self-restraint in the attempt to understand the role and place of strategy. In his book Some

\textsuperscript{63} The same holds true for the definition of strategy. Analyzing strategies simply by looking at how they adhere to a given central definition is a shortsighted, methodologically challenging, and ultimately fruitless exercise. For example, if one was to take the joint U.S. military definition of strategy as a framework of reference, it would quickly show that even that agreed, official definition changed over time, reflecting bureaucratic compromises and changing dynamics within the system. If one was to strictly adhere to a dictionary’s definition, such a selection would be arbitrary at best, hardly satisfying the desideration of the Political Science/Military History disciplines.
Principles on Maritime Strategy, published in 1911, “the best theorist of his time” (McDougall 2011: 32) noted,

“Naval Strategy is not a thing by itself, […] its problems can seldom or never be solved on naval considerations alone, […] it is only a part of maritime strategy […] [by which we mean] the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces” (Corbett 1911: 9-11).

The point of the relationship of sea power on the one hand and land power on the other hand is worth exploring. The finding that man lives on land and not at sea appears to be trivial. Considerably less trivial is the insight that the strategic impact of naval forces must be felt on land (Gray 1994: 3). The value of sea power and a naval strategy that buttresses it must therefore be measured against what is on land. In this regard, Corbett underlined that strategy must be closely aligned with foreign policy in order to make a difference. Corbett’s further merit lies in breaking up Mahan’s fleet-on-fleet action focus (Till 2009: 57). Instead, Corbett emphasized the broad spectrum of naval operations and application of force in lieu of decisive battle at sea (McDougall 2011: 32). Using mobility, relatively unimpeded access, operational reach, and flexibility (all of which are aspects inherent in principal navies), sea power, as part of a country’s military and security strategy can be of compelling value in conflicts. It can also serve as a major deterrent and a significant contribution to limited wars. Moreover, maritime nations that bring sea power to bear can better scale their participation in conflicts and wars to a degree that continental states cannot (Till 2009: 60).

It is important to emphasize once more that sea power must, as a principle, serve a political end, and should be fully integrated into the grand strategy of a state. As Mahnken (2010: 69) notes, “Strategy is about making war useable for political purposes. […] It is the essential link between political objectives and military force, between ends and means.” A strategy seeks to

64 The argument between continental and maritime strategists has a rich history and repeatedly stirred controversies in academia. If one follows the deliberations of early 20th century geopolitical thinkers such as Harold Mackinder or Karl Haushofer, world politics is first and foremost the struggle for continental domination over the Eurasian heartland (the ‘world island’ in Mackinder’s words). Hegemonic policies across the sea, they asserted, was doomed to fail from the beginning (McDougall 2011: 31). However, a look into history will qualify that argument. The courses of World War I and II were decisively changed after the United States was drawn into the conflict (1917, 1941). Massive economic and materiel support for allies, successful battles at sea (e.g., Midway 1942), colossal amphibious landings (e.g., Normandy 1944), and the prevalence of commercial shipping in the Battle of the Atlantic (1941-1943) are visible reminders of what sea power can accomplish. This goes to show that decisions in epochal military struggles could be forced from the sea by seapowers (Duppler 1999: 13-14). The final decision, obviously, occurred on land because continental powers either collapsed due to internal struggles or because a massive use of force was directed against the land-wards center of gravity by the antagonists (Gray 1994: 8). For more on the seapower/maritime vs. landpower/continental argument, see Sheehan (2010: 52-54).
limit trade-offs in the face of finite resources, evade incompatibilities, and hedge against negative consequences (Kugler 2006: 62). In this sense, it reflects central themes of Carl von Clausewitz in that war is the continuation of politics by other means; that acts of violence in war serve a larger purpose that would be unattainable otherwise; in that a military victory may be regarded as useless if it does not serve the acquirement of a political objective (Sheehan 2010: 49). Jörg Duppler suggested that strategy be understood as having both an institutional and a functional dimension in peace and war. Likewise, naval strategy is the operative art of orchestrating naval warfare in support of the overall effort (Duppler 1999: 16; correspondingly Wegener 1974: 28). More trenchantly, navy (or naval) strategy is the science of using the Navy in peace, crisis, and war. In the framework of the overall grand and security strategy, it serves the implementation of a nation’s maritime interests. Naval strategy is therefore uniquely positioned between the political and the operational level (Duppler 1999: 17).

That limits the documents under consideration to those official, declaratory “Washington-level” pieces that feature involvement of the highest representatives of civilian and military actors, usually the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and/or the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), thus making is a U.S. Navy strategy.

“What is a “Navy strategy”? – The US Navy’s theory about how its forces contribute to US national security (= a set of concepts & arguments). It should coherently enumerate, think through, lay out, and ideally prioritize: maritime components of threats to the nation, strategies those threats are likely to employ, reasons why these threats & strategies are salient, optimal potential Navy operations to counter those threats & strategies, reasons how & why these operations will work.” (Swartz 2011b: 27, slide 53)

It is instructive to remember that, besides declaratory Navy strategies – or “what it says to itself and the world about what it should do and does, and where it is heading” (Swartz 2009b: 3) – deployments, operations, force structure, personnel, and training also need strategic approach that, ideally, are coordinated with the declaratory documents (ibid). This list is hardly exhaustive and furthermore could include infrastructure, warfare areas, cyber security, recruitment, and other subsets.

3.4 Naval Missions and their Implications on Strategy and Fleet Design

Historically speaking, states in general have developed six distinct ways to employ naval forces. As offensive variants, fleet-on-fleet action (or battle at sea), blockade of the enemy, and power projection/expeditionary operations can be noted. Commerce raiding (attack on commercial trade), coastal defense, and the fleet-in-being concept fall into the defensive cate-
In order to frame the role U.S. naval forces could fulfill, it is instructive to take a look at the characterization of the function of modern navies. It was first laid out by Admiral Stansfield Turner in 1974 as “Missions of the U.S. Navy” (Turner 1974, reprinted in Hattendorf 2004: 31-52) and soon adopted by many analysts as the most useful military analytical framework for naval force missions of modern navies. The ‘classic 4’ missions were sea control, projection of power ashore, naval presence, and strategic deterrence. These missions, in turn, serve larger naval roles and policy objectives. Sea control and power projection have been described briefly above; naval presence is understood as the geographically forward deployment of naval forces so that they could be on station to attend to events ashore and provide decision-makers the range of options on the spectrum of conflict. Strategic deterrence is understood the use of sea power assets to keep an adversary from following a certain course of action. It follows that there is an intimate relationship between the level of coercion and the level of power projection activity at and from the sea (Kearsley 1992: 102).

The following illustration uses a slightly different metric in assigning deterrent and combative functions to sea control and power projection. It then derives specific naval function. Presence is taken as a prerequisite for these missions, although the term does not appear.

65 According to the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military (2002: 145), a fleet-in-being is “a fleet that avoids decisive action, but, because of its strength and location, causes opposing forces to locate nearby, and so reduce the number of opposing units available for operations elsewhere.” A fleet-in-being strategy was employed by the German High Sea’s Fleet during World War I.

66 Secondary naval missions such as naval diplomacy or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief were, at the time, not part of the general consensus of naval missions. Samuel Huntington had cautioned against using Navy assets for missions they were not designed, built and equipped for in the first place. To him, the ships were not built and the men not trained for that kind of detours.
Methods of sea control, as Turner outlined, can include sortie control (a contemporary synonym for blockade), chokepoint control, open ocean operations, and local engagement through the exercise of sea control (Till 1987: 59-61). This canon was amended by a fifth option, forward operations as a way of keeping and exploiting initiative (ibid. 63). Naval missions therefore serve as a suitable tool to grasp the intended strategic effects of naval forces as articulated by document drafters. It follows that specific instruments (i.e., naval platforms and weapon systems) must be developed, procured, and fielded for such missions. The instruments (or weapon systems) for such endeavors are summed up in the following diagram.
Image 6 illustrates the advantages of a balanced fleet, a term favored by many naval strategists. The wider the variety of weapon systems available, the wider the range of operational possibilities; a properly balanced composition of weapon systems, in principle, increases naval flexibility and the capacity to respond to changing or unexpected circumstances (Till 1987: 65). A reliance on one platform may inhibit flexibility, restrict the numbers of options for the national command authority, and unbalance the fleet to become a niche force.

Sea control capabilities are at the heart of the naval mission set. For power projection ashore, naval presence, and strategic deterrence (the other three of Turner’s ‘classic 4’), a navy can utilize their sea control assets although it will be better served to field flexible warships designed for that specific purpose which retain the capability to do other missions as well. It needs to be noted that role of navies in strategic deterrence, as mentioned in illustration 5, must be divided into general, conventional deterrence – “potential adversaries are deterred, or not deterred, by demonstrations of a navy’s evident ability to perform conventional maritime ‘war-fighting’ tasks efficiently” (Till 1987: 92) – and nuclear (strategic) deterrence. Finally, the combative function of navies, the last column in illustration 5, also deserves detailing. One of the still most lasting instances of the range of power projection ashore can be derived

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67 “Forward operations” was not included in the original table, but has been added here based on Till’s assessment that “they [too] would require the full set of weapons systems” (Till 1987: 65).
68 Strategic deterrence by U.S. Navy submarines armed with nuclear-tipped missiles as the naval leg of the U.S. nuclear triad exploits the maritime domain and fields advanced technology. For the purpose of this dissertation, the strategic nuclear deterrence use of the sea is outside of the core interest of the study. The SSBN’s special role in the naval strategic context is symbolized best by the fact that the U.S. nuclear weapons are subject to the jurisdiction of a specialized functional military command, the U.S. Strategic Command.
from the British experience in the Falklands War 1982, where – perhaps with the notable exception of nuclear missile strikes – the broad spectrum of modern sea power tools was displayed.\(^{69}\)

All of these missions describe the political function short of general war. This provides decision-makers with a scalable instrument in their toolbox. Although naval missions have certainly evolved over time, Turner’s ‘classic 4’ remain the leverage for any serious discussion about the utilities of navies. For naval planners and document drafters, these missions often provided a starting point for their conceptual ideas and writings.\(^{70}\)

\(^{69}\) Even more than 30 years after it was fought, the Falklands War still warrants deeper study in the context of naval warfare and strategy. It was a conflict of many “firsts” (first modern A2/AD war, first use of anti-ship missiles, first successful attack of a nuclear hunter/killer submarine against a major enemy surface combatant, operational debut of the V/STOL Harrier aircraft, an illustration of the Royal Navy’s new Invincible-class aircraft carrier in combat action, etc.) and a major expeditionary joint operation. Although the conflict dynamics must be understood by its historical background, the lessons of the war hold continuous relevance. For an essay on lessons for the U.S. Navy, see Bruns (forthcoming), part of a volume. The official Navy report (DON 1983) is also worthwhile, and the best lessons-learned study remains Cordesman/Wagner (1991: 238-401). Two books instrumental to the course of the conflict are the memoirs of the British South Atlantic naval task force commander (Woodward/Robinson 2012) and the authoritative military history account (Middlebrook 2001).

\(^{70}\) For a concise overview of these naval missions with a focus on the evolution in light of 21\(^{st}\) century security challenges, see Forster (2013: 25-49).
4 The Nexus of Strategy, Planning, and Force Structure

There is an indivisible connection among the ways, the means, and the ends in policy. These quintessential components of strategy govern planning, for a given strategic document would be of little or no use if it were not speaking to how to achieve a proclaimed goal. Force planning (the art of structuring, budgeting, maintaining, and periodically reviving the force), thus, is indispensable in any strategic deliberation. There is a correlation among six key variables regarding force planning. These are:

- national interests and objectives;
- the derived security strategy;
- the means and instruments in use;
- the risk of failure;
- the security environment; and,
- the available resources (Bartlett/Holman/Somes 1995: 114-126).

A change in one of these parameters would require the modification of the other key indicators. Depending on which variable is being changed, the balance of the whole effort requires adjustments in the goals, the means, a reassessment of the risk of failure, or a revision of the strategy altogether (Fitschen 2007: 19-20). Bartlett, Holman, and Somes as well as Fitschen have subsequently identified eight, partially complementary approaches, which underline planning strengths and weaknesses. All of these methods are driven by unique factors, resulting in certain strengths and distinct collective weaknesses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Drivers</th>
<th>Planning Strengths</th>
<th>Planning Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-Down</td>
<td>Interests Goals Strategies</td>
<td>Concentration on objective Macro perspective Different instruments of power</td>
<td>Resource constraints are usually ignored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-Up</td>
<td>Existing level of military capabilities</td>
<td>Emphasis on the present security and policy conditions</td>
<td>Neglect of the future Micro perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario</td>
<td>Situation and context</td>
<td>Specific focus Setting of priorities Dynamic, flexible approach</td>
<td>Unpredictability of events Self-dynamic approach Trends towards retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Focus on future threats and enemies Combined macro and micro approaches Emphasis on military capabilities</td>
<td>Simplistic model Inflexible/static approach Inherently retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Functional approach</td>
<td>Realistic assessment of capabilities Priority-setting</td>
<td>Trend toward sub-optimization Ignorance of strategic objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging</td>
<td>Risk minimization</td>
<td>Approach faces insecurities Balanced and flexible planning</td>
<td>Threat of overstating enemy capabilities Categorization in “worst case” scenarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities/Technology</td>
<td>Superior technological systems</td>
<td>Emphasis on knowledge and creativity Risk and loss reduction Force multiplier</td>
<td>Cost-intensity Higher risk Imbalanced force structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Reflection of domestic policies/policies Necessary setting of priorities</td>
<td>No illustration of security and defense policy environment Defense spending on basis of well-being of the economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 7: Strategic Planning Ways, Drivers, Strengths, and Weaknesses (Fitschen 2007: 21).

The table illustrates the various approaches to make and similarly to analyse strategy. It is striking that only the top-down approach features the primacy of politics (a precondition in democratic states), whereas the other variations potentially run the risk of allowing the in-
struments of politics a higher priority than the overarching goals. A top-down strategy at the same time can be problematic because it may run diametrically opposed to a military service’s culture and outlook.

The top-down approach is closely aligned with a logical strategy and force planning model. It follows a logical path that runs from the determination of national interests to the formulation of a national strategy and a military strategy, including components for different branches of the military. In reality, however, this approach is in fact heavily influenced by currently shifting political and economic framework conditions, finite resources, new and old threats, and technological advancements (Lloyd 1997: 3, Stallmann 2000: 8, George/Bennet 2005: 276). It is thus seldom, if ever, linearly accountable.

Strategy remains a loop series of questions that need to be answered. First, which policy objectives are to be achieved (‘What do we want to do?’). Second, how can the strategic execution go about (‘How do we plan to do it?’). Third, an indispensable assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, opportunities, and challenges (‘What are we up against?’). Fourth, unilateral or multilateral choices, alliance or coalitions or alignments, international institutions, defense forces, and other economic, political, diplomatic, and informational instruments must be weighed (‘What is available to do it?’). Fifth, risks, deficiencies, unforeseen outcomes, and other cultural blinders must be considered (‘What are the mismatches?’). The sixth question loops back to the first step in that it ponders strategic goals and desired or demanded endstates (‘Why do we want to do this?’) (Liotta/Lloyd 2005: 122).

Any sound analysis of strategic and force planning processes must take into account both long-term factors as well as more short- and medium-term issues such as technological revolutions, reactions to a changing strategic environment, and maritime capabilities of an opponent (Till 1999: 242).
5 Methodology for Analysis

Based on what has been established in the previous chapters, seapower has a horizontal dimension (following Mahan’s (et al.) requirements of a seapower) as well as a vertical dimension (following Lloyd/Liotta’s notion that it must be embedded into the security and defense policy context of a nation). For the U.S., that means considering the joint, interagency, and international policies, processes, activities, and operations, and “it would be difficult if not downright impossible to discuss the Navy in complete isolation from its sister services, joint command and planning systems, and allied and friendly navies” (Swartz 2009b: 7).

A solid sea power analysis of the reciprocal connection among maritime strategy, naval strategy, and U.S. security and defense policy – especially across the broad spectrum of three decades – consequently can only be made on the basis of a reliable methodology. Richard Kugler (2006: 42-47) lists 25 possible subject areas as to how strategic analysis could be undertaken. The list includes the comparison of policy visions, values, or ambitions; a discussion of main actions, instruments, and other characteristics; theories of actions and consequences; an assessment of expected effectiveness, benefits, and losses; a discussion of the level of effort, resource requirements, and costs; a cost-effectiveness analysis; a look at implementation strategies; time horizons; identification of constraints, difficulties, and roadblocks; a confidence-motivated study on the U.S. ability to make policy succeed; a check on consistence with other policies; an assessment of unipolarity and multipolarity; a discussion of feasibility and prerequisites for success; checking for encouraging signs and warning signals; a discussion of robustness and flexibility; vulnerabilities to opposition; externalities, wider consequences, and implications; persuasion and public support; assumption, uncertainties, and biases; sensitivities and risks; contentious issues and key judgments; ‘gold badges’ and ‘red flags’ (features that make a particular strategy and strategic option particularly attractive, necessary, or unavoidable – or the opposite, respectively); an analysis of trade-offs; the adaptability to other ideas; and bottom-line appraisals. Each would be a methodological warranted perspective, although only a combination of these could yield the best analytical results. These partially influenced the framing of this study, but they required a workable overarching conceptual tool to make an analysis spanning three decades of U.S. Navy strategic capstone documents possible. In that spirit, this study uses an analytical pattern in that it concentrates on:

- (1) macro-level grand strategic developments;
- (2) domestic factors and events;
(3) development of U.S. Navy strategies (taking into account technological developments);
(4) the particular sea strategic concept behind such capstone documents;
(5) force planning (including budgeting);
(6) planned vs. actual implementation (strategically and operationally); and
(7) assessment of selected strategies regarding their legacy and enduring naval power principles. 71

This conceptual approach encompasses the overarching aims as well the subordinate policies. The interaction of politics, grand strategy, maritime strategy, and naval operations (Gray 1994: 33) must always be taken into account. 72 The dynamic relationship between strategic and operational guidelines intimately connects to the tides and currents of political changes and upheavals which have characterized the period from the 1980s onward. Major threats and challengers came and went as presidential administrations sought to craft policies according to their agendas, the pressures of domestic developments, and in response to (or in anticipation of) international crises. All the while, technological advances increasingly shaped the use of military force. Major modifiers on strategy-making (such as particular individuals or rising and falling budgets) came and went. At the same time, there are some identifiable constants in developing, maintaining, and exercising sea power. In fact, that framework of naval missions has remained relatively constant over the decades just as constant evolution in war-fighting, operational, tactical, technological, political, and strategic decision-making occurred.

Using this methodology, this study takes U.S. Navy capstone documents into consideration to produce a strategic analysis. Only overarching, “Washington-level” documents with significant involvement of top-level officials that transport fundamental assertions about the use of American sea power (more precisely: naval power), communicate aspiration to shape the course of events, and inform the Navy, the other sea services, politics, and the larger public, will be considered. 73 Given their reciprocal relationship with U.S. Navy strategy, global and

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71 This approach is inspired by Geoff Till’s discussion of the setting of sea power and seapower (2009: 21).
72 Questions of naval tactics will be outside of the realm of this discussion – despite the established bon-mot that tactical actions may have strategic consequences. The levels of war – strategy, operations, tactics – are obviously closely interrelated, as strategy requires tactics, and tactics can enabled strategy (Swartz 2011b: 14, slide 28). The political and strategic levels are more fruitful for the objective of this study. Naval tactics on the other hand remain relatively constant despite the influences of technology (Hughes 2000: 3).
73 Similar approach to Swartz (2011b: 16, slide 32): He cautions that CNO (Chief of Naval Operations, the U.S. Navy’s highest-ranking officer) involvement and visibility should also be taken into account when choosing the capstone documents to look at. Self-descriptions, on the other hand, are often of little help, for documents of the
regional (geo-) political situations, national security strategies and events, and technological innovations need to further inform the frame of reference.

Such a contextualizing approach serves as the pattern that allows tracking U.S. Navy strategy development since the end of the Cold War and comprehending it as a product of the strategic science and art of strategy.\(^{74}\) There is neither a formal nor a mathematical proof that one strategy is better than another (Kugler 2006: 86). Successful strategy – the adjective remains problematic – thus must be measured against achieving a clearly articulated objective, the emphasis of relative superiority versus an antagonist, a faithful cost-revenue calculation, and a check of advantages and disadvantages of alternative strategies (Mahnken 2010: 69). An analysis of the reaction of an antagonist/competitor in the international arena contributes to whether a strategy was successful or not. Checks and balances of domestic politics must also be taken into account for foreign policy objectives, and – quite important – that the quality of a given strategy is dependent on the intellectual capacities of a political leadership (Wagener 2010: 10-11).\(^{75}\) If strategy-making is a demanding, targeted task requiring conceptual, analytical, and evaluative talent as well as the ability to handle empirical data and numbers (all at the same time), the same holds true for strategic analysis as well. Therefore, aspects of change and continuity in capstone documents must also be taken into account (Kugler 2006: 113). In sum, the methodological challenges of strategic analysis, especially regarding the U.S. Navy, are manifold:

same league have been labeled as “strategies”, “concepts”, “visions”, “strategic plans”, etc. In the face of few formal definitions on the term (some of which may even change over time, too), Swartz rightfully underscores the need for this working interpretation. It should also be noted at this time that this dissertation does not attempt to analyze unsigned and aborted draft efforts of capstone documents in-depth (for a list of examples, see Swartz 2011b: 17, slide 34).

\(^{74}\) Thomas Mahnken (2010: 70) stated that, in the face of numerous strategic choices which are influenced both by people and by political realities, “[Strategy] is more an art than a science. […] [But that] does not mean that it cannot be studied systematically. Rather, the theory of strategy consists of concepts and considerations instead of fixed laws.”

\(^{75}\) It should be noted that this is difficult, if not impossible feat to measure. For illustration: just because a political or military leader in Washington, D.C. does not have a Navy background, he or she will not automatically disfavor the Navy for a lack of intellectual embrace of all things maritime. The same holds true for the other way around: A Navy background does not automatically warrant a comprehensive proposition of the sea-going services. As an instructive example, consider the presidency of James E. “Jimmy” Carter (1977-1981), a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of 1947). As will be emphasized in the central chapters of this study, his presidency was one that is largely viewed as detrimental to the Navy. Ronald Reagan’s two terms (1981-1989), on the other hand, were a period of “naval renaissance.” Reagan was a U.S. Army Captain during World War II, serving on the U.S. East and West Coasts, but not overseas. His background was in the acting and advocacy business before he became a politician in the 1950s. This goes to show that personal backgrounds of stakeholders are hardly an analytical category to reckon with. Personalities and strategy-making, as much as everything else, is about context, and political and personal interplay.

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“Proof of a document’s ‘success’ is impossible; too many interacting military, political, bureaucratic, economic & human factors to track; impossibility of untangling all relationships; difficulty in finding data (very sparse and unbalanced literature; difficulty in finding accurate data (memories can be thin reeds); precise parallels between past & present & future are speculative.” (Swartz 2011b: 12, slide 24; emphasis in original)

In turn, this makes the methodology of identifying and analyzing a pattern all the more central. It should be helpful to visualize, again, what the context of the subject area of interest is and how it can be framed methodologically.

Illustration 8: The Setting of the U.S. Navy Strategy

Seapower input

Grand

Security

Military

Maritime

Navy

Seapower output

Development of the strategy, sea-strategic concept, force structure and budget, major naval operations, etc.
6 The Particulars of Naval Strategic Culture and How They Inform Strategy and Force Employment

After the terms and conditions of sea power have now been established, the genesis of grand, military, and naval strategy has been touched upon, and typical models of rational force planning and strategic deliberation processes have been outlined, it must be noted that there is a particular strategic culture that governs how one thinks about the sea as an operating space for military force. After all, the key contribution of the U.S. Navy to U.S. national security is the conduct of operations at and from the sea with the central theme of expeditionary warfare (Barnett 2009: 6-7). There are certain constraints, but also a number of opportunities associated with war at and war from the sea. “Naval warfare,” as Bernard Brodie (cited in Barnett 2009: 44) remarked, “differs from land warfare in the objectives aimed at, the implements used, and the characteristics of the domain on which it wages”. These boundaries influence the applicability of naval power at all times. Senior civilian decision-makers must expect expertise from their subordinates and from military leaders due consideration of these factors. These individuals also have an obligation of counseling objectively and true to facts. It follows that advisors and decision-makers can formulate a wise strategy only in acquaintance with the specific opportunities (and potential shortcomings) of naval forces, thus minimizing the risk of catastrophic failure.\(^6\)

6.1 Multidimensionality of the Operating Space

The space that is analytically relevant for sea power has dramatically increased in complexity in the course of just over a century. Well into the 1800s, it was one-dimensional, essentially encompassing surface warfare using rowing boats, then sail ships, and finally steam-powered vessels. Thanks to massive technological innovation since the early 20\(^{th}\) century, the space became three-dimensional owing to the advent of submarines and aviation. Later that century, exploration of the earth’s atmosphere and space added a fourth dimension. The fifth dimension, electronic warfare (EW), has complicated the analysis.\(^7\) With regard to the 21\(^{st}\) century, cyberspace became the sixth dimension of naval warfare. Jointness and combined operational dynamics add additional layers. In short, these developments have vastly complicated orchestrating financial, personnel, technological, and intellectual resources. It follows for decision-makers that naval power must be wielded in a sound and coherent fashion in order to make a

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\(^6\) (Strategic) Failure also has effects on learning. Armies and navies hardly ever learn from success (Gray 1994: 23), and may thus fall victim to planning for the last, rather than the next conflict. As a matter of fact, Gray noted that “painful experience provides excellent education” (ibid: 43).

\(^7\) Gray described the five dimensions of naval warfare as surface, sub-surface, aviation, EW, and nuclear weapons (1994: 132-133).
strategic difference. Success in any one dimension is usually not very likely to be decisive enough in winning a war as a whole – save perhaps for the employment of the “wild card” nuclear weapons (Gray 1994: 135). This is a consideration that relates to the distinct subcultures that can be observed in the U.S. Navy (as much as in any other modern naval force). These subcultures, or unions, are usually the surface warfare, submarine warfare, and naval aviation careers that those who wear a naval uniform must specialize in early in their professional education. Such specialization usually occurs according to talent, military aspirations, socialization, and a host of other factors. Therefore, at times it is perhaps misleading to speak of the Navy as a whole. The “unions” are in a constant competition with each other regarding budgetary allocations, promotion of flag officers to the top of functional/regional commands, or staff positions in the White House, Pentagon, or elsewhere. Yet, their common denominator is a naval strategic culture that influences how the members think about, and consequently appraise, their operating spaces. This culture is an amalgam of shared beliefs, values, and training regarding the use of military force to achieve political ends (Barnett 2009: 9). It feeds from immediate common experiences as well as from a larger, overarching institutional experience. Naval history – the academic study of war at sea, and how and why naval forces operated – becomes an important tool in conveying such experience to the officer corps, politicians, and the broader public. In other words (Grove 1992: 189), “naval history is far too important for naval practitioners of any generation to ignore.”

6.2 Naval Forces and Their Oceanic Environment
The maritime domain differs from conditions on land in a number of ways. The physical complexity of the operating space and the forces of nature are worth noting. Wind, waves, precipitation, ice, clouds, fog, currents, temperature, or obstacles such as reefs, sandbanks, shallow waters, and confined waterways mandate a heavy dependence of naval forces on technology. Mastering the art of navigation is a central life insurance policy against the brute forces of nature. The world’s physical and legal organization influences significantly what navies offer to do – and how they do it.

6.2.1 Technology
The dependence on technology for survival at sea, coupled with the capabilities of the individual to master such technologies, can be described illustratively (in stark contrast to the way

78 It should be noted that the U.S. Marine Corps is part of the surface and aviation communities, owning to its unique position within the Department of the Navy. Its roles in modern combat and war-fighting (infantry, counterinsurgency, et al) furthermore shape the self-image of the USMC. Interestingly, a subculture for EW, cyber-space, or nuclear weapons has not (yet) taken shape.

79 For further discussion of the subject, see Jervis (1995).
of doing business in armed forces on land) as, “The Navy mans the equipment while the Army equips the man” (Barnett 2009: 17). Successful sea power rests principally on fielding and mastering sound technology in overcoming the hardships and hazards associated with the sea. For a warship, that means staying afloat, going places, and returning home as deemed necessary, in order to defend itself, serve larger policy (even strategic) objectives, provide operating and rest space for its crew, and to be interoperable with other branches of the military or international partners in joint and combined operations. A reliable industrial base that can provide for such an advanced system of systems is imperative if one wants to sustain forces and morale.

6.2.2 Points of intersection

Given the sheer distance and multidimensionality of the domain, focal points on the high seas are the own and opposite coastlines and numerous choke points, straits, harbors, approaches, channels, canals, and bights. Whether natural (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz that connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea or the Strait of Gibraltar that links the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea) or man-made (such as the Suez Canal which allows transit from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden or the Panama Canal which links the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean), these hubs and bottlenecks are a prime starting point for trying to obtain influence through force. Collins (1998: 57) points out that control of key straits and other natural or manmade narrows has been a basic military objective since naval warfare came into vogue, because adversary armed forces on one or both sides of any naval choke point may try to deny free passage to opponents. The history of the 20th century is littered with events where such bottlenecks made bold headlines. The Panama and Suez Canals, Gibraltar, the Dardanelles, the Red Sea’s southern gate at Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait that separates Taiwan from mainland China, and the Strait of Hormuz astride sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that have been (or still are) bones of contention. The control of sea lines of communications and choke points enables reinforcements of forces and their logistical support, whereas the control of geographic areas at sea enables the projection of power from the sea on land. Countries can be coerced or economically throttled by way of a blockade, and

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80 It follows that for many naval officers and enlisted personnel develop an almost intimate familiarity with the units that they work with and serve on. This symbiotic relationship is most visibly displayed by the fact that members of the naval service usually live and work on their respective (sea-going) units (with some notable and obvious exceptions such as command billet holders, ashore staff, naval aviators, and most submariners who usually get to spend their time off a vessel while it is in port).

81 For an illustrative discussion on the importance of industry for war, see for example Heinz Schulte (2012), Die Industrie und der Krieg.
one’s own maritime traffic and coast can be guarded against interference (Fischbock 1982: 1). Choke points and sea-lines can become a scarce strategic commodity (Nincic 2002).

6.2.3 Legal context

The economic importance of the seas goes hand in hand with an almost absolute absence of political control and jurisdiction, at least in comparison to the contexts ashore. International rules and regulations such as the Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) (1982), or the International Ships and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) (2004) cannot overcome the realization that international waters, the High Seas beyond the territorial waters (12 nautical miles) are largely ungoverned spaces.

The following illustration shows the legal boundaries of the oceans and its neighboring airspace. The prescription stems from the UNCLOS. The territorial sea (measured 12 nautical miles from the so-called baseline, the low-water mark) is sovereign territory of the given state. Legally, rights and obligations similar to land and airspace apply. The adjacent exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the sea zone in which a state has special rights over the exploration of marine resources. It stretches 200 nautical miles from the coast. The surface waters are international waters. In other words, a third state can use the seas – in accordance with UNCLOS – up until the 12-nm-territorial water mark. This has significant political ramifications. The absence of clear boundaries at sea (and the need to rely on GPS technology or visual marks like buoys) and unclear intentions can inhibit otherwise legal and rational encounters.

82 Maritime trade and seaborne commerce increasingly dominate prosperity and global economic development, and are consequently a good worth safeguarding in times of peace, conflict, and war. Often, these sea lines are compared to land-based routes. In contrast to highways or railway lines, however, fixed and clearly marked routes are unusual at sea – safe for harbors, choke points, approaches, and roadsteads.

83 For comprehensive overviews, see Andree Kirchner (2012) and Tim René Salomon (2013).
With the increasing use of the sea for commercial and political means, there appears to be a larger need for international law to regulate the jurisdiction of the domain. At the same time, the world’s oceans remain in ownership of the world’s population (commons), in essence an area that does not belong to a single state, but offers global access (Posen 2003). Posen emphasizes that command of the commons (the seas, air space above 15,000 feet, space, and cyberspace) is the indispensable foundation of American hegemony. It follows that states that bring to bear corresponding means can use the sea as a genuinely unique area for deployment, positioning, and (military) operations (Feldt 2003: 25).

However, rules of engagement for the use of military force at sea have also gained importance in what can be understood as the famous ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma at sea’. Jervis (1995: 43) speculates that

“Some technologies and tactics generate incentives to strike first. In such a situation fighting may occur even though neither side wants it: each knows that despite a mutual interest in staying at peace, attacking is much better than receiving the first blow. Because ships are small in number and relatively vulnerable, […] navies are more prone to destabilizing dynamics of this kind than are armies. While there are cases of isolated inadvertent exchanges between land units, these rarely spread very far. But ships not only carry more national prestige, they operate in fleets and the potential for undesired escalation is very great.”
Therefore, there is a direct thread that runs from strategic objectives to tactical and operational procedures, where tactical actions in turn can have strategic consequences. Navy commanders must be aware of such problems and follow rules and regulations closely. These issues notwithstanding, the legal context translates into the ‘freedom of the seas’, which is of overarching strategic use for a global power projecting nation such as the United States. Using the freedom of the seas, the U.S. (and for that matter any other state so wishing) can routinely deploy its forces across the globe to loiter at the territorial seas of a friend or competitor, survey international naval exercises, collect data and intelligence, transit straits and canals, etc. The sea thus offers unique opportunities for a preventively-tailored security and a defense policy built around crisis management and conflict prevention (Feldt 2003: 25). The control of the seas is, as previously noted, a very important power factor. Despite the fact that the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS to date, the Convention has entered into customary law and its effects are of central strategic and political importance to the U.S.

6.3 Mobility, Flexibility, and Scalability of Naval Forces

Long transits into a given theater of military operations can be a logistical nightmare for an island nation such as the United States. This problem is overcome by relying on permanent forward bases, host-nation support, or port rights in allied countries. In peacetime, crisis, and war, replenishment-at-sea (RAS) maneuvers complement extended periods on station for Navy warships; floating warehouses supply warships with fuel, ammunition, stores, mail, and numerous other services while at sea. This allows operations in a given area for weeks (as opposed to days), with the notable exemption of nuclear-powered vessels, which are limited only by the physical and psychological endurance of the crew.

The scalability of force packages from single units to large fleets and the flexibility of naval platforms to serve in a variety of missions vastly broaden policy options. From maritime interdiction operations to sanctions/no-fly zone enforcement, noncombatant evacuation operations, and preemptive strikes on the lower end of the spectrum to amphibious raids/assaults and full-scale strike warfare to defeat an enemy on the higher-intensity end of combat operations, naval forces can – in principle – offer a broad and politically rationalized palette of opportunities to decision-makers (USNWC 2011: 39). Others options include contributions to global or regional balance of forces, surveillance and shadowing (intelligence gathering),

84 For instructive samples, see DON/OPNAV/HQ USMC/DHS/USCG (2007) and Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School (2012).
85 For a critical assessment regarding the potential military use of the seas for armament, warfare, testing, and military-political political objectives, see Gröh (1988: 21-53).
demonstration of political will and technological innovation, sea denial (rejection of access to a certain area at sea), blockade and quarantine, “showing the flag”, port visits, contributions to alliance coherence, maritime security and safeguarding from piracy and maritime terrorism, and denial of a shadow jurisdiction of the high seas (Hofmann 1983: 137-139). Cost-intensive naval units, often delivered in only the smallest of quantities (a marked difference to the quantitatively expansive armament of armies and even air forces), must therefore be flexible enough to attend many, if not all, of these tasks successively and complementary. A ship that serves only a single task is hardly useful (with the exception of the strategic deterrence submarines). During operations in task forces (with task groups and task units as subordinate categories), such a modular concept can be brought to full effect. Admiral William Halsey, Jr. (1882-1959) compared it with a card game, stating,

“A fleet is like a hand of cards at poker or bridge. You don’t see it as aces and kings and deuces. You see it as a hand, a unit. You see a fleet as a unit, not carriers, battleships and destroyers. You don’t play the individual card, you play the hand” (cited in Barnett 2009: 79).\(^{86}\)

In the U.S. Navy, the operational procedures in times of peace only marginally differ from operations in conflict and war, save perhaps for the use of weapons, the accompanying risk, and the mounting tension and fear (Barnett 2009: 41). The Navy, unlike the Army or the Air Force, is not a garrisoned force. Its training at sea but in view of the own or foreign coastline (or carefully transmitted through media outlets) can be a more direct and visible contribution to U.S. national security needs than the work-up of a Army brigade at a military training facility in Louisiana or an Air Force dry bombing-run of a warplane at a proving ground in Indiana. U.S. naval forces are designed to be inherently deployable and, whether in times of peace or crisis, they need to keep up a high operations tempo to overcome the inherent operational stress of being at sea.

At the same time, as outlined above, operational flexibility and maneuverability offer unique opportunities for the use of naval forces. Operations in conflict and war can include naval gun fire support of operations ashore, covert introduction of special operations forces, air operations using helicopters and airplanes, air defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, and amphibious warfare (vertical insertion via helicopter, horizontal insertion via amphibious transport). Moreover, anti-surface warfare (ASuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW), and mine-countermeasures (MCM) warfare constitute key applications of

\(^{86}\) For a sample composition of U.S. Navy task forces and task groups, see annex to this dissertation.
The portfolio is further complemented by options such as non-combatant evacuation missions, humanitarian assistance, sanctions enforcement, and maritime security, although some may hold that these missions are not what navies should primarily be maintained for, and which can only be side projects for the core tasks.

Naval forces are a scalable and subtly tuned part of the military and policy toolbox of a state. Unlike armies and air forces, forward presence can be applied outside of territorial waters, and can be withdrawn with relatively little loss of face (Hoffmann 1983: 144). Overflight or stationing rights in foreign countries (with their possible political ramifications, both internationally and at home) do not play a larger role. In contrast to garrisoned, stationary forces, which may have to conquer, clear, hold, control and defend physical territory, the advantage of naval forces is their inherent dynamic posture. At the same time, war at and from the sea must deal with the absence of geographic front lines, a vastly more complicated reconnaissance and surveillance of territory at sea, and nearly constant maneuverability of naval force. A ship outside of a port, whether it is friend or foe, is hardly ever in a stationary position. It follows that their relative mobility, flexibility, and adaptability represent a “way of life” (Barnett 2009: 64-66). This knowledge underlines, in turn, that in order to make a strategic difference sea power must be tightly moored to political goals and strategic objectives (Gray 1994: 11). Otherwise, navies risk their strategic irrelevance.

The essence of the post-World War II U.S. Navy is globally forward operations in peacetime, crises, and war. This significantly influences the way naval officers think about the contributions their service can provide. Because of their operations-heavy experience, they often overlook the strategic effects navies (and the U.S. Navy) can have. They can fail to acknowledge the geostrategic effects navies have when these officers are physically tasked to write strategy. As Haynes (2013: 9) points out, such emphasis on operational experience, tactical skills, technological knowledge, and resource management was reasonable during the demands of the Cold War. But it came at the expense of a greater understanding of the Navy’s strategic effects and the underlying strategic theoretical foundations of sea power. Someone who by virtue of their professional upbringing is schooled at keeping the largest degree of versatility may be skeptical if not outright disdainful of written strategic concepts, or elaborated capstone documents crafted at a Pentagon or White House desk. Even codified, written doctrine is often skeptically received; after all, the U.S. Navy (in marked difference with other U.S.

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87 Colin Gray suggested abstaining from understanding land power, air power and sea power as a zero-sum game. Rather, one has to consider the relative strategic applicability of sea power (Gray 1994: 10; emphasis by the author) over other forms of military interventionism. This dissertation follows that counsel.
services or institutions and some foreign navies) prides itself on its “can-do” attitude, its ad hoc operational and flexible mentality (Swartz 2009b: 14). Naval doctrine functions more like the British constitution, passed from generation to generation of naval officers. Attempts to codify doctrine in naval warfare publications were often all but ignored. As a result, the Navy never developed a formal corpus of doctrine capstone documents like the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, or the joint forces did (and do).

All of this – lack of political controls, unburdened oceanic environment, a certain degree of independence from daily logistical support, extended sustainability, multi-mission capability – fosters a highly imaginative and innovative mindset in the minds of Navy operators (Barnett 2009: 69). Strategy development in a democracy is a multi-level, dynamic, but very seldom bureaucratically traceable, and ultimately nonlinear process. It must also be noted that there are obviously also disadvantages to naval forces which can translate into political disadvantages. These include misinterpretation of signals, limitations of endurance, vulnerabilities, and indecisive outcomes (Forster 2013: 15-17).

6.4 The Elements of a Strategic Concept

The problem of formulating strategy, much less sound strategy, stems from a dilemma. On the one hand, strategy must serve as guiding principles for decision-makers. It has to be clear and concise. On the other hand, it appears illogical and outright impossible to expect from a strategy a prompt, adequate reply to any and all current and potentially emerging policy challenges. Therefore, strategy must be flexible enough to provide guidance beyond the day. The value of a written strategy thus can be constrained (Wagener 2010: 2). If the development of strategy often is a permanent process of questioning, application, and evaluation (Hattendorf 2004: 2) – a perpetual “reality check” – the question is why does a military service, a Navy in general, and the U.S. Navy in particular need a strategy?

As a young political scientist in 1954, Samuel Huntington wrote in his ground-breaking article ‘National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy’ that three key elements would define an armed branch of the military. According to Huntington,

“a military service may be viewed as consisting of [1] a strategic concept which defines the role of the service in national policy, [2] public support which furnishes it with the resources to perform this role, and [3] organizational structure which groups the resources so as to implement most effectively the strategic concept” (Huntington 1954; emphasis by the author).
Calling for a unifying purpose that shapes and directs a military service’s activities, the strategic concept should describe how, when, and where a military would appear to protect national security. Without such a fundamental description of how to implement national policy, a military service would remain merely the sum of its parts, its people, its platforms, its traditions, and its bases. Moreover, a strategic concept needed to provide impetus for budgetary allocation by the government and recruit personnel, without which a military branch cannot be sustained. The resources allocated to a service, Huntington noted, are a function of the public support that the institution enjoys. The service has a responsibility to harness such support and foster an organizational culture that supports such endeavors.

“It can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to national security. [...] If a service does not possess[s] a well defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.” (Huntington 1954)

Whereas these roles can be analyzed individually, one should not understand these dynamics solely as linear processes. Strategic planning resembles a parallel process, not a sequential one. Strategic planning (declaratory, procurement, manning, etc.) and execution run on parallel tracks, often with very limited feedback and interaction between one another. It follows that by focusing on strategy as a sole determinant of naval power, the analysis must fall short. Rather, the strategy, policy, concepts and doctrines are a determinant of national naval power, not the exclusive determinant (Swartz 2011b: 46, slides 91-92).88

This dissertation proposes to explain the constituents of U.S. seapower by dividing them into a horizontal (functional) and a vertical (institutional) axis.

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88 CAPT (USN) John Byron, in a 1987 USNI Proceedings article, noted four determinants, namely strategy, resource input, force structure, and technology. Each drives and is driven by the other three (Swartz 2011b: 46).
In other words, American seapower (a functional and a horizontal dimension) and the sea power it wields is a complex and comprehensive amalgam of rational and institutional makers, shapers, and factors – as part of an “outward-looking foreign policy […] rooted in geography, political constitution, and national character” (Cropsey 2013: 85). After discussion the institutional and functional American seapower (one word) in chapter 7, the dissertation will then analyze American sea power (two words) in chapters 8, 9, and 10.
7 Makers, Shapers, Factors: Genesis of American Seapower

7.1 Horizontal Dimension: Functional Constituents of the U.S. as a Seapower

There are central factors that influence seapower in the sense of area analysis and formulation of applicability of a given naval strategy. A firm knowledge and a sound understanding of the functional dimensions of seapower can sustain successful strategic application. If one is unclear and ineffective about seapower (one word) components, sea power (two words) cannot unfold to the degree desired. A comprehensive discussion of all characteristics of American seapower, not unlike the one that Mahan, Booth, and Grove have carved out, would certainly warrant its own independent, geospatial study. It is useful to briefly look at the factors, keeping in mind the global applicability that governs such an understanding of seapower, but it is ultimately fruitless to simply measure U.S. landmass, economic output, or other contributors and then proclaim the absolute quality of American seapower. Geo-economic issues mean little without the context of grand strategy.

According to Ken Booth (1979: 173), the central determinants of functional seapower – and these can obviously be applied to the U.S. as well as any other state – are:

- physical separation of a state’s fleets and units (U.S. reserve fleets on the East and West Coast plus the forward-deployed assets);
- the quality and quantity of its harbors (a number of large naval bases on either coast, several of that largest commercial ports worldwide on the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific);
- a state’s location relative to important choke points and potential allies/enemies (as an island nation with strong normative and historical ties to Eurasia);
- the distance from the country’s own maritime obligations (global); and,
- the type of land/water that separates a state and its maritime responsibilities (the High Seas).89

A detailed analysis of the application of military seapower would also have to include cultural geography, that is: population patterns, ethnicities and races, religious groups, population geography (cities, towns, military bases, military installations, fortifications), and infrastructure in the littoral and coastal regions (ports, approaches, offshore installations, navigational hazards, channels, canals, locks, docks, shipyards, roadsteads, railroads, airports, pipelines,

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bridges). Such an area analysis has significant military implications that cannot be totally left out of consideration by military planners. Very broadly speaking, there are two pillars to functional seapower, a geographic and an economic one.

Regarding physical geography, factors such as position, size, texture of the landmass, offshore islands, shape of territory, drained areas along the coast, geology, condition of the soil and vegetation principally constitute seapower, one’s own or anyone else’s. These considerations have very real naval implications for shipbuilding and training. It holds true that, “Currents, tides, waves, swell, and sea ice are manifestations of intense interest to military mariners and civilian policy-makers who plan, prepare for, conduct, or depend upon naval considerations” (Collins 1998: 49). Additionally, tactical awareness is a major enabler of sea power. The complexion of the sea water, surf, the littoral zone, light data, meteorological circumstances, and climate conditions also govern effective application of naval force (ibid: 340). A nation that understands itself as a seapower needs to factor in these considerations. Aspects pertaining to oceanography (the oceans, their contents, subsea topography, shorelines, etc.) have an influence on the use of sea power, too. The operating conditions and mastering the challenges they provide shape naval plans, programs, and operations on, above, and below the surface along the littoral as well as on the high seas. They influence ship designs, amphibious landings, and submarine and antisubmarine warfare (ibid: 59). The constant and complex threat of natural disaster such as floods, storms, and earthquakes also needs to be taken into account. A seapower can hedge against such disasters by developing contingency plans and provide deployable military and civil-diplomatic power to dispatch rapidly to a crisis area. For that, it needs to maintain a capable industrial and intellectual base of private and federal institutions employing oceanographers, meteorologists, and other (maritime) researchers. Many declaratory strategies, especially those on military force, cannot include all of these issues. However, such high-level documents need to at least implicitly convey that the planning rests on a

90 On the level of tactics, a comprehensive picture is indispensable for the military leaders, and military geography (approaches, chokepoints, cover) needs to be taken in account. It also informs military logistics, replenishment, maintenance, engineering, and transport of materiel and casualties. This points to the intimate relation of the different level of wars again, for a seemingly peripheral issue such as casualties can be charged with strategic importance.

91 “The littoral zone is the part of the ocean closest to the shore. The littoral zone is from the shoreline to 600 feet (183 meters) out into the water and is divided into three zones: the supralittoral zone, the intertidal zone, and the sublittoral zone. The supralittoral, or spray, zone is only underwater during unusually high tides or during storms. It starts at the high-tide line and goes toward dry land. The intertidal zone is between the high-tide and low-tide lines. The sublittoral zone extends from the low-tide line out to 200 meters. The littoral zone is a tricky area for predicting water conditions because so many factors affect it. Coast currents, onshore and offshore winds, reef, bays, and the shape of the shoreline are some of the things sailors have to deal with in this zone.” (Office of Naval Research, Science & Technology Focus. Ocean Regions: Littoral Zone – Characteristics; http://www.onr.navy.mil/focus/ocean/regions/littoralzone1.htm [22 March 2013])
sound understanding and knowledge of functional seapower components. A declaratory strategy need not factor in the remote possibility of coastal devastation by a major accident or a natural disaster, but it must convey to its audience that such an event would not render the strategy completely useless. In addition, an overarching strategy has to – at least implicitly – consider geopolitics, centers of gravity, strategic mobility of one’s own and the opponent’s forces, alliances, and critical infrastructure. Naval doctrine can be helpful to that end, but overarching documents have to be flexible and comprehensive enough (sometimes perhaps deliberately vague) to have their desired impact. A declaratory strategy that does not take into account these important constraints is doomed to significantly limit its own effectiveness.

A second pillar of functional seapower is the economic domain. It goes without saying that a potent industrial base, sustained investments in state-of-the-art research, design and technology, and access to (and profit from) the liberal international market enable sustaining capable naval forces. In fact, the protection of ocean trade, which would be rooted in and considerably further a country’s industrial base and economic well-being, rests at the very heart of Mahan’s naval strategy ideas. To arrive at a more contemporary assessment of economic inputs into and net value from seapower, analyses of the percentage of GDP (directly or indirectly invested in the maritime domain and maritime business, or in relation to other branches), the merchant fleet size, the seaport usage, and the population size have to be considered (Kearsley 1992: 139-152). Once again, such a discussion would warrant its own deepened study. It must be reiterated that these aspects, even down to the operational and tactical level, can have strategic significance (as they are a carefully placed piece of the puzzle that makes an aligned successful strategy). Ultimately, this study is much more interested in the institutional, or vertical, determination of American seapower and the setting of U.S. Navy strategy in it.

7.2 Vertical Dimension: Institutional Constituents of the U.S. as a Seapower

As famous American baseball player Yogi Berra once remarked (quoted in Yarger 2006: 31), “In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is.” An analysis of domestic conditions for the institutional mooring of sea power which rests solely on theoretical models will therefore likely remain limited in practice-oriented analysis. Too intertwined and ultimately impossible to tease apart are the various responsibilities, institutional and personal interests, leadership and subordinate personalities, institutions, systemic dynam-

92 For an enlightening discussion about the crucial relationship between naval force and the U.S. seapower status, see Mackenzie Eaglen/Bryan McGrath (2011). There, the authors explore how the maritime power that is the United States requires sustained financial and intellectual investments into naval force for one cannot function without the other.
ics, and the interplay of politics, policy, and polity. History also plays a significant role. As Kearsley (1992: 157) remarked, “In relation to maritime power, there is also value in looking at the population’s links with its past, so as to better understand its current attitude and future direction.” A people with a maritime history and a maritime component of its political culture can go a long way in establishing institutional seapower.

### 7.2.1 Hierarchic Organizations and their Planning and Learning Processes

Collins’ attempt to display the strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities (or “Who does what?”) serves as an illustration of a hierarchical model that allocates responsibilities for the different levels of military strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Strategies</th>
<th>Primary Focus</th>
<th>Primary Participants</th>
<th>Primary Policies</th>
<th>Primary Input</th>
<th>Primary Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Objectives</td>
<td>Chief of State; Governmental Advisers</td>
<td>National Policies</td>
<td>National Power</td>
<td>National Plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Strategies</td>
<td>Regional Objectives</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers; Ambassadors</td>
<td>Foreign Policies</td>
<td>Diplomacy; Economic Levers</td>
<td>International Accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Military Strategies</td>
<td>Regional Military Missions</td>
<td>Defense Ministers; CINCs</td>
<td>Unilateral or Coalition Policies</td>
<td>Unilateral or Coalition Forces</td>
<td>Unilateral or Coalition Plans and Ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Art and Tactics</td>
<td>Subordinate Military Missions</td>
<td>Subordinate Military Commanders</td>
<td>Joint or Single Service Policies</td>
<td>Joint or Single Service Forces</td>
<td>Joint or Single Service Plans and Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 10: Joint and Tactical Hierarchy (Collins 2002: 4).

This template can be applied to the American context. There is a logical causal connection between the operational art and tactics and the national strategies (see also illustration 4). The division of labor and responsibility ensures a shared effort to attain the larger strategic ends. It also helps to hold politicians, appointees, and military commanders accountable for their actions and plans. The national military, regional, and theater military strategies are designed by designated civilian and military individuals.

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93 The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military (2002: 441) defines a theater (of operations) as “a large geographical area designated for the conduct of military operations and for the administration of such operations.”
Similar to the standardized models of strategic planning, a formalized textbook process of institutional learning seldom confirms to practice. Historically, with regards to navies, there have been two kinds of revolutionary changes that shaped how these military services think about their function. Either, technological innovation prompts a “bottom-up” reaction or shifts in the international security environment provoke a “top-down” response. The former is more common than the latter (Breemer 1994: 40). The figure below, taken from John Nagl’s landmark study on counterinsurgency, serves as an illustration. Although it deals explicitly with doctrine, strategic learning — arguably even more complex and fragile than doctrine — works under similar dynamics.94

The differences in the level of ambition between doctrine and strategy have been established. It is also of note that the particulars of a military service — especially those being at sea — are often limiting the opportunity and indeed the ability to think and act according to the doctrine, and even more so to strategy. In other words: Doctrinal learning has the most chances of being successfully moving forward with people (or institutions) who can commit sufficient time and resources to the art of learning; on the other hand, many institutions and certainly a lot of military officers on active duty seldom find themselves able to consider the larger questions at hand. This is certainly even more true for the even abstracter art of strategy (beyond, perhaps, what has been taught in the course of education), and significantly being reduced the farther down the chain of command one goes. The implementation of best practices may be the best thing participants can hope for. In other words: the navy sailor at sea is focused on doing his or her job, and that is a full-time employment. Doctrine may be an issue for officers; strategy is hardly an issue on the minds of anyone below the level of admiralty, or in the civilian world below agency leadership (Haynes 2013: 7). Exceptions only prove the rule.

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mains highly desirable. In lieu of an agency framework, a closer look at strategic processes is necessary. This comes at the significant cost of adding further complication to the analysis.

Process is the key to understanding and explaining naval strategy. It does not suffice to identify and analyze ideas and concepts. In order to elucidate the history of naval strategy, one must move behind the ideas to consider where they came from, and how they were translated from theory into practice (Rosenberg 1993: 145). It follows that standardized models for the evolution of strategy have rather limited value, especially in the face of competing interests and research methodologies that historians and political scientists bring to bear. More than a dozen aspects could be accounted for in a comprehensive analysis of naval strategy and the historical context in which the capstone documents emerge.

- The nature of naval training and education, officer career patterns, professional specialization of the officer corps;
- The career patterns and operational, technical, and staff background of individual naval officers in significant national or fleet positions of leadership;
- The procurement expenses, capabilities, operating patterns, and sustainment requirements of modern naval weapons systems;
- Changes in tactical doctrine and naval operational art;
- The administrative structure, operational doctrine, strategic plans, and command and control organization of tactical units beyond individual warships;
- The sources of intelligence information, including their nature, their quality, and their frequency, and the methods of intelligence production, analysis, and dissemination;
- The structure, organization, and procedures of naval service’s strategic planning;
- The structure, organization, and procedures of naval service-wide systems/sensors/weapons program and procurement planning;
- The status of research and development progress of a nation’s naval warfare technology and the situation of the national scientific and industrial infrastructure for research, development, and production of naval warfare technology;
- The character and personalities of national naval service leadership;
- The structure, organization, and procedures of national strategic military planning;

As of 2014, an agency-focus analysis of naval strategy-making in the United States remains a sought-after academic desideratum. As a theoretical discourse, or focusing on the details of one particular Navy strategy, such a study in the context of evaluating and measuring the strategic utility of naval forces would be most desirable as a methodological handout and a conceptual instruction. Hattendorf (2004) has some points regarding the formal processes. Insightful, but limited to PowerPoint slide format, is Swartz’ study on lessons learned (2009b).
The structure, organizations, and procedures of national program and procurement planning;

The character and personalities of national defense leadership;

The character and structure of the national political system as it relates to defense issues; and,

The character, structure, and status of national financial and economic systems as they relate to national defense (ibid: 150-152).

However, a ready template or methodology has thus far not emerged. Analysts have repeatedly attempted to grasp these complex processes and to understand and explain the determinants of naval strategy making (Grove 1990). The quintuplicate of “machines, men, manufacturing, management and money” (Sumida/Rosenberg 1995) sums up the governing factors of the quintessential forces at play. Wilfried Stallmann (2000: 259) added a sixth factor: mentality. Once again, these organizational features of the Navy strategy process are difficult to weigh in their relative importance, and ultimately impossible to tease apart.

Although some of these factors may be secondary in nature, their correlative value – first their influence on a work-in-progress Navy strategy; second their reflection in tabled drafts of such documents; third their accurate success/failure as part of a published strategy; fourth their persistence (i.e., operational reflection, and continuity in following strategies) – must be considered in the overall picture. They are not necessarily sequential in what is called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes in the U.S. Department of Defense bureaucracy, but often parallel, converging, competing, and ultimately impossible to discern academically. It follows that the process of naval strategy-making is not a mechanistic dynamic, but an organic one. It cannot be captured easily in flow charts. In fact, it rests more on operational experience or programmatic realities (often classified, obscure, complex and poorly articulated) than on readily definable theory. This makes the process hard to track and even harder to describe (Rosenberg 1993: 174). In other words, Navy strategy is an organic, intricate, non-linear, and inherently dynamic system that is methodologically challenging to analyze. This leads the researcher to return to the larger context, such as grand strategy, framework conditions, and the trade winds of political processes. If one wishes to understand why and how the Navy formulated its capstone documents the way it did, one needs to comprehend the broader grand strategy (and strategic) choices. These, in turn, were influenced by
world events, domestic interests, technology, naval force employment options, and intellectual influences stemming from the idealistic strategic culture of the United States.\footnote{This segment’s deduction was developed for, and is to a significant degree based on the paper “Managing Strategic Change, Embracing a New World Order. U.S. Navy Strategy in the 1990s, with Special Consideration of the Atlantic Ocean”, given by the author on the occasion of the McMullen Naval History Symposium, September 20, 2013, at the United States Naval Academy (USNA) in Annapolis, MD. The author holds a copy.}

Collins provided a useful illustration of the six-step planning process, fully aware that this would constitute a simplification of the dynamics at play (illustration 12). Beginning with the national interests, threats to those fundamental aspects of national benefit and well-being are identified. To counter such pressures, political and military objectives are derived to guard these national interests. It follows that the military leadership, complying with providing options to the civilian commander-in-chief, devises a preferable military strategy. That, in turn, is influenced by domestic and foreign policies (and, one might add, politics as well). A coherent strategy identifies the resources it requires, which are inevitably finite and thus must be checked against those resources available. It follows that ends and means are ultimately mismatched. Consequently, trade-offs and acceptable risk must be considered. Once those risks have been identified, the strategy, the resources, or both are subject to revision. Such changes can occur frequently if and when political-military priorities, threats, and policies transform. In general, the frequent and chaotic interplay and correlation between those logical steps is seldom discernible.
Illustration 12: Six-Step Strategic Planning Process (Collins 2002: 6)

In order to comprehend continued high levels of spending on defense and the concurrent efforts at doctrinal and strategic adjustment as well as institutional redesign, one must also look at the role of ideas – and fundamentally, to what end a military is used – as well as domestic and bureaucratic (i.e. inter-service, inter-administration, inter-governmental) politics (Goldman/Arquilla 1999: 11). These logical chains are often broken and obstructed.

For context, it is useful to briefly explain the functions and roles of those domestic makers and shapers of institutionalized American seapower. This aims to present the reader with a sense of context for American seapower and strategy-making responsibilities (these include statements or actions that effect strategy, naval operations, policies, etc.). It also provides insight into some standardized and non-standardized processes as well as universal responsibilities in decision-making and action regarding U.S. Navy strategy. Given the inherent dynamics
of complex bureaucracies, personal interplay, and related framework conditions, the following descriptions are only of a general nature. However, one needs to take into account the structure in order to arrive at a sound understanding of the shapes that U.S. Navy strategy, and the relevant developments associated therewith, can take. National security, after all, is ultimately a domestic public good.

Against the background of representative and applicable democratic parameters (e.g., constitutional and legal provisions, general elections every four year, Congressional elections every two years, primacy of politics, relevant jurisdictions, standardized bureaucratic processes, and professional career patterns), three generic but at best vaguely definable groups of institutional makers and shapers of U.S. Navy strategy can be defined: Makers, shapers, and factors of seapower and strategy.

- **Makers** are all those who are constitutionally obliged to “make” U.S. Navy strategy and the larger national strategy into which it links, or those who directly inform or shape such processes. The most prominent makers belong to the executive and legislative branches of government, the civilian and military bureaucracy (in particular the Department of Defense), and obviously to the Navy itself.

- **Shapers** are understood as those people or institutions that, bounded by constitutional obligations or driven by commercial and political interest, indirectly influence the making and execution of U.S. Navy strategy. They do not have a formal role in the making or execution of Navy strategy. Shapers can also be generic influences on Navy strategy that inform, propel, or in some cases even constrain how the Navy goes about its business.

- Finally, the international context and the enduring importance of ideas are valid factors to be considered.

The analytical differentiations between these groups can be murky, and the criminological tracing of “Who did what when to which effect?” is difficult, if not impossible to exercise given the scope of this study. Much rests on a combination of influences, not least the assertiveness of the characters (indeed, personalities) involved. Domestic politics, political networks and interconnectedness, membership/association with a political party, or simply access to decision-making and exercise of power play a significant role in the process. An individual strategic mindset is hard to measure, but corresponding education – e.g., PhDs in international relations or strategic studies – can serve as valuable indicators.
Given the frequently lamented problems of strategy and strategic analyses outlined earlier – or in other words, theory vs. practice – the following pages supply modest general-purpose statements regarding the qualitative organizational framework of U.S. security policy. These different makers and shapers are typically under the influence of the ‘checks and balances’ concept. That particular notion describes the often institutionalized inability of one branch (or, in some cases, a fraction of a branch) of government, one institution, or one person (or a group thereof) to attain wide-ranging power over the strategic direction of policy and, implicitly, maritime and naval strategy. America, the seapower, is an amalgam of influences from governmental institutions, ideas, a variety of interests groups, the news media, and political movements, all of which shape the foreign policy realm (Lowi et al 2010: 680) and transcend simplistic geo-economic determinants. The following makers and shapers vertically constitute institutional American seapower. These are the people and institutions responsible for the genesis of U.S. seapower and by extension Navy strategy. The following discussion does not include the specific offices and institutions within the Navy Department itself which are tasked with strategic planning; they will be acknowledged when the actual naval strategic capstone documents are analyzed (chapter 8, 9, and 10).

7.2.2 Makers
The first principal starting point to lay out what “makes” American seapower is a discussion of U.S. national interests, reflecting Collins’ six-step planning process diagram. These national interests – derived from a nation’s inherent values and proclaimed rationale – have been discussed previously in chapter 3.1, but it is worthwhile to briefly review them here. National interests can reach from the realist point of view on one end of the spectrum to the idealist or even utopian point of view on the other end. The former considers national interest inseparable from national power; the latter identifies national interests as a universal aspiration for mankind (Bindra 2005: 4-5). The weighing of these views naturally differs and emphasis often shifts with presidential policies. Still, for the U.S. a general canon of basic and indivisible national interests can be identified. These are defense interests, economic interests, world order interests, and ideological interests (ibid: 7). It must be noted that all four groups of national interests are to be subdivided into more comprehensible policy objectives. Defense interests, for instance, include the national survival of the United States, including deterrence and prevention of an attack using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction. Economic interests incorporate the viability and stability of the global economic system, including trade, energy supply, and financial markets. World order interests have as a feature
the maintenance of cordial relations among states and their citizens as well as the provision of relative peace and stability. Ideological interests include the promotion of human rights, democracy, justice, and good governance abroad.

A tripartite report from July 2000 issued jointly by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Nixon Center, and the Rand Corporation suggested – yet unobstructed by the terrorist attacks of 2001 and their aftermath – a different categorization. This academic view should not be confused with an official statement, but according to the report, national interests for the U.S. can be subdivided into vital, extremely important, important, and secondary interests.

Vital interests are the prevention, deterrence, and reduction of WMD attacks on the U.S. or its military forces abroad, assuring allies’ survival and cooperation in the international system, prevention of hostile powers or failing states on U.S. borders, ensuring the viability and stability of the major global systems, and the establishment of productive relations with strategic competitors such as China or Russia. To the commission, extremely important U.S. national interests include the prevention of WMD weapons and its proliferation, the promotion of international mechanisms and the rule of law for conflict prevention and solution; the prevention of regional hegemony in areas of interest such as the Persian Gulf, a general promotion of the well-being of America, its allies, and friends; the promotion of democracy, prosperity, and stability in the Western hemisphere, the prevention, management, reasonable termination of major conflicts in important regions, the maintenance of a key edge in military and information systems technology, the prevention of uncontrolled massive immigration across U.S. borders; the suppression of organized transnational crime, drug trafficking, and (state-sponsored) terrorism; and, the prevention of genocide.

Important national interests include discouragement of human rights violations in foreign countries, promotion of pluralism, freedom, and democracy in regions of strategic interest, prevention and ending of conflicts in less significant regions of strategic interest, protection of American citizens from terrorist organizations, reduction of the economic inequality between richer and poorer nations; prevention of nationalization of U.S.-owned assets abroad, boosting of domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors, information superiority on the dis-
tribution of U.S. values, promotion of international environmental policies, and a maximization of U.S. gross national product from international trade and investment.  

Finally, a group of secondary or, in the words of the report, “less important” national interests contains the following objectives: balance of bilateral trade deficits; enlargement of a democratic community of states; preservation of territorial integrity or the particular political constitution of other states everywhere, and export enhancement of specific sectors of the economy (Commission on America’s National Interests 2000: 5–8). In contrast, Yarger and Barber (1997) proposed a much more cautious formulation of national interests in that they warned against using a verb or an action modifier. Such semantic concerns aside, in reality national interests are seldom mutually exclusive, although national survival and well-being are a precondition for many other objectives. Policy-makers must accept certain trade-offs. It can be safely assumed that these national interests condition decision-makers’ actions. Their enduring influence stems from national political culture, U.S. history, and the strategic, national DNA. Changes to the layout or priority of these goals are usually measured in decades, not years or months (Bindra 2005: 8).

The second principal starting point for this tour d’horizon is the U.S. Constitution. As illustration 13 summarizes, a crafted division of labor and responsibilities exists between the legislative and the executive branch. In the realm of foreign policy (and implicitly decision-making that affects strategic planning accordingly), both branches of the government have certain rights and obligations, which individuals can use to various effects (the third constitutional branch, the Supreme Court, seldom interferes in these power brokerages).

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97 For introductions on regions of U.S. strategic interest from a German perspective, see Richter (2012), Heiduk (2012), Kaim (2012), Nolte (2012), and Leininger (2012).

98 Yarger and Barber also proposed the grouping of national interests along four characteristics: Defense of the homeland, economic prosperity, promotion of values, favorable world order. In a second step, the intensity of interests would be determined into vital, important, and peripheral. It follows that on this basis that challenges (that is to say threats as well as opportunities) can be identified, checked against the national strategic policy, and according policy-recommendation can be facilitated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power granted to</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War power</td>
<td>Commander in chief of armed forces(^{99})</td>
<td>Provide for the common defense; declare war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties</td>
<td>Negotiate treaties</td>
<td>Consent to treaties, by two-thirds majority (Senate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointments</td>
<td>Nominate high-level government officials</td>
<td>Confirm president’s appointments (Senate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign commerce</td>
<td>No explicit powers, but treaty negotiation and appointment powers pertain</td>
<td>Explicit power “to regulate foreign commerce”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General powers</td>
<td>Executive power; veto</td>
<td>Legislative power; power of the purse; oversight and investigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ultimately, the American system of strategic planning is a pluralistic one. According to Hattendorf (2004: 1), four discernible levels are at work. First, high policy is established at the level of the President and modified and supported by Congress. This includes the general direction for the country, and how decision-makers attempts to spend finite resources on defined objectives. Second, the general conceptual planning for war is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group provides the military context to those high-policy ends that are seen to need a forceful backing. Third, the services program the force through a system of coordinated procurement of equipment often accompanied by statements of strategy that define the rationale for the weapons or platforms involved. It is coordinated by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The Secretary is providing the rationale in the division of the budget (and labor) among the branches of the military. Fourth, the preparation of operational plans for operations is the responsibility of the various unified and specified commanders in chief. The U.S. is the only country that has divided the world into geographic areas of responsibility complemented by functional military commands.

These four actors in strategic planning, in other words the makers of strategy, need to be reviewed briefly for the purpose of this study.

\(^{99}\) Constitutionally, this is a congressional power (Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the “Commander-in-Chief clause”). The question of whether and to what extent the president has the authority to use the military absent a declaration of war by Congress is a long-standing sources of conflict and debate in political and legal circles.
The President and his senior staff are the principal architects of U.S. foreign policy (Lowi et al. 2010: 680-681, Sirakov 2012). U.S. foreign policy is very strongly identified with the President. As commander-in-chief, he is the head of state, head of government, and the highest-ranking commander of the U.S. military in peacetime, crisis, and war. It follows that there is a unique responsibility regarding the ability to put people in uniform into harm’s way. Presidents have the power to set their own foreign policy agendas (with very real ramifications for the use of military and naval force toward selected ends). They are also under almost constant pressure to respond to international crises, factor in global developments, or assess domestic events such as election campaigns, poll numbers, or economic conditions. Within the administration there may be rifts over competing policy solutions and resources, with the President often directly or by implication involved in the management of the staff battles occurring at subordinate levels. A President’s performance over the course of his term(s) is often subject to wave-like changes, and phases of strong, powerful decision-making can alternate with pursuing unrealistic policies in transition periods (Hastedt 2012: 156). Prime examples are presidential transitions. Incoming administration can have sweeping policy ambitions. Outgoing administrations can suffer from the ‘lame duck’ phenomenon (an outgoing president is unable or unwilling to be reelected but a successor is not yet inaugurated). This usually serves to impede presidential assertiveness.

The President very much relies on the National Security Council (NSC), established by the National Security Act of 1947, and the National Security Advisor. The wording speaks of national security rather than foreign policy, which shows the council’s limited strategic aspiration in contrast to long-term policy crafting (Hacke 2005: 32). That does not mean that the NSC could not, and would not, engage in micromanaging the Pentagon or other military issues. Presidents have made use of the council and its staff to varying degrees over time, and consequently on occasion National Security Advisors have risen to the highest influences on a President’s mind and action – with Henry Kissinger, advisor to President Richard Nixon 1969-1974, perhaps as the most illustrative case in point.

100 The actual power of the presidency as a person or as an institution is among the favorite subjects of researchers who focus on the political system of the United States. For an overview of the debate and literature on the subject, see Hastedt (2012: 151-152). One of the key standard discussions of Presidential powers is Neustadt (1991).
101 On the role and history of the National Security Council, see Rothkopf (2005), Auger (2012), and Horlohe (2012).
102 For a very recent example of a Secretary venting about these incursions into Pentagon responsibilities, see Gates (2014: 352, 452, 553, 586-588).
General national security decisions can involve a perceived current threat to the territorial security of the U.S., its current allies, major clients, or proxy states, and a perceived danger to U.S. government, military, or diplomatic personnel, to significant numbers of U.S. citizens, or to U.S. assets. In addition, events related to ideologically committed opponents of the U.S. (states, regimes, or regime contenders), events that likely to lead to loss of U.S. influence in regions perceived as within the U.S. sphere of influence, events which involve inter-state military conflict of potential consequence in human and strategic terms, or events that, because of civil disorder, threatened destruction of a substantial number of persons, also trigger national security decisions (Meernik 1994: 123).

U.S. military involvement in world affairs is typically larger when the region or the area of interest features an established U.S. military presence (most likely an existing base), involves the transfer of military aid to a state or organization, and if there was a prior use of force (ibid: 127). However, sea power is absent from this land-forces focused view. 103

It is crucial that such policy demands will need a toolbox that is able to fulfill a president’s needs. In other words, a coherent strategy of a military service that hedges against a broad range of uncertainties and provides options to a president is in the highest demand. However, it also runs the risk of being vague and indiscriminate. Once again, sea power with its inherent flexibility can be a preferable tool. This is not to say that sea power is the solution to everything. In fact, presidents may be tempted to over-use naval forces and thus drive a more escalatory policy. For an assessment of the relevance of sea power to a president, the intangible personality and character of a leader – his family roots, social and political upbringing, his pre-politics career, his relationship to the sea in the broadest sense – may also factor in. At the same time, an intimate understanding of the Navy or even active duty can be a formative component of national seapower and presidential sea power policies, although the influence should not be overestimated. 104

103 On the use of the military with special consideration of naval forces in the post-World War II world, see Siegel (1991) and Cobble/Gaffney/Gorenburg (2005).
104 Of the post-World War II presidents, the following served in the U.S. Navy (notably, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 34th President, was a Five-Star Army General in World War II): John F. Kennedy, the 35th President, served with distinction on torpedo boats PT-109 and PT-59 in the South Pacific in World War II. Lyndon B. Johnson, the 36th President, served in the Pacific theater – while a sitting Congressman. He retired as a Lieutenant Commander. Richard Nixon, the 37th President, retired as a Lieutenant Commander after an administrative career that took him to the Southwest Pacific in World War II. Gerald Ford, 38th President, saw wartime service on the aircraft carrier Monterey (CVL 26). He transitioned out of the Navy as a Lieutenant Commander. James Earl “Jimmy” Carter graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1947, serving as a nuclear submarine officer until his naval career cut short in 1953 when he resigned his commission due to family circumstances. George H.W.
According to Hastedt (2012: 158-161), past Presidents have tended to execute their office either in a rhetorical, unilateral, constitutional, or partisan style – all with very comprehensive implications for their way of composing and bringing across their foreign policy and according strategy. Most visible examples include policy statements named after presidents, such as the Bush (after George W. Bush) or the Monroe (after James Monroe) doctrine. All the while, the extent of presidential powers is constantly evolving, which is inherent in the interplay of ‘checks and balances’, but has also generated warnings of imperial notion or institutional blockades. Presidential planning statements on strategy, drawn up by national security staff (most notably the National Security Council and the wide-spread U.S. intelligence community)\(^{105}\) include high-level documents such as National Security Strategies. Subordinate sea-focused strategic statements include the (first) National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005). More comprehensive presidential initiatives since the turn of the century were the Container Security Initiative (CSI)\(^{106}\) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).\(^{107}\)

Seemingly lesser documents can also have substantial strategic leverage. The label ‘strategy’ need not necessarily be applied to such documents. In fact, omitting the term altogether can serve policy objectives. But high-level statements of this sort can have very real consequences for strategic planning and execution, with wide-ranging implications for the military and the Navy to follow. A striking recent document is the Defense Strategic Guidance, which introduced the notion of a rebalanced strategic focus of U.S. foreign and security policy on Asia and the West Pacific into the discourse (The White House 2012).\(^{108}\) With the immediate power that a president has through speeches or policy directives, carefully crafted and vetted interagency documents can on occasion simply be eclipsed by events. This holds especially true in a city like Washington, D.C., where new strategies can have a short half life if a domestic news story or some international event appears more important.

*The Congress* consists of a lower and an upper chamber, the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate, respectively. While there is usually little in the way

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\(^{105}\) On the role of national security intelligence, see Johnson (2012) and Wala (2012).

\(^{106}\) CSI = Container Security Initiative. U.S.-sponsored program launched in 2002 under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security, aimed at securing containers shipped to the United States. By virtue of global trade, the vast number of cargo is transported in these TEU, or 20-foot-equivalent, steel boxes. Intermodal transfer allows transportation by ship, truck, and railroad, offering cheaper transport — but also a potential inroad for criminal or terrorist activities.

\(^{107}\) PSI = Proliferation Security Initiative. U.S.-sponsored program launched in 2003, to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As of 2013, the program has been endorsed by 102 states worldwide.

\(^{108}\) This anticipated or actual rebalancing to Asia was very much driven by the White House, but it discomforted allies and stirred up China.
of disagreement over U.S. grand strategy (and, frankly, little influence on it), both legislative bodies have unique functions and rules pertaining to strategic planning outlined in Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution mandates that Congress shall have power to “provide and maintain a Navy”, while it only allows the legislature to “raise and support Armies” (Art I, Sec. 8, emphasis added). In other words, while the fathers of the Constitution had a notable aversion against standing armies, they saw the need for a standing Navy and were ready to give Congress far-reaching powers to sustain a naval force. The two principal congressional tools that heavily influence strategic decision-making (with implicit repercussions for the U.S. Navy) are the provision of funds to budget current ongoing and possible future (Fiscal Year) operations of the military, and oversight and investigation (Lammert 2012).

Congressional hearings and testimony serve an important purpose. They usually consist of an oral and a written component. These events are designed to inform and influence members of Congress, their staff, and anyone from the public, press, or other interest groups who attends (that group is obviously considerably smaller in classified hearings). The written testimonials are usually disseminated to larger audiences in print or electronic form, thus providing a powerful leverage for policy steering. This is particularly crucial for the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle. The PPBS links operational requirements with financial requirements and points out where funds need to be steered. This cycle consists of a two-year budget plan that is brought before Congress. It rests on the so-called Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), a six-year overview drawn from even more outward-looking documents of strategic intent.

As Lowi et al. (2010: 684) have remarked, “Congress’s ‘power of the purse’ is its ultimate weapon.” Via assessing the reasons for spending a large amount of money on certain military hardware, by way of hearings in the Armed Services Committees and subcommittees, and allocating funds to one project or another, Congress can have a strong influence on military spending (Stallmann 2000: 10). By supporting, modifying, or blockading presidential policy,

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109 The Senate also confirms presidential nominees. Although often consequential (the Senate has to approve a large number of presidential government appointees each year), that power can be used to slow down the ongoing course of procedure. On occasion, such provisions are used as a bargaining chip in order to extract concessions from the president or from fellow Senate colleagues. At the same time, promoting proven strategic thinkers or experienced policy-crafters into executive positions in the political, bureaucratic, or military realm potentially can have wide-reaching implications. For example, promoting someone with a visible track record in strategic thinking to a higher office can serve higher political purposes. A very recent example is the nomination of Robert “Bob” Work, former Undersecretary of the Navy (2009-2013) and a retired Colonel, United States Marine Corps, to Undersecretary of Defense.
and a wide range of other direct and indirect influences on foreign policy, Congress can exert considerable leverage on strategic decision-making. This is something usually not well-reflected in political science analysis, and particularly in strategic studies pertaining to the U.S. Navy. Congress hardly plays a role in those analyses. Less visibility versus the high-profile personality of the President, however, does not mean less importance in the policy-making process. There are a number of direct and indirect legislative and nonlegislative congressional avenues to shape foreign policy, as the following illustration shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Indirect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation Appropriations</td>
<td>Nonbinding Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties (Senate)</td>
<td>Procedural Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonlegislative</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters/Phone Calls</td>
<td>Agenda Setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations/Advising</td>
<td>Framing Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearings</td>
<td>Foreign Contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 14: Avenues of Congressional Foreign Policy Influence (adapted from Carter/Scott 2012: 233)

Congressional action is to a very large degree impacted by

- The constituency (the desire to be reelected, to obtain campaign funding, and a sense of representation of the home state/district) and relevant interests groups (with often narrow agendas);
- Partisanship, driven by alignment with the party leadership;
- The President, his policies, and party identifications;
- The news media;
- Staff, or the professionalism and topical expertise of aides to a representative/senator;
- Chamber membership;

\[110\] The crucial role of Congress as a whole and particular individual members of parliament is especially highlighted in times of deep-rooted partisanship and ‘divided government’ (when the Republican Party and the Democrat Party both control a parliamentary chamber, or hold the White House), where decision-making processes pertaining to larger strategic ends is severely hampered by the inability (or unwillingness) to compromise. Whereas Congress as a collective body may fail, it is instructive to give significantly more attention to the role of the relevant committees, and the Representatives and Senators who sit on these working groups. A study on Congressional role in American seapower and strategy would be highly desirable.
• Relevant committee membership as a source of policy expertise and the location for procedural access points from which to influence policy;

• Party status (the majority/minority role that governs each chamber’s full plenum and committee leadership);

• Party leadership position (the power and visibility a Congressman or woman has inside a party structure); and,

• Seniority, or the accumulated (assumed) expertise (and, in many cases, ‘expert-ness’) of a politician (Carter/Scott 2012: 236-239).

The Navy, much like other military services, maintains a congressional liaison office for both chambers of Congress. Thus, it seeks to inform and influence legislative action, update staff, and explain to elected officials the status of current and future Navy business. While Congress does not issue formal strategies (let alone Navy, naval, or maritime strategies), it can request statements of various lengths and substance from the executive branch. Used as one basis for further planning, these documents – among the most relevant to this study are the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Navy’s 30-Year-Shipbuilding Plan – often serve as a basis for allocation of funds, and thus a budgetary shaping of future strategy.

Having briefly described the constitutional obligations of the Presidency and Congress in the articulation of strategy (which influences Navy strategy to a degree), one can now turn to the U.S. military establishment (Rid 2012). These are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Regional/Functional Combatant Commanders.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the panel of senior military leaders, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who advise the Commander in Chief and subordinate bodies and institutions on military matters. The second hat they wear is as advisor to the (civilian) secretary of their respective service, i.e. the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to the Secretary of the Navy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) is a member of the National

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111 The council currently (July 2014) consists of the Chairman (currently General Martin Dempsey, USA), the Vice Chairman (currently Admiral Sandy Winnefeld), the Chief of Staff of the Army (currently General Raymon Odierno, USA), the Commandant of the Marine Corps (currently General James F. Amos, USMC), the Chief of Naval Operations (currently Admiral Jonathan Greenert), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (currently General Mark Welsh, USAF), and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (currently General Frank Grass, USA).

112 With more responsibility for the operational and strategic levels of war transferred to joint organizations, the military services – as institutions – have become more tactical in their focus. They are increasingly reduced to
Security Council. Although the service chiefs represent the highest-ranking flag officers of their services, since the adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 the chain of command goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Regional/Functional Combatant Commanders and essentially bypasses the JCS.\textsuperscript{113} As such, the Joint Chiefs do not have direct authority to craft strategy. However, by virtue of its political role and its obligation to provide for general conceptual plans for war (Hattendorf 2004: 1), the panel can still substantially influence the decision-making processes.

Military-strategic responsibility increasingly rests with the Department of Defense (DOD), the military bureaucracy, and the unified combatant commanders. Therefore, one needs to turn to the Pentagon itself, and more precisely to the \textit{Department of the Navy} (DON), which is the governmental organizational structure for the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and in wartime the U.S. Coast Guard. As §5061, Title 10 of the U.S. Code further states, the DON is composed of (1) the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, (2) the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, (3) the Headquarters, Marine Corps (Commandant of the Marine Corps), (4) the entire operating forces, including naval aviation of the Navy and of the Marine Corps, and the reserve components of those operating forces, and (5) all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the Navy.\textsuperscript{114} The CMC and the CNO are the principal senior advisors to SECNAV and serve as members of the JCS. These individuals can push or decelerate service strategies. Again, a general statement is difficult to come by and the analysis that follows in chapters 9-11 will discuss the varying degrees of such senior leaders on particular strategic documents.

OPNAV has two roles. It provides naval advice to the higher echelons and it crafts service budgets and programs. Internally, these responsibilities include the linking and coherence of parallel initiatives, the alignment of force structures, the building and maintenance of a service consensus, cohesion and esprit, the integration of warfare unions, and the focus on exercises, war games, and experimental, educational and training efforts. Externally, OPNAV has to demonstrate that Navy leadership is thoughtful and consistent with national and joint policies, in step with or even ahead of the times, highly trustworthy for the purpose of national

\textsuperscript{113} For a history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Rearden (2013).
\textsuperscript{114} It also includes the U.S. Coast Guard if it operates under the command and jurisdiction of DOD/DON by Presidential or Congressional direction in times of national emergency. The last such occasion was World War II. In peacetime, the Coast Guard’s governmental structure was the Department of Transportation (DOT) and is since 2003 the newly-formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
policies, displaying a compelling rationale for its desired new procurements, and appearing unified. Further goals included giving sister and allied services a sense of how to best partner with the Navy, to contribute to deterrence and perception management of potential foes, and finally shaping and leveraging overarching (military/security/grand) strategic capstone documents (Swartz 2011b: 85, slides 169-170). Historically, various OPNAV offices and branches have been engaged in formulating capstone documents and naval strategy. Support for thinking about, and more importantly writing, capstone documents is often solicited through outside contractors.115

The Unified Combatant Commanders: The commanders of the regional or functional commands are an integral part of the chain of command coming from the President and going to the Secretary of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized and codified the role of these theater or specialized commands, essentially establishing the command structure that is still in place today (although some changes have occurred, a list is reprinted here along with a graph detailing the current areas of responsibility which can be found in the annex).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>HQ</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Command</td>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>1 October 2007</td>
<td>Stuttgart (Germany)</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Command</td>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>1 January 1983</td>
<td>Tampa, Florida (USA)</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Command</td>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>15 March 1947</td>
<td>Stuttgart (Germany)</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Command</td>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>1 October 2002</td>
<td>Petterson AFB, Colorado (USA)</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>1 January 1947</td>
<td>Oahu, Hawaii (USA)</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Command</td>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>6 June 1963</td>
<td>Miami, Florida (USA)</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Command</td>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>16 April 1987</td>
<td>McDill AFB, Florida (USA)</td>
<td>Functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>1 June 1992</td>
<td>Offutt AFB, Nebraska (USA)</td>
<td>Functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Command</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>1 July 1987</td>
<td>Scott AFB, Illinois (USA)</td>
<td>Functional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 15: Unified and Specialized Commands (as of July 2014).

The geographic commands have a naval component in their organization (e.g., U.S. Naval Forces Europe) and draw up the requirements for fulfilling the missions assigned to them by the political and military leadership. Such requirements, in turn, inform the public debate and

115 The 1992 strategy “…From the Sea” was developed under considerable input from outside contractors Norman Polmar and Scott Truver to turn it from an internal Navy paper to a document that could track with Congress and the public (Truver interview 2012, 00:38:00 – 00:41:15).
shape the strategic and operational pressure in Washington, D.C. For example, the demand to have a larger carrier presence in the Persian Gulf can go a long way to inform the political debate about the current and future carrier force. The functional commands also have naval components in their organizations and make similar requests to their superiors as well as reflect overarching guidance (such requirements often represent an ideal demand hardly executable in the face of finite overall resources).

It follows that the President, Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense/OPNAV, and the Regional/Functional Commanders influence (with varying resources, diverging levels of ambition, and disparate outcomes) the process of strategy formulation and its implementation. They also provide a constant stream of authoritative and even semi-authoritative directions to the military as a whole and the U.S. Navy in particular. Measures to shape and postulate strategy (even if the term ‘strategy’ is carefully omitted) include presidential directives as well as National Security Strategies, various kinds of military reviews, National Military Strategies, Nuclear Posture Reviews, National Defense Strategies, Quadrennial Defense Reviews, DOD, joint, and doctrinal publications, various testimonies and directives, modifications of U.S. public law, and international treaties (Swartz 2011b: 93, slide 185). Congressional records on authorizations and appropriations language, statements of congressional intent and committee reports, Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents, and CJCS papers add to the convolute.116

On balance, all of these makers:

- Are instrumental to the intellectual deliberation of seapower;
- Oversee (and occasionally hinder/halt) the rise of a capstone document through the echelons;
- With the assistance of their staff and independent government entities assess its policy repercussions, ideally both inside and outside of the United States Navy and the government; and,
- Attempt to align the processes as well as the products with overarching policy guidance and multi-faceted developments (such as technological breakthroughs, major international conflicts, manpower issues, etc.) that inform sea power practice.

116 A look at the wealth of documents stemming from evolving national policies and strategies over the period under consideration for this study reveals that reciprocal causality is a difficult thing to assess. In other words, it is ultimately futile to discern when the Navy utilized language handed down from its political and civilian leadership, and when it was able to shape the discourse itself. The fact is that there is a dynamic relationship between the various levels which leads to strategic progress.
They literally ‘make’ and drive strategy, not least because of their designated role in the U.S. political bureaucratic system. Besides these true makers of foreign policy, there are additional influences which shape the institutional dimension of U.S. seapower, and by implication parts of its derived Navy strategy. The ‘foreign-policy establishment’ is a much larger arena, including what can properly be called the shapers of foreign policy. These are a host of unofficial, informal players, and individuals who possess varying degrees of influence depending on their prestige, their reputation and socioeconomic standing, and (most important) the party and ideology that are dominant at a given moment (Lowi et al. 2010: 685). Some of these can very broadly be put into different groups which inform American seapower posture. They will briefly be discussed in the following section.

7.2.3 Selected Shapers

The shapers and factors have limited (to none) codified authority in the actual making of the U.S. Navy’s strategy, due to the absence of U.S. constitutional guidance, and/or their position and standing in an administration. Unsurprisingly, even the outright lack of direct influence on actual decision-making procedures does not prevent attempts to indirectly influence decisions regarding the implicit making of strategy. These actions can at least shape strategic actions and decisions. Thus, these shapers are a necessary consideration in the analysis of American seapower. The shapers discussed here are other departments of the U.S. government, other branches of the U.S. military, interest groups, the news media, and laws and courts. Often, these shapers will seek to join hands and find avenues to leverage even more influence. For example, industry representatives will work through their respective Congressman in Washington. Successful lobbying for one type of warship over another can impinge on the force structure for years and even decades to come. Media and professional lobbyists can drive a certain agenda, be it friendly toward the Navy or not. These shapers deserve some discussion (although it is a bird’s-eye perspective) in order to provide a broader understanding of the complexities under which seapower genesis occurs. Fundamentally, they make up the conditions under which the Navy operates strategically on the “home front”. The institutions portrayed do not make strategy, but they may often attempt (and at times successfully) shape public and professional opinions about how it should or should not be used. Consequently, their view is often less systemic, i.e. less (grand) strategic, but rather interest-group oriented and often deliberately narrow. The larger outside debate about grand strategy is usually confined to academic circles instead.
Within the executive branch, there is also competition between various agencies and departments, be it for resources or access to higher levels. Policies of agents outside of the national security and foreign policy establishment, i.e., other Departments, can have indirect ramifications for the military, and by extension eventually the Navy (Arnautovic 2012). A visible example is the handling of diplomatic relations by the Department of State, although that particular department’s role in national security matters has been somewhat declining for decades (Rosati/DeWitt 2012: 179-182).\footnote{Other departments with limited international roles are the Department of Finance and the Department of Homeland Security.} The shared responsibilities between the Department of State and the Department of Defense in foreign affairs are a recurring source for potential conflict and contention (recalling the diplomatic use of the sea in the ‘use of the sea’ triangle previously discussed), although there are instances where both departments successfully cooperated (for a recent example, see Gates 2013: 98-99, 283, 482). In a more abstract regard, non-partisan government agencies can also have substantial influence. The Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) all provide a never-ending stream of analyses which in themselves can decisively inform policy and eventually influence strategy.\footnote{For example, all three institutions have recently provided a continuous stream of analyses on the subject of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the problems associated with the program. These papers inform the staffers at various agencies and institutions. In principle, these organizations are non-partisan and neutral.}

With finite resources, the Other Branches of the Military are natural competitors for a share of attention and, more importantly, the budget allocation that the Navy receives. Despite the various reforms in the national security and military establishment, it is particularly the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force that can infringe on the Navy’s turf when it comes to the division of labor, visibility in the public’s eye (i.e., through the appointment of high-ranking members of a specific service to another public position), and most importantly the division of the budget shares.\footnote{For a review of U.S. Navy/U.S. Army relations, see Swartz’s briefing slides for the 1980s (2011h: 86-90, slides 171-180), 1990s (2012b: 110-115, slides 220-229), and 2000s (2011j: 167-180, slides 334-360). For a review of U.S. Navy/U.S. Air Force relations 1970-2010, see Swartz’s stand-alone briefing slides (2011m) as well as his sections for the 1980s (2011h: 73-85, slides 145-170), 1990s (2012b: 93-110, slides 186-219), and 2000s (2011j: 147-167, slides 294-333).} Although for long periods of time the division of the budget remained roughly at 1/3 for each major military branch, there is a constant battle by the services to be an administration’s favorite poster child and make its case for investments into hardware or
manpower. Additionally, in the past there has been some notable naval infightings between the Navy and the Marine Corps, which also inhibited coherent strategy-making.\textsuperscript{120}

Also of some notable importance are the various \textit{Interest Groups}. The literature usually broadly divides these shapers into three categories. Economic, ethnic, or human rights (Lowi \textit{et al.} 2010: 685-686; Haney 2012: 294-297) interest groups can serve as intermediate agenda-setters and more or less sensibly shape policies toward a certain country, region, or issue.\textsuperscript{121} These interest groups display many varying degrees of organizational coherence and professionalism (some enlist lobbyists to further their cause), as well as a wide range of motifs. For example, industry lobbyists from a defense manufacturer may want to raise support for a new weapon or warship. Other interest groups may want to draw attention to a much larger agenda such as constitutional concerns over military spending, human rights infringements abroad, or even more principal issues. In combining grass-roots activism with high-visibility statements or events, some of these interest groups can have substantial impact on policy-making.\textsuperscript{122}

Within the U.S. political culture, frequent interchanges between the government sector and the private sector occur. The most visible issue is the use of contractors (often retired military) in areas of strategic planning and thinking. The cross-fertilization between think tanks, lobbying firms, and the executive and legislative branch is remarkable. In fact, members of the vast presidential government often find new jobs working for such a private institution while members of the permanent government stay put. Think tanks and academic institutions may hope to use that person’s contacts and tide him or her over until the next potential change in government occurs. Consequently, these people come up with new ideas and concepts, hoping to foster a pool of talent for the next election and return to government positions after the next cycle. Against this background, the output of the energetic think tank community in Washington, D.C., and beyond must be understood a potential factor of medium-term agenda-setting (Braml 2012).

\textsuperscript{120} The Marine Corps is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy, but has its own ethos and standing – while it relies on the funds for its platforms and weapons to come from the overall DON budget. Lately, the USMC has been increasingly used in the expeditionary campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, provoking a scoffing characterization as a second land army. Since 2001, it has been increasingly co-elevated in standing.

\textsuperscript{121} Additionally, those associations that support a certain professional cause merit attention. Illustrative examples in the realm of the Navy should include such interest groups as the Navy League of the United States, the Naval Order of the United States, the Surface Warfare Association, and various veterans’ associations.

\textsuperscript{122} For instance, the annual AIPAC (American-Israeli Political Action Committee) conference has become a key event on the schedules of many decision-makers. Likewise, industry trade shows such as the annual Sea Air Space Exposition are often utilized for programmatic speeches by SECNAV, SECDEF, USN flag officers, and other principal makers of U.S. Navy strategy. As other shapers, the influence on the course of events is difficult to discern – but noteworthy nonetheless.
The influence of national Media on policy decisions (and, eventually, strategy-making) needs to be taken into account as well (Kleinsteuber/Kutz 2012). For the news media, this was described as a “CNN effect” in 1993 by veteran diplomat George F. Kennan (1993: A14).\textsuperscript{123} Although the term was coined using the relatively new cable news network and figured prominently in the context of U.S. experience intervening in the Somali civil war 1992-1994, it is in fact far from being a modern phenomenon.\textsuperscript{124} For the U.S., media reports often decisively triggered or subsequently shaped military interventionism in such instances as the Spanish-American War 1898, the Vietnam War (1964-1973), and the Teheran Hostage Crisis of 1979/80 (van Belle 2012: 277-278). The revolutionary potential harnessed from the introduction of social media since the early 2000s, social media websites such as Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, and Youtube, and the wide advent of the internet have dramatically increased the speed and potential impact of news media reporting on policy-makers, but also offer a number of new opportunities to engage to public.\textsuperscript{125}

Finally, one must also mention the Laws and Courts as secondary framers of the shape and form of American seapower. The premier direction to the seapower makers, and by implication for U.S. Navy Strategy, obviously stems from the U.S. Constitution. Title 10 of U.S. Code (as amended) is the key legal text that governs how American seapower is constituted.\textsuperscript{126} The judicial branch it is deeply interlinked with the executive and legislative branches through the checks-and-balances system, but rarely mingles with grand and military, let alone naval, strategic issues. Exceptions to the rule are the potentially wide-ranging decisions of federal courts on the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policies regarding military service of gays and lesbians (1994, repealed in 2011) or the Defense of Marriage Act (1996, ruled unconstitutio-

\textsuperscript{123} CNN = Cable News Network, usually referred by its acronym. The Atlanta, Georgia-based, 24-hour cable news channel was founded in 1980.

\textsuperscript{124} The U.S. decision to intervene in Somalia was partially motivated by the images of the humanitarian crisis in the failing country. Consequently, when U.S. Marines of the United Task Force (UNITAF) conducted an (unopposed) amphibious assault and landed at the beach and the airport at Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, they were greeted by a trove of reporters and TV cameras eager to transport images of the U.S.-led intervention into the living-room of the world. By the same token, the decision to leave the country is also attributed to the grave images that were broadcast worldwide after American helicopters were shot down over Somalia’s capital on 3 and 4 October 1993. Five U.S. Special Forces soldiers were killed in action and a couple of the bodies were mutilated and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.

\textsuperscript{125} One can also consider the use of popular culture (music, television, computer games, and movies) by the Navy and its friendly-minded supporters to raise public awareness of the service. For a discussion of the relationship between the Navy and Hollywood, see Suid (1996). For a short article on the relationship between the Navy and popular culture, including “The Simpsons” TV series, the “Top Gun” movie (1986), and the music video “If I Could Turn Back Time” by the artist Cher, see Bruns (2010a).

\textsuperscript{126} Other acts with wide-reaching decision-making and -planning implications are the aforementioned National Security Act (1947), which established a centralized bureaucratic and military command structure, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) which brought the concept of jointness into being.
al in 2013), and rulings on authorization on the use of military force. They can inhibit or propel military effectiveness, especially in times of crisis.\textsuperscript{127}

7.2.4 American Seapower and Alliance Considerations

Finally, the debate of potent shapers of U.S. Navy strategy must include the important international context, in particular normative roots and political and military alliances (Varwick/Hecht 2012). After all, this context is a principal determinant of U.S. sea power. Geography and alliances indicate where, when, and how U.S.-led sea power can be directed. The actual process of aligning ways, means, and ends regarding the use of military (naval) force obviously is confined to the American context (grand, military, and naval/maritime strategies are usually a sovereign function after all), but alliance and international organizational constraints must be considered. The U.S. is obviously bound by international law and subscribes to established norms and forums. It is a member of various international organizations and alliances, and a signatory or implicit supporter to numerous multilateral agreements with a security and/or maritime dimension.

The United States is bound in one military alliance in particular: NATO.\textsuperscript{128} The alliance, a political and military pact formed in 1949 against the increasingly assertive Soviet Union and its satellite regimes, is a system of collective defense (Kaplan 1999). Article 5 of the treaty states that after appropriate review and decision-making, an attack on one member state shall be considered an attack on all member states. This unique function, designed for the Cold War, was not invoked until after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Hallams 2010). Today, NATO, as a fundamentally trans-oceanic alliance, operates four standing naval task groups.\textsuperscript{129} NATO naval forces were involved in embargo and strike operations in the Balkan Wars during the 1990s and operations against Libya (2011). To date, there is a NATO anti-piracy operation at the Horn of Africa (“Operation Ocean Shield”) and since 2001 naval forc-

\textsuperscript{127} For a very recent example, see Gates (2014: 332-333). The Secretary of Defense and the service chiefs were very concerned that a quick repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy, e.g., if the policy was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, would have detrimental effects for unit cohesion and fighting morale on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{128} On European influence on U.S. foreign policy, see Risse-Kappen (1995).

\textsuperscript{129} Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 (which evolved from standing NATO naval forces in the Atlantic, activated in 1968, and the Mediterranean, activated in 1992) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Groups 1 and 2 (activated under different names in 1973 and 1999, respectively) train and operate together. U.S. Navy units are participating regularly in these exercises, providing a visible commitment to the alliance.
es have been engaged in “Operation Active Endeavour” in the Mediterranean to enhance maritime security and provide for maritime domain awareness.\textsuperscript{130}

The U.S. Navy also conducts or participates in a host of multinational maneuvers and exercises designed to improve interoperability and to convey political ends. While these exercises do not hold automated defense obligations for Washington, they are an expression of politico-military objectives and signal intent to partners and adversaries. Forward-based or forward-deployed naval forces provide the necessary options to commanders, which once again underlines the versatile nature of naval assets. The annual US-led exercise in the Baltic Sea provides an illustrative example. Baltops was first conducted in 1971 under direction and command of a U.S. Navy admiral. Recently, the exercise even featured the participation of former Warsaw Pact forces, and even the Russian Navy as recently as in 2013.\textsuperscript{131} This is a marked difference from earlier such tactical operational maneuvers of Cold War days. During Baltops 1985, when five U.S. Navy warships practiced in conjunction with NATO navies, the reactivated battleship \textit{Iowa} (BB 60) demonstratively fired a full broadside (in a cordoned-off area) east of the Danish island of Bornholm. That action certainly echoed with Soviet leadership at the time. In both eras, the conduct of Baltops served immediate as well as larger American interests. Naval forces’ inherent flexibility and the particulars of the sea as an operating space allow a fine-tuned commitment to underscore political objectives.\textsuperscript{132} Growing Russian assertiveness against its European neighbors in 2014 has rekindled a debate in the U.S. over which treaty obligations justify going to war.\textsuperscript{133}

A similar military bond albeit without the same trigger as the NATO treaty exists for various other U.S. defense relations, such as in Pacific where allies like Japan and South Korea are currently concerned over an increasingly assertive and militarized Chinese foreign policy. Beijing’s policy raises concerns in Tokyo and Seoul as well as in other capitals in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan and South Korea have a substantial U.S. military presence in their coun-

\textsuperscript{130} A study on the relationship between NATO and the U.S. Navy would be desirable. The same holds true for finding out if, when, and how multilateral vs. unilateral considerations have influenced the thinking of U.S. Navy strategists.

\textsuperscript{131} In 2014, Russia did not participate in the Baltops exercise.


\textsuperscript{133} For an exemplary exchange of views on this contentious debate, see a debate at The National Interest in April 2014. Justin Logan, director of foreign policy at the Cato Institute (Washington, D.C.), questioned the worth of going to war over a country such as Estonia on the grounds of a treaty (“Is Estonia Worth a War?”, 10 April). For a strong rebuttal, see David Santoro, Senior Fellow at CSIS (Washington, D.C.), who for the East European case argues that failure to uphold codified alliance defense commitments would undermine U.S. and NATO credibility, and by extension that of the entire U.S. alliance system (“America’s Treaty Allies: Worth Going to War Over?”, 28 April).
tries, and Japan hosts the U.S. Navy’s only forward-homeported nuclear aircraft carrier, currently the *George Washington* (CVN 73).\(^\text{134}\)

In the Middle East, specifically with regard to the U.S. commitment to Israeli defense and security, American assurance is also under closer scrutiny. These examples are designed to underscore that diplomatic and military treaty requirements at least implicitly influence American seapower posture and operational priorities. If defense obligations were invoked, they would have clear implications for U.S. defense policy. In fact, with forward-deployed U.S. sea power and the surge capabilities discussed, naval forces are particularly prone to be first-responders. Concurrently, U.S. military strategy – and by implication Navy strategy – has to take such scenarios into account. Accordingly, these dynamics need to be factored into strategic planning.

### 7.2.5 The Enduring Persuasiveness of Ideas and Ideals

How the United States seeks to shape global order, and to what ends it employs its military (in particular the Navy) to attain these goals, is a determining factor of America’s seapower posture. Obviously, such considerations are deeply linked to national interest and the political culture. A contemporary model proposes the theory of liberalism as a point of departure. Such a school of thought presumes that the traditional, neorealist balance-of-power politics fall short of providing sustained peace and security. The underpinning of U.S. policy in the pursuit of political goals (where applicable) are supported by military means (imperial liberalism) and/or the construction of hegemonic structures (hegemonic liberalism) (Krause 2009b: 91).

The U.S. has an opportunity – some would perhaps even suggest an obligation – to responsibly shape the world order. The promulgation of advancing democracy, human rights, and principles of a liberal economic order often drives U.S. foreign policy (although rhetoric and actual policy are often divergent: the latter is necessarily more pragmatic). This should not obstruct the notion that U.S. policies are first and foremost self-serving American interests, not global common political denominators. The nation’s tools of influence are manifold, and the presence of military power such as forward-stationed or -deployable naval force can be a central one.

The visualization of national security can be traced to overarching, sometimes competing world order ideas. The analytical division into a realist-internationalist, a liberal-internationalist, a realist-isolationist, and a liberal-isolationist vision is the most compelling

\(^{134}\) *George Washington* will be relieved by *Ronald Reagan* (CVN 76) when the former will undergo a planned complex, multi-year overhaul.
The realist-internationalist school of thought proposes a large capable military that enables the U.S. to single-handedly contain, deter, and defeat an adversary power. It was a favorable model for the Cold War years. By comparison, a liberal-internationalist model requires smaller forces whose main target is to assure allies and contain smaller regional rogue states.

Where in the realist-internationalist view military forces can be tailored for fighting war, possibly even for fighting the general war that represents the ultimate danger, in the liberal-internationalist understanding military forces are required to be capable of a wider variety of activities. They need to be able to act in concert with allies or within a coalition framework, even when such cooperation is not military necessary (ibid: 19).

A realist-isolationist worldview would instead lobby for a fortress America that is shielded from the perils of the world, but which punishes aggressors. A liberal-isolationist view, finally, would dismiss the military as a tool to improve international order altogether. Such competing visions are especially compelling after fundamental changes in the international environment, where the nation ponders its future and the Navy (much like the rest of the military) has to justify its existence and relevance. The end of World War II offered much of the same knee-jerk as did the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 years. In all instances, the Navy had to justify its place in the political establishment and anticipate what framework the presidential administration would prefer to visualize American national security.

Such competing theories are principal methods of attempting to explain U.S. foreign and security policy. If, when, and where sea power is fielded often rests on these paradigms offered by idealist, liberal, or realist convictions, world order visions, and geopolitical considerations. More fundamentally, the link among national grand strategy, national interests, and naval force is one worthwhile exploring. In other words, the question begs an answer as to when, why, and how America goes to war by sea. Here, the role of naval force in peacetime also factors in, for it has ramifications for naval presence, deployment patterns, and procurement. If a naval service cannot make its case along the lines of national imagination or the visions of its political leadership, it risks looking unimaginative and self-centered. To make a strategic difference, naval strategy needs to be finely attuned to such demands.

There are two other sets of competing visions, more specifically about the nature of war America conducts and the role of naval power in such conflicts. These visions are principally either countersocietal or countermilitary (Rhodes 1999: 21-25). Whereas the former, rooted in
American colonial experience, sees war as a conflict that pits one national society against another, the latter stems from the European state tradition and interprets war as a clash between rival nation-states and their professional military establishments. Consequently, with regard to the specific use of war and the targets against which armed force is directed, rivaling patterns emerge. Rhodes points out that a countersocietal way of war ultimately seeks to impose forcible change on an adversary society. It accepts the use of military force to obtain political concessions. In the countermilitary view, competition is framed as a struggle between armed professional militaries instead and societal casualties are to be avoided at high costs: “In one, the deliberate reduction of the Soviet Union to radioactive rubble is acceptable; in the other, the accidental death of a few hundred civilians in a Bagdad shelter is unacceptable” (ibid: 21).

Historically, American political culture has shifted between oceanic and cis- or transoceanic visions. Whereas the former assumes that control (indeed, command) of the international commons attains political objectives, the latter assumes that war requires the destruction or occupation of the adversary’s territory to achieve that purpose; the cisoceanic version puts a premium on protection of the homeland, which at least in theory assures a political stalemate. The following illustration shows the more practical ramifications of naval forces in the U.S. mindset. This paradigm has shaped U.S. naval thinking especially in times of strategic reorientation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oceanic Vision</th>
<th>Countersocietal</th>
<th>Countermilitary</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main target is enemy commerce, not its military forces</td>
<td>Sea denial, destruction of enemy fleet</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Imposing of unacceptable stalemate on an imperial aggressor</td>
<td>Navy need not be routinely forward-deployed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force demands: improved intelligence and reconnaissance, space-based systems (cyber), long-range aviation, missiles, choke point control, offensive mining, forward submarine patrols, convoy escorts to defend own seaborne trade</td>
<td>Force demands: Fleet to go deep into harm’s way; SSN (anti-ship/anti-submarine missiles), carrier battle groups with capable air- and missile-defense escorts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Examples: Jeune École, German U-Boat fleet in World War I, II</td>
<td>Examples: Mahan (1890s), post-Vietnam period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cis-/Transoceanic Vision</td>
<td>Strategic bombing</td>
<td>Strategic bombing less important</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Navy support role (Marine Corps, Army, Air Force bring war to enemy)</td>
<td>Force and power projection into the littoral (carrier air strikes, amphibious landings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy navy needs to be neutralized if it attempts forward operations</td>
<td>Protection of allies, swift and decisive force, SLOC control, precision strikes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLOC control</td>
<td>Navy designed and routinely dispatched forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force demands: SSBN, CVNs, amphibious lift, ASW, superior surface fleet to deter enemy (balanced fleet)</td>
<td>Force demands: carriers, cruise missiles, AAW/BMD, mobile Marine units</td>
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There are two settings of sea power; this study uses the image of two dimensions of seapower. One is of a more functional (or horizontal) kind. It can best be described with basic geographic, geopolitical, and geophysical terms. Unsurprisingly, the United States displays seapower
features under that template. Such conditions can also be applied to allies and antagonists, foreign shores so to speak, for they constitute major operating areas for the U.S. Navy.

The second dimension of seapower is an institutional (or vertical) one with much higher interest to the strategic studies. With regard to the United States, it involves such complex deliberations as organizational planning and learning, a definition and derivation of national interests, major makers and shapers of institutional seapower, and understanding the role of alliances and ideas. Functional and institutional seapower form the context in which sea power is exercised. Accordingly, the context also significantly influences strategy-making.

In theory strategy-making should directly and discernibly complement high policy in the establishment of goals and objectives for programming and war-planning. In practice, each level of strategy-making has its own demand and supply relationship, a function of the nature of the system (Hattendorf 2004: 1-2). This is a recipe for contradiction and disjunction. A strictly rational calculation of strategy is eclipsed by the practical necessity for simplification. Bureaucratic interests and a high degree of uncertainty contribute to the confusion and render logical models limited in use. Any rational calculus is forever changing against the backdrop of political events and technological developments, which alter the situation at home and on the global stage. The development of strategy and the posture of American seapower and its application of sea power is a perpetual process of questioning, application, reexamination, constant adjustment, and reevaluation.

This study will now turn to how these processes played out between 1981-1989, 1989-2001, and 2001-2011.

Describing the 1980s as a gleaming ‘naval re-birth’ implies that there must have been a great deal of agony and sluggishness prior, in French parlor, a ‘naval baisse.’ It is instructive to look at the development of the U.S. Navy prior to the 1980s, in particular in the Cold War and the 1970s. Similar to changing currents and tides or the ‘bull and bear’ phases of the stock markets, strategic culture and strategic implementation also undergo periodic ups and down which in turn decisively affects the role of sea power, the genesis of capstone documents, and their respective political and military implementation.

8.1 Prelude: 1945-1980, a “naval baisse?”

The U.S. Navy came out of World War II as a large force resting on battleships and aircraft carriers. It was proud of its wartime contribution in defeating the Axis powers by large-scale transoceanic campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific, in Europe, North Africa, and Asia. In conjunction with allies, the U.S. Navy had developed and brought to bear a variety of sea power measures. These ranged from sea control, efficient ASW and ASuW, large-scale amphibious landings, carrier aviation, to naval gun-fire support, and others. A massive military and commercial ship-building program sustained the allied efforts and provided the embattled allied war economies. Allied forces were supplied with men and materiel courtesy of U.S. maritime power. The war began on a shock on the morning of 7 December 1941 with the Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base in Pearl Harbor (Hawaii) and ended for U.S. sea power on a high note with the Japanese capitulation on the deck of the battleship Missouri (BB 63) in Tokyo harbor on 2 September 1945. However, the Navy soon found itself in stormy political weather. In September 1945, a month after the detonation of two nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced Japan to surrender (at the moment of the Navy’s apotheosis), Navy Secretary James Forrestal appeared before the House Committee on Naval Affairs and asked, ‘Why should we maintain any Navy after this war?’ Absent a maritime enemy, and with air-atomic warfare the apparent mode of the future, the Navy did not have a mission (Baer 1994: 275).

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135 Hartmann 1990; see also Rudolf (1990: 241-362) for a similar characterization.

136 For an overview of the U.S. Navy history and its capabilities from the founding to the early Cold War, see for example Love (1992a), Rose (2006a/b), and Symonds (2006). It is important to note that the history of capstone documents as a broad category can be traced back to roots of the U.S. Navy. The Navy always had some form of capstone document, of varying proficiency and quality, since its inception in 1775 (see Swartz 2011b: 47-58, slides 94-115 for a list), but none of the quantity and quality that emerged with “The Maritime Strategy” and the follow-on capstone documents.
The Soviet Union, the principal foreseeable antagonist, was a continental land power almost straight from a textbook, and did not possess an offensive naval fleet. The advent of nuclear weapons – the Soviet Union’s first testing of a weapon in 1949 ended the U.S. monopoly on the atomic bomb – in its cynical Dr. Strangeloveian sense lured many strategists to assume that nuclear delivery platforms and a small conventional standing army, not a globally-engaged military controlling the seas, were the wave of the future. The next war, in all likelihood, was bound to be quick, escalatory, nuclear, and ultimately devastating. In other words, strategic thinking was nuclear thinking (Schmidt-Skipiol 1992:4). That in turn either limited the Navy’s purpose to little more than transport of reinforcements. The prospect of all-out nuclear war degraded sea power. The anticipated World War III battlefields in Central Europe did not have much in common with the Navy’s Pacific campaigns at all. Organizationally, strategically, perhaps even intellectually, the Navy was ill-prepared for the post-war strategic landscape. Instead, it found itself fighting bureaucratic domestic wars. The reorganization of the national security apparatus through the creation of the Department of Defense (through the National Security Act of 1947, as later amended) robbed the Navy of considerable bureaucratic clout and established the U.S. Air Force as a serious competitor for resources, political influence, and a major role in the coming war. The Navy, as all services, was also subject to extensive demobilization from its wartime posture. This was significantly in the interest of Congress, which proclaimed that, as Baer (1994: 278) pointed out, “the United States had command of the sea and was in no danger of losing it.” In an era of nuclear warfare, other uses of a Navy in limited warfare and power projection – two classic sea power measures, after all – were in little demand. However, the conditions under which defense policy operated soon changed. In April 1950, a joint group from the Department of State and the Department of Defense issued a directive that changed the U.S. outlook on the world. National Security Council memo # 68 (NSC-68) called for an assertive, staunch anti-Soviet policy worldwide, coupled with substantial investments in defense. Although the message did not

137 See George Kennan alias X (1947). The famed essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” established the basis for the American policy of containing the Soviet Union using sea control as the glue that tied the United States to its European and Far East allies.


139 The argument between the Navy and the Air Force came to a heat in the controversy over resource allocation towards a new supercarrier, the planned United States (CVA 58). Only three days after the keel of the massive new warship was laid, construction was abandoned on the grounds that the money would be better invested in long-range B-36 bombers. This preservation of carrier aviation became known as ‘Revolt of the Admirals’, “and in these terms, the National Security Act of 1947 was a Navy victory. It denied the Air Force the control of naval aviation. The Navy could keep direct control of its carrier-based and land-based aircraft […]” (Baer 1994: 291) For an account, see Barlow (1994).

140 The original report was made available by the Truman Library: National Security Council (1950).
put the Navy in a significantly more favorable position, it implied a larger utility of American sea power in the emerging postwar order and a strategy of containment of Soviet Russia. Five World War II and post-war developments helped buttress the U.S. grand strategy of containment in the maritime realm, which later became known as combat-credible forward presence. First, the wartime creation and use of fast carrier task forces to attack and destroy critical targets ashore and at sea; second, the wartime creation and use of Navy-Marine Corps amphibious task forces to assault defended forward beaches; third, the late-war creation and use of mobile afloat logistic support forces to refuel and replenish forward warships far forward, while underway, even in combat; fourth, the development of air-delivered nuclear bombs as the most lethal and important weapons in the American arsenal; and fifth, the 1949 U.S. Navy decision to develop the attack submarine as a principal forward ASW weapon system (Swartz 2014: 2-3).

The decision to send the Missouri (BB 63) to Turkey in 1946 signaled early American commitment to the volatile states in the East Mediterranean littorals in the face of Communist inroads. The U.S.-led United Nations force to intervene in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953 relied substantially on naval assets such as battleships, carriers, and amphibious assaults. The Navy sought to bring to bear the advantages inherent to its force: mobility, readiness, flexibility, and power-projection ashore. Its instruments were more discriminating than what the Air Force and the supporters of nuclear war proposed. Other limited conflicts of the time seemed to vindicate that position and underscore the Navy’s role and the view the service held of itself. The Suez Crisis in 1956 underlined the troublesome constellation in the Middle East as a hot proxy conflict between East and West, and it gave a role to sea power. An Israeli drive toward the Suez Canal was backed by substantial British and French naval forces centered on battleships and carrier aviation. The Soviet Union was drawn into the conflict on the side of Arab nationalists; nuclear escalation was not ruled out by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The intervention of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower halted the escalatory path and eventually defused a crisis that severely curtailed British and French power and prestige. Two years after Suez, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 rested on the capabilities of the recently-established, forward-based U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. The Suez crisis and the U.S. intervention in the Levant also turned out to be a significant motivation for the Soviet Union to acquire more offensive sea power capabilities under the leadership of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov.

141 For a discussion of the events and the strategic ramifications of the Suez Crisis, see Kyle (2011).
The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, which put Soviet missiles on the U.S. doorstep, was eventually defused by the installation of a naval quarantine (a type of naval blockade) around the Communist-ruled Caribbean island, which drove home the value of measured political and military responses, particular by American sea power. Consequently, the doctrine of massive retaliation (a general nuclear war strategy devised in the mid-1950s) was superseded by a doctrine of flexible response by the late 1960s. U.S.-led sea control supported the containment of the Soviet Union by surrounding it with forward-based forces and covering the seas in between (Baer 1994: 335). Whereas the grand and military strategies against the Soviet Union were codified, the U.S. Navy failed to publish its thinking in written, publicly concise, and declaratory fashion. That left the position of the Navy dependent on that the global political fever chart, domestic political opinion, and the general budget share that the service could obtain. The Navy’s narrative atrophied because it was not explained what exact strategic importance the Navy had in the overall design of U.S. foreign and security policy (Schmidt-Skipiol 1992: 5).

Meanwhile, new platforms such as the Forrestal-class aircraft carrier, the development of sea-launched missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and the feasibility of nuclear propulsion for surface warships and submarines gave the Navy longer, state-of-the-art legs. This shaped the Navy’s *raison d’être* but came at further cost to its strategic mindset and its military-intellectual capabilities. The promises of technology eclipsed the need to think about the political ends of naval warfare. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the father of the nuclear navy, established a power base outside of service control. Until his forced retirement, Rickover went on a comprehensive campaign to establish and maintain a nuclear Navy. Although each warfare community (surface, subsurface, aviation) wrestled for support and influence, winning support for nuclear-powered ships significantly drove the Navy’s narrative.

In the next major crisis, the Vietnam War (1964-1973), U.S. sea control remained largely uncontested, and consequently the Navy very much focused on strike warfare against shore targets. Sustained carrier strike warfare, naval gunfire support, coastal and riverine operations, counterinsurgency, and late in the war the mining of North Vietnamese ports drove USN involvement in Vietnam. This came at the expense of Navy sea control capabilities (Nichols/Tillman 1987, Sherwood 2004, Marolda *et al.* 2013). Meanwhile, in Washington, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 had given increasing operational and force-structure plan-

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142 For a history of events, see Munton/Welch (2011). For the U.S. Navy’s perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Utz (1993).
ning oversight to the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the CNO. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s style of management frustrated many who saw a Navy’s value in more than just riverine and coastal small-boat operations, carrier air strikes against an elusive enemy, and junior partnership to the other branches of the U.S. military, but they lacked arguments against seeming compelling numbers and statistics that came from the Pentagon leadership. It did not help that President Lyndon B. Johnson micro-managed a significant number of U.S. military issues in Vietnam, and that the Army and Air Force had shouldered considerably more costs and losses in South East Asia. The Navy found itself between a rock and a hard place. The war in Vietnam threw the Navy off balance. It was the limited war the Navy had talked about when it rationalized its force-structure and training to contrast with the popular nuclear-war scenarios. Against a coastal country, major tactical firepower could be brought to bear, and the use of attack aircraft carriers and bombers for shore bombing vindicated the force structure. Ultimately, the Navy was much less prepared for other dimensions of limited war, such as small-unit actions to attain coastal control, riverine patrols, and counterinsurgency. The emphasis of carrier air strikes also came at the expense of understanding and practicing the value of sea control in the age of the flexible military response strategy (Baer 1994: 392-393).

In July 1969, President Richard Nixon, in an address on the Pacific island of Guam sought a way out of the unwinnable war in Southeast Asia. In what became known as the Nixon Doctrine, the President went on record underlining that the U.S. would keep its treaty and alliance commitments. It would also continue to provide nuclear deterrence for its allies, but unlike before, the U.S. would stay out of what it saw as regional Asian wars. To support the Nixon doctrine, an ocean strategy based on a deterrent force of missile submarines and a general-purpose fleet was formulated. The latter presumably permitted the Navy to control selected sea areas, project power abroad, and maintain a naval presence where desirable, albeit with a much smaller force (Ryan 1981: 66).

In other words, the Navy faced three major challenges. It tilted internally toward some missions at the expense of others and at the cost of intellectual verve of broad, comprehensive understanding and application of sea power; it was disadvantageous in the budgetary competition with the other services which bore the brunt of Vietnam; and in the face of financial austerity under Nixon, it had to rely on and utilize an increasingly aging and shrinking fleet still

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143 For an analysis of the Nixon Doctrine, see Litwak (1986). The text of the speech can be found in: Nixon (1969).
featuring a large number of different ship and aircraft types. Dramatic social and demographic
dynamics in desegregating the Navy and transitioning to an all-volunteer force (reflecting
developments in U.S. society accordingly) put an additional burden on the service.\textsuperscript{144} The
Navy’s public image was further rocked by such catastrophes as the deadly blaze aboard the
aircraft carrier \textit{Forrestal} (CV 59).\textsuperscript{145} To add insult to injury, just as the United States wan-
dered deeper and deeper into the Vietnamese quagmire and the Navy faced its internal prob-
lems, the Soviet Navy aspired to emerge as a formidable naval challenger on the high seas.
Moscow sought to augment its coastal defense forces (which relied on diesel submarines and
light surface units) with more capable ships, thus reflecting broader geopolitical claims and
significant strategic ambitions for a blue-water navy.\textsuperscript{146}

At the time of withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. Navy had maneuvered itself into a corner
and was not able to stand up to a sea-control challenger. As an institution, the Navy had ad-
hered to power-projection and reliance on attrition air strikes from the sea against a foreign
shore. This came at the cost of neglecting the sea control mission. Concurrently, the discourse
concentrated on naval platforms, not the missions. The introduction of nuclear-powered bal-
listic submarines (SSBN) had freed the aircraft carriers from their nuclear role and provided
an impetus for revitalized thinking what could be achieved with these (and other) ships in the
first place.

At the same time, a reemergence of conventional war concepts provided a new thrust for Na-
vy thinking and planning. The Sino-Soviet political split signaled the potential for inner-
Communist bloc rifts and provided leverage for U.S. strategy. The defense drawdown by the
United Kingdom (including the Royal Navy) from east of Suez pointed to an increasingly
important transfer of presence requirements to the U.S. and its Navy.\textsuperscript{147} Decolonization after
World War II had multiplied the number of states, some of which were often drawn into vio-
lent civil wars and then became sites for proxy superpower conflict. In parallel, world mari-

\textsuperscript{144} For accounts, see for example Sherwood (2007) and Freeman (2009).
\textsuperscript{145} 134 people lost their lives in the July 1967 catastrophe at sea. For an account, see Freeman (2004).
\textsuperscript{146} Willy Brandt, German chancellor 1969-1974, rather joyfully recounted a discussion of the naval buildup with
his visiting guest of honor, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The Russian remarked that in terms of submarine
armament, the U.S. domination in the subsurface domain would not last long, for the Soviet Union would “bake
a new submarine every week” – an image that the General Secretary accentuated for the amused Chancellor
Brandt by forming the hands like kids do when they “bake” things playing in a sandbox (Brandt 1989: 210).
\textsuperscript{147} For discussions of the drawdown of the Royal Navy in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, see Grove (2005:
213-263) and Redford/Grove (2014).
time trade experienced a growth, despite the first in a row of oil price shocks, as still more and more first-world countries emerged as economic powers since 1945.\footnote{148}{A key enabler for the post-war economic growth was the Bretton-Woods monetary management system established in 1944 to codify and govern financial and commercial relations among the world's major industrial states in the mid-20th century. The agreement was toppled in 1971 after the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the system. For more on the economic expansion after World War II, see Crafts/Tonilio (1996) and Rosenberg (2002).}

This is not to say that the nuclear, bipolar world ceded dominating world affairs; in fact, just as the superpowers negotiated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), other countries (India, South Africa, and Pakistan) aspired to join the exclusive nuclear club. Wars continued to occur frequently, and these crises would be more complex than ever. Such thinking emphasized conventional force, even in the age of nuclear warfare, as the weapon of choice. Ironically, opposing (and roughly equal) nuclear forces diminished in their political value, while conventional balances became more important in their relation to nuclear equilibrium, deterrence, and incremental escalation. The Cold War and the vast conceptual and ideological differences between the East and the West had settled in the minds (and purses) of decision-makers. Détente, the easing of the Cold War begun under Richard Nixon and continued under his successor Gerald Ford, for the time being replaced the containment approach toward the Soviet Union. However, direct Soviet-American conflict was always a possibility, as the naval confrontation during the Yom Kippur War (1973) readily demonstrated.\footnote{149}{In response to the coordinated Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel, there was considerable confusion in Washington what the best way forward would be. Admiral Thomas Moorer, CJCS, sided with Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger on maintaining a careful support of Israel which sought to avoid torpedoing the post-war situation and U.S. relations with the Arab world. Accordingly, the U.S. 6th Fleet maintained a rather dispersed position. A task force around the carrier \textit{John F. Kennedy} (CV 67) stood at Gibraltar, and another task force around the carrier \textit{Independence} (CV 62) took position just south of Crete. ADM Daniel Murphy, Commander 6th Fleet, was flabbergasted. It was not until the Soviet Navy surged more than 100 Russian naval vessels in support of Egypt and Syria that the U.S. hesitantly changed its position to also include U.S. provision of supplies to Israel and a direct maritime presence in the Eastern tip of the Mediterranean (Love 1992: 653-658).}

The Navy needed to reinvigorate its offensive strategic thinking rather than simply support defensive considerations. To that end, five major efforts to codify Navy thinking emerged during the 1970s: These were “Project SIXTY” (1970), “Missions of the U.S. Navy” (1974), “Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy” (1975-1978), “Sea Plan 2000” (1978), and “The Future of U.S. Sea Power” (1979). The selection of the commander of the U.S. brown-water naval forces in Vietnam, Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt, as Chief of Naval Operations is therefore not without a timely sense of irony. A hands-on personality, Zumwalt was “determined to right the balance and give the Navy a full-service doctrine and a full-service force” (Baer 1994: 393). That included the designation of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and the CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K), specific offices within OPNAV to foster and institutionalize
strategic planning. “Project SIXTY” (a planning memorandum, Zumwalt’s favorite vehicle to distribute his views in the navy) was signed by Zumwalt in 1970. It was a self-described assessment and sought to give the Navy a direction. Strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime presence were articulated as the principle ordered tasks of the U.S. Navy for American national security. The memorandum proposed to shape the future fleet along the lines of a “hi-low mix” of expensive capital ships for power projection (specifically new carriers and some submarines) and more affordable, smaller, low-value sea control combatants.

“Missions of the U.S. Navy,” drafted and signed by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner (then President of the Naval War College), was published four years later (Turner 1974). It elaborated on the preceding document and outlined four distinct naval missions: power projection, sea control, naval presence, and strategic deterrence. Those were the ‘classic 4’ that fundamentally focused the Navy’s roles in U.S. foreign and security policy. Turner’s paper illustrated the relationship of missions and tactics, created new vocabulary, and underlined the focus on the Soviet Union, thus providing lasting intellectual legacy for the Navy officer corps in the decades to come. The advent of new platforms and technologies and the introduction of the Harpoon-type anti-ship missile in the 1970s provided a further influx of capabilities to support a broader mission- and mind-set. However, the national leadership in the early and mid-1970s was not very receptive to include power projection or sea control. Consequently, the services did not even need to consider their role in the next war and the political ends of their contributions to national defense. The Navy (much like the Marine Corps, the

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151 The paper emphasized sea control over maritime power projection. The former, in the Vietnam years, had been neglected and Admiral Zumwalt sought to address the sea control backlog without ceding power projection capabilities. “Zumwalt preferred the term sea control to Mahan’s control of the sea, the latter implying total use or total denial. Such extreme measures were neither possible nor necessary in the 1970s. Sea control connoted all the Navy need realistically aim for: use of a limited area for a limited time.” (Baer 1994: 404, emphasis in original)
152 Although the report called for four classes of ships meant to meet the Soviets at sea, only one was put into service, the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG 7 etc.) patrol frigates. A second, more ambitious low-end class designated as a 17,000-ton, 25-knot sea control ship priced at the fraction of that of a nuclear aircraft carrier and equipped with helicopters and V/STOL (vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing) airplanes never saw the light of day (Baer 1994: 405).
153 See also discussion in chapter 3.4 of this study.
154 Some of the new capabilities introduced in the 1970s were the two naval command platforms of the Mount Whitney-class (LCC 19/20), P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, A-6E ‘Intruder’ and EA-6B EW jets, the Mk 48 torpedo, the RH-53D AMCM helicopter, carrier-launched F-14 ‘Tomcat’ AAW jets, the first of the Nimitz-class nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers (CVN 68 etc.), Spruance-class (DD 968) destroyers, Los Angeles-class (SSN 668) attack submarines, Tarawa-class (LHA-X) amphibious ships, and the above-mentioned Perry-class frigates. Operationally, the advent of satellite technology and the concept of battle groups centered around nuclear aircraft carriers (CVBG) marked major changes (Swartz 2011d: 6, slide 6). Additionally, the AEGIS integrated shipboard weapons system was developed. Applying computers, radars, and missiles, the system creates a defense umbrella for surface warships by automatically detecting, tracking, and countering anti-ship weapons.
Army, and the Air Force) continued to think about itself in isolation and focused on how to fight, not why.

For the Navy, one of the more palpable side effects of détente, retrenched high-level policy decisions after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal was a drop in force levels. Old ships were retired en block and scrapped without suitable replacements. Congressional austerity, a senior political leadership that invested in other things than the Navy, and the high inflation rate which drove up unit cost further limited ship-procurement. Consequently, the Navy battle force consistently stayed behind the force level goals articulated by its leaders. Fleet size dropped from 769 in 1970 to just 512 in 1975. It reached a contemporary all-time low of 464 in 1977 (Hattendorf 2004: xiv-xv). This quantitative attrition of American sea power was met with intellectual erosion of sound naval strategic thinking; Admiral Rickover’s nuclear ideology went so deeply into the service’s educational and operational structure that it left little room for thought exercises (and writings) on more traditional naval missions and how these in turn should shape strategy.

In the face of a worn-out and ever-shrinking fleet, Admiral James L. Holloway (CNO 1974-1978) provided a new focus on long-range planning, including calling for prospective ship levels from 500 to 800 warships (Hattendorf 2004: 7-8). To Holloway, sea control and power projection were not to be ranked or prioritized. Instead, they necessitated each other (Schmidt-Skipiol 1992: 6). A qualitatively and quantitatively robust and more capable naval force would be needed – not least because the momentous Red Fleet exercises Okean-70 (1970) and Okean-75 (1975) drove home to many the extent of Soviet naval armament and their adoption of a global offensive maritime strategy. The emergence of a Soviet blue-water navy sparked increasing attention for Soviet naval doctrine, strategy, and operations. That analysis surprisingly indicated that the Soviet Union assigned a much higher priority to defending the Soviet homeland and its strategic SSBN reserve. A Battle-of-the-Atlantic-style campaign against allied sea lines of communication, which had loomed large in Western strategic minds, was comparably less important (Center for Naval Analyses 1992: 48). This insight yielded one of the central tenets of “The Maritime Strategy” a decade later, namely configuring its forces and thrust to engage the SSBN, not to guard Atlantic SLOCs.

For the time being, senior leaders in Washington were consumed by domestic post-Watergate and post-Vietnam agendas, which added to overall strategic uncertainty. Successive admin-

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istrations under Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter reduced the Navy’s role in national war plans, with the notable exception of the nuclear ballistic missile submarines now used for strategic deterrence. Presidents followed a policy that hoped to drive strategic decisions through a combination of cost-control measures, diplomacy with the Soviet Union, a hope for arms-control agreements, and a rejection of limited armed conflicts like Vietnam (Baer 1994: 411).

Very prominently, the concept of swinging the U.S. Navy from the Pacific to the European theater in times of crisis and war gained some notoriety. The Navy operated under what was known as the 1.5-war assumption, or providing enough forces to respond to one contingency in Europe and have the on-station Pacific forces ‘swing’ to the European theatre if deemed necessary (or the other way around). Few Navy leaders doubted the potentially devastating consequences of this plan. The underlying assumption implied the desertion of U.S. interests in the Pacific. From the Aleutians to Japan, the Pacific would be left essentially unprotected. The Indian Ocean would also be affected. In times of conflict and crises, this could have disastrous consequences, both militarily and politically.

The Navy instead wanted to give intellectual support to the concept of keeping a two-ocean force ready and available should superpower war (contrary to the conviction of the senior leadership) not be confined to the Central European front. In practice, however, the ‘swing strategy’ remained official doctrine, however fraught with geostrategic challenges and considerable intellectual shortsightedness it was. National strategy had largely dismissed the Pacific, and consequently the Navy did not receive sufficient guidance for that theater. The reasoning went ‘Why have a two-ocean navy at all, when the national strategy does not favor an offensive, global seapower role in general war with the Soviet Union in the first place?’ Contrary to the assumptions in Washington, to the Navy the war in the Pacific would have been by all predictions not a half-war, but rather part of a two-ocean war with the Soviet Union, one for which the Navy was ill-prepared. Toward the end of the 1970s, the gap between internal Navy thinking and the naval part of the national defense policy as outlined in the Carter administration’s Presidential Review Memorandum-10 (PRM-10) widened (The White House 1977). Critics such as the political scientist and military strategist Edward Luttwak blasted the administration and the Navy publicly for failing to come up with a coherent and consistent maritime strategy (Hattendorf 2004: 13).

Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor and Undersecretary of the Navy James Woolsey took it upon them to produce “Sea Plan 2000”, a study was done with the consent of – and direc-
tion of – the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{156} A working group’s effort from the Secretariat of the Navy, the document underlined how naval forces could be decisive in crises and war with the Soviet Union by maintaining stability through forward deployments and the perception of naval power; by containing crises through their inherent capability to affect outcomes ashore and lasting superiority at sea versus the Red Fleet; and by deterring global war through the protection of sea lines of communication, reinforcement of allies, holding pressure against the Soviet Union, and hedging against further possible contingencies (Hattendorf 2004: 15, Swartz 2011a: 6, slides 11-12). It also suggested three different force level options aimed at maintaining “a balanced fleet as national insurance” (Ryan 1981: 130). This served to turn around force level declines and to reflect that despite the U.S. industrial base’ capabilities, warships could not be churned out from the shipyards overnight. At the same time, “Project Sea Strike”, a complimentary effort aimed at taking on the Soviet military at sea, originated with Admiral Thomas Hayward during his time as Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet (Hattendorf 2004: 17-20). Hayward wanted to place the Pacific Fleet within a global naval strategy to be used in the event of war with the Soviet Union. In his mind, the Pacific Fleet needed to develop an offensive plan, if only for political flexibility, not just keep the defensive one that it already had. Ultimately, such offensive-minded ideas would serve to hedge against the impractical reflex to swing forces from the Pacific to another theater. Hattendorf (2004: 18-19) pointed out that “[…] By using Sea Strike as a threat to the Soviet Union, Pacific Fleet planners argued that U.S. naval forces in the Pacific could make a strategic difference by preventing the move of Soviet forces to Europe.” Together with re-discovering its naval mission roots, the Navy now proposed thinking about the larger political context and began to emancipate itself from the burdens of the past. Those in Washington, however, were not quite ready to support this.

Hayward soon succeeded Holloway as CNO, serving from 1978 to 1982. In congressional hearings on Capitol Hill, Hayward criticized the civilian planning in the Department of Defense and how it stood diametrically opposed to naval planning. To Congress, the administration, and the public, he sought to explain the need for an offensive Navy with a global aspiration. Hayward suggested a naval force that relied on technological superiority and carrier avia-

\textsuperscript{156} The Navy was upset with the Carter Administration’s national security review (Presidential Review Memo 10) and its output (Presidential Directive 18), in which the Navy participated but wound up not being listened to very much. Claytor and Woolsey got the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Woolsey) to formally request Claytor to do a Navy Force Planning Study, which became “Sea Plan 2000”, and which was then formally delivered by Claytor to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown -- and only then distributed more widely through the Navy and Defense community (Peter Swartz, e-Mail to author, 22 July 2014). The document “Sea Plan 2000” is reprinted in Hattendorf (2007: 103-124).
ation that offensively addressed Soviet claims to power. If possible, the Soviet Navy should not have the luxury of maintaining sanctuaries for its conventional and nuclear maritime assets. At the same time, Hayward reminded his audiences of the principle of calculated risk. A coherent and sensible force structure was as imperative as the integration of allies into it, Hayward noted. In his view, sea power was also critically important for the post-conflict environment. In theory, this offered a compelling narrative for a large, strong, and global Navy. However, Hayward soon learned that convincing political leaders is often more of a marathon than a 100-yard dash. A global maritime thinking did not fare well with President Carter and his Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. The administration continued to direct resources toward meeting the Red Army on the ground in Europe, not at sea. A maritime strategy was superseded by continental commitment and the focused shifted away from the Pacific (as the Navy underlined) to Central Europe (where the Army and the Air Force succeeded). The two-ocean Navy concept was not maintained further. By all indications, the Navy was closer to being reduced to a one-ocean force than growing into a two-ocean navy.

For the time being, the colliding ideas in Washington over the role and direction of the U.S. Navy could not be resolved, although Carter (a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, after all) did not fully dismiss a Navy’s role. To him, the main task remained sea control and Third World contingencies. The President engaged actively in debates about the future U.S. Navy. Carter, e.g., supported a smaller, conventionally-powered carrier earmarked for peacetime presence missions (dubbed the CVV) during 1978/1979. He encountered the fierce opposition of those who lobbied for further nuclear-powered Nimitz-class large aircraft carriers. These platforms were the most capable aircraft carriers in the world. They were designed for global operations and general war against the Soviet Union, and its supporters insisted that power projection and sea control for the Navy were mutually accommodating and indivisible. A distant blockade of the Soviet Union was floated as an alternative by the supporters of the Carter policies, but that amounted to a move that never gained much traction (Rudolf 1990: 161). Eventually, the Navy was able to lobby Congress successfully for the inclusion of CVN 71 (the future Theodore Roosevelt) into the budget for fiscal year 1980. The point was made that without a sufficient number of CVNs, the Navy feared that it would be reduced to convoy

157 The 1978 hearings introduced the term ‘naval supremacy’ into the political discussion. This superiority reflected the strategic interests of the Navy as an organization to mitigate risk and uncertainty in the face of continuing Soviet naval assertiveness. It was designed to be a qualitative, unilateral supremacy over the Red Fleet, without having to rely on allies to attain such supremacy (Rudolf 1990: 173). In contrast, these contributions were specifically encouraged in the 1979 “The Future of U.S. Sea Power” document authored by Admiral Hayward (reprinted in Hattendorf 2004: 125-134).
158 On the carrier debate and the stakes it entailed, see Ryan (1981: 104-119).
escorts and ASW (Love 1992b: 674). As such, “Sea Strike” and “Sea Plan 2000” were the Navy’s codified attempts to push back the defense policy of the Carter administration (and scuttle the CVV in the process). The main point of the Navy’s argument was that the Central Front could not be seen isolated from the European flanks such as the Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea. What was more, an emphasis on a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Germany with a severely constrained role for naval forces, in the minds of Navy advocates, risked national survival.

Linking policy objectives to war-fighting capabilities again became the essence of strategic thinking and a competitive narrative. Admiral Hayward quite masterfully nourished this renaissance within the Navy in the face of a militarily hesitant, human-rights-policies-heavy Carter administration that clearly preferred continental over maritime thinking. In the minds of Navy leaders, the Navy needed to offer a compelling idea that overcame the established strategy which on a battle between ground forces and supporting air forces in Germany (which, to most Navy people, was not even strategy, but rather a logistics exercise and a question of ‘Who could get there first?’). As Rear Admiral (ret.) James Stark recounts (interview 2012, 00:00:45-00:01:30), “There was no deception, there was no political dimension to it; the Navy wanted to put more of that in [the debate].”

These developments occurred against the background of geopolitical events that seemed to give the Soviet Union and its allies a leg up in the bipolar world conflict. In the Indian Ocean region and the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy was fundamentally challenged by the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in December 1979, which (aside from being a demonstration of conventional military power) promised Moscow potential access to warm-water ports in Pakistan. A little further to the West, the fall of the U.S.-supported Shah in Iran to the Mullah regime in January 1979 replaced one authoritarian regime with another, albeit this one staunchly anti-American. Admiral (ret.) “Ace” Lyons asserted that, “The Carter administration never really understood that the Shah and his military was the underpinning for our [the U.S., S.B.] military strategy in the Persian Gulf.” (Lyons interview 2012: 00:32:50 – 00:33:10) The kidnapping of U.S. embassy personnel on 4 November 1979 yielded the Teheran hostage crisis. It lasted a full 444 days, and a U.S. military operation to free the captives

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159 On the Carter administration’s disarmament efforts, fleet posture policies, and the role of Congress in debating these issues, see Rudolf’s comprehensive chapter (1990: 146-240).

(“Operation Eagle Claw”) resulted in catastrophic failure (Crist 2013: 31-32). In a sweeping recognition of the strategic interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region, Jimmy Carter proclaimed a new policy during his State of the Union address in January 1980. The president announced the prospective use of force if the vital U.S. Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf interests were impaired by a Soviet takeover. The presence of two carrier strike groups during the course of the crisis signaled the merits of a continuous, combat-credible forward naval presence in the region that went beyond the island of Diego Garcia (recently leased from the British). However, there were simply no assets available for a three-ocean Navy that was needed to convincingly buttress the Carter Doctrine. In other words, and certainly not limited to the Indian Ocean, Carter essentially began naval armament without wanting to pay for it (Love 1992b: 700).

After one term, Carter was voted out of office in the November 1980 general election. The Navy had learned the hard way that “as any other agent of government, [it] is the instrument of national policy, its junior partner in every regard, and to disassociate itself from the broad national position is to disassociate itself from the source of its purpose and its strength” (Baer 1994: 415). Yet, the Navy’s rearguard battles set the stage for a reinvigoration of strategic naval thinking that formed the roots of “The Maritime Strategy”. Both as a process and a capstone document (or, more fittingly, a series of documents), “The Maritime Strategy” is a product of its 1970s context.


8.2.1 Global trends & Challengers to U.S. Security

The Soviet Union appeared to come out of the 1970s on a high note, having acquired visible influence and access worldwide. The build-up of its blue-water navy and its challenge to the United States were symbolically illustrated best by the Soviet’s utilization of the former U.S. naval bases in Cam Ranh and Da Nang (Vietnam). The Soviet Union’s naval build-up resulted in a quantitative, but not necessarily qualitative dynamic upper hand at sea versus the United States early in the decade. The Red Fleet’s global aspirations were visibly underlined by the large Okean-80 naval exercise (1980). The introduction of new warships such as the Akula-class attack submarines first commissioned in 1984 – which could not be detected reliably by the U.S.-maintained SOSUS system – drove home the point of global Soviet blue-

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161 For an on-scene account of the operation by one of the commanders, see Kyle (1990).
162 For an analysis of this new grand strategic component, see Crist (2013: 33-48). For the text of the speech, see Carter (1980).
water intentions. The impression of a stable, powerful, even prosperous Soviet Union would turn around within just a few years. Moscow witnessed a stunning stagnation and a rapid succession of leaders. Leonid Brezhnev, in office since 1964, died in 1982. He was succeeded by the ailing Juri Andropov, who passed away in 1984. Then, Konstantin Chernenko governed little over a year before dying in 1985. His successor, in turn, was the young and assertive Michael Gorbachev. Under his reign, the tight grip of the Soviet Union on its Warsaw Pact alliance loosened imperceptibly. The continuous unraveling of Communist leadership led to the end to the Cold War in 1989. But for the early and mid-1980s, nuclear-underwritten bipolarity seemed destined to stay. The bipolar world order – not to be confused with the medical condition, but perhaps often with similar symptoms – was a hallmark of superpower relations. While the Cold War deepened at the beginning of the 1980s, major arms limitations inroads contained and then reduced the number of nuclear weapons in the second half of the decade.

On balance, the constellation of parallel Cold War and lower-level inter- and intrastate competition continued to dominate international affairs. The 1980s marked a continued rise in the number and lethality of terrorism incidents, and the number of reported natural disasters was on the rise as well (Swartz 2011h: 4-5, slides 7-9). There was also a visible upswing in the number of multilateral forums and international codification. Examples include the G-7 meeting of the world’s seven largest economies as a key political steering and coordination forum. Significant in the maritime domain, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was codified (The United Nations 1982). In the United Nations, the United States continued to exercise its rights and obligations as a permanent member on the U.N. Security Council which it held since 1945. In Europe, the process of political integration continued to deepen. The European Community (EC), created in 1957 and more of an economic integration tool than a military partner for the United States (that role would rest prin-

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165 Poland for instance was the first country under Moscow’s umbrella to allow labor unions. A few years earlier in 1981, the same country had installed martial rule to fend off domestic turmoil in hope of preventing a Soviet intervention on the template of the Red Army’s incursion into Czechoslovakia in 1968.

166 Peter Rudolf noted that Ronald Reagan put an end to talks about conventional arms limitations at sea, something which the Carter administration had carefully started; instead, Reagan focused exclusively on nuclear arms control efforts (1990: 241). The Navy did not seem particularly invested in arms control at all.

167 The United States is not a signatory to date but subscribes to some significant aspects of the treaty as customary law.

168 For the relations of the United Nations and the United States, see Ostrower (1998) and (particularly during the Cold War in the security policy realm) Bruns (2008: 24-36).
cipally with the Western European Union), expanded by the inclusion of Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded in 1949 as Europe’s insurance policy against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact, remained in place. In response to the introduction of SS-20 nuclear-tipped missiles in Eastern Europe, a double-track decision was agreed upon. Moscow’s failure to withdraw its SS-20 missiles from the Central front resulted in a coordinated NATO decision to upgrade and expand its own arsenal of theater (as opposed to intercontinental) nuclear weaponry, consisting of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. In Europe, this could only be marshaled against substantial domestic protest, especially in West Germany. In 1983, movies like “The Day After” (about the world after a nuclear war) and “War Games” (about the threat of nuclear escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union), as well as German singer Nena’s hit record “99 Luftballons” (or “99 Red Balloons” in its English variant, about a mass release of balloons that triggers inadvertent nuclear war) had considerable impact on, and were a deep-felt expression of, public opinion in opposition to NATO’s double track decision.

In the ongoing context of the Cold War, the Soviet Union remained the central challenger to American security. In response, the U.S. fielded a more assertive foreign policy, a stronger commitment to national defense, more confrontational rhetoric, and offensive security strategies (Keller 2008b: 105-131). Both superpowers’ nuclear and conventional arsenal retained substantial potential.

By extension, some states like Libya continued to challenge regional (rather than grand strategic) U.S. security interests. In the 1980s, the United States sought to hedge against being drawn too openly into proxy wars (like Angola or Nicaragua). It only engaged militarily with substantial ground troops if it was assured of a clear mission success (e.g., in Grenada 1983 and Panama 1989). This underlined the value of sea power as a foreign policy tool. In principle, sea power provided more nuanced but open options in peacetime, crisis, and war when ground forces were not available or other means appeared to be too risky.

8.2.2 Conflicts, Crisis, and Wars

By virtue of Cold War rationale, the armed conflicts of the 1980s influenced American thinking and strategic posture as they were all seen in that context; by virtue of bureaucracy rationales, it is impossible to discern which events influenced which change in “The Maritime
Strategy” (if any). To give the reader an idea of the violent 1980s, selected wars and conflicts with U.S. participation shall be discussed briefly.

Soviet offensive military, diplomatic, and economic outreach had tied together separate locations of strategic American interest, namely the Middle East (with close ally Israel and access to natural resources) and the West Pacific (a forward U.S. naval hub). Those who had turned away from the costs and responsibilities of armed interventions in the years after the conclusion of the Vietnam War were shocked by a series of American humiliations by antagonist powers. The embassy seizure in Teheran in November 1979, the introduction of Soviet naval ships to recently forsaken Vietnamese bases (providing reach into a critical maritime arena), and the invasion of Afghanistan which threatened a Soviet reach to the Indian Ocean region (including access to its maritime and energy supply lines) contributed to conveying that American power and influence was waning (Baer 1994: 426-427).

Consequently, the public perception of the military’s readiness and its capabilities suffered a blow. Since the conclusion of the Vietnam War, there had been a marked skepticism and sometimes even outright unwillingness to engage militarily. The impression that even limited commando operations by Special Forces could not be marshaled successful added to America’s crisis of self-confidence. The Middle East at the time continued to be in grave turmoil. Iran and Iraq went to war against each other between 1980 and 1988. This included the use of weapons of mass destruction (C-weapons). Israel’s air force raided Iraq’s nuclear plant at Osirak in June 1981. In the meantime, Egypt consolidated a new leadership under Hosni Mubarak after his predecessor Anwar El Sadat, an advocate of reconciliation with Israel, was assassinated on 6 October 1981.

In the South Atlantic, the Falklands War from April to June 1982 occupied the minds of politicians and militaries in the West and the East alike. Although the United States was not a

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169 To maritime strategists such as retired Vice Admiral Lyons, “[John] Lehman’s favorite fleet admiral” (Swartz 1996: 94), Islamic Anti-American fundamentalism has its roots in the U.S. inability and unwillingness to act swiftly and decisively in the face of aggression in Teheran. The American withdrawal from Lebanon after the Marine Corps Barracks bombing in 1983 and the attack on the U.S. embassy in 1984, in his view, encouraged the notion that once U.S. casualties had to be taken into consideration, the political power base for American interventions would crumble and U.S. forces would withdraw, a key idea that al-Qaida built its own strategy on. Lyons lobbied unsuccessfully to retaliate against Iran in 1979/1980 and against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1983/1984 (Lyons interview 2012: 00:35:00 – 00:46:20).

170 To British naval historian Eric Grove, the war was the “most notable naval event of the decade and the most significant traditional, fleet vs. fleet battle in the post-war era.” (Grove 1990: 159) It is important to note that this war was an inner-system and not a U.S.-Soviet proxy conflict.
warring party in this conflict, it quickly sided with the U.K.\textsuperscript{171} The war between Great Britain and Argentina over the South Atlantic islands was an instrumental example of modern warfare at and more so from the sea. Its lessons included the roles and values of smaller and larger warships, aircraft performance, anti-ship missile use, submarine operations, ship survivability, logistics, and more. Consequently, the Department of the Navy commissioned a report that was submitted in 1983, outlining the lessons the United States could draw from that South Atlantic war.\textsuperscript{172} In the context of the Cold War, and thus perhaps most importantly to the U.S., “the effect of the Falklands War was far greater than simply the retaking of the islands. It greatly improved the credibility of NATO’s deterrence in demonstrating the willingness of a Western democracy to fight for principle, and its skill in doing so” (Lehman 2001: 283).\textsuperscript{173}

1983 was a very tense year in the U.S.-Soviet conflict, prompting superpower tensions to the brink of serious and direct war. On 25 October, U.S. Marine Corps and Army forces invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury was designed to oust the Socialist government on the island.\textsuperscript{174} U.S. forces involvement in the Lebanese Civil War also escalated that year: two suicide attacks on the American embassy and the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut with a large number of casualties prompted U.S. withdrawal a few months later (Hammel 2005: 285-420). During the transitions at the top leadership position of the USSR, the Reagan administration continued its strictly anti-communist rhetoric. In parallel, arrangements were made for the deployment of new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was proclaimed. Amid renewed tensions, a South Korean type-747 jumbo jet was shot down on 1 September over the Sakhalin Peninsula.\textsuperscript{175} Three weeks later, on 26 September, a Soviet early-warning installation erroneously detected a U.S. nuclear missile launch. The Russian officer of the guard decided to override his orders, based on his knowledge of previous false alarms – thus sparing the world a consequential retaliatory

\textsuperscript{171} In a presentation at the “Falklands War – 30 Years On” conference in Portsmouth (UK) on 19 May 2012 and in subsequent statements, Lehman revealed that the United States made preparations to deploy the U.S. Navy’s helicopter carrier \textit{Iwo Jima} (LPH 2) should one of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers be lost (see also Lehman 2012b).

\textsuperscript{172} For the report, see DON/OPA (1983).

\textsuperscript{173} On the enduring relevance of Falklands War for the U.S., see Bruns (forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{174} John Lehman blasted the Grenada operation for the near total lack of intelligence, a lack of interoperability between the land and sea forces of the U.S., and the exceptionally high attrition rate of helicopters (Lehman 2001: 289-296). Still, the military operation met its objective.

\textsuperscript{175} KAL flight 007 bound for Seoul had digressed from its designated route due to a navigational error. In consequence, it violated Soviet airspace (twice). It was shot down by Soviet interceptor jets, which may have mistook the airliner for a U.S. intelligence gathering plane patrolling outside Russian airspace at the same time. All passengers aboard the commercial airliner, among them a sitting U.S. Congressman, were killed.
Soviet nuclear strike at the U.S. heartland and prospective global nuclear war (Hoffmann 1999: A19).

During the first half of November, NATO conducted its “Able Archer” military staff exercise. The Soviet Union, by all accounts, considered this exercise as a thinly disguised veil for an imminent decapitating nuclear first-strike of the alliance against the Warsaw Pact and increased the readiness of its forces. In the fall of 1983, the world was closer to nuclear war than at any other time of the Cold War (Schild 2013: 190), perhaps with the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Fortunately, tensions leveled and then decreased after 1983.

In the middle of managing the superpower confrontation, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi continued to be a secondary, but very persistent nuisance in international affairs. Sponsorships of international terrorism prompted the United States to retaliate repeatedly (Lehman 2001: 350-360). And in 1989, Central America once again became the site of a U.S. military intervention, this time in Panama. Throughout the decade in the Caribbean region, a “War on Drugs” also consumed many intergovernmental resources. The U.S. Navy began to be tasked with a supporting role in the attempt to curtail drug shipments from South America to the markets in the United States (and practice its low-intensity conflict-resolution skills in counter-narcotics operations in the process) (Thompson 1999: 1-28).

8.3 Personalities, Domestic Conditions, and National Security Strategies

8.3.1 Presidents, Secretaries, and Policy/Strategy Leaders

Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter in the White House in 1981. As running mate, the former governor of California selected his inner-party rival, George H.W. Bush from Texas. Reagan had already campaigned for the Republican Party ticket four years earlier, only to lose the presidential primaries to then-incumbent Gerald Ford. In 1976, a controversial CBO study about the role of the Navy and future battle-force levels had diverted considerable public attention to the question of military force levels (Love 1992b: 678-688). The Republican Party platform had taken this discussion into the primaries that year. Reagan therefore was no stranger to the concept of a large Navy. In 1980, with foreign policy issues high on the

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176 In line with Hattendorf (2004:1), with the addition of Congress to the discussion (see also introduction to this study).

177 After eight years as Vice President, Bush successfully ran for President in the general election of 1988. His tenure will be analyzed in more detail in the chapter on the 1990s.

178 That paper analyzed three force levels: 600 ships assembled mainly around 14 aircraft carriers groups, 500 ships grouped around 12 carriers, and 400 vessels clustered around 10 carriers. The study was criticized for weighing sea control tasks versus power projection against the Soviet Union, rather than having the Navy do both (see also Rudolf 1990: 113-114).
election agenda and President Carter attacked as weak on American leadership, the focus in the primaries and the general election in 1980 again turned to the future size of the military. The 600-ship Navy theme tracked strongly with audiences during the campaign (Lehman 2001: 100-101).

The new president sought a tougher stance against the Soviet Union, as amplified by his support for the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative and a more aggressive rhetoric. He reversed his course notably toward the end of his first term and took a significantly less confrontational public stance going into 1984 and his re-election campaign. This became known as the “Reagan reversal” (Schild 2013: 191-202). As his Secretary of Defense, Reagan chose Casper “Cap” Weinberger (in office from 1981 to 1987). Weinberger, a staunch supporter of the defense build-up in the 1980s, postulated what became known as the Weinberger Doctrine. In a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on 28 November 1984, the Secretary of Defense stated six conditions under which U.S. military forces would be committed to a conflict. This doctrine was informed by the post-Vietnam War reluctance to commit military power in entangling limited wars, and influenced by reflecting on the U.S. interventions in Grenada and Lebanon in the year before. In the future, the U.S. should only assign military forces when its vital interests or those of its allies were at stake. If combat forces were deployed, they should be sized accordingly and committed to defined political and military objectives. The relationship between objectives and the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary, beginning with the exploration of whether a conflict was in the American national interest at all. Consistent support of the American people and its elected leaders in the legislative and executive branches was also a prerequisite. In any case, the Secretary proclaimed, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort (Weinberger 1984).

As Secretary of State, Reagan picked Alexander Haig, a retired four-star Army general, graduate of the Naval and the Army War Colleges, and former SACEUR (1974-1979). After a tumultuous eighteen months in office (which included international foreign policy crises in the Falklands and in Lebanon), Haig – who frequently clashed with Secretary of Defense

179 In an address on 8 March 1983, the President called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” (Reagan 1983). In a much-less confrontational 12 June 1987 speech in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, with reference to the iconic nature of the speech’s site he appealed to Soviet General-Secretary Gorbachev to “open this gate, tear down this wall” (Reagan 1987).

180 Weinberger’s successor was Frank Carlucci, who had served the Reagan administration in various positions and oversaw the last two years of the Reagan administration (1987-1989). His impact on foreign policy was limited compared to Weinberger. When George Bush Sr. became President of the United States in 1989, Richard “Dick” Cheney was nominated as Secretary of Defense (1989-1993).
Weinberger – resigned over disagreements with administration policies.\textsuperscript{181} His successor was George P. Shultz, who remained in office until 1989 (the longest-serving Secretary of State since Kennedy/Johnson appointee Dean Rusk). Shultz efficiently managed the foreign policy challenges of the time and he was among the first to advocate a more cordial approach to the Soviet Union from March 1985.

Over at the Pentagon, John Lehman was sworn into office as Secretary of the Navy in 1981. Lehman quickly ascended as the face and public voice of “The Maritime Strategy”.\textsuperscript{182} He confidently remarked (2001: 105) the he saw himself as the Navy’s CEO:

“The best CNOs have provided real leadership and good professional advice to the president, but never have they operated as chief executive officers. When the Secretary of the Navy does not run the Navy, the Navy simply is not run.”

Lehman’s get-go attitude and media-savvy personality made him a star in Washington. He provided the necessary top cover and climate where the idea of an offensive, forward Navy that provided the Commander in Chief with multiple opportunities on the spectrum for peacetime engagement, crisis, and war could blossom. As “The Maritime Strategy” was disseminated, Lehman had to increasingly cede control of the process to OP-603 and the Navy who fleshed out the details of the idea.\textsuperscript{183}

Admiral Thomas Hayward, CNO from 1978 to 1982, oversaw the transition from Carter to Reagan. Hayward created the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the Naval War College, the work of which became one of the key influences on “The Maritime Strategy”. Traditionally, the Navy’s service chiefs are usually appointed for a single term of four years (with the notable exception of Admiral Arleigh Burke, CNO 1955-1961) and so it would be up to the incoming admiral to utilize the changing circumstances and steer the Navy forward. As an administrative rather than an operational leader, Navy strategy and strategic documents are among the prime activities for CNOs. In 1982, Admiral James Watkins, Hayward’s deputy,\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{181} His relatively short time in office, his military career, and his policy management isolated him from any serious influence on “The Maritime Strategy”. For an account of his one and a half years in office in his own words, see Haig (1984).

\textsuperscript{182} Swartz (1996: 118) recalls that “Lehman repeated the same themes over and over again in his speeches, rather than jumping from topic to topic. He made himself, the U.S. Navy, and the Maritime Strategy synonymous in the public, Capitol Hill, and much of the Pentagon mind.”

\textsuperscript{183} Thanks to his energetic way of handling his exceptionally long tenure as Secretary of the Navy, Lehman quickly eclipsed the legacies of his Carter-era bureaucrat predecessors Graham Claytor (1977-1979) and Edward Hidalgo (1979-1981). Lehman successors also stood in his shadow, and Jim Webb (1987-1988), William Ball (1988-1989), and Lawrence Garrett, III. (1990-1992) consequently only had short terms with little lasting influence. It should be cautioned that there were (and probably are still today) as many fans of Lehman (“The right man at the right time” [Rudolf 1990: 244]) as there are cautious critics (“There was more to the Maritime Strategy than John Lehman” [Swartz 1996: 95]). Lehman was a key figure in “The Maritime Strategy”, but by far not the only driver.
became CNO. He was the first member of the submariner’s union to rise to that position since Admiral Chester Nimitz (CNO from 1945-1947). He provided essential continuity from the Hayward era. “The Maritime Strategy” was then developed by Watkins’ flag officers and their staff between 1982 and 1984. Watkins was succeeded in 1986 as CNO by Admiral Carlisle Trost, another submariner who embraced “The Maritime Strategy” (Trost participated in the development of “The Maritime Strategy” in some of his previous posts and roles). Trost’s term was characterized by the rapidly changing nature of global political conditions and a significant number of transitions in the Reagan administration. Trost in turn was succeeded by Admiral Frank Kelso (1990-1994), the third consecutive submariner to be appointed to the top of Navy leadership. In Admiral William Crowe Jr., the Navy also provided the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1985 to 1990.184 The influence of the military in the executive branch rose during the Reagan administration, with a rising budgetary tide lifting all services’ boats. The Navy, both uniformed and civilian leadership, sought to capitalize on this, looking to push back the civilian and scientific control of military (and by implication naval/maritime) strategy through systems analysis tools that dated back to the tenure of Secretary McNamara.185

In Congress, the Republicans held a majority of Senate seats during Reagan’s first term, but lost it to the Democrats in the 1984 election. The House of Representatives was under Democratic control over the course of the whole decade. Although working with a divided government, Reagan policies during his first term fared reasonably well on the Hill, which can be attributed to the persuasive and aggressive lobbying of Lehman and powerful allies in the committee chair seats. Even without these force multipliers, Congress was generally sympathetic toward the Navy,186 because the discussion shifted from certain budget items like expensive aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines to the overall rationale of the Navy in U.S. national security. Additionally, the increase in defense money was to the benefit of many states and districts with defense-related industry or military bases. In fact, Lehman’s strategic

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184 His predecessor was General John Vessey Jr., USA (1982-1985); his successor was General Colin Powell, USA (1989-1993). Powell later served as Secretary of State in the first administration of George W. Bush (2001-2005).

185 Rudolf (1990: 243) suggests that the leadership of the Pentagon was brought off-balance by the Navy’s and Navy Department’s assertiveness in the 1980s. In the view of that author, Secretary of Defense Weinberger was in a particular unfortunate position. Rudolf attests a lack of security-policy expertise and describes him much less versed than his predecessor Harold Brown.

186 According to Swartz (1996: 36), an exception from the rule was Senator Sam Nunn. The Democrat from Georgia challenged Lehman at various hearings on Navy budget and strategic decisions. Other, somewhat influential counter-Navy voices on the Hill included Senator Ted Kennedy, the venerable Massachusetts Democrat who attacked the Navy on arms control issues later in the decade, and Representative Les Aspin, the Wisconsin Democrat who would be appointed Secretary of Defense in the Bill Clinton administration.
home-porting initiative, underwritten as a force dispersal action to hedge against a massed Soviet attack, multiplied the number of naval stations throughout the country, thus potentially providing thousands of jobs and revenue dollars to more states and municipalities.

8.3.2 Domestic conditions

The Reagan administration steadily increased its defense budget. A persistent national security consensus and a more assertive foreign policy buttressed that policy.


This soaring government spending is significant because the U.S. economy experienced a period of turbulence in the 1980s. Military investments were an example of deficit spending, an economic strategy where government spending is higher than revenue in hopes of rekindling an ailing economy through federal intervention. Due to a recession in the early 1980s, the nationwide unemployment rate climbed to more than 10% in 1982. Industries such as the automobile and steel manufacturers experienced substantial downturns. Inflation was on the rise, and oil prices had peaked in 1980. Through a combination of measures that soon became known as Reaganomics, the U.S. government sought to alleviate domestic pressure. On Monday, 19 October 1987, the “Black Monday” stock market crash sent further shock waves through the economies of the U.S. and the world (Carlson 2006: 3-11).

8.3.3 Selected U.S. National Security Policies, Doctrines, and Capstone Documents

By 1980, détente between the superpowers had definitely ended. The U.S. continued its overarching grand strategic path of attempting to contain the sprawl of Soviet influence world-
wide. But the emotional trauma of the Vietnam War loomed large in the American psyche, and world events suggested a downturn in U.S. power that even the Carter Doctrine could not decelerate significantly. The Reagan administration, in turn, was vocal against the Soviet Union, buttressing its rhetoric with potent and controversial policies.

The first major national capstone document, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 32, appeared on 20 May 1982. It stated the overarching security policy goals of the United States as:

- Deterring military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S. and its allies;
- Strengthening of U.S. influence globally through existing alliances and coalitions;
- Containment and reversal of Soviet military presence and control throughout the world;
- Neutralization of non-military efforts by the Soviet Union;
- Actively seeking long-term liberalization and nationalist tendencies within the USSR and its allies;
- Strengthening the U.S. military;
- Assurance of U.S. access to foreign markets and resources;
- Access to oceans and space;\(^\text{187}\)
- Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
- Encouragement and support of development aid by the U.S. and its allies in the Third World; and,
- Promotion of a well-functioning international economic system (The White House 1982: 1-2).

Reagan’s address to the nation on 28 March 1983 was another milestone in publically laying out his administration’s national security policies. The address laid out the rationale for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Despite its tremendous costs and doubtful viability, Reagan supported this ground- and space-based system designed to destroy incoming ICBMs. To his critics, the high-tech “Star Wars” program signaled a grave waste of resources; to some in the Soviet Union and even in Europe, SDI signaled that the U.S. was beginning to plan a

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\(^{187}\) Space gained increasing prominence in the military and political spheres in the 1980s. It served both as an operating space for satellites and weaponry, as SDI promised, and as a frontier for American destiny as the Space Shuttle program readily demonstrated (damped only by the explosion of the Challenger shuttle on 28 January 1986).
limited, first-strike nuclear war by evading mutual assured destruction (Schild 2013: 155-161).

On the lower end of the conflict spectrum, U.S. support of anti-communist governments and insurgencies increased. The Reagan Doctrine attempted to destabilize Soviet proxies through material aid and training for insurgents and rebels in countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. In Afghanistan, the U.S. supported the Mujahidin in their war against the Soviet invaders. Whereas most of these programs were shrouded in secrecy, one revelation made headline news and sent the Reagan administration into its most serious domestic crisis. In the Iran-Contra affair, it was revealed that Contra rebels in Nicaragua were supported with revenues of weapon sales to Iran. These in turn were designated to free American hostages from the hands of Shiite militias in Lebanon. Iran, which demanded more weapons, humiliated the Reagan administration as much as it had previously humiliated the Carter government (Hacke 2005: 373). The Iran-Contra conspiracy came to a head in July 1987, when National Security Council staffer Colonel Oliver North, USMC, was summoned to testify before Congress on the scandal. North was indicted in 1988 (and Reagan barely avoided an impeachment). By then, an exodus of seasoned hardliner national security decision-makers already had begun. CIA director William Casey passed away, and National Security Advisor John Poindexter, presidential speechwriter Pat Buchanan, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger left the administration in the course of 1987 (Bierling 2003: 183). National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci became Secretary of Defense and General Colin Powell followed in Carlucci’s position.

On the bureaucratic side, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of October 1986 was the most important congressional intervention in DOD bureaucracy since the creation of the Department in 1947. The Act mandated increasing focus and emphasis on joint strategy, planning, and operations in the military realm. It broadened the operational command roles of the CINCs as well the advisory powers of the CJCS, both at the expense of service chiefs such as the CNO. More so, it mandated annual presidential reports on national security strategy, and it triggered a flood of new publications on ‘jointness’. The Navy was skeptical towards the move for such deep integration, which was perceived as irreversible. Henceforth, the nation’s naval forces would be far more tightly integrated into joint concepts and operations, in spite of the unique nature of the maritime environment and of warfare at and from the sea (Swartz 2014: 18).

The Reagan administration rushed out its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in January 1987, soon after the Goldwater-Nichols Act was signed into law. This first official NSS was
thus “prepared in a very limited period of time and reflected the intent to document only current strategic thinking. [...] Taken as a whole, of course the document portrayed a comprehensive strategic approach toward the Soviet Union” (Snider 1995: 7), but it did not integrate strategy across regions of U.S. strategic interest. Its January 1988 follow-up document came at a time of increasing deficits. It attempted to formulate a comprehensive and integrated national security strategy, e.g., elevating economic elements of national power into the calculation.

Reagan’s successor George H.W. Bush submitted his first NSS in March 1990. The rapidly changing geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe greatly complicated the facilitation of a visionary administration statement of ways-means-ends causality on time. The original Goldwater-Nichols legislation had implicitly assumed a fairly stable state in the international environment, with the yearly report articulating incremental changes to both perceptions of and responses to that environment (Snider 1995: 8). In an increasingly uncertain environment, the NSS therefore appeared over one year later than planned. The central formal document by which the President and the Secretary of Defense were advised on military matters was the National Military Strategy, compiled by the CJCS. In its classified 1989 version submitted by Admiral Crowe, it included chapters on national military objectives and national military strategy and an appraisal of U.S. defense policy and intelligence. It looked at fiscal constraints on force levels, and evaluated risks to U.S. national interests. The capstone document still focused on the Cold War and the Soviet Union. It emphasized the military value of alliances such as NATO while emphasizing forward-deployed forces (Meinhart 2012: 84). Such was the lay of the land in the 1980s when the Navy sought to use the momentum provided by the incoming Reagan administration and its policies to present its case vocally for a coherent strategy.

8.4 Developing and Promulgating USN Strategy 1981-1989

a) Evolution

When Reagan was sworn in as President in January 1981, the Navy was on an upward swing and the seeds for what would become “The Maritime Strategy” had long been planted.188 The Reagan administration’s policies and people provided the top cover and the much-desired fertilizer. According to Lehman (2001: 121-137), “The Maritime Strategy” rested on eight

188 For a discussion of the period 1945-1955, see Palmer (1988). Representative accounts on the origins of “The Maritime Strategy” and the underlying assumptions also by Barnett (1989a/b) and Gray (1990). Swartz (2011h: 32, slide 64) notes that the Navy “had benefited from increased visibility during [the] last years of Carter Administration (late 1979-1981): utility of CVBGs, ARGs, sealift, preposition ships [was] recognized and funded.”
principles. First, it was derived from and dependent on the overall national security strategy established by the President. Second, that national strategy provided the Department of the Navy with maritime tasks such as controlling international crises, deterring war, sea control, access, support of land battles, and attack at the source. Those tasks – third – required maritime superiority, which in turn – fourth – required a disciplined maritime strategy (as the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill policy ends). That strategy was imperative for relating and conforming Navy and Marine Corps planning, programming, budgeting, and research and development efforts. The document also reoriented ship, aircraft, and weapons system design plans as well as personnel and training policies. Fifth, the strategy had to be based on a realistic threat assessment. Sixth, it needed to be global, not sequential as a land campaign. Seventh, it needed to fully integrate U.S. and free world forces, including Air Force, Coast Guard, and Army. Eighth, the strategy needed to be a forward strategy.

The actual document has its roots in a workshop on Soviet naval intelligence convened in 1981. At least eight larger iterations of various length and scope were produced, both in classified and after 1986 in unclassified versions. The vetting process itself obviously produced numerous drafts and versions. The following table gives an overview of the documents and their principal drafters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status/format</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Principle Drafters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secret publication</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>CAPT Roger Barnett, CDR Peter Swartz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Warfare Strategy</td>
<td>Secret publication</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>CAPT Larry Seaquist, COL Phil Harrington (USMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Maritime Strategy</td>
<td>Secret publication, revision</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>CAPT Larry Seaquist, CDR Wood Parker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Maritime Strategy</td>
<td>Unclassified booklet (<em>Proceedings</em>)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>CAPT Linton Brooks, CDR Robbie Harris, MAJ Hugh O’Donnell (USMC), Dr. Harvey Sichermann, CAPT Peter Swartz, Fred Rainbow (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings professional magazine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy”</td>
<td>Unclassified article</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>CNO staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Maritime Strategy</td>
<td>Secret publication, revision</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>CDR Mitch Brown</td>
</tr>
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Illustration 18: Main 1980s USN capstone documents (Swartz 2011g: 24-26, slides 48-52; 2011h: 69, slide 138)
The broad spectrum of contemporary media outlets was utilized, ranging from (classified) briefings to public versions and discussions in journal articles, illustrated professional magazine exposures, and books. Even a VHS video was produced to distribute “The Maritime Strategy” to all ships in the fleet (Swartz 2011g: 6, slide 11). The character of the strategies was always that of a work in progress. There was never one single manuscript, but rather a plethora of documents. Accordingly, parallel efforts were underway to continuously improve and operationalize “The Maritime Strategy”. “The Maritime Strategy” publications were signed by CNOs Admirals Watkins and Trost in coordination with Secretary of the Navy Lehman and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), whose force as part of the Navy Department was also included in the strategic layout. A consolidation of existing thinking rather than a vision, “The Maritime Strategy” aspired to be an “explanation of use of current forces. [It] told a story; provided a narrative” (Swartz 2011g: 5, slide 10). As a comprehensive concept, it included peacetime forward-deployed heavy attack carriers forces for offensive operations in a global war and as a national power instrument for regional crises intervention (it was not simply a war plan against the Soviet Union) and it was so convincing that inner-administration disagreement focused on mere semantics, i.e., whether the United States should aspire to ‘naval supremacy’ or ‘naval superiority’ (Rudolf 1990: 249-251, Love 1992b: 708).

Beside referencing numerous national overarching strategic guidance documents, U.S. laws, memoranda of understanding with sister services, joint documents, and allied capstone documents (i.e. from NATO), the authors of “The Maritime Strategy” could draw from a vast number of contemporary contextual publications. Examples included earlier documents such as Project SIXTY (1970) and Sea Plan 2000 (1978). Beginning in 1981, a host of public statements in speeches, testimony, and articles by John Lehman and other individuals, official reports, the output of the Strategic Studies Group, a steady flow of intelligence accounts about

\footnote{There are at least three strands, combining a total of twenty-four threads of possible explanatory patterns pertaining to the analytical genesis of Navy strategy. These include a rational strand, “like they teach you at staff college and the junior service college courses. How ‘the book’ says you make Strategy, or at least how you should” (Swartz 1996: 16); an organization strand, “like they teach you at the Kennedy School and the senior War College courses. How Pentagon and fleet insiders say you ‘really’ make Strategy” (ibid: 17); and a personality strand, “like you read in the newspapers and memoirs and see in the movies: How the participants say they and their colleagues actually made Strategy.” (ibid.) Swartz, the political scientist and military staff action officer for “The Maritime Strategy”, goes on to note that “I was one of the twisters of the 24 threads. These threads did not flow to us on neat conveyor belts, neatly twisted into three strands. Rather, they often arrived all tangled in balls and knots. Sometimes they were thrown at us. […] Other times they were just rolled over, underhand. We had to do lots of untwisting and untangling. […] Other times we had to go looking for them as they flowed elsewhere […] Then we had to reroute them over to our desks and lay them together to form the line we were making.” (Swartz 1996: 15). This realization, of course, goes back to the challenges of discerning the analysis of naval strategy from a political science point of view discussed in the first chapters of this dissertation.}
the Soviet Navy, and other papers helped in the effort to explain how all the integrative pieces of the Navy fit together. As the strategy emerged, it was tested repeatedly in large-scale and smaller exercises. The academic discussion of just what kind of strategy “The Maritime Strategy” really was, or whether it was a by-the-book strategy at all, is eventually futile.

“To the developers of the Maritime Strategy in OP-603 […] and to the thinkers at the Naval War College, the Maritime Strategy was intended to reflect – and to drive – all aspects of naval policy. It was at once the Navy’s declaratory strategy, budget strategy, employment strategy, and programming strategy.” (Swartz 1996: 55, emphasis in original)

These carefully crafted moves hardened the strategy and elevated it in the public political and military discourse.

The writing process then was truly “organic” (Swartz 2011g: 22-27, slides 44-54). Extensive socialization of the briefing material (among those who had access) allowed countless interactions, both critical and supportive. In the spring of 1984, the secret document was ready for CNO signature. Various briefings and shorter articles followed, and in 1986 an unclassified version was published as a supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute’s professional journal, Proceedings. A number of semi-official writings and unofficial publications from outside, which escorted the conceptual processes of writing and re-writing the strategy, emerged concurrently. Three distinct periods emerge in hindsight: Framing of the strategy under the conditions of secrecy and with mixed messages from the fleet and the Secretary of the Navy; the publication and dissemination of the strategy in an unclassified form to the public and the fleet; and finally the attempt to bring the strategy indoors again in attempts to enhance the strategy’s salience and guard its future viability.

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190 For a representative open-source analysis, see Frod/Rosenberg (2005). The Soviet Union was not idly standing on the sidelines of the intelligence business, as the exposure of the Walker family spy ring in the U.S. demonstrated. U.S. Navy Chief Warrant Officer John Walker and his associates provided information about the U.S. Navy to the Moscow from 1965 to 1985 – resulting in “the Navy’s biggest betrayal” (Prados 2010).
191 For a comprehensive list of contemporary publications, see Swartz (2011g: 16-21, slides 31-42).
192 See section 8.6.3 for details. See also interview with Admiral (ret.) Lyons (2012, 00:20:00 – 00:30:00).
193 Of note is an unofficial ‘Navy Study Group’ convened in the Washington, D.C.-area between 1983 and 1985 by Commander Jim Stark, a graduate of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a Massachusetts graduate school focusing on international affairs and attracting a number of U.S. Navy officers as their students. This outside forum to discuss and influence naval strategy has, in various iterations and under different conveners, survived until today.
194 See Watkins (1986). This is the document that is often referred to as the “Maritime Strategy”.
195 For a comprehensive list of these, see Swartz (2011g: 28-29, 31, slides 55-57 and 61), and Swartz’ annotated bibliography on the accompanying debates in Hattendorf (2004: 185-277).
196 For an assessment of the threads bound together to make “The Maritime Strategy” and an appraisal of those that had less or no influence at all, see Swartz (1996: 109-115).
b) Strategic Concept

The central innovations of “The Maritime Strategy” were its dedicated offensive approach and the three distinctive stages of naval force employment in peaceful presence, crisis response, and global conventional war. Rather than sticking to the more defensive notions of naval force employment in previous decades, it sought to charge against the Soviet Union in peacetime to globalize the conflict in general war. Splitting the enemy’s forces is a classic military maneuver. This required forward-deployed and forward-based assets. In addition, the strategy sought to utilize Russia’s principally unfavorable geographic position and posture as a land power. To the planners, this warranted a closer look at the global choke points. The control of these man-made or natural narrows where commercial and military shipping has to pass through was a key strategic enabler for the thrust against any assertive Soviet naval claims. Choke point control therefore kept Soviet naval forces from exercising sea control, dispersing their force, controlling sea lines of communication, and supporting its troops and allies.

Illustration 19: Crucial Naval Choke Points during the Cold War (Collins 2002: 58).

However, this was also a high-risk strategy. In principle, “The Maritime Strategy” exposed the high-value aircraft carriers which were deployed near the enemy’s mainland through the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap in the West and the Sea of Okhotsk in the East. The U.S. Navy’s inherent strength (the orchestration of carrier task forces) could have easily translated into a
decapitating blow if the Soviet Union had felt provoked enough to react with force. For the U.S. Navy, bringing the capital units out this far also made integration with allies and overcoming warfare unions’ squabble an imperative.

As opposed to the proponents of the European central front scenario for the next war, where tactical nuclear weapons would likely be used in the very early stages of the conflict,\textsuperscript{197} the maritime strategists in their war games chiefly emphasized conventional forces and a globalized approach. The authors of “The Maritime Strategy” reasoned that by keeping the conflict nonnuclear (i.e., escalating horizontally rather than vertically), the United States’ geographic, military, economic, and political advantages (all of which are key components of sea power) could favorably underpin Washington’s grand strategy and provide for a higher likelihood of prevailing in the conflict. It was expected that a prolonged conventional war would wear out the Soviet Union’s planned economy and authoritarian regime.\textsuperscript{198}

A further major impetus to the intellectual formation of “The Maritime Strategy” was the realization that Soviet military doctrine had undergone a significant change itself. Like the West, the Soviet Union had also become somewhat acquainted with the demands of the Cold War. Consequently, the USSR toned down the idea of an offensive, global nuclear war against the United States and its allies. Instead, Moscow focused on obtaining control of Europe. In the Soviet view, this would be facilitated by deterring a U.S. nuclear attack using assets like the SS-20 missiles and the submarine ballistic missile reserve. A defensive strategy was designed to protect that fleet in the hope of essentially safeguarding that deterrent. It was on these assumptions that U.S. Navy planners re-energized their offensive ideas. If the navies of the United States and its NATO allies could overcome Soviet defenses, they could put at risk the Soviets’ strategic reserve. If they destroyed submarines before the submarines sailed into the open ocean, they could better assure the safety of NATO shipping. If they conducted amphibious campaigns on Europe’s flanks in support of a ground war to hold or regain Europe, they would bring to a general war a great maritime asset (Baer 1994: 421).

\textsuperscript{197} Such a scenario is unfolded in Tom Clancy’s novel “Red Storm Rising”, first published in 1986. The fictional story, based on actual contingency plans, follows a NATO-Warsaw Pact war which begins in Southwest Asia. As the conflict broadens, violent battles in Central Germany and naval campaigns in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea eventually turn the tide for the U.S. and its allies.

\textsuperscript{198} That, in turn, did not exclude the Navy’s forgoing of nuclear options. Improved SLBM type Poseidon and Trident I formed the submarine leg of the nuclear deterrence triad (with ICBM and strategic bombers as the other two legs). At any time, in any circumstance, the Navy was to be prepared to act more or less at any point along a continuum of violence whose levels ranged from display to nuclear war (Bear 1994: 432). The use of nuclear weapons in naval warfare has limited plausibility. They were only suitable in a general nuclear war, which would severely curtail the relevance of naval forces in the first place. Its only objective during the Cold War, therefore, was deterrence. They did so by carrier- or submarine-launched missiles (Grove 1990: 92).
In a protracted conventional war, the need for secure SLOCs would dramatically rise as European allies would expend their depots and war-fighting platforms in battles of attrition. Containing and attacking the Soviet subsurface capabilities at their bastions, consequently, could be a prime enabler for U.S. sea control, thus securing and defending the maritime highways for NATO.

In the Pacific, far away from the Central Front occupying many NATO allies’ minds, things stood somewhat differently. The Navy rejected the notion of the Carter years that war would be confined to one theatre, most likely Europe. That is the principal reason why the service never really warmed to the force posture earmarked for the Pacific. In the meantime, the Soviet Pacific Fleet benefited disproportionately from the USSR’s naval build-up, focusing on the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kuril Islands, and two large naval bases as staging points. The Soviet Navy fielded SSBNs, V/STOL carriers, heavy cruisers, and amphibious assets. It routinely and substantially engaged in naval diplomacy and show-of-force missions in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. It could also threaten the sea lines of communication in the West Pacific, and shadow U.S. naval movements in the Pacific (i.e., the 7th Fleet area of operations).

In the days of the ‘swing strategy’, the Pacific would have been largely deserted, with grave strategic and political ramifications for the United States. Now, an offensive in the Pacific as first devised in “Sea Strike” would – given the right number of ships and suitable doctrinal guidance – bind Soviet forces. These would then be unavailable to be employed against NATO flanks, the Persian Gulf, Asia, or to threaten sea lines of communication. An American offensive based principally on carrier battle groups would capitalize on the Western advantageous geography and forces against weaker and less geographically favored Soviet forces (Baer 1994: 425).

Given its operational expertise and technological edge, the U.S. Navy was confident that it could master such operations. In its refocus from a secondary role in general war, the Navy sought to make a deliberate strategic difference by enhancing deterrence, controlling escalation, solidifying the Western alliance, influencing neutral states, defending the U.S., supporting land campaigns, limiting Moscow’s options, and increasing Soviet uncertainties. Throughout, “The Maritime Strategy” promised to help gain the initiative and provide a strong deterrence and termination of hostilities factor (Hattendorf/Swartz 2008: 192).

Consequently, “The Maritime Strategy” was a farewell to the ‘swing strategy’ of the Carter years and the smaller fleet that came with it. Instead, it advocated a big fleet composed around
carriers and a host of smaller platforms. “The Maritime Strategy” saw itself not just as the war plan against the Soviet Union, but aspired to be the coordinated narrative for peace, crises, war, and war termination. In other words, it explained the Navy’s reasoning in war-fighting and in what was dubbed the “violent peace” (Cable 1989). As such, it connected the defense at the place of aggression to the opening of new fronts and “linked symmetric with geographic-asymmetric reactions” (Rudolf 1990: 254).

“The Maritime Strategy” presented a coherent narrative that addressed the whole spectrum of naval warfare in support of overarching grand strategic goals. As the level of violence increased from mere presence to surveillance, show of force, use of force, limited war, global conventional war, theater nuclear war, and finally strategic nuclear war, the Navy was fashioning itself to play a role accordingly and to provide to policy-makers a range of options. The objectives of crisis response were to lend support to national policy objectives, provide flexible military options to the national command authority (usually the President), control escalation, counter Soviet encroachment, and counter state-sponsored terrorism (Hattendorf/Swartz 2008: 161).

In the strategy, the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ missions were intimately connected. Instead of separately going their own ways in sea control, power projection, or intervention, the two sister services were placed under wide-ranging, synthetic categories: peaceful presence, crisis response, and global conventional war. More precisely, surface warfare, ASW, AAW, EW, and strike warfare were to be thought of in a globalized manner instead from a limited Navy/Marine Corps or even a ‘warfare union’ perspective. “The Maritime Strategy” was also broad in scope, attempting to show how all the players – U.S. home and forward-deployed forces, U.S. Navy, sealift and prepositioning forces, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force, allied/friendly navies, and perceived neutrals such as China – might play (Swartz 2011g: 34, slide 67). Quite significantly, “The Maritime Strategy” postulated in its 1985 version that “naval forces prevent major global war through controlling crises and containing limited wars” (Swartz 2011g: 34, slide 68, emphasis in original).

This is not to dismiss vocal critics of the Navy’s effort. On the contrary, there were substantial camps of individuals and groups who lobbied against “The Maritime Strategy”. Critics attacked the Navy’s assumption about the nature of a general war, its assessment of likely Soviet actions in such a war, the disconnection to national political objectives, and its proposed offensive operations. These controversies fueled the general debate in the public and profes-
sional realm, which in turn gave the Navy a chance to make its case.\textsuperscript{199} The Navy was willing to admit certain realities right away. It was certainly true that the defeat of the Soviet Union at sea would not guarantee a successful defense of NATO, but it was also true – and more important – that the loss of NATO’s supremacy at sea would guarantee NATO’s defeat (Lehman 2001: 188).

The critics aligned along a few broad strands.\textsuperscript{200} The first and most fierce charge related superficially to the general defense budget. The Navy’s plan of action, so the argument went, was absorbing money that could well go into Army and Air Force at the Central Front in Germany to provide deterrence and war-fighting capabilities where the Cold War could predictably turn hot soonest. Supporters of this often included former Carter administration officials (such as former Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer).\textsuperscript{201} Behind such an approach stood the clash of the two schools of thought, of maritime vs. continental strategists which underwent a renaissance during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{202} Those critics often failed to acknowledge that the Navy was fully aware that “The Maritime Strategy” was merely the maritime component of national military strategy, and that U.S. success still relied on a complementary land component, too. The Navy understood that the Russian center of gravity lay at land, not at sea.

A second line of thought sought to attack the aircraft carrier. This reflected earlier debates about that capital class of ships during the Carter and Truman administrations.\textsuperscript{203} Again, the carrier as a platform was not ruled out altogether. Instead, critics suggested looking (again) at an inexpensive, somewhat smaller, conventionally-powered version to employ the Navy for a distant blockade of the Soviet Union (Rudolf 1990: 306). The large-deck carrier critics were unable to drive home their point. Navy proponents could even invoke President Carter as a crown witness who did not oppose the nuclear carrier after he had at first vetoed it during his presidency. And this time, the Navy made the case against its carrier critics that in fact both

\textsuperscript{199} Critique was stated in various forums such as Congressional hearings and in academic journals. For a worthwhile dispute, see Brooks (1986) and Mearsheimer (1986) in an issue of \textit{International Security}.

\textsuperscript{200} John Lehman grouped the critics of the strategy in five distinctive categories. To him, there was the OSD & JCS bureaucracy, which for one reason or another was hostile against the Navy; the Europeanists were nearly obsessive with Europe and NATO as the center of all foreign and defense policy; the reformers, who advocated for smaller, cheaper, low-tech ships rather than expensive high-tech units; the détenteists, who were unwilling to confront the assertive Soviet Union; and the ad hominem critics of John Lehman himself (Lehman 2001: 145-147).

\textsuperscript{201} “The guy that everyone in the Navy loved to hate.” (Captain (ret.) Robbie Harris interview 2012, 00:39:10 – 00:39:30).

\textsuperscript{202} On representative musings about the continental vs. maritime debate, see Dunn/Staudenmaier (1984), Komer (1984), and Barnett (1987).

\textsuperscript{203} The same arguments are made today as were made for Forrestal-class and United States (CVA 58) in the late 1940s: “The only thing that has changed is the names of some countries we invade, the hull number of the ship, and the name of the ship.” (Scott Truver interview 2012, 00:18:20 – 00:18:50)
were in need: the large carrier Navy would be suitable for power projection against the Soviet Union, while smaller sea-control platforms would serve the U.S. well in Third World interventions (Rudolf 1990: 272). In other words, the Reagan administration sought both, big carriers for the economy-of-scale effect and small-deck vessels (LHA/LPH/LHD) as a supplement (Grove 1990: 127-128). The Navy’s view of the argument was summed up by Swartz (1996: 27) as such, “The Soviets may be the main enemy, Europe may be the central piece of geography in the global balance and the ground and air battle on the Central Front may be the main event, but it is not the only event.”

The third line of argument was less strategically founded. It simply accused the Navy of putting forward a ship-building and -financing strategy. The poster slang of the 600-ship Navy appeared arbitrary and unrelated to the needs of national security, and critics advocated spending that money on any other program or budget item. It does hold true that Lehman used “The Maritime Strategy” to sell the President, Congress, and the American people on the 600 ships. The Navy was not unhappy with that.

The fourth group included the operational challengers who questioned the viability of the main features of “The Maritime Strategy.” Why should the relative safety of practiced nuclear and conventional deterrence be discarded in favor of an aggressive, untested naval offensive action? To the critics, the Navy’s argument of a low likelihood of a Soviet anti-CVBG campaign seemed flawed. Critics pointed out that in sound traditional military planning, one’s own force and action should not be shaped by the intentions, but by the capabilities of the enemy – and the Soviet Navy did have tactical nuclear capabilities (Rudolf 1990: 296-297).

A related fifth and very important strand questioned the Navy’s underlying assertion that it could keep the conflict with the Soviet Union conventional at all. Escalation control lay at the heart of “The Maritime Strategy” even though commentators had warned of inadvertent nuclear confrontation, stating that a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States could be the unintended consequence because of the seemingly conscious decision to fight a conventional war (Posen 1982: 29). In fact, the dynamics of the nuclear age could spell diametrically opposing effects to what planners envisioned, namely that escalatory pressures simply overruled any conventional war plans that policy-makers harbored. NATO’s Northern

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204 The ‘love affair’ with nuclear deterrence points to a fundamental and inherently American struggle (Rudolf 1990: 117): Throughout its history, the United States has often oscillated between engagement, reluctance, and disengagement in world affairs. During the Cold War, the United States embraced its role as the leader of the West. The nuclear bomb and its associated deterrence value vaguely promised a cold, but stable balance. In other words, it was a weapon to end all wars. As history showed, local wars were still the case, but the dreaded global World War III did not start.
flank was at a special risk of being the stage for nuclear escalation because U.S. naval operations (forward operations of attack submarines, offensive carrier battle group operations in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and a NATO naval counterattack in defense of Norway) all occurred in proximity to the Soviet ballistic missile submarines stationed in Murmansk. “The Maritime Strategy” significantly raised the risk that the potential belligerents were willing to run in order to guard their own strategic forces. The fine academic distinction between defensive and offensive acts was hardly fully assessable at sea or in the fog of war (ibid: 31-34). Nuclear war at sea was certainly a possibility that needed to be taken into account. Accidents at sea (caused by routine covert operations in the vicinity of the opponent’s territorial waters or major naval assets, harassment for tactical military purposes, routine monitoring, or other brazen conduct), the attractiveness of ships as nuclear targets, the launch autonomy of naval commanders (especially on submarines where the order was not physical or technical, but doctrinal [recalling the Navy’s aversion against doctrine] and thus dependent on personnel and discipline), and U.S. and Soviet general doctrine for conduct of nuclear war all provided enough potential to trigger atomic warfare at sea (Ball 1985: 3-4).

Often overlooked, the authors of “The Maritime Strategy” included a vital list of uncertainties at the end of their work (Hattendorf 2008: 193-199). These pointed out that this declaratory document was never designed to be an unchangeable, biblical truth. Rather, it rested on certain realities that the Navy held self-evident and for which it lobbied. The section on uncertainties reflected the Navy’s disposition that it knew that “The Maritime Strategy” would be up against constantly changing parameters.

“The Maritime Strategy” also needed to hedge against the incalculable aspects of the subject at hand. It was downright speculative if, where, and how Soviet aggression could lead to war, and NATO, the U.S. military, and the branches of the military were seldom followers of the same school. The view that war between the United States and the Soviet Union could be triggered in Southwest Asia (not the Pacific, the North Atlantic, or Central Europe) had some subscribers, not least because of the schizophrenic position in which the Navy found itself. In the 1980s, the Navy’s surface and air operations focused heavily on that area (see section 8.7), while U.S. Navy planners zeroed in on NATO areas and the West Pacific, and the submariners concentrated on the Arctic (Swartz 2011h: 35, slide 69). Correspondingly, to hedge
against such uncertainties, naval force structural planning had to be coordinated into “The Maritime Strategy”.

8.5 Force Structure

When Ronald Reagan took office, the first effects of a moderate naval armament and force recapitalization were slowly emerging. The forward-hub deployment strategy established after World War II continued to shape force posture, procurement, and shipbuilding. By 1980, the Soviet Navy was a habitual challenger to U.S. sea control in the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility; a dramatic change from the more hypothetical threats that triggered the establishment of the forward hub in 1947. The standing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and its routine challenges of U.S. Navy ships and planes required a more focused support of the force in the Mediterranean. The increasing demands of an emerging permanent Middle East force, although not concurrently reflected in ship-building plans, also influenced force structure. Several older warships, technologically outdated and often operationally worn, were decommissioned or placed into the reserve fleet during the 1970s.

Technological innovation and comprehensive computerization increasingly shaped the force and its assets. The naval force ascent, both qualitatively and quantitatively, intensified in the course of the decade, resting on both the workhorses of the legacy fleet and new additions to the force. The following graph shows the general development of the size of the Navy against postulated force level goals.

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205 Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Navy relied on forward-based (or rotating, forward-deployed) fleets. The Atlantic Fleet was significantly larger than Pacific Fleet, and more ships were stationed on the U.S. East Coast than on the West Coast.

206 Examples include the Gearing-, Fletcher- and Allen-M-Sumner-class destroyers, the Iowa-class battleships, World-War-II escort carriers, and old cruisers.

207 For a basic discussion of modern U.S. and allied warship design, technology, sensors, and armament from a contemporary perspective, including sectional drawings of warship classes of the U.S. Navy since the end of World War II, see Friedman (1978).

208 For an analysis on the relationship of “The Maritime Strategy” and fleet design from an interactive point of view that goes beyond operations research and systems analysis, see Friedman (1987).
It must be noted that the goal of fielding 600 warships was never achieved. This pertains to the particulars of naval force planning and building, i.e., the substantial amount of resources to be invested over a long period of time for a relatively small number of units. It also points out that the 600-ship Navy as it was proposed was more of a sensible baseline rather than a strictly enforced (and perhaps sensibly enforceable) force-level goal.

209 The Congressional Research Service and the Naval History and Heritage Command apply slightly different metrics to the determination of ship inventory/fleet size. For the current metric of counting the fleet and the Naval Register, see Department of the Navy (2011).

210 From inclusion into the defense budget to keel-laying to rollout, the procurement of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier usually takes anywhere from 3-7 years, not including sea trials and shakedown. The timeline for smaller units such as conventionally-driven cruisers, destroyers, and frigates is similarly arduous. This is a marked contrast to procurements for the Army and the Air Force, where large quantities of material can be fielded comparatively rapid to achieve substantial economy-of-scale effects in RD&T and procurement.

211 In March 1982, the Congressional Budget Office issued a report which studied four options to arrive at 600 ships. Option I would attain these goals by 1992, which meant the ships would have to be endorsed and authorized no later than 1988. This was most likely the shortest period of time in which the Navy’s objective could be reached. Congress could decide to accomplish the same goals, but over a longer time. Hence, Option II would expand the authorization period from six to ten years, with authorizations extending through FY 1992 and force goals substantially achieved by 1996. Option III would be a lower cost-alternative version of producing fewer ships, but one in which the kinds of warships procured would all be of the same types contained in current Navy plans. It would result in a substantially smaller fleet than Options I and II. Option IV would bring in some ship types not contained in Navy plans. It would attain numerical force levels comparable to the Navy goals at a lower cost than Options I or II (Globalsecurity.org 2011). The report is Congressional Budget Office (1982), Building a 600-ship Navy: Cost, Timing, and Alternative Approaches. CBO: Washington, D.C. Correspondingly the same institution studied the manpower demands for a 600-ship Navy in Congressional Budget Office (1983), Manpower for a 600-ship Navy: Costs and Policy Alternatives. CBO: Washington, D.C.
In fact, the number dovetailed Lehman’s political message of combat-credible forward naval presence. Mandated to organize, train, and equip, the Navy – or Lehman, the public face of the Navy’s efforts – provided Congress and the President with a detailed strategy. In order to carry out that strategy, the narrative continued, there was a need for 600 ships, precisely a number that was already under discussion during earlier force level debates. Affordability – specifically the claim to save costs by procuring two aircraft carriers in one single fiscal year, twice – was a major selling point to Congress. To the public, the ambitious yet relatively rational force-level goal seemed to integrate well into the policies of the Reagan administration. It also provided a sense of good stewardship of the public’s resources.\(^\text{212}\)

The 600-ship Navy plan proposed 15 carrier battle groups (CVBG) including 16 carrier air wings (CVW), four surface action groups centered around reactivated battleships (BBAG/SAG) of the Iowa-class, 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), some ballistic missile submarines, and suitable amphibious lift for Marine Corps elements (a Marine Amphibious Force [MAF] and a slightly smaller Marine Amphibious Brigade [MAB]). It was also to include between 100 and 110 frigates, 31 mine-countermeasure vessels (MCM), and support ships to match (Swartz 2011h: 31, slide 61). These numbers remained deliberately squishy to reflect uncertainties in budgeting and procurement, although some elements were publicly developed further.

The 600-ship Navy was purposely carrier-centric, which is less surprising when one considers the prominent role these large platforms played in the posture of U.S. sea power since the early 1940s. Moreover, Lehman, the architect of the plan, was a reserve naval aviator with a degree of appreciation for that particular platform – and a bias. The battle group concept was developed to put to sea powerful force packages: CVBGs would consist of two (optionally nuclear-powered) cruisers, four guided-missile destroyers, and the same number of guided-missile frigates. The carriers, the center piece of the proposed plan, would be conventionally-and nuclear-powered legacy platforms of the Midway-, Forrestal-, Kitty Hawk-, Enterprise-, and Nimitz-classes.\(^\text{213}\) Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) was authorized during the Carter years (FY80) and joined the fleet in 1986; Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) and George Washington (CVN 73) were both included in the FY 83 budget, joining the fleet in 1986 and 1989, respectively. John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and Harry S Truman (CVN 75) were included in the FY 88

\(^{212}\) On Lehman’s narrative, see Swartz’s reflections (Swartz interview 2012, 01:45:15 – 01:51:10). Swartz was Lehman’s “Maritime Strategy” action officer from 1984.

\(^{213}\) The advanced, significantly improved versions of the 90,000-ton carriers are also sometimes called the Theodore-Roosevelt-subclass.
budget, but did not join the fleet until 1995/1998. To persuade congressional oversight of the massive national investments into two carriers in one budget year was mastery. Congress, which “needs to know the broad flow of events, not minute details” (James Stark interview 2012: 00:28:13 – 00:28:46), thus adopted the general sense of the important role of sea power as an underpinning of global U.S. security. The question was rather ‘how much’ would be enough.

The surface action groups each consisted of one battleship, a cruiser, a quartet of destroyers, and the same number of guided-missile frigates. The four *Iowa*-class battleships built in the 1940s and in action during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, were previously seen as out-dated for most late-Cold War naval missions. They appeared to be outmoded and given their large crew size were relatively cost-ineffective. But the return of these behemoths – at a fraction of the cost for a newly procured warship of comparable size – demonstrated two things: first, it was a signal to the Soviet Union that the U.S. Navy would field these large vessels as part of its naval build-up. The Soviet Union, from 1980 on, added their *Kirov*-class nuclear-powered battle cruiser as a powerful surface combatant of its own. As such, the battleships of the *Iowa*-class were considered a match, but more so a determined political symbol of naval diplomacy. Second, they were an operational addition much sought-after by the U.S. Marine Corps and war-planners alike. The Marines valued the precious battleship’s large guns which provided naval gunfire support ashore. To modify the battleships, several wide-ranging changes to design, armament, and weaponry were discussed. Innovations implemented aboard the *Iowas* (which were in essence anachronisms in the computer age) included modern communications equipment, close-in weapons systems (CIWS) for self-defense, and Tomahawk cruise missiles. After all, in the words of the Secretary of the Navy, “the new naval mission

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214 To arrive at the large number of carriers available for strike groups, some legacy platforms received service-life extension programs (SLEP) and extensive modernization in the 1980s. The decision to continue the procurement of the enhanced *Nimitz*-class carriers occurred on the basis of extensive advocacy studies by the Navy on future carrier platforms. According to one participant, no less than 43 different versions (including operational analysis) were considered at one point or another, including V/STOL, tactical and support variants, and even conversions of Spruance-class destroyer hulls into low-end aircraft carriers (Scott Truver interview 2012: 00:10:40 – 00:15:00).

215 The defense budget division of roughly 1/3 for each service (Navy, Army, and Air Force) would remain fairly constant in the 1980s, as a rising budgetary tide lifted all boats.

216 The costs for the procurement of the large carriers consumed much of the shipbuilding budget at the expense of other smaller or low-end capabilities.

217 The major technological innovations that were mature in the 1980s included the Aegis integrated naval combat system, of which the Mk-41-Vertical Launching System (VLS) was derived; the Tomahawk cruise missile, in its various versions (it gave the Navy an independent strike quality); the Harpoon ASuW missile; and the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow anti-ship-missile missile. The 1980s contained a number of incidents such as the Falklands War Exocet attacks on British warships and the 1987/1988 missile threat for U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf, which both displayed the opportunities and shortcomings of naval missiles and their respective command systems. For a detailed overview of U.S. Navy weapons systems, see Terzibaschitsch (2001).
was to demonstrate to the Soviet Union every day that the U.S. Navy and its allies would have the capability to defeat the Soviet navy and to strike hard into the Soviets’ heartland if they ever attacked a member of NATO” (Lehman 2012a).

President Reagan was sold on the merits of such measures by Lehman and others. “The Maritime Strategy” action officers managed to insert parts of emerging rationale into his speeches. And so, in his address on the occasion of the re-commissioning of the New Jersey (BB 62) on 28 December 1982, Reagan noted,

“We can't shut our eyes to the fact that, as the Soviet military power increased, so did their willingness to embark on military adventures. The scars are plainly evident in a number of Third World countries. We're also aware that, though the Soviet Union is historically a land power -- virtually self-sufficient in mineral and energy resources and land-linked to Europe and the vast stretches of Asia -- it has created a powerful, blue-ocean navy that cannot be justified by any legitimate defense need. It is a navy built for offensive action, to cut the Free World's supply lines and render impossible the support, by sea, of Free World allies. By contrast, the United States is a naval power by necessity, critically dependent on the transoceanic import of vital strategic materials. Over 90 percent of our commerce between the continents moves in ships. Freedom to use the seas is our nation's lifeblood. For that reason, our Navy is designed to keep the sea lanes open worldwide, a far greater task than closing those sea lanes at strategic choke-points. Maritime superiority for us is a necessity. We must be able in time of emergency to venture in harm's way, controlling air, surface, and subsurface areas to assure access to all the oceans of the world. Failure to do so will leave the credibility of our conventional defense forces in doubt.” (Reagan 1982)

The 600-ship Navy rested principally on a mix of new ships and legacy platforms which were modified to compose a large and sustainable force. The 31 ships of the 8,000-ton Spruance-class destroyers (DD 963 through DD 997) were the backbone of the late Cold War Navy (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 49-54). Additionally, the 5,600-ton Farragut-class guided missile destroyers (DDG 37 through DDG 46) and the 4,600-ton Charles F. Adams-class guided missile destroyers (DDG 2 through DDG 24) were as valuable to the 1980s Navy as the 7,800-ton Leahy-class guided missile cruisers (CG 16 through CG 24) and its sister ships, the 8,000-ton Belknap-class (CG 26 through CG 34) guided missile cruisers. Of note were six nuclear-powered surface warships, a legacy of Admiral Rickover who tightly controlled nuclear propulsion issues in the Navy until he was retired by John Lehman in January 1982. The 9,100-ton Bainbridge (CGN 25), the slightly smaller 8,700-ton Truxton (CGN 35), and the 11,700-ton guided missile cruisers of the Virginia-class (CGN 38 through CGN 41) were powerful, large, and expensive assets to the Navy's arsenal. On the lower end, the conventionally-powered 2,600-ton Garcia-class frigates (FF 1040 through FF 1051), the numerous 4,200-ton Knox-class frigates (FF 1052 through FF 1097), and the Oliver Hazard Perry-class 4,100-ton
newcomer guided missile frigates (FFG 7 through FFG 61) served as the workhorses of the Navy (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 55-58).  

A look at the procurement dates of the Perry-class frigates indicates that they began joining the fleet as early as the late 1970s. The Reagan administration thus was able to easily continue and expand procurement of these vessels, rather than having to have completely new designs developed. Sure enough, new designs joined the fleet in the 1980s as well, complementing the legacy ships. These and the additions from the 1970s to the inventory increasingly changed the mindset of the Navy. New and more capable platforms such as the Spruance-class allowed for a larger tactical and operational flexibility. As operational commanders rotated back into shore billets in Washington, they took with them the knowledge of the expanded versatility and often included that in their strategic thinking and planning. This was a textbook case of a “bottom-up” change in naval thinking: new weapons demanded a new operational culture and, along the way, amplified a new and fresh thinking about naval power.

One of the most notable new additions to the Navy’s fleet was the 9,600 ton, Aegis-equipped guided-missile cruisers of the Ticonderoga-class (CG 47 through CG 73). Originally based on a Spruance-class destroyer hull, the ship’s capabilities were far-ranging, featuring the typical Mk-41 VLS for missile employment. Helicopters, long-since a mainstay aboard Navy ships, were a natural and also increased the vessel’s operational flexibility. Four guided-missile destroyers of the 9,800 ton Kidd-class (DDG 993 through DDG 996), originally slated for the Shah’s Iranian navy and based on the Spruance-class, also joined the U.S. fleet. They featured Mk-41 VLS, too. Toward the end of the decade, preparations were made to procure the next-generation destroyer, named after the lead ship Arleigh Burke (DDG 51 etc., still in production to date) (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 39-46).

Below the surface, the 17,000 ton Ohio-class nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines (SSBN 726 through SSBN 746) began joining the fleet (Ohio was commissioned in 1981). The Trident II C-4 SLBM was the standard submarine-launched ballistic missile of the time, greatly extending the range of its predecessors to some 4,000 miles. The 6,900-ton Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN 668 through SSN 773), of which a total of 62 units were procured, provided the U.S. submarine force with another powerful tool in the maritime

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218 The U.S. Navy had expurgated its inventory by 1980 of old World War II and first-generation ships, paying off whole classes such as the Forrest Sherman-type destroyers and the three Albany-class guided missile cruisers (Silverstone 2007: 70-71, 41-42).

219 The Aegis system is a totally integrated shipboard weapon system that combines computers, radars, and missiles to establish a defense umbrella for surface shipping. They system is capable of automatically detecting, tacking, and destroying airborne, seaborne, and land-launched weapons (Oxford 2002: 5).
domain against the Soviet Navy. The *Los Angeles* boats joined the established 4,600-ton fast attack nuclear submarines of the *Sturgeon*-class (SSN 637 through SSN 687) to buttress the operational ideas of “The Maritime Strategy.” Arrangements were made for an improved *Los Angeles*-class SSN, the *Seawolf*-type attack submarine (SSN 21), which was to be the main submarine platform well into the 21st century. Due to massive cost overruns, only three of the originally planned 29 units were ever procured.

In the amphibious component, the first of eventually eight *Wasp*-class small carriers (LHD 1 through LHD 8) came online. It was developed as a direct successor to the established *Tara-wa*-class (LHA 1 through LHA 5), and joined the legacy fleet of *Raleigh*- and *Austin*-class amphibious transport docks (LPD 1 through LPD 15) and *Thomaston*- and *Anchorage*-class dock landing ships (LSD 28 through LSD 40). A modern equivalent, the 15,800-ton *Whidbey Island*-class (LSD 41 through LSD 48) entered the fleet from 1985 onwards (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 82-97, Silverstone 2007: 98-105).

Augmenting the 600-ship Navy were a variety of auxiliary vessels. To recapitalize its MCM fleet, the U.S. Navy procured the *Avenger*-class boats (MCM 1 through MCM 15). New ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS 1 through T-AGOS 18), 25 maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), and 116 ships in the reserve supported the forward-deployed, offensive-minded strategy. Military sealift program assets (robust U.S. government-owned fleets of prepositioning and fast sealift ships subject to CINC demand and JCS adjudication [Swartz 2011h: 53, slides 105-106]) included the *Algol*-class fast sealift vessels (T-AKR 287 through T-AKR 294) (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 175-176) and fleet oiler replenishment ships of the *Henry J. Kaiser*-class (T-AO 187 through T-AO 204) (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 113-117). The Navy also welcomed two *Mercy*-class hospital ships (T-AH 19/20) to the fleet, both of which were converted tanker hulls. These unarmed ships, painted white and sporting an oversized red cross on their hulls, have assisted in numerous humanitarian assistance missions and disaster relief since joining the fleet.

Submarines have a significant value in ASW and against surface ships, but limited to impossible AAW capabilities. Enemy action or technological malfunctions can quickly be fatal. Command and control limitations for submerged boats remain an operational challenge. They are also impractical for naval diplomacy. In short, submarines are useful for sea denial and strategic deterrence, but not for sea control (Grove 1990: 132-134).

Reserve forces were augmented as well. On the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and its sister institution, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), see Terzibaschitsch 2002: 146-174. Since 1976, the RRF supports the rapid worldwide deployment of U.S. military forces. As a key element of strategic sealift, it primarily supports transport of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment, combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled. They fall under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Administration (MARAD), management of which is overseen by DOD and DOT.
Regarding naval aviation, the fleet saw some major changes as well. Aircraft numbers remained at a steady high rate, with the operational availability rate averaging 71% from 1980 to 1988. The P-2 Neptune maritime patrol/ASW aircraft, the F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber, the A-7 Corsair II attack jet, and the F-8 Crusader jet were retired. New F/A-18 C/D Hornet multi-role aircraft and MH-53E Sea Dragon and SH-60 Seahawk multi-mission helicopters were incorporated into the fleet. Improved F-14B Tomcats continued to be procured in great numbers; A-6 Intruder attack and EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasures aircraft took center stage.


Additionally, U.S. allied navies were not dormant in the 1980s, often recapitalizing and modernizing their own fleets to reflect operational experiences and political demands. These allies often provided the lower-end or niche capabilities within NATO, while the United States was able to focus on the more costly high-end assets. “The Maritime Strategy” was

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222 The Royal Navy introduced enhanced versions of the Type 22 ASW/AAW/ASuW frigates and later commissioned the heavy Type 23 multipurpose successor to modernize the fleet after the Falklands War. Some of these warships are still in service with the Royal Navy (Grove 1987, Brown/Moore 2003). NATO allies such as the West German Bundesmarine procured multipurpose ASW/AAW Bremen-class (structurally similar to the Dutch Kortenaer-class) frigates in comparably large quantities to field improved capabilities for envisioned escort operations in the North Atlantic during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the eight frigates were extensively modified to address the more comprehensive demands of an expeditionary navy. The warships are currently decommissioned and will be replaced by four new F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class frigates (Kaack 2013: 16-21).
parsed so that the integration of allies could be facilitated. The U.S. Navy’s fleet force structure throughout the decade presented itself as follows:

<table>
<thead>
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<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
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<td>37</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Command Ships</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Total</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Active</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.6 Strategic and Operational Implementation: Planned vs. actual

At the beginning of the 1980s and throughout most of the decade, the confrontation with the Soviet Union shaped conceptual thinking. The U.S./USSR maritime balance, according to a Department of Defense presentation, looked like this:

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223 Command Ships are large purposely-built or converted military vessels designed to embark a fleet commander. They are equipped with command and control facilities, office space, and accommodation for the admiral and his/her staff.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Open access to oceans</td>
<td>Constrained access to oceans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long distance to allies</td>
<td>Short distances to allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>Sea control/power projection</td>
<td>Sea denial/peripheral sea control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive capability</td>
<td>Few large ships</td>
<td>Land-based naval air force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea based aviation</td>
<td>Many small ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack submarines</td>
<td>Anti-ship missile system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amphibious forces</td>
<td>Attack submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive capability</td>
<td>Marginal AAW capability</td>
<td>Marginal AAW capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Inadequate ASW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air cover</td>
<td>Inadequate sea-based air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained Operations</td>
<td>Excellent underway replenishment</td>
<td>Limited underway replenishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worldwide base structure</td>
<td>Limited overseas base system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Major advantage – offensive and defensive technology</td>
<td>Anti-ship missiles and surface ocean surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Extensive exercises</td>
<td>Limited at-sea time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer force</td>
<td>Manning by conscripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wartime experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fundamental differences prevailed between the two nations, their sea power assets, and their respective sea-strategic concepts. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union often came very close—literally bumping into each other at times in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea—other contingencies for the U.S. dominated the operational action and expertise of the 1980s Navy.

8.6.1 Major U.S. Naval Operations\(^\text{224}\)

The thrust of “The Maritime Strategy” was that it was tentatively as useful in the overarching objective of deterring (and, if must be, defeating) the Soviet Union as it was for lesser contingencies. It was also a strategy that could be executed with available forces; it was a real-time strategy (Hattendorf/Swartz 2008: 140).

“It was my firm view that conflict with the USSR was a low probability event...although we often found ourselves (USN) involved in ‘crisis response’ events possibly sparked by the USSR via its proxies. That said, the fleet was designed for a fight with the Soviets and our responses to various non-Soviet ‘crises’ were handled as

\(^{224}\) Major naval operations understood as the sustained commitment of forces engaged in expeditionary operations against a shore or a fleet. On the problem of analytical definitions, see Vego (2008: 7-39).
lesser included’ events, i.e., with the forces (fleet) designed to fight the Soviets.”  
(Robbie Harris, e-mail to author, 27 January 2014)

On balance, the Navy and the Marine Corps responded to 47 individual crises during the 1980s, much more than the Army and the Air Force did (Baer 1994: 446). The following is a discussion of three selected U.S. naval operations of the decade. Keeping in mind the particular nature of a forward-deployed fleet (it is not kept in a U.S. port until a problem arises but rather maintains a permanent forward presence in areas of interest), the following paragraph illustrates some of the ‘real-world’ engagements for the service. In the 1980s, the U.S. forces’ responses became more energized. This shift was manifest in high level of activity extending from the Gulf of Sidra in the Western Mediterranean to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The decade was also marked by the onset of simultaneity of events. Not only was the United States doing more in the 1980s compared to the 1970s, it was responding to situations concurrently with a particular focus on Europe-Africa and Persian Gulf regions (Cobble/Gaffney/Gorenburg 2005: 21). Events in Lebanon and responses to the spike in Palestinian terrorism in Europe and North Africa (such as airplane hijackings in 1985 and 1986, and the capture of the Italian passenger liner Achille Lauro in October 1985) accounted for three-fourths of U.S. responses in the USEUCOM area (ibid: 23).

a) Lebanon (1982-1984)

Occupying the U.S. operational focus in the first third of the decade was the civil war in Lebanon, a country ravaged by turmoil and armed conflict for years. After the 1982 Lebanon war, a multinational force consisting of U.S., French, Italian, and British forces provided a permanent presence in Beirut in order to deter the outbreak of further hostilities. Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) wrestled for influence as fractional strife continued to fuel the violent unrest (Hartmann 1990: 231-234, Lehman 2001: 302-303). Iran ascended as a contender in this conflict, too. The Soviet Union did not appreciate the Western military presence in what it considered one of its premier areas of interest and influence either (Lehman 2001: 303). In 1982, 800 U.S. Marines were stationed in Beirut as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. They were quickly caught in the middle of the murky conflict. The deteriorating security situation was not properly reflected in more appropriate rules of engagement. Shortcomings in intelligence collection and contradictions in the chains of command of inter-departmental policy and military decision-makers severely diluted the U.S. effort to remain outside of the raging civil war (ibid: 304-310). A more coercive, active

\footnote{See Siegel (1991: 47-48) for short info on these incidents and the U.S. Navy response. See also Lehman’s accounts (2001: 352-354).}
U.S. military intervention from the sea remained undone because the high-value warships could have been at risk from terrorist attacks and close-in weapons if they loitered too close to the coast. The White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department pursued incompatible Lebanon policies and greatly complicated assessing and addressing the situation on the ground properly. Fear of mission creep – an epitome of the Vietnam syndrome – led to an overly cautious political attitude in Washington, with disastrous results on the ground by 1983. On 18 April, an explosion at the U.S. embassy in the Lebanese capital claimed the lives of 63 (17 of whom were Americans), and on 23 October the detonation of a truck-borne bomb at the Marine Corps barracks killed 241 U.S. servicemen.\(^{226}\) In the meantime, the recently reactivated battleship *New Jersey* (BB 62) had eventually arrived off the Levant coast. However, retaliatory strikes were not conducted until December after aircraft from the carriers *Independence* (CV 62) and *John F. Kennedy* (CV 67) had engaged Syrian-controlled surface-to-air missile (SAM) positions, and the U.S. Navy lost planes and pilots.\(^{227}\) The *New Jersey*’s guns were more heavily used in February of 1984, when the decision to withdraw the remaining U.S. Marines from Lebanon was flanked with a massive, but hardly strategically useful barrage of the battleship’s 16-inch shells at enemy positions in the Bekaa Valley west of Beirut (Love 1992b: 746). This engagement was the most intense shore bombardment since the Korean War (in which the *New Jersey*, incidentally, was also used). The U.S. Navy’s engagement in Lebanon revealed flaws in the uniformed chain of command, the policy objectives of the mission, and the backwards-thinking of naval aviators, which eventually caused the catastrophic U.S. score sheet (Lehman 2001: 330).\(^{228}\) For the time being, the Reagan doctrine – to sustain American influence in regions of strategic interests – appeared to be under severe pressure (Love 1992b: 747).

\(b\) *Libya (1981-1989)*

Libya was another key contender for 1980s U.S. naval operations. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Libyan government under Muammar Gaddafi presented a key foreign-policy challenge to the United States, not the least because Gaddafi was staunchly anti-Israel and a ruthless and aggressive dictator.\(^{229}\) The extravagant ruler, who had risen to power in 1969 in the aftermath of a coup, supported international terrorism in the Middle East and Europe, both of which reached dramatic highpoints in the 1980s. He was also suspected of developing weap-

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\(^{226}\) A parallel attack on the French compound at Beirut at few moments later killed 58 French soldiers. Six civilians were also among the dead that day.

\(^{227}\) See Lehman (2001: 319-331) for an account.

\(^{228}\) These lessons learned significantly contributed to the changes in all three areas that Lehman sought to implement in the coming months and years, such as seeking innovations in naval aviation (Love 1992: 744-745).

\(^{229}\) President Reagan, in a news conference on 9 April 1986, labeled him the “mad dog of the Middle East”.
ons of mass destruction. The Gulf of Sidra, a large body of international waters hugged by the Libyan coastline, was declared subject to extensive Libyan claims of sovereignty. To uphold the right of free maritime passage and prevent a creeping entry into customary law by Libyan actions, President Reagan in August of 1981 authorized freedom of navigation naval exercises that would cross the self-proclaimed Libyan “line of death”. To the U.S., that action had both a legal and an operational connotation for because the Gulf of Sidra was the only place in the Mediterranean that was free of any major sea lanes or airways. For decades, the U.S. Sixth Fleet had depended on it for periodic live-fire exercises (Lehman 2001: 351). In the process of the operation, which included the carriers Forrestal (CV 59) and Nimitz (CVN 68), two of the Libyan Air Force aircraft that sought to intercept the U.S. force were shot down by Navy fighters (Siegel 1991: 43).

U.S. forces repeatedly clashed with the Libyan military between 1981 and 1989, but the largest military engagements occurred in 1986 (Love 1992b: 755-768). In response to hijackings of commercial airliners and the bombing of the airports of Rome and Vienna in December 1985, Gaddafi was accused as the mastermind and financier of these perpetrations. From January through March 1986, the U.S. Navy used its routine challenges of unlawful Libyan territorial claims to mount large-scale naval exercises. On its third incursion, a large force – consisting of the three aircraft carriers Coral Sea (CV 43), Saratoga (CV 60), America (CV 66), the guided-missile cruisers Ticonderoga (CG 47) and Yorktown (CG 48), and “122 other American warships” (Lehman 2001: 356) – under the command of Admiral Frank Kelso (later CNO) sought to draw out Libyan forces. This resulted in a high attrition rate with the inferior green-water Libyan navy and a demonstration of defense capabilities against SAMs. The U.S. Navy had benefited from the 600-ship Navy and made progress in tactical proficiency. It was soon ordered to terminate its war-fighting efforts prematurely. This development, although a far cry from the problems encountered in Lebanon a few years earlier, also showed the limits of the Reagan doctrine in counter-terrorism operations. In early April, just weeks after the clash, state-sponsored terrorist attacks on the “La Belle” discotheque in West-Berlin (a club frequented by U.S. service members, two of whom were among the three dead) and a TWA flight en route from Rome to Athens (killing four Americans) could be traced to the Libyan regime’s brazen attempt to obtain a profit from what was seen as American hesitancy.

The situation further escalated when, in a joint Air Force-Navy retaliatory strike on 15 April 1986 codenamed “Operation Eldorado Canyon”, the U.S. launched a large-scale attack on Libyan shore targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. It utilized naval assets on station in the 6th Fleet
AOR and Air Force elements based in the U.K., which participated despite the need for a concerted refueling effort and a detour around Gibraltar (France had declined the U.S. over-flight rights for this operation). The operations in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986 marked the first operational employment of Aegis-equipped guided-missile cruisers and destroyers (Lehman 2001: 174) and by-and-large discouraged Gaddafi from further acts of terrorism.²³⁰ Lehman’s gleaming conclusion in his memoirs (2001: 360) spells out,

“It was precisely those ships, aircraft, and weapons that had been ridiculed during the early 1980s by the antinaval reformers in Congress and their academic camp followers that performed so brilliantly: the aegis cruiser, the F-14, the F-18, the A-6, the F-111, the Harm antiradiation missile, and the Harpoon antiship missile. […] Another obvious and strong lesson was the destruction of the myth of interservice rivalry.”

If anything, the Gulf of Sidra clashes underlined that the Reagan administration took a much tougher stance against regional challenges when provoked in comparison with President Carter. At the time, the United States (after Reagan’s policy reversal) and the Soviet Union (under newly-elected president Gorbachev) carefully approached each other. Comparably minor skirmishes such as U.S. operations against Libya demonstrated the strategically vital position of strength from which Reagan could negotiate.²³¹


The third large U.S. naval operation of the 1980s came about in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Arabian Sea. Those bodies of water had been elevated to an area of major strategic importance since the promulgation of the Carter doctrine.²³² The looming establishment of a permanent and ready forward-deployed U.S. force²³³ and the significant utilization of Diego Garcia in the Western Indian Ocean signaled growing U.S. commitment to the region. They also dovetailed the global approach and thinking behind “The Maritime Strategy”. Meanwhile, the Iran-Iraq War broke out in 1980. The conflict, which consumed the vast majority of the decade for the belligerents, began when Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein’s expedited

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²³⁰ With the notable exception of the bombing of New York City-bound PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988. 270 passengers, crew, and people on the ground were killed.

²³¹ Mirroring one of the first uses of naval force during the Reagan years, yet another Gulf of Sidra incident between U.S. jets and Libyan interceptors occurred in January 1989. Four F-14 Tomcats from John F. Kennedy (CV 67) engaged and shot down two MiG-23 airplanes (Love 1992b: 768).

²³² Until Britain withdrew from ‘east of Suez’ after 1968, the most visible evidence of American interest in the Persian Gulf was the Navy’s small Middle East Force, whose rather thankless task was to steam from port to port and show the flag. Rather than taking up Britain’s heavy burden, President Nixon adapted his doctrine to the Persian Gulf with the ‘Twin Pillars Policy,’ under which the United States provided arms to Saudi-Arabia and Iran so that those two countries might share regional hegemony and peacekeeping duties. In 1977, America’s prestige in the Middle East was rapidly eroding as a result of Carter’s wild oscillations between his human rights policy and the established Twin Pillars approach. (Love 1992b: 770)

²³³ The U.S. 5th Fleet was not established until 1995.
an increasingly aggressive foreign policy aimed at controlling more oil reserves in the Middle East. In addition to the land war, warfare also included attacks on shipping in the Gulf. Control of regional sea lines along with destruction of enemy merchant ships (and those of its allies) and the protection of oil export assets became key objectives in Iraq’s strategy and operations. Since Iraq owned few maritime or naval assets that were worthwhile attacking, Iran responded by targeting ships trading with Bagdad’s allies in the Persian Gulf, principally Kuwait. 71 merchant ships were attacked in 1984 alone, compared with 48 in the first three years of the war (Schneller 2007: 13). Two years later, Iraq stepped up its air attacks on tankers serving Iran and Iranian oil-exporting facilities. At this point, U.S. interests and those of her allies were increasingly at risk, although Washington had officially remained neutral, only gradually tilting toward the Iraqis, and the Iran-Contra affair not withstanding (Love 1992b: 773). In the fall of 1986, the government of Kuwait sought help from the international community. Its tanker fleet was affected disproportionately by the Iranian attempts to curtail oil revenue supports for Iraq’s war efforts (Crist 2012: 160-164). Utilizing the provisions of international law and the terms of trade of commercial shipping, freighters were to be reflagged carrying U.S. flags and escorted by allied warships. The U.S. was reluctant at first to provide such support. In “Operation Earnest Will,” up to 30 U.S. Navy ships patrolled the Arabian Sea, with periodical incursions of cruisers, destroyer, and frigates through the Strait of Hormuz to provide escort service through the mine-infested narrow maritime highway. All the while, command and control problems impaired sea power action at this critical interface of two U.S. regional commands (U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. PACOM). Overcoming problems with MCM capabilities and equipment governed daily operations (Schneller 2007: 16-18).

In 1987 and 1988, the naval action that drew in U.S. Navy forces escalated decisively. First, on 17 May 1987, the guided-missile frigate Stark (FFG 31) was hit by two Exocet air-to-surface missiles from an Iraqi jet, which mistook the American vessel for an Iranian warship.

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234 For a chronology of events, see Pemsel (2006: 1264-1270).
235 According to Schneller the request was also addressed to the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union. “It was the specter of the Soviets using the escort mission to project power into the region that finally precipitated U.S. government action.” (2007: 14-15) As Love points out (1992b: 774), “American strategy was about to be transfigured by Kuwait’s diplomacy. Instead of having to fight its way to the Gulf, the Red Navy was now being invited to appear at the artery of Europe’s oil supplies under the aegis of a multinational policing effort, a prospect that especially horrified [Casper] Weinberger.” When the U.S. attempted to involve NATO powers in the defense of shipping in the Gulf, the member states coldly declined because they did not seek to entangle the alliance outside of Europe. It took attacks on European-flagged commercial shipping to reverse that course partially.
236 On the problems encountered through clashes between “type A” personalities, see Love (1992b: 780-781).
237 The Maritime Strategy called for both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets to advance into well-mined Soviet waters, and so Congress was asked to authorize the construction of Avenger-class minesweepers in 1982 (Love 1992b: 783) (eventually, 14 of these mine countermeasure ships were commissioned by 1994). Mines threatened to erode the otherwise high confidence of Navy planners to put all of the service’s assets into harm’s way.
37 U.S. sailors were killed, but damage control efforts were successful in keeping the five-year old ship from sinking. In addition, the Navy – tasked with preventing the actual distribution of Iranian mines rather than having to find and clear them once they had been laid – repeatedly clashed with Iranian forces in the following months. On 14 April 1988, the Stark’s sister ship Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) struck a mine. The resulting explosion injured ten sailors, and on 18 April the U.S. retaliated against Iranian command and control platforms with “Operation Praying Mantis” (Love 1992b: 787-790). Surface ships and carrier-based aircraft obliterated two oil platforms used by the Iranian military as command and control posts. In this battle, U.S. naval forces sank or damaged half of Iran’s operational navy (Schneller 2007: 19). But it took a tragic incident for Iran to agree to a ceasefire proposal negotiated by the United Nations. On 3 July 1988, the guided-missile cruiser Vincennes (CG 49) mistakenly shot down Iran Air flight 655, killing 290 passenger and crew aboard the Airbus A-300 (Love 1992b: 791-793).

Politically, “the United States’ stand in the Gulf during 1987-1988 erased the negative images resulting from the failed Iranian rescue mission and withdrawal from Lebanon” (Schneller 2007: 19). The U.S. Navy reduced its forces in theater down to just five warships patrolling in the Gulf by the summer of 1990 (ibid: 19).

On balance, the 1980s witnessed growing U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. The conflicts generated by turmoil in Libya, Lebanon, and Iran kept the Navy quite busy. Containing the spillover-effects from these lesser-included events dominated U.S. response in both the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean areas. However, this level of activity did not preclude the forward-deployed forces from also pursuing more traditional Cold War missions of deterrence and surveillance against the Soviets in the thrust of “The Maritime Strategy” (Cobble/Gaffney/Gorenburg 2005: 28). In fact, it was the combination of efforts and events that characterized American sea power between 1981 and 1989.

8.6.2 Relationships to sister services: Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force

a) USMC

The Navy’s relationship to its sister service, the Marine Corps, was generally cordial. After all, the 600-ship Navy included amphibious ships. Lift capability for amphibious forces - that is, forces capable of making a forcible invasion from the sea - was increased about 50 percent to provide a capability to land a Marine Amphibious Brigade, or MAB (15,500 troops), in addition to the current ability to land a Marine Amphibious Force, or MAF (32,500 troops).
The Maritime Strategy was developed with significant and continuous Marine Corps input, and the Marine Corps’ take on the issue co-appeared in the Proceedings issue that featured “The Maritime Strategy”. For the NATO flanks, especially Norway, amphibious capabilities and pre-positioned equipment were indispensable. The Marine Corps was also pleased to see the return of powerful naval gun-fire and better close-air support. These were mostly achieved through the re-commissioning of the *Iowa*-class battleships and the decision by both the USN and the USMC to buy and fly F/A-18s (Lehman 2001: 247). In short, the Marines’ expeditionary mindset and the Navy’s strike force focus could be reconciled easily given the upswing of Navy budgets and coherent strategic narrative, despite the oft-cited uneasiness over the Navy having to pay for the Marine Corps’ transportation.

*b) USCG*

In the 1980s, the Coast Guard operated under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation (DOT) and therefore did not benefit directly from the increased DOD budget spending. In the realm of homeland security, absent a coastal defense role for the U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard had significant ASW, MCM, and reconnaissance roles against Soviet submarines that ventured near or into the U.S. EEZ. Beyond these maritime defense zones (codified in an agreement with DOD), the Coast Guard often continued to operate as an expeditionary joint force under the direction of U.S. SOUTHCOM (together with the Navy) in a significant number of Caribbean and South American counter-narcotics operations (Fuss 1996; Swartz 2003: 11-12)

c) USA & USAF

Throughout the decade, fierce inter-service rivalry for budgets and attention continued. The Army and the Air Force were very focused on the Central Front contingency in West Germany. Both services had developed the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine which was designed for the conduct of operations on a non-linear battlefield. It emphasized continuous operations in depth and the integration of nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces and close cooperation between air and ground forces (Oxford 2002: 10). The Air Force and the Army were both skeptical of the Navy’s new ambitions. In a world where NATO was essentially preparing for World War III in Europe, Army leadership saw the Navy doing what it did in World War

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238 For a pledge to fuse AirLand Battle and “The Maritime Strategy” based on the notion that they worked on the same operational level of war, see Bradley (1986). The AirSea Battle concept of the late 2000s/early 2010s deliberately invokes the AirLand Battle doctrine of Cold War days. However, the former document is about warfare whereas the latter document initially was about more efficient procurement.

239 Swartz noted that “The Maritime Strategy” initially sought to integrate all aspects of the fleet plus the allies plus the Air Force plus the Army – i.e. Hawk medium-range surface-to-air missile batteries – along. He disappointedly stated “We never were able to bring the Army along.” (Swartz interview 2012: 00:53:00 – 00:53:45)
II: Convoy escort. Consequently, misunderstandings ensued: “What the Navy calls the Army’s lack of understanding of the uses of sea-power, the Army calls a waste of resources or gross negligence of duty” (Swartz 1996: 41). It was a credit to the diplomacy of CNO James Watkins who worked with the SACEUR General Bernard Rogers (USA) in overcoming some Army/NATO reluctance and resistance to “The Maritime Strategy” (Lehman 2012a).

The Air Force still remembered the carrier controversies of the past decades enough to remain skeptical of the Navy’s offensive, carrier-centric efforts. The generous defense budget spike and the renewed appreciation during the Reagan years for the military helped to overcome the fiercest of these competitions, at least for the time being. A naval renaissance did not come at the direct expense of the Army and the Air Force, although both services – with their own visions of the war to come – were careful to cheer for it. “The Maritime Strategy” was often dismissed as a tool of Secretary Lehman (the USNR aviator) and CNO Watkins (the submariner) to groom their unions. Discussions of a more substantial kind – short versus long wars, maritime versus continental emphasis, global versus theater strategies – were muted during the well-funded years. The Air Force and the Army did envy the way the Navy used its vaunted flexibility to present a contemporary case that left the other services looking narrow-minded, outdated, or tongue-tied (Baer 1994: 442-443). The Army’s and Air Force’s views were by no means unfounded, but they simply did not see a significant contribution of naval power to their overall objective.

8.6.3 Relationships to Allies

To the authors of “The Maritime Strategy”, the inclusion of allies was very important.240 NATO member states were particularly crucial, although fundamentally the Navy’s effort was obviously one that carried American national interests, not necessarily that of America’s allies. Again, the benefits of a non-static document rather than that of a cast-in-stone doctrine are obvious for the diplomacy part of the Navy’s effort.

However, “The Maritime Strategy” sent a mixed message to European leaders, signaling that the U.S. was also willing and able to fight in the North Atlantic and the Pacific, but it was unclear how these two theaters were to be connected strategically. The underlying, permanent uncertainty about the stakes that the United States would be willing to commit to the defense

240 Swartz (1996: 48) recounts that “press and commentators in allied countries, especially Australia, often were (or acted) shocked when they heard their country was tied in to USN maritime Strategy, which to them mean Lehman’s wild ride to the Kola [Peninsula, S.B.] and nuclear provocation and escalation.” For an early push-back, see Desmond Wettern’s interview/article with John Lehman (1984).
of Europe did not go away. Concurrently, leaders may have worried that escalation in the Pacific would trigger a hot war over Berlin and at the Central Front. In addition, the Navy’s conviction that “The Maritime Strategy” could keep any global war non-nuclear risked undermining a key pillar in NATO’s flexible response strategy: If Western strategists emphasized in their public (and private) pronouncements that armed conflict would remain conventional, the Soviet Union might feel encouraged to believe that it could easily avoid nuclear punishment for any conventional aggression (Posen 1982: 29).

NATO at the time was considered as heavily nuclear- and Germany-centric, and too dominated by the battle doctrine at the Central Front in Hessen and Bavaria (Swartz 1996: 27). It followed that the Navy’s narrative was to emphasize theaters of war against the Warsaw Pact that lay at the flanks, or even outside of NATO area. On the Southern flanks, the littoral states of the Mediterranean Sea needed to be reassured of the salience of “The Maritime Strategy”. The Mediterranean had been the site of repeated U.S.-Soviet naval confrontations and it was the operating area for Moscow’s forward-based forces, which sought to counter-balance the U.S. Sixth Fleet’s assets. Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, were located at a geostrategically important position. On the Northern flanks, the “The Maritime Strategy” was reasonably attractive to allies such as Norway: The country would have been “on the wrong side of the barrier” (Baer 1994: 433) had a GIUK
distant blockade strategy prevailed; on the other hand, Norway was at risk of being drawn into a U.S.-Soviet conflict first, and should not have had an interest in an escalating naval strategy (Rudolf 1990: 310).

Close U.S. allies such as the U.K. and West Germany also reviewed their posture in the period of interest. In Great Britain, the Defence White Paper of 1981 (also dubbed the “Nott Review”) sought to significantly reduce British conventional military capabilities. Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government attempted to offset the effects of economic stagnation that had previously besieged Britain. The Royal Navy (RN) was slated to be affected considerably, but the Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands and Britain’s subsequent major expeditionary operation into the South Atlantic prevented the drawdown from taking full effect for the time being. In West Germany, NATO’s forward-defense at the inner-German border relied on a robust mix of conventional and nuclear forces. The conservative-liberal gov-

242 Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom “gap”
243 Weickhardt (1988) provides a concise discussion of the maritime and continental ramifications in the Barents Sea/Northern flank setting.
244 For a review of the scope of the proposal named after then-minister of defense John Nott, see Dorman (2002).
ernment led by Helmut Kohl produced defense white books in 1983 and 1985 that very much reflected the particular German, land- and air-power-driven interests for national survival. At the same time, the German Navy’s operational thinking and its embrace of a broader contribution to NATO’s forward defense at sea (containment, defense in depth, keeping of the initiative) was reflected in its landmark policy guideline of 1985. The North Sea and Norwegian Sea were recognized as potentially significant operating areas (The Federal Minister of Defense 1985: 211-220). The capstone document codified emerging German thinking of operating forward in the Baltic Sea in peacetime, conflict, and war. The Federal German Navy (FGN) now contributed substantially to ASW and SLOC protection in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea.\footnote{For a discussion of the Nordic area’s strategic importance in the late Cold War, see Grove (1989).} Because the advent of “The Maritime Strategy” did not mean a significant trade-off in Germany’s own security (i.e., through severe cuts in U.S. conventional ground and air forces in Germany), the American military strategy was generally welcomed.\footnote{An representative analysis of the German/central European view on the naval strategies of the superpowers was published by (Captain, Federal German Navy) Weisser (1988). For a German discussion of the maritime element in U.S. global strategy, see Weisser’s book (1987), pp. 102-114.}

Politically, European leaders in the 1980s were often very much concerned about arms control, often vocally supported by large public demonstrations and peace movements. “The Maritime Strategy” neglected this issue.\footnote{Swartz critically reflected the absence of arms control from “The Maritime Strategy” stating that the authors of the document understood such measures to be part of the general onslaught against the Navy by Central front advocates and supporters of détente (Swartz interview 2012, 01:07:45-01:09:15). For a representative discussion on the arms control implications of “The Maritime Strategy”, see Stefanick (1986).} Although naval arms limitations are inherently difficult (Grove 1990: 154), the Soviet Union repeatedly proposed such measures. Whether this was a practical proposal or a political maneuver, those attempts eventually did not lead anywhere (Rudolf 1990: 380-383).

To test “The Maritime Strategy” at sea (and to quell possible allied concerns about the way forward), a number of large U.S./NATO exercises were conducted in the context of “The Maritime Strategy”. Examples included Ocean Safari and Northern Wedding exercises in 1981, where operations in the North Atlantic remained undetected by the Soviets for four days.\footnote{Admiral “Ace” Lyons, who would later rise to Deputy CNO and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, had commanded that exercise. He introduced new operational orders and attributed the fact that the Soviets could not find the task groups to them still holding access to the old material (as it was proven four years later when the Walker spy ring was busted, there was indeed a leak and the Soviets were reading U.S. Navy communications) (Lyons interview 2012, 00:18:00 – 00:21:15).} In Fleet-Ex 83, three aircraft carriers operated in the North Pacific (significantly contributing to Soviet nervousness in 1983). Ocean Safari 85 ran from August to September 1985 and included convoys crossing the Atlantic and hugging the European coast from Iceland to
Portugal. More than 150 warships, among them the Iowa (BB 61) battleship and the Saratoga (CV 60), Enterprise (CVN 65), and America (CV 66) CVBGs, participated in this sweeping demonstration of NATO naval power. Teamwork 88 was the largest multinational exercise in the decade. Held in the summer of 1988, it simulated operations in the Norwegian fjords. On the far side of the world in the Pacific, PacEx 89 was a massive naval exercise that drew out aircraft carriers, battleships, and numerous other warships. Allied navies from Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea routinely trained with the U.S. Navy. As “The Maritime Strategy” had laid out, these exercises signaled to the Soviets that if they attacked NATO in Europe, “they could expect us to be coming at them in the Pacific” (Lehman 2001: 364).

8.6.4 Significant Organizational Changes

As in other bureaucracies, the DOD/Navy organization is an institution that frequently undergoes changes. These can have a strategic implication when they significantly pool or disperse major personnel resources and responsibilities (Goldwater-Nichols has previously been mentioned in this study as a factor). In addition, individuals can be promoted or demoted in order to leverage their influence on strategy, even if it might be subordinate. Such was the case with Admiral Hyman Rickover, who was retired in 1982. Over the several decades of his service, the admiral had developed a substantial power base in his crusade to turn the Navy into a nuclear-propelled force. He brutally controlled reactor research and technology efforts, training, and crewing of nuclear warships. With Congress, he repeatedly sought to make the case for more and more nuclear-powered warships, winning powerful followers in the process. Rickover, who had joined the Navy in 1918, also forged powerful alliances in the military bureaucracy, officer corps, and the U.S. defense industry. His influence and peculiar personality prevented successive presidential administrations from disposing of him. By 1980, more than two decades after the first nuclear-powered submarine Nautilus (SSN 571) was launched, the Navy operated a nuclear fleet of 126 warships, including 74 attack/patrol/hunter submarines, 41 strategic-missile submarines, three aircraft carriers, and eight guided-missile cruisers. These vessels represented about one third of the Navy’s warships and the bulk of its offensive forces. The Navy paid a significant price because funds for the high-maintenance nuclear-powered ships ate away at resources also desired to recapitalize the conventionally-powered fleet. The focus on atomic energy also meant that evolutions in technology which occurred in the aviation and commercial shipping world passed by the Navy until the late 1990s (Lehman 2001: 12). Lehman made it his mission to retire Rickover, the “paradoxical visionary” (ibid:

249 For a representative earlier discussion of the operational ramifications of “The Maritime Strategy” (in Northern European waters), see (VADM) Mustin (written while deployed aboard USS America) (1986).
8). Against the admiral’s explicit wish, Rickover agreed to retire at age 82 on 31 January 1982 (and only after causing quite a stir at the White House described by Lehman in ibid: 1-8).

Lehman identified some other issues, one of them not unconnected to the dismissal of Rickover. The design and procurement of the SSN 668 (the Los-Angeles-class) attack submarines was split between General Dynamic’s Electric Boat division and the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company. The former contender offered an economically unviable contract that was unable to hedge against massive cost overruns caused by inflation and faulty engineering. In the end, the Navy had to bail out the shipyard itself so that it could put its boats into service, albeit at a much higher cost to the tax-payer.

Lehman also tackled a reform of the Navy Department against the background of rising costs for the Navy’s new F-18 Hornet fighter jet. Naval aviation was a central cornerstone in the recapitalization of the Navy as the 600-ship Navy with its fifteen carriers and four Marine Corps air wings required double the procurement rate of tactical aircraft that had prevailed during the late 1970s (Lehman 2001: 220-221). In order to adhere to the constitutional guidance of maintaining a permanent Navy, Lehman pushed forward the horizontal integration of the U.S. Naval Reserve, which had previously worked with outdated ships and technology, into the Navy (ibid. 247). Innovations within the Navy’s structure with visible impact on the operational and even tactical levels in the 1980s included the Naval Strike Warfare Center. Nicknamed “Strike-U” and based at NAS Fallon, NV, it came to life in 1984 with the objective of advancing the proficiency of naval aviators. The facility merged with two other institutions in 1993 to form the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center. The most visible and perhaps far-reaching organizational change in the 1980s was the standing up of new combatant commands. While the U.S. Central Command (1983), Special Operations Command (1987), and Transportation Command (1987) remain active until today, the Space Command (1987) was terminated in 2002. The U.S. Navy had opposed the establishment of each, fearing loss of autonomy and intra-service squabbles (Swartz 2011h: 26, slide 52).

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250 The price of Navy aircraft had been escalating between 10 and 20 percent higher than the rate of inflation since 1950. Cuts in the Navy’s budget amounting to 22 percent in constant dollars during the 1970s resulted in massive loss of capabilities. As the prices increased and the dollar value decreased, by 1980 the Navy was able to buy only half the number of aircraft it lost each year to peacetime attrition, a process Lehman called “unilateral disarmament through price escalation” (Lehman 2001: 220-221).
In other words, in the 1980s formal strategic efforts of “The Maritime Strategy” were accompanied by less visible, informal ones to create the conditions under which strategic Navy issues could be addressed and implemented (Swartz 2011h: 40, slide 79). This underlines that the evolution of the Navy and its strategy in the 1980s was an organic and inherently dynamic, multi-faceted exercise that involved dedicated inside and outside participants.

8.7 Assessment: A Strategic Sea Power Renaissance, 1981-1989

“The Maritime Strategy” capstone documents of the 1980s, “a tumultuous period for sea power theory” (Tangredi 2002: 125), represented a dedicated re-focus of the nexus of national and naval interests (Barnett 2009: 90). As Geoff Till pointed out, the maritime posture of the Cold War United States was largely dominated by three aspects in the decision-making processes, namely, the checks and balances between the President and Congress, the state of relations between the services, and the relations between the different ‘unions’ of the Navy itself (1999: 252-253). “The Maritime Strategy” utilized executive/legislative branch synergies and overcame inter-service and inter-warfare union competition for the time being. These three parallel successes (otherwise often highly unlikely to be achieved concurrently) made “The
For the administration, as Lehman wrote in his memoirs, it was one of the rare opportunities to hit the ground running.

“The President had specifically called for maritime superiority in his principal national security campaign speech in Chicago in March 1980, and the six-hundred-ship objective was a plank in the Republican platform. The Secretary of Defense offered strong intellectual support, and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees were equally committed.” (Lehman 2001: 115)

A post-World War II naval depression had cumulated in the 1970s, when the inability to articulate the Navy’s strategic role in national politics, diminishing budgetary resources, an ageing and ever-shrinking fleet, the Vietnam War legacy, and the Soviet naval challenge on the high seas threatened the future of the service. The Navy was unable to develop and implement a suitable strategy. The attempts to recapitalize the fleet lacked direction and political support. During the anti-naval early Presidency of Jimmy Carter, the discrepancy between the political ideas of the administration and the ideas of the Navy reached a highpoint (Stallmann 2000: 169) that was hard to overcome.

In the 1980s, CNOs Hayward and Watkins in conjunction with Secretary Lehman managed to turn around the dispute and disorientation on the use of force that prevailed in the 1970s by tying together main elements of offensive U.S. Navy thinking into a comprehensive and easily understood narrative. None of these individuals accepted the gunboat diplomacy and spotty escort duties that CNO Zumwalt and Presidents Nixon and Carter had cherished. Most importantly, they did not accept any naval strategy that was based on an unbuilt ship such as the CVV concept (Baer 1994: 430). The goal of a 600-ship Navy, an arbitrary number, served a political purpose of signaling the intent to pursue a global and proactive U.S. sea power role. The Navy’s strategic missions were in place before the goal of 600 ships in the inventory was informal national policy, and not the other way around as vocal critic Robert Komer would have it. These ideas lay dormant until the external and internal conditions were such that they could be awakened. The 600-ship Navy therefore dovetailed “The Maritime Strategy,” although it was a convenient vehicle to bolster the intellectual work of the Navy with clear numbers that were demonstratively beneficial for the defense industry. More than the simple and often scrutinized game of counting ships, “The Maritime Strategy” must therefore also be assessed for the deed it performed for the Navy and the nation as an intellectual exercise.

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251 Robert Komer in an interview with Peter F. Kroegh on the TV show “American Interests” (29 November 1986).
“The Maritime Strategy” connected the naval missions of power projection and sea control by building on a forward naval force. It also added sealift as third component of U.S. seapower and it was flanked by the introduction of fitting platforms into the fleet (Grove 1990: 98).

Stallmann (2000: 213-214), for example, remains outspokenly skeptical about the possible success of conventional U.S. forces in (a) disabling 300 Soviet submarines, (b) securing.

252 For the moment, this eclipsed the ballast that decades of prevalent air power doctrine, massive retaliation, the threat of nuclear annihilation, and sharply limited understandings of sea control had burdened the Navy with. The format of “The Maritime Strategy” provided objectives (deterrence, escalation control, and favorable war termination), spoke to the forces involved (current and future forces, and joint/combined operations), and was promoted as a global coalition strategy that raised the nuclear threshold. It showed that the Navy had a vital role to play in protracted, conventional wars. For that, it drew on forward posture, high readiness, and technological advantages (Hattendorf/Swartz 2008: 140). The service was able to obtain the initiative in strategically communicating a causal ways-means-ends relationship, employing the constituents of functional and institutional seapower, and explaining to the senior policy-makers that it could exploit naval flexibility and mobility for larger national ends.

The Navy’s compelling strategic narrative tracked with the White House, Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, allies, and the public. “The Maritime Strategy” was also very much aligned with the strategic culture of the Navy. It boosted the service’s confidence to engage eagerly in discussion, by arguing for build-up of naval forces of all types and by aligning with national defense policies (Swartz 2011g: 45, slides 89-90). Its offensive nature projected power to the flanks of Europe. It integrated naval aviation to help discourage a Soviet drive westward, and to destroy Soviet attack submarines, thereby guarding the oceanic sea lines of communication. That move exposed the Soviet strategic ballistic missile submarine fleet in its bastions. As Seth Cropsey (2013: 97), Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy for the Reagan and the Bush administration, exuberantly summed up the effects of “The Maritime Strategy” as follows:

“This strategy was disputed, criticized, and disparaged. It proved immensely successful. It offered a coherent and sensible raison d’être that took full advantage of all the Navy Department’s capabilities. The new maritime strategy undertook missions that supported the other military services and advanced the United States’ interest in opposing U.S. strengths to Soviet weaknesses for the purpose of achieving strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. It was comprehensible, capable of being articulated, and inseparable from the navy’s successful effort to increase the fleet from its forty-year nadir of 464 combatants to nearly six hundred ships in less than a decade.”

How effective and successful “The Maritime Strategy” really was remains challenging to qualify. Stallmann (2000: 213-214), for example, remains outspokenly skeptical about the possible success of conventional U.S. forces in (a) disabling 300 Soviet submarines, (b) seizu-
ing the SLOCs in the Pacific and the Atlantic, (c) advancing into the area within reach of land-based naval aviation in order to attack military bases, and (d) influencing potential events at the Central Front by way of an amphibious landing. Neither was it tested in World War III with the Soviet Union, nor did it succeed in the broad scope of reformulating the Reagan administration’s national policy and strategy to match the innovations proposed by “The Maritime Strategy.”

In addition, some of the assertions of “The Maritime Strategy” must be questioned. Its conviction that global war with the Soviet Union would remain conventional may appear convincing in hindsight, e.g., given the extensive reforms under Gorbachev from 1985 on, but it was a deliberate bet that – given events such as in 1983 – amounted to brinkmanship.

“The Maritime Strategy” that appeared in the January 1986 issue of Proceedings “lurked in embryo of ‘Sea Plan 2000’ of 1978” (Gray 1995: 202). It was driven by the Navy’s conviction that it could contribute more to making a strategic difference in the next war than by adhering to the defensive sea control and maritime highway safeguarding that the Carter administration foresaw – a role in which “the U.S. Navy was disinclined to confine its strategic ambitions to the role of a maritime railroad company” (ibid.). It was Admiral Holloway’s opposition to Carter’s swing strategy that helped pave the way; successive CNOs embraced Holloway’s views. The edge that the Soviet Union was seemingly gaining as it strove to become a full-spectrum blue-water navy was countered by building more U.S. warships and by adopting an offensive wartime strategy that would allow the U.S. to seize the initiative early in a great-power war (Love 1992: 716). “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s attempted to draw both from Mahan (it stressed the decisive war-fighting and political capabilities of navies) and from Huntington (it provided a purpose and the according resources to the Navy of its place in national defense) to formulate a sound, diagnostic narrative. The document also accurately reflected the Zeitgeist of the early 1980s.

Although President Reagan never signed “The Maritime Strategy”, it was in line with his way of handling the presidency. He mentioned it in some speeches, which was enough as far as most of the Navy was concerned. In fact, Reagans relative non-involvement in naval issues was a contrast to President Carter, and perhaps provided the right amount of breathing-space for the seapower ideas to take shape. “The Maritime Strategy” dovetailed the national security directives. If it ever sought to influence and decisively shape overarching national security strategies, it failed – overtaken by the course of world events, hampered internally by transitions in high offices (and subsequent agenda-changes) and the fact that it never aspired to be a vision.

As has been pointed out before, seapower is not only a military concept to control events at sea. Moreover, it serves to influence events ashore. It controls international trade and commerce. The use of naval force in wars is subject to certain opportunities (and some limitations). Navies are instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and political influence in situations below hot conflict (Tangredi 2002b: 114).
The scope and legacy of “The Maritime Strategy” can only be assessed by putting it into the context of the Navy’s efforts at making a strategic difference in the 1970s, the 1990s, and the 2000s respectively. In the 1970s, with morale, ships, and planes worn out after Vietnam, a consensus on the Navy’s sense of direction emerged only very slowly. It was flanked by successive CNO course corrections, an administration that displayed a lukewarm attitude to the service, and a defense budget squeeze (Swartz 2011h: 97, slide 193). Without a naval strategic baisse, there could not have been a naval renaissance. Using Hartmann’s description more pointedly, one could therefore speak of a naval strategic renaissance, which played out under the Reagan administration’s agenda. After all, the Navy embraced established missions, concepts, and practices that were on the shelf rather than inventing something completely new (Owens 1999: 167). Additionally, from the 1960s on the Navy began fielding the ships and aircraft that formed the backbone of “The Maritime Strategy”. “The Maritime Strategy”, the logical step under the Reagan administration, was a process that built on a restoration of a sound narrative that ranged from Hayward to Watkins and Lehman. The action officers were able to vitalize the overarching visions. The articulate timing and its narrative allowed the arguments to have maximized impact. In the early 1980s, the course was set for a more coherent, codified Navy narrative that was thoroughly socialized and tested (Swartz 2014: 17). During the Carter years, the strategic ideas of the Navy collided with the strategic priorities of the civilian Pentagon leadership (Rudolf 1990: 260). In the 1980s, internal consensus on the Navy’s rationale, a warm administration attitude towards the service, a continuity and indeed unity of thought across CNO tenures, intelligence community unanimity, and ballooning defense budgets changed the framework significantly (Swartz 2011h: 97, slide 193). The first Reagan administration’s defense plans helped overcome previous uncertainties. It also offered the budgetary and intellectual vigor that allowed “The Maritime Strategy” to unfold. As a proactive capstone document, it elevated the role of American sea power visibly (and in fact, also seapower) as a political and military tool in the Cold War. To the public, the actual conflicts and missions that occupied the Navy in the 1980s bore little resemblance to the high-end global plans of “The Maritime Strategy.” Still, every bit of naval engagement must be understood to have influenced Soviet naval aspirations, whether the U.S. was actively and directly involved (Libya, Lebanon, Persian Gulf) or not (Falklands).

The Navy ended the 1980s with considerably higher morale and consensus on its rationale than it had entered the decade. There was upbeat triumphalism as the Warsaw Pact unraveled. The Navy was reasonably confident in its strategy- and policy-making ability (not least because their capstone document retained the same name and format for identification purposes).
and its operational and tactical competence. It displayed confidence in the modernity of its systems and the fleet-deployment strategy and fleet readiness (Swartz 2011h: 96, slide 192). The strategy’s accomplishment was not so much caused by radical, new ideas; instead, “The Maritime Strategy” succeeded in clearly articulating where naval strategy and naval forces should fit into the broader national military strategy and the more detailed plans and operations of regional commanders. Equally significant was that the strategy provided a lucid target for planning and decisions on naval forces and force structures (Weeks 1992: 30). Additionally, the public image and support of the Navy went through the roof, which in turn boosted service cohesion and morale.\textsuperscript{255}

For the moment, these positive aspects were larger than some other dawning concerns.\textsuperscript{256} Immediate problems such as leveling ship numbers toward the end of the 1980s, the still unsatisfactory state of ASW and MCM platforms and capabilities, and the 19 April 1987 turret explosion on the \textit{Iowa} (BB 61), which killed 47 sailors, paired with broader challenges. The Navy lost its bureaucratic battles against centralization and the momentum of “The Maritime Strategy” slowed down considerably towards the end of the decade as action officers rotated to other billets. The White House was not enthusiastic about fully replacing its grand strategic posture of deterrence and caution with that of an offensive Navy as relations with the Soviet Union thawed. The Reagan administration was also occupied fighting for its own political survival in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair.

Therefore, the “The Maritime Strategy” should not be confused with a maritime grand strategy; as a service strategy, it was subordinate to the continental grand strategy of preventing domination of the Eurasian landmass by an adverse or hostile power (Owens 1993: 11). The Navy had anticipated it could validate major acquisitions for an offensive carrier and submarine fleet, and that it did. It could also reasonably hope that, after debate, a new national strategy for a global maritime war would emerge, a strategy in which this offensive force would be the main naval component. That did not happen. The legacy of “The Maritime Strategy” is, therefore, that of a sound and timely revival of the Navy’s strategic thinking and articulate

\textsuperscript{255} After all, some of the most iconic popular culture products of the decade have a dedicated Navy component. Examples include the 1986 blockbuster movie “Top Gun” about heroic naval aviation training, starring Tom Cruise, Val Kilmer, and the score of Giorgio Moroder; Tom Clancy’s debut novel “The Hunt for Red October”, first published by Naval Institute Press in 1984 and subsequently turned into a successful movie (1990) starring Alec Baldwin and Sean Connery; and the 1989 hit song “If I Could Turn Back Time” by Cher, which featured a jubilant music video (the major artistic and marketing platform of the 1980s) filmed aboard the battleship \textit{Missouri} (Bruns 2010a).

\textsuperscript{256} For a stern warning about the future of “The Maritime Strategy” from an end-of-decade perspective, see O’Rourke (1988). The author cautions that the Navy should address the critics of the strategy or risk turning into a lucrative target for Congress and the other branches of the military, esp. in budget terms.
purposefulness. It was not the Navy’s attempt to capitalize on budget and zero-sum game theories versus the other branches of the military. It was not simply a ship- and technology-procurement strategy. After all, Luttwark pointed out that the political effectiveness of navies is governed by the political context, not the tactical capabilities (cited in Grove 1990: 159). “The Maritime Strategy” provided a global offensive orientation and a nuclear counter-force strategy. Internally, it served as a base for research, development, and procurement. It was a framework for operational planning, tactics, training, and exercises; against the geostrategic background, it did not present itself as countering the continental strategy (Rudolf 1990: 329).

The Navy, in the words of CNO Watkins, was seen “singing from the same sheet of music” (cited in Baer 1994: 432) and “The Maritime Strategy” served as a marching direction. Additionally, as much as it was an offensive military strategy and a Navy narrative, “The Maritime Strategy” was therefore a self-supportive, offensive bureaucratic measure for Congress, the White House, and the American people.

The international context shifted dramatically between 1989 and 1991, essentially nullifying the business model on which “The Maritime Strategy” rested. It once again raising the question ‘What do we need a Navy for?’ After “the Navy’s Cold War zenith” (Haynes 2013: 42), American sea power for the 1990s would have to be reconsidered.
Managing Strategic Change and Embracing a New World Order (1989-2001)

The powerful images of thousands of East and West German citizens climbing the Berlin Wall on the night of 9 November 1989 hold their place as an iconic and peaceful moment of the 20th century. The rapid and revolutionary disintegration of the East German authoritarian regime, epitomized by these images televised to a worldwide audience, triggered a process that quickly led to Germany’s unification. Contrary to a prevailing view, little suggests that the Cold War ended as abruptly for the rest of the world as it did for the divided country in the heart of Europe that night. Conquest of the symbol of the Iron Curtain notwithstanding, the termination of the superpower conflict was a process that began much earlier than 1989. Likewise, it did not end that night in Berlin, but perhaps more precisely with the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991.257

The emergence of what was to come next resembled much more of a precarious process fraught with uncertainty than a chapter from international relations textbooks. The political events had historic military and geostrategic ramifications. The U.S. Navy had neither a peer naval competitor nor a superior maritime adversary; further, a credible naval adversary could not be discerned in the foreseeable future (Hattendorf 2006: 1). For U.S. leaders, the tectonic developments stemming from the “German question” had to be handled with statecraft, diplomacy, and persuasion.258 Other real-world events – some of them associated, others unconnected to the unraveling of the Soviet empire – continued to demand the attention of senior policy and military decision-makers. For the U.S. Navy, the lasting relevance and indeed growing importance of sea power under the American umbrella of underwriting the emerging post-Cold War world order needed to be freshly assessed. These results needed to be channeled and transformed into applicable capstone documents that reflected the increasing consolidation of the defense establishment into a growing joint and efficiency-driven system.

In the past – during the World Wars and the late Cold War – enemy submarines, surface, and enemy naval aviation (even if they resumed the form of defensive and partial sea control only) threatened the survival of U.S. military and commercial shipping in times of crises. By impli-

257 For this chapter, it is helpful to understand the decade as “the long 1990s”, framed by the pivotal events of the fall of the Berlin Wall on the one hand and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the other. Both events serve to remind the analyst as well as the senior decision-maker of strategic uncertainty. For an expanded discussion of U.S. foreign and national security policy during that period, see Chollet/Goldgeier (2008).
258 For the best review of the process of German unification and European reconciliation, see Rice/Zelikow (1997). Condoleezza Rice served as an advisor to President George Bush Sr. on national security affairs (1989-1991); she was National Security Advisor (2001-2005) and Secretary of State (2005-2009) for President George Bush Jr.
cation, American access to areas of interest on the far sides of the globe and political and military influence (in short: power projection) were potentially inhibited. The U.S. Navy therefore, for decades, invested considerable financial and intellectual resources into a force that was designed to meet and rise above that naval threat. When the Soviet Union faded away from the world stage, it took with it the powerful blue-water Navy that Moscow had maintained. Most of the niche-capability Warsaw Pact naval assets, principally directed against American and allied ships, submarines, and aircraft, went away with it. Consequently, U.S. Navy leaders almost immediately faced hard questions in Washington as to what its role and functions were in the future against less maritime capable and politically assertive targets.

At the core of the debate was the question of just how much the future development of naval forces would cost (Hattendorf 2006: 1). Once again, the Navy was tasked with formulating an institutional expectation as to what the next war would look like and how it would be won by a significant contribution of American sea power. Without the framework of the Cold War, world order and the understanding of national security were in revision. The direction that the service took was not always clear, not least because semantic confusion about doctrine, policy, strategy, etc., reigned. The Navy needed to unify for a multi-front campaign against Congress, the White House, and the other branches of the military. Mindful of Huntington’s 1954 warming that a military service needed a strategic concept in order to make sense to itself and to the public, successive Navy declaratory capstone documents went about seeking to explain the broad purpose for American security and the future development of the service.

9.1 Prelude

On 2 August 1990, President George Bush, Sr., gave a much-noticed speech in Aspen, Colorado. The address focused on the emerging new geopolitical conditions and reflected the president’s desire to drastically re-shape U.S. military posture. Acknowledging that the danger of a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe was remote and Warsaw Pact forces were in a rapid decline and withdrawal, Bush proclaimed that,

“The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can and must be different. [...] What matters now, then, is how we reshape the forces that remain. Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests -- the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed. The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or a shrunken-down version of the forces that we possess right now. If we simply prorate our reductions, cut equally across the board, we could easily end up with more than we need for con-
tingencies that are no longer likely, and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions but restructuring." (Bush 1990a)

In other words, the president called for a drastic makeover of the U.S. military (a top-down approach that was designed to leave no stone unturned). At the time, the military maintained a peacetime forward presence in Europe, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf. It was designed for crisis response and surge ability. It retained an edge in developing and fielding advanced weapon technology. Although the country continued to hedge against a potential renaissance of Soviet-style large-scale conflict, the President announced a comprehensive restructuring of its all-volunteer forces over a period of five years. Bush’s speech came at a very peculiar time. On the same day that he spoke in the Rocky Mountains resort town, halfway around the world Iraq invaded its neighbor Kuwait. That was precisely the sort of regional contingency, unrelated to the U.S.-Soviet relationship but affecting U.S. national interests that Bush had described as a consequential national security issue in the post-Cold War era. Within days, the U.S. decided to deploy troops to the Persian Gulf to guard Saudi-Arabia against continued Iraqi military aggression and to expel Saddam Hussein’s troops from oil-rich Kuwait. Seeking the imprimatur of the international community, the administration also deliberately involved the United Nations.259 Bush’s Aspen speech signaled the dawn of a new decade, and the events of that day – Bush’s rhetoric, his ideas on restructuring the military, and the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait – set a defining tone for the early 1990s.

In an address before a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990, the President underscored his thinking using the notion of an emerging “New World Order” (Bush 1990b). He lobbied heavily for his course of action in the Persian Gulf region, one that saw the U.S. Navy once again engaged in the Middle East waters. Strategically the Navy, whose highest-ranking officer, the CNO, in May 1990 had still defended “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s, stood before a pile of shards. Just as the president outlined a drastically different “New World Order”, the Navy declared to the public (and itself) that its policy was “Steady as she goes”. Haynes (2013: 66) unapologetically infers that, “‘The Maritime Strategy’ was too tainted and too rooted in the past to be of much use in an environment in which only self-proclaimed ‘new’ ideas could be assured a hearing.”


At the outset of the first post-Cold War decade, precisely because the antagonist was gone, the U.S. Navy was not necessarily out of business. Along with the end of the Cold War, the perpetual threat of quick, decisive global nuclear war, and mutually assured destruction receded. Since the late 1940s, the nuclear duopoly between the East and the West had been a major challenge to factor in war-planning. In the early 1990s, the world suddenly looked much different. In the words of Colin Gray (1992: 290), “[t]he demise of one of the superpowers eliminate[d] for a while the most nominally persuasive of threats to the strategic utility of sea power: the peril of a war so brief and destructive that sea power’s enabling action would be short-circuited.”

In other words, naval forces could now be more important than ever because they could provide for a variety of missions beyond pure ship-on-ship combat or nuclear deterrence. As Lundesgaard (2011: 6) points out, it is the naval forces’ “ability to exploit the international commons, their mobility and their status as symbols of power that make them useful for anything from diplomatic missions to a full-scale naval battle between peer competitors.” The demise of the Soviet Union brought a “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1990) that opened a window of opportunity for the triumphant U.S. to remake the post-Cold War order. For the time being, the Navy failed to utilize the momentum. Even worse, the service continued to use the way of rationalizing and explaining its force structure and mission set using the template global, forward operations against the Soviet Union when it should have highlighted the value of sea power in lesser contingencies. Previously, the Navy had paid comparatively little attention in its justifications to the smaller contingencies of presence and coercive diplomacy. The senior leadership wanted a demonstration that the Navy had understood the vastly altered environment.

Nevertheless, the fundamental change of an ocean without a rival eventually forced the Navy to undertake a significant strategic change in its culture and outlook. It was a rare moment of “top-down” revolution brought about by a systemic shift that made obsolete many of the convictions that held dear. In this respect, Rosenberg’s pointing out the problem of transforming an armed service as complex as a navy in the face of momentous geopolitical shifts is worth noting. While shifting international geopolitics creates new policy challenges and potentially

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260 The U.S. retained the sea-borne submarine leg of its nuclear deterrence triad.

261 It should be noted that the nuclear threat did not disappear, but rather regionalized, replacing the global war scenario. Examples for regional nuclear aspirations in the 1990s can be found for North Korea, Pakistan, India, Iran, China, and some successor states of the former Soviet Union.

262 For a study on smaller-scale contingencies and the forces that shape the Navy, see Swartz/McGrady (1998).
new military adversaries, twentieth century navies remained technology-based, manpower, and capital-intensive institutions which could not be transformed quickly, and whose basic employment requires a great deal of time and effort to master (Rosenberg 1993: 144-145).

The new threefold challenge, therefore, consisted of [a] the short-term goal of assessing how rapidly the old Cold War military threats were declining so as to draw down forces rationally, [b] the medium-term test of assessing the residual military threat and of crafting an overarching policy to address it, and [c] the long-term task of defining what manner of military threat might force the U.S. to reconstitute all or some part of the military-industrial base that it was planning to disassemble (Smith 1999: 11). At the same time, it was by no means clear what this unraveling world order would look like: a “clash of civilizations,” (as Samuel Huntington outlined in 1993), the “end of history” (as Francis Fukuyama suggested in 1989), or a murky, undistinguishable mixture of different futures?

9.2.1 Global Trends & Challengers to U.S. Security

It is not without some degree of irony that “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s – the concise, offensive sea-control-minded, and clearly articulated strategic plan for confronting the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact – was never fully tested. The early 1990s saw the demise of the very global constellation on which the U.S. Navy’s capstone documents of the 1970s and 1980s (and American national security posture of the Cold War) rested.

The bipolar system ceased to exist. It was replaced by a consolidating and increasingly economically interdependent system that had emerged slowly over the past decades and now integrated fiercely. As CNO Trost noted in an article (1990: 93), “Global economic interdependence is a fact of life.” This proclaimed fact of life yielded an increasingly tightly-knit community of market economies. Presumably, nations from the former Second and Third World (the Warsaw Pact and the non-aligned developing nations, respectively) were freed from the shackles of Cold War days. They could improve their societies and economies with better competitiveness and a larger degree of assimilation in global markets. As a dominant economic world power, the United States could embrace the increasing globalization of goods and services. From the moral high ground after “winning” the Cold War, to the U.S. it appeared that the advancement of democratic systems would be beneficial to everyone involved. This was first outlined by the support of the Bush administration for democratization proces-

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263 This was also facilitated by the emerging, then towards the end of the decade rapidly expanding World Wide Web. The internet, originally developed with a military purpose in mind, dramatically affected people’s lives – and, as the 2000s showed, not least military doctrines, people’s security concerns, and warfare.
es in Eastern Europe after the end of the Soviet Union. Later, under President Bill Clinton, the post-containment policy was expanded. The new strategy was coined in a speech that Anthony Lake (Clinton’s National Security Advisor) gave on 21 September 1993 in Washington, D.C. In his remarks titled “From Containment to Enlargement”, Lake outlined four aspects of the emerging U.S. grand strategy: The strengthening of the community of large market democracies, the help and support for new democracies and market economies, the countering of aggressive states hostile to democracy and markets, and pursuing a humanitarian agenda that anchored the liberalist market ideas in regions of concern. Lake cautioned that this should be done pragmatically and carefully.264

With the prospects and promises of globalization, maritime trade experienced a considerable growth rate. The triumph of the twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) container enabled the economic use of the seas for just-in-time transport and delivery.265 The growth in maritime trade underlined the indispensable economic dimension of sea power: The maritime highways, which often passed through choke points, require sustained investments in maritime safety and security.266 This also concerned conditions ashore. According to this line of thinking, safe and stable conditions ashore facilitate the security of adjacent shipping lanes. Consequently, the protection of sea lines of communication (Mahan’s classic notion) was broadened and redefined, therefore outlining an old, but potentially vastly expanded field of activity for naval forces.

The international system expanded markedly in the 1990s. Thirty countries joined the United Nations as full members between 1990 and 2000. NATO, absent a rival military bloc, began to expand along the Baltic Sea to include the former German Democratic Republic (East-Germany) upon German reunification on 3 October 1990. Poland joined the alliance in 1999. At the same time, the European Union expanded when it welcomed Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. The G-7, the group of the seven largest industrial nations, was expanded to the G-8 by the inclusion of Russia in 1998.267 This complemented the United States’ position as the sole remaining global superpower. The U.S. enjoyed economic primacy and sported the

264 For the address, see Lake (1993). An analysis of the foreign policy implications can be found in Keller (2008a).
265 The overwhelming number of the ships that transported these goods across the vast oceans, however, was built in the Far East. Shipyards in Korea, Japan, and China eclipsed their commercial shipbuilding competition in America and Europe, leading to a deep-rooted consolidation of the shipbuilding markets.
266 Choke points are those artificial or natural bottlenecks such as canals and narrow straits where maritime traffic converges and the potential for disturbing the flow of goods is significantly elevated.
267 Russia’s participation was revoked on 24 March 2014 in the aftermath of the Crimean Crisis 2014. The original forum participants (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States) reconvened in the G-7 format.
world’s largest economy. The US-Dollar served as the global reserve currency and American investment banks dominated world financial markets well into the 2000s. The United States also boasted military primacy. It still fielded the most powerful military, it supplied the highest defense expenditures, and it served as one of the worldwide leaders in defense technology and research. The U.S. enjoyed primacy in the global commons: the sea, the air, space, and the emerging cyberspace. The United States continued its forward global conventional military posture, deepened and expanded its military alliances and partnerships, and sustained its nuclear deterrence.

In the 1990s, U.S. national security – and the ways it served grand strategy – was re-defined. Nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. cities and command and control facilities ceased to be a significant threat (although Russia retains to this day the capabilities of nuclear deterrence, albeit to a much less confrontational degree than in Cold War years). Russia, the largest state of the dissolved Soviet Union, was on rapid downturn. A 1991 coup d’état, still under the Soviet Red Star, attempted to displace Michael Gorbachev. His successor Boris Yeltsin fended off a constitutional crisis in 1993 and engaged in desperate attempts to halt the disintegration of the country, for example, by military intervention in Chechnya (1994). Meanwhile, the Russian economy was ailing badly and its military (not least the venerable surface and nuclear submarine fleets) deteriorated rapidly. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, was signed in July 1991. It cut – rather than limited, as previous treaties of similar effect had attempted – strategic offensive nuclear warheads on both sides. Intrusive verification regimes were agreed upon. Three U.S. Navy strategic submarines were converted into SSN on the building-ways, and the overall number of U.S. Navy SSBN was reduced from 18 to 14 after four of the Ohio-class boats were converted to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles (Silverstone 2007: 36).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union posed the immediate risk of transferring nuclear weapons and related material from the newly-independent former Soviet republics back to Moscow, to dismantle it on-site, and to contain proliferation of radioactive material and other Soviet lega-

268 The first official port visits (some of which conducted under the umbrella of the annual Baltops exercise) by U.S. warships to Russia in the early 1990s provided the sailors with unique revelations about the state of the Russian Navy: Decaying former Soviet warships rested on the bottom of the naval bases, left to decay at their own peril. In another instance, Captain Harris recounts that on a visit with the cruiser Yorktown (CG 48) and the flagship O’Bannon (DD 987) in 1992 to Severnemorsk, during a tour of the large Russian battlecruiser Kirov (065) he encountered vastly outdated 1960s/1970s technology in the Command Information Center (CIC) – and a large mouse-trap. Neither rodent pests nor clunky machinery were problems in the USN CICs (Harris interview 2012, 01:10:00 – 01:17:00).
cy technology to rogue states. These rogue states – Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, or Afghanistan – kept the United States busy throughout the decade. Conduct (or proxy support of) inter-state and civil wars, support for terrorism and insurgency groups, and unstable and failing statehood emerged as post-Cold War security problems. Some of these countries had benefited from Soviet economic and military support throughout the Cold War, for example diesel-electric coastal submarines, capable missile boats, mines, or anti-ship rockets. On the high end, more and more countries acquired ballistic missile capabilities; the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan come to mind (Gormley 2010: 177-184, Kan 2014: 1-50). In East Asia, China slowly emerged as a maritime player in the region, at first expanding its small coastal defense fleet to a more blue-water oriented offshore navy. Maritime incidents throughout the decade in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait signaled Beijing’s growing assertiveness. In 1998, under a cover-up, it acquired the derelict Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag to underline its quest for power-projection assets.

Absent a significant threat to U.S. (and indeed, global) survival, a spotlight turned on emerging civil wars, some of which had been under a blanket for the duration of the Cold War. Inter-state warfare, although still prevalent during the decade, was complemented by emerging concern for transnational and global problems. These included, but were not limited to, terrorism, organized crime, and climate change. Natural disasters increasingly demanded significant attention. Associated famines, refugee waves, and other humanitarian catastrophes often provided an impetus for U.S. consideration and involvement. Organized crime infiltrated many parts of societies around the world, and modern piracy (chiefly in Southeast Asia around the Strait of Malacca for the time being) slowly moved into focus. Although the 1980s had seen a significant rise in the number and quality of terrorist activity, the 1990s featured some lethal incidents as well. The terrorist network Al-Qaida emerged as a major facilitator of attacks against U.S. targets. It stood behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Five years later, two nearly simultaneous explosions directed against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998 killed 224 and wounded more than 4,000 others. Finally, on 12 October 2000, at 11:18 a.m. in the Yemeni port of Aden, suicide bombers detonated an explosive-laden boat directly against the port side of the guided-missile de-

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269 The latter two formally joined the club of nuclear powers by conducting atomic bomb tests in May 1998.
270 Remarkable attacks include the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center parking garage in New York City (6†, more than 1,000 injured), the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City by U.S. right-wing militants (168†, more than 600 injuries), and the Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult the same year (13†, more than 6,000 injured).
The resulting blast tore a large hole in the ship’s hull, killed 17 sailors, and wounded 37 others (Pearl/O’Rourke 2001: CRS-2).

In summary, national security was increasingly defined in a broadened, more comprehensive sense than before. The territorial perception of security and the according way of warfare were complemented by a more diffuse, elusive, and transnational nature of events and threats. Globalization of goods and services, in other words, also offered a flip side: the globalization of challengers and dangers no longer confined to a particular country or military pact.

9.2.2 Conflicts, Crises, and Wars

The major conflicts, crises, and wars of the decade partially reflected such developments. The U.S. intervention in Panama in December 1989 in the shadows of the geostrategic events in progress in Central and Eastern Europe was a relatively minor incursion. It was a different case with the Gulf War. “Operation Desert Shield”, mounted after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and “Operation Desert Storm” (the offensive action from January 1991 to expel Saddam Hussein’s force from the sheikdom in accordance with United Nations resolutions and as a part of an allied coalition effort) were the first larger post-Cold War military operations. The Gulf War had obvious strategic ramifications. It featured clear regional aggression and incursion by a rogue power into a neighbor’s territory; it occurred in a world region of supreme strategic interest regarding resources; and former Cold War adversaries and a reunited Germany participated (to various degrees) on the same allied side.

In another expedition to buttress the “New World Order”, U.S. troops were ordered into Somalia in 1992 to contain a civil war, which broke out after the demission of Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. The images of human suffering on the Horn of Africa were picked up by international media, generated public interest and concern, and eventually triggered a series of U.N.-led operations. The Bush administration was pressed to provide troops. Images of U.S. Marines wading ashore in Somalia unopposed were widely dispersed, but at the same time created a mounting expectation for an equally smooth and swift military operation. As the events unfolded, this was not the case. In what became known as the Battle of Mogadishu, U.S. units (supported by allied forces) fought Somali militia particularly vicious-

271 The invasion of the Central American country was designed to unseat the ruling regime of General Manuel Noriega. “Operation Just Cause” contained limited military objectives (removal of Noriega and stability for the country which was of obvious strategic interest to the U.S. due to the Panama Canal). The Panama Canal Zone was principally U.S.-controlled territory. In 1977, the Carter administration agreed to relinquish control over the area adjacent to the Canal by 1999. The operation contained only some Navy/Marine Corps assets and rested primarily on the shoulders of the Army, Air Force, and Special Operation Forces (Phillips 2004: 5-49).

272 See chapter 9.6.1 for details.
ly on 3 and 4 October 1993. The operation – a tactical draw but a strategic U.S. defeat of the kind that the United States had not witnessed since the Tet Offensive (1968) – was aborted amidst heavy casualties on both sides. The gruesome media coverage of fallen American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu unsettled the American public.\(^{273}\) This contributed to the U.S. decision not to intervene in the equally bloody genocide in Rwanda in 1994, where ethnic Hutus murdered hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsis. American inability to contain the Somali civil war shaped the global perception of U.S. military capabilities and informed skepticism regarding the American political will to accept casualties. It reinforced the impression that the U.S. would rather withdraw ground troops and reduce commitment than actively and aggressively seek a favorable decision by force and diplomacy. Not unlike the U.S. policy after the Beirut barracks bombing of 1983, such perception can empower an adversary’s opinions and policies to undermine American leadership. In the harsh assessment of Haynes (2013: 133), Somalia was therefore nothing less than “a fiasco, a geopolitical knockdown, and a nightmare for [Bill, S.B.] Clinton […]”.

The new president inherited a number of regional crises when he took office in January 1993. Bill Clinton’s activist foreign policy sought to reframe the understanding of and approach to security and national defense. Consequently, American military engagement in the armed conflicts of the decade remained selective and heterogeneous at best. Iraq continued to be a regional nuisance that kept U.S. military forces disproportionately busy. In Haiti, America’s backyard, the U.S. did intervene.\(^{274}\) On the other side of the world, the People’s Republic of China challenged the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan) over the “One China policy”.\(^{275}\) Things were more complicated in the Balkans, an area which American foreign and defense policy devoted considerable attention to throughout the 1990s. As Yugoslavia fell apart after the end of the Cold War and a violent and bloody civil war ensued, NATO and the U.N. mounted military-backed efforts to pacify the region.\(^{276}\)

\(^{273}\) The incident was part of the larger “Operation Gothic Serpent”. More commonly, the events are also often referred to as the “Black Hawk Down” incident, named after the loss of two name-giving Sikorsky UH-60 helicopters. The battle was described in a 1999 book of the same name, and popularized through a commercially successful movie which was released in 2001. For a review of the operation from the U.S. Army’s perspective, see Stewart (2002).

\(^{274}\) Mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 940, a multinational American-led force conducted “Operation Uphold Democracy” to do away with the illegitimate military regime on the Caribbean island. The joint and combined operation was a swift and decisive success (Kretchik et al. 1998). See chapter 9.6.1 for details.

\(^{275}\) In response to Chinese missile test firings and naval exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan in 1995, President Clinton in March 1996 ordered the deployment of two Navy aircraft carrier strike groups to deter Beijing from aggressive action against the island and thus to contain the crisis (Ross 2000). See chapter 9.6.1 for details.

\(^{276}\) The flanking international military response included substantial conventional assets such as a naval blockade, a no-fly zone over former Yugoslavia, and an air campaign dubbed “Operation Deliberate Force” (Au-
The 1990s, in essence, witnessed a series of crises and smaller (but often protracted) wars. None of them occurred against a global challenger to fundamental U.S. security interests. Therefore, each crisis had to be assessed on its own merits by American policy and strategic leaders. Bush’s “New World Order” aspiration and the high morale in the West after the end of the Gulf War quickly ran out of momentum when President Bush lost in the election campaign of 1992. Clinton came into office focused on the economy and not necessarily on international security. In principle, he was an inward-looking, domestic president who relied on his advisors to make and shape foreign policy. The emerging global security environment was outlined comprehensively in an article by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in the February 1993 issue of “The Officer” Magazine. The list, which was reprinted in a work by two Chinese authors (Liang/Xiangsui 1999: n.p.), is characterized by its remarkable foresight (although the aspects of the strategic environment naturally were broad-brush). To date, it provides the basis for many discussions on contemporary national security challenges. The changes in the geopolitical environment were so fundamental that they necessitated a fresh look at the threats they produced and, in turn, their implications for the use of U.S. military force. The emerging environment was distinctively more uncertain because it transcended the bipolar bloc-centric conditions that had been well-established since the late 1940s. This had consequences for military and political alliances and coalitions. At the beginning of the 1990s, the NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations seemed poised to be suited to facilitate peaceful and sustainable solutions to the multiplying number of threats that emerged. For the military, Aspin noted, the new threats translated into a more focused, targeted approach limited in scope. Aspin’s observations implied nothing less than a fundamentally challenged strategic environment and military mindset:
A Comparison of the New and the Old Security Environment

1. In Regard to the Geopolitical Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</th>
<th>NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bipolar (rigid)</td>
<td>Multipolar (complex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictable</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>Nationalism and religious extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. the number one Western power</td>
<td>U.S. only the number one military power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent alliances</td>
<td>Temporary alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A paralyzed United Nations</td>
<td>A dynamic United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In Regard to Threats faced by the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</th>
<th>NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single (Soviet)</td>
<td>Diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to U.S. survival</td>
<td>Threat to U.S. interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrable</td>
<td>Non-deterrable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe-centered</td>
<td>Other regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High risk of escalation</td>
<td>Little risk of escalation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of strategic nuclear weapons</td>
<td>Terrorist using nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt</td>
<td>Covert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. In Regard to the Use of Military Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</th>
<th>NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attrition warfare</td>
<td>Decisive attacks on key targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War by proxy</td>
<td>Direct reinforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance primarily on high technology</td>
<td>Integrated use of high, medium, and low technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward deployed</td>
<td>Power projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward based</td>
<td>Home based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host nation support</td>
<td>Reliance on own strength</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This was the context that U.S. leaders were confronted with in the early 1990s. Some of these aspects were amplified in the course of the decade while others receded in importance and impact.
9.3 Personalities, Domestic Conditions, and National Security Strategies

9.3.1 Presidents, Secretaries, and Policy/Strategy Leaders

George Bush Sr. had handily won the November 1988 Presidential election and was sworn in as 41st President of the United States in January 1989. His vast experience in the field of international politics and his tenure as Reagan’s Vice President enabled him to manage many of the unforeseeable events of the tumultuous years ahead. As his Vice President, Bush chose Dan Quayle, a Congressman from Indiana. The Republican administration carefully managed the disintegration of the Soviet Union with many face-saving measures for the crumbling Soviet Union and without ballyhoo. Bush was a staunch ally of German Chancellor Kohl in the drive for German reunification and full NATO membership for Germany. The president oscillated between more assertive grand strategic aspirations of a new world order and the immediate task at hand: the management of the successful end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. As his secretary of defense, Bush chose Richard (“Dick”) Cheney. Cheney came to Washington in 1969 as part of the American Political Science Association’s fellowship program. He had served in the Nixon and Ford administrations in the 1970s. He was a Washington insider and, by all accounts, a hardliner. Cheney served in the House of Representatives (representing a district in Wyoming from 1979 to 1989) and joined the Bush cabinet after the President’s previous nominee for the position of Secretary of Defense failed to be confirmed by the Senate. He oversaw the re-setting of the course and posture of U.S. defense policy after the end of the Cold War. As secretary of state, Bush nominated James Baker (1989-1992) and, later, Lawrence Eagleburger (1992-1993). Baker, a reserve Marine, served as White House Chief of Staff (a position he returned to during the final year of the Bush administration) and Secretary of the Treasury under Reagan. He was instrumental in leading the State Department in support of German reunification, management of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, and the Gulf War. The military coalition in the war would have been unattainable without Baker’s diligent efforts (Hacke 2005: 456-520). His successor Eagleburger (the only career diplomat to advance to the top of the State Department) had a considerably shorter track record. The disintegration of Yugoslavia dominated his time in office.

In the Pentagon, the national security team was complemented by Secretary of the Navy Henry L. Garrett. Less publically vocal about strategic matters than the CNO, Garrett resigned in

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277 On Bush’s comprehensive reflections of his tenure in the national security arena and the defense issues at stake, see Bush/Scowcroft (1998). On foreign relations, the end of the Cold War, and the Bush presidency, also see Hurst (2000) and Maynard (2008).

278 For the Secretary’s own views on his tenure, see Baker (2008).
June 1992 after three years in office in the aftermath of an investigation of the “Tailhook ’91” scandal. The scandal unseated the Navy’s strategic culture. It fueled internal distortions and preempted social changes that affected the service throughout the remainder of the decade.

At the time, women were increasingly integrated into the ranks of the male-dominated naval aviation community where some of the behavior displayed at such conventions was previously seen as utterly normal and part of the natural swagger. Garrett’s (acting) successor for the remainder of the Bush Sr. presidency (1992-1993) was Sean O’Keefe, a former Congressional staffer and Pentagon analyst. Service secretaries and CNOs throughout the 1990s spent a considerable amount of time righting the public image and internal well-being of the Navy after “Tailhook ’91”, but the scandal became emblematic for a hollowed-out, morally discredited, and macho military service in disarray (Vistica 1997).

Admiral Frank Kelso III was appointed as Chief of Naval Operations, succeeding the more strategically versed Carlisle Trost. Kelso served as CNO from June 1990 to April 1994, thus working for two presidents, three secretaries of defense, and three secretaries of the Navy. Kelso also was the third submariner in a row to rise to CNO and he was a product of early career-specialization under Admiral Rickover. He had participated in developing and testing “The Maritime Strategy” as a flag officer and in one of his previous commands in the U.S. Sixth Fleet oversaw combat operations against Libya in 1986. Kelso was an honest and pragmatic but hardly an ambitious leader. His major task was to transition of the military from the Cold War posture to an uncertain post-Cold War design. In his view, that called for new policies, but not a whole new strategy.

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279 The annual symposium of the “Tailhook Association”, a fraternal non-profit group of naval aviators, held in Las Vegas (Nevada) in September 1991 was overshadowed by at least 90 cases of sexual harassment and physical abuse during the conference. 83 of the victims were women. The Secretary of the Navy and the new CNO Admiral Frank Kelso both attended that particular symposium. The resulting investigation stained the Navy’s public image and shed a light on internal proceedings of the naval officer corps. It cut short (and in many instances practically ended) the careers of some 300 officers and 14 admirals, including the tenures of the Secretary of the Navy and with two years delay CNO Kelso (Vistica 1997). Former Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb, speaking on the occasion of a visit to the U.S. Naval Academy five years after the incident, compared the comprehensive punishment of a whole cohort of naval aviators to the anti-communist McCarthyism witch hunts of the 1950s (Webb 1996).

280 One of the most prominent examples of social distortion within the military is the uneasy handling of homosexuality. Gay and lesbian lifestyle was to be muted by the persons affected under the controversial “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy established by the Clinton administration. Why, it was then asked, was a dismissive treatment of women socially accepted within the military whereas same-sex orientation was not? The Navy failed to address the resulting social problems accordingly (certainly not to offer explanation or justification, but at least to alleviate the problems). Consequently, it let outsiders dominate the future of the service in that particular policy area and charge against the Navy’s self-perception. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was eventually repealed military-wide in 2011.
The most important strategic leader of the Bush years in the military realm was arguably General Colin Powell (USA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By utilizing the provisions laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the general was turning the Pentagon’s decision-making process on its head. In order to hedge against coming post-Cold War draw-downs and budget cuts, Powell decisively changed the process by which U.S. strategy was determined (Haynes 2013: 47). Instead of global conflict with the Soviet Union, the emerging security to-do list included now a stronger emphasis of presence, crisis response, and regional (limited) conflict missions for the military. This was a far-reaching shift that was flanked with a notable desire by Congress to obtain a peace dividend through reduced spending on a considerably smaller military. This led to a force and a strategy determined by the Congressional budget instead of (ideally) having it the other way around. Aware of the legislative branch’s desires, Powell attempted to retain the existing institutional balance among the military services and to avoid an indiscriminate dilution of rational strategic objectives (ibid. 48). In such a strategic and diplomatic approach, Powell clearly outshone the service chiefs and the service secretaries. He utilized the power granted to him as the principal military advisor to the President, and aimed to provide integrated, joint strategic direction of his own (he lacked faith that presidential guidance and service planning would be effective in downscaling U.S. defense posture rationally). The price was that seemingly non-integrated service concepts such as “The Maritime Strategy” were dropped in favor of strategic defense-planning coming from the Joint Staff.

The 1992 presidential elections brought William J. “Bill” Clinton into the White House, signaling a generational change in the American presidency. The young, charismatic Clinton (who would occasionally entertain impressionable audiences as a saxophone player) reflected the desire by many Americans who had voted for him to overcome the militarized Cold War mindset and its dominance of foreign affairs in favor of concentrating on the economy and on social well-being. As his running mate, Clinton selected Congressman Albert “Al” Gore (who had represented Tennessee in the House of Representatives from 1977 to 1993). Gore had some expertise in foreign affairs (and unsuccessfully ran for President in 1988 and again in 2000). The Clinton administration replaced containment of the Soviet Union with a strategy of enlargement and political-economic engagement built around the idea that mutually con-

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281 According to Haynes (2013: 53-54), however, “Powell was among those that did not fully ‘understand’ or ‘appreciate’ the Navy’s continuing role. Powell had an incomplete understanding of the Navy. […] Powell did not understand the nature of the Navy’s thinking during the Cold War. He did not understand the reasons for the Navy’s generic operational flexibility approach […]”
nected, prospering nations would not aspire to regional hegemony and become threats or challenges to the U.S. Clinton’s first National Security Strategy consequently postulated:

“Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and policy and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.” (The White House 1994: 2).

This hardly altruistic approach yielded broadening and strengthening existing alliances such as NATO, while retaining American leadership and military contingency planning in nuclear and conventional terms. It included opening new avenues of cooperation with countries around the world (such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace program with Eastern Europe) and in the near neighborhood, such as the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Canada, the United States, and Mexico (signed into law in 1994). Clinton’s approach also pointed to the concept of military intervention on humanitarian grounds. Clinton’s last National Security Strategy of 2000 summed this up as follows:

“In some circumstances our nation may act because our values demand it. Examples include responding to natural and manmade disasters; promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; supporting democratization, adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military; assisting humanitarian demining; and promoting sustainable development and environmental protection. The spread of democracy and respect for the rule of law helps to create a world community that is more hospitable to U.S. values and interests. Whenever possible, we seek to avert humanitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a wide range of partners, including other governments, international institutions and nongovernmental organizations. This may not only save lives, but also prevent crises from getting worse and becoming a greater drain on resources.” (The White House 1999: 2)

As his Secretary of Defense, Clinton selected Les Aspin, a Representative from Wisconsin and former chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC). Aspin faced a number of daring challenges after he joined the administration. These included policies regarding the role of women and homosexuals in the military, the future posture of the force, the size of the defense budget (Aspin initiated a “Bottom-Up Review” of force structure in 1993), and the perennial closing of military bases throughout the country and abroad. The Navy anxiously awaited the results of Aspin’s policy decisions. In his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 15 January 1993, Aspin stated that U.S. naval forces “should be sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, but also for the many other important tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key ingredient of this mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, de-
terence and crisis control” (cited in Davis 1993:17). Aspin faced increasing pressure because of crises that unfolded in the course of 1993, cumulating in the embarrassing defeat of U.S. forces in the Battle of Mogadishu. Consequently, Aspin stepped down after just one year at the helm of the Department of Defense.

His successor was William Perry, an experienced businessman and defense policy insider, who served from 1994 to 1997. Perry coined a “preventive defense” approach to deemphasize the nuclear deterrence focus of Cold War days. The policy sought to prevent threats from emerging in the first place, but if that failed, to deter and if need be to fight such threats decisively using military force. Geographically, this pulled the military forward. Like his predecessors, Perry was confronted with a host of post-Cold War crises abroad (the Balkans, Haiti, and the Persian Gulf) as well as on the home front (mainly the budgetary battles). Increasingly frustrated with the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, Perry resigned shortly after Clinton won another Presidential term in the 1996 elections (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense 2014). He was succeeded by William Cohen, an experienced Republican Congressman from Maine who stayed for the remainder of Clinton’s tenure. As Secretary of Defense, Cohen had to deal with the Kosovo War (including the dismissal of then-SACEUR GEN [USA] Wesley Clarke in 2000), cruise missile strikes against Iraq, the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, and the terrorist attack on the destroyer Cole in Yemen. Clinton’s Department of State was led by Warren Christopher during the first term (1993-1997) and Madeleine Albright, the first female U.S. Secretary of State, during the second term (1997-2001). Christopher, a lawyer by training from California who had served the Johnson and Carter administrations, needed to manage the broad and diffuse challenges that the United States faced in the early 1990s. Albright held a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University and previously served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Her experience in international diplomacy endeared her to Clinton. The Balkans and Iraq remained focal points of her time in office (Office of the Historian, Department of State 2013).

From 1993 to 1998, the Navy Department was headed by Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton. A businessman with a five-year career on active duty in the Navy as a nuclear submarine officer (and later as a reservist), Dalton came into public office just as the Navy was recovering from the fallout of the “Tailhook ‘91” scandal. Dalton’s call for CNO Kelso’s resignation in the wake of the subsequent investigation was overruled by SECDEF Aspin and the White House (Healy 1993), although Kelso eventually did retire in 1994. For the remainder of his service, Dalton concentrated on managing the fallout of the embarrassment. He also dealt
with issues arising from the further integration of women into the Navy (Bowman 1998). His immediate focus on smoothing and integrating the service culture is emblematic of Dalton’s unwillingness to engage in larger strategic visions. He left the office after five years, an unusually long period of time for a Secretary of the Navy, and was replaced by the Richard Danzig, a former Undersecretary of the Navy. Danzig’s official biography describes his professional objectives while in office as,

“Treating Sailors and Marines as skilled workers (ridding the Services of ‘a conscript mentality’) and directing new capital investments and personnel systems to better support them; achieving better synergy between the Navy and Marine Corps; strengthening the ability of the sea services to influence events on shore; and embracing information age and other new technologies that can better achieve these goals” (Department of the Navy 2000)

To achieve these goals, Danzig, a more energetic strategist than his predecessor, adopted an increasingly activist, bi-partisan approach to strengthening the Navy. He stayed on for the remainder of Clinton’s second presidential term.

As much as continuity could be observed in the civilian leadership of the department, the top military management was in rather dire straits. CNO Kelso, who was active on the capstone documents for the service but mismanaged the “Tailhook” fallout, left office in April 1994. Kelso was replaced by Admiral Jeremy “Mike” Boorda, who was selected to restore the Navy’s public image, rebuild service morale, and reestablish good relations with Congress (Haynes 2013: 135). These had deteriorated over the past few years. Boorda was the first person who rose through the enlisted ranks to the top position in the U.S. Navy. He enjoyed good standing as a “Sailors’ Sailor” with most of the Navy, and his operational record with NATO Mediterranean operations let him stand out as unique and practically tested. His relationship to the top Navy brass (especially Naval Academy graduates and naval aviators) was less sparkling due to Boorda’s career background and his sweeping handling of the “Tailhook” affair. 282 Personally, he took a lot of criticism over his right to wear valor markings on combat service medals from service during the Vietnam War. On 16 May 1996, after just two years in office, Boorda killed himself in his Washington Navy Yard residence in part over those allegations (Shenon 1996). His suicide at age 56 was a shock for President Clinton. The Navy now had to deal with yet another addition to the long, agonizing series of scandals and embarrassments. It would be up to Boorda’s successors to steer the service into calmer waters and restore public, inner-service, and Congressional confidence.

282 A Baltimore Sun article on the occasion of Boorda’s death insinuated the relationship between the service’s culture and the admiral’s personal problems (N.N. 1996).
Admiral Jay Johnson, a naval aviator, was selected to straighten the Navy’s course. Johnson largely shied away from publishing major declaratory strategies. Instead, he focused on implementing the “…From the Sea” (1992) and “Forward…From the Sea” (1994) capstone documents that his predecessors had issued. To restore the Navy’s technological edge, he also directed efforts to develop the next generation of warships, aircraft, and information systems. He improved the quality of life and work in the Navy by directing changes in the inter-deployment training cycle (the period of time between deployments), by trimming at-sea time, and by measures to reduce wear and tear on the equipment. He optimized procedures throughout the bureaucracy of the service so that sailors could spend more time ashore with their families and enjoy increasing benefits in pay, health care, and housing (Naval History and Heritage Command 2008).

Increasingly inward-oriented to calm service culture and reassure Congress, CNOs did little to infringe on the turf of the CJCS. Over the course of the 1990s, the Chairman was always a U.S. Army general. Powell, John Shalikashvili, and Hugh Shelton oversaw a period in which the joint staff became deeply involved in defense-planning and strategy-making. This dovetailed an increasing oversight role of the civilian bureaucracy over U.S. military planning (Swartz 2012b: 26, slide 52). The Navy seemingly lost the ability and the informal responsibility to be the master of its own strategic fate to fellow military men and to civilian claims. Congressional influence on strategy-making and defense-planning also rose considerably due to Goldwater-Nichols, most prominently displayed by the mandate to submit a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) beginning in 1997. Capitol Hill, after a conservative landslide victory in the 1994 midterm election, featured a strong Republican voice in that of Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). Republicans for the first time in forty years controlled a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Divided government provided a considerable problem for Clinton who was forced to battle the Republicans on many occasions instead of being able to focus more on foreign policy.

9.3.2 Domestic Conditions

By 1990, the United States was the single remaining political, military, and economic global power. The U.S. (and with it the capitalist-driven market economy) had demonstratively prevailed over the Soviet-style, socialist, planned economy. A low inflation rate and low unemployment numbers (after a small spike amidst a short recession in 1992, the overall numbers went down progressively) helped considerably in sustaining U.S. momentum. A stock market, housing, and credit boom set the tone for an increasingly energized and globalized private-
capital financial trade business. Highly speculative internet businesses drew an overwhelming majority of capital, resulting in the bursting of the “dot-com bubble” in March 2000. The U.S. pushed several free trade offensives (NAFTA mentioned above) and it co-founded the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 (Mildner 2012: 176-177). The industrial and defense sector at home, on the other hand, consolidated. This was related to the restructuring of the military and budgetary reduction. The Bush Sr. administration and in particular the Clinton administration reduced overall government spending on defense. The military budget went down significantly from its Cold War heights, although the Navy was able to retain roughly one third of the share among the services. The following illustration outlines the declining defense expenditures in absolute and relative terms.


Of the multitude of defense companies, through mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies, only five larger firms remained (Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Northrop-Grumman, and Boeing). Affecting the defense sector as well were several rounds of base realignment and closures (BRAC), signaling the withdrawal of the military from some parts of the country. BRAC rounds usually eliminated corresponding jobs in the military as well as in the local and regional industry and service sectors. While it was justifiable to reduce two thirds of the troops in Europe (given the lack of any credible threat to the Cold War/Central Front areas of strategic primacy such as the Fulda Gap, the Goslar Corridor, or the Göttingen Gap), a significant number of military bases in the United States were closed and abandoned
as well. Just like the Army and the Air Force, the Navy was also affected. In 1991, three naval stations were closed; in 1993, one government-owned shipyard, 12 naval stations, three naval hospitals, and a variety of other installations were shut down. Two years later, in 1995, four additional shipyards in Charleston (South Carolina), Long Beach (California), Mare Island (California), and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) folded. Only the facilities in Norfolk (Virginia), Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Portsmouth (Maine), and Puget Sound (Washington) remained (Swartz 2012b: 60, slide 120). In the states affected by closures, this added to an overall dismal public image that the Navy had to increasingly cope with. A series of bad press incidents plagued the service at the time. Beginning with the turret explosion aboard the battleship Iowa (BB 61) in 1989, the fallout of an FBI anti-corruption investigation involving Department of the Navy and defense industry individuals, lawsuits over the cancelled McDonnell Douglas all-weather A-12 carrier stealth bomber in the early 1990s, the “Tailhook ‘91” scandal and the following investigations (the Navy lost some 15 percent of its flag officers in the course of demotions and forced retirements), a cheating scandal at the U.S. Naval Academy in 1994, and Boorda’s suicide in 1996 cumulated to paint the Navy in a devastating state of affairs. All of that affected Navy morale, retention rates, and public standing. This was terrifying for a service that was proud of its traditions, its heritage, and its gallantry (Vistica 1997). The problems contributed to the impression that the Navy neither had the integrity nor the vision to serve as a key tool for U.S. foreign and security policy ends.

9.3.3 Selected U.S. National Security Policies, Doctrines, and Capstone Documents

The “long 1990s” saw an endless stream of national security policy revisions, doctrinal documents, and capstone strategies. As the world order was redefined, successive administrations and their policy and military leaders attempted to grasp the imminent changes and frame America’s role in the post-Cold War world. Trying to make sense of the present and plan for the future occurred amidst real-world defense and national security developments. Goldwater-Nichols mandated submission of an annual senior-level security strategy by the President. Except for 1992 (when the Bush administration did not publish an NSS), these strategies served to establish and reiterate the strategic choices that Bush or Clinton faced in support of American grand strategy. These documents naturally were the product of a vetted, interagency process. As such, they were carefully crafted, but often only resembled a low, whitewashed, common denominator. The tight schedule between NSS documents – after staff produced one document, they immediately began work on next year’s document – put immense pressure on the authors and robbed the document of the really new and ground-breaking insights and ways-means-ends causalities to influence public and political discourse. To complement top-
level guidance, the White House submitted a steady stream of National Security Directives (NSD, Bush Sr.) or Presidential Decision Directives (PDD, Clinton), respectively. These national security memos were often used to clarify administration policies.\textsuperscript{283}

In addition, the joint staff was also very active in producing series of documents. National Military Strategies (NMS) were submitted in 1992, 1995, and 1997. U.S. strategy reports on East Asia appeared in 1990, 1992, 1995 and 1998. Joint doctrinal publications continued to stream from the Joint Staff, most prominently the conceptual documents “Joint Vision 2010” (1996) and “Joint Vision 2020” (2000). The Pentagon still submitted its annual Defense Department reports. The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) – written by the Secretary of Defense, approved by the President, for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – sought to tie together the guidance given in NSS and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). In turn, the CPG served as the principal source document for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Finally, periodic analyses such as the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends Report 2010 (November 1997) and Global Trends Report 2015 (December 2000) added to the multitude of documents. A few documents stand out from this bouquet, that is, from the perspective of this study and consequently deserve discussion in more detail. These are, in chronological order, the 1991 Base Force Report, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, CJCS General Powell and his staff produced a concept titled Base Force and developed in the 1992 National Military Strategy (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1992: 17-25).\textsuperscript{284} It was designed to replace the global containment strategy whose objective was fading away with the new era. It advocated a more nuanced, regional focus for the emerging threats of the post-Cold War world, including a distinct regional and surge focus (to that end, the Base Force concept contained strategic, Atlantic, Pacific, and contingency forces). The growing federal deficit also demanded action by prudent military planners. From a congressional perspective, it was the hope for a ‘peace dividend’ (a rerouting of funds for military and defense items to social welfare programs) that made budget cuts

\textsuperscript{283} In the national security and military realm specifically for the Navy (some were referenced in the capstone documents), the following directives are of note: NSD-49 (12 October 1990) on freedom of navigation issues; NSD-74 (24 November 1992) on peacekeeping and humanitarian relief policy; PDD-25 (6 May 1994) on U.S. policy regarding multilateral peace operations; PDD-26 (9 June 1994) on U.S. Arctic policy; PDD-32 (23 January 1995) on freedom of navigation issues; PDD-56 (May 1997) on administration's policy on managing complex contingency operations; and PDD-60 (November 1997) on nuclear weapons employment policy. The full texts of the memos can be found at the website of the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum (http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd.php) and the William J. Clinton Presidential Library (http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/pdd.html).

\textsuperscript{284} For an in-depth discussion of the Base Force, see Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner (2001), pp. 5-39.
very attractive. Accordingly (and in part to push back across-the-board un-strategic spending cuts), the Base Force called for substantial financial and manpower reductions (while retraining a sensible base) within a short period of time to make the U.S. military ready for the changing strategic environment. To offset capability gaps and leverage efficiencies, the report also put an emphasis on more and honest jointness (Swartz 2012b: 27, slide 53). The report provided a floor for future planning. Its objective was to outline the minimum force needed to execute the new U.S. strategy, to continue to meet obligations stemming from enduring national security needs, and to preserve American interests in the changing world. It also hoped to retain some capabilities should a resurgent Soviet Union once again challenge the U.S. and the West (which at the time seemed like a distant, but still possible outcome). The Base Force outlined four elements of U.S. defense strategy, namely strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and the ability to reconstitute the U.S. military quickly. Rather than focusing on the ultimately unpredictable future engagements and threats specifically (thereby dismissing a threat-based strategy), the report used a capabilities-based analysis to arrive at the defined, balanced base force.

The report remained the conceptual force structure document for the remainder of the Bush administration. Its underlying principles by General Powell (dubbed the “Powell Doctrine”) built on the principles as laid out in the Weinberger Doctrine a few years earlier, including clear provisions on the U.S. use of military force (Powell had worked for Weinberger before rising to the top military position of the Joint Staff).

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of 1993 was the second major force structure review, just a couple of years into the decade (Department of Defense 1993). It was directed by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. While the report can be explained partially by the incoming administration’s desire to distance itself from the work of its predecessors, it also points toward the high level of uncertainty that cloaked defense planning in the 1990s. Sensible strategic planning in the face of uncertainty was obviously in higher demand than ever, but at the same time it was still largely unclear just how that could be facilitated. Successive administrations now used the force structure setscrew to go about that business. The Bottom-Up Review was even more assertive and wide-reaching in terms of force and budget reduction, proposing cuts of up to one third, thereby surpassing the Base Force’s 25% reductions. In addition, this review’s most serious shortcoming from the Navy’s perspective was that it downplayed the capability of U.S. naval forces to shape the strategic environment through forward presence. Instead,

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Secretary Aspin’s approach was explicitly threat-based (Owens 1993: 16-17). Importantly, the BUR preempted Clinton’s first national security strategy of 1994 in that it called for an increasing operations tempo and a higher deployment rate of a significantly smaller military. In setting the political and rhetorical stage for U.S. participation in multilateral operations, it signaled the intent to increase burden-sharing among allies and drive efficiencies, or in other words: “to do more with less”.

The Bottom-Up Review cautioned that in strategic planning, external threats were important but needed to be compared with the nation’s resources. This was a marked change from the abundant defense spending during the Cold War. Much to the Navy’s relief, the BUR report acknowledged the vital role of presence and peacetime engagement. Both are traditional roles for naval forces (Swartz 2012b: 27, slide 53). It noted four overarching priorities for the U.S., namely, (1) defeating aggressors in major regional contingencies (MRC); (2) deterring regional conflict and provision of stability in areas of strategic interest; (3) conducting of small-scale interventions (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief); and, (4) deterring attacks against the U.S., its forces, or its allies by WMD (Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner 2001: 46-48). The document further assumed that U.S. forces would need to be designed so that four sets of tasks could be achieved abroad. To that end, it used a two major regional contingency force-sizing metric. In other words, it called for troops of a quantity and quality that could engage decisively in two major regional conflicts somewhere in the world in parallel (for example North Korea and the Persian Gulf). In addition, the report incorporated smaller-scale conflicts or crises (that would require U.S. forces to conduct peace enforcement or intervention operations), overseas presence (the need for U.S. military forces to conduct regular peacetime operations in critical regions of the world), and deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction, either against U.S. territory, U.S. forces, or the territory and forces of U.S. allies (Department of Defense 1993: 13).

The U.S. military would continue to be tasked with addressing the range of the spectrum of conflict across all these categories, making the post-Cold War peacetime operations and crisis response in all likelihood a busy, but – so it was hoped – relatively manageable task for the U.S. The central struggle for planners would be to balance the war-fighting capabilities of

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286 The established model of the spectrum of conflict for the military consists of notional phases in a serial chain. The pattern describes a conflict’s dynamics and the role that the U.S. military intends to play. In its most common way, it consists of six phases. Phase Zero is known as the “Shape” phase in which prevention and contingency preparation are undertaken. Phase I, “Deterrence”, is a defined crisis that needs to be met by capable actions and means. Phase II, the “Seize” part, contains the assurance of friendly freedom of action and access to a theater’s infrastructure. Phase III, “Dominance”, establishes powerful force capabilities to achieve full-spectrum
the force on the one hand with the presence requirements as mandated by the report on the other hand. When the Bottom-Up Review was implemented, it occurred to leaders that military deployments and engagements as well as political commitments were “from a historical perspective, more frequent, larger, and of longer duration than had been seen in the past” (Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner 2001: 59). During its first term, the Clinton administration failed to prioritize the use of the U.S. military but actually used it as an active and often indiscriminate foreign policy tool instead. These lesser contingencies took a toll on the force and almost equaled the stress of one MRC. That was one of the major reasons why during the second half of the presidency, Clinton went from a more interventionist approach to economizing the military just to win wars. In addition, the ambitious promotion of democracy and market economy slowed considerably (e.g., with respect to Russia and China [Bierling 2003: 224-226]). Clinton needed to concentrate on domestic issues, not least around his impeachment in 1998/1999. A careful global engagement was once again replaced by regional wars prisms as the overriding planning metric.

The third major capstone document of the decade came in 1997 with the Quadrennial Defense Review. It was mandated by Congress in 1996 and had its roots in a report of the Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces (1995). One of its major motivations was to balance the defense program needs with budgetary provisions and to strengthen the role of the legislature. Central to this approach was to offset one of the key problems that had developed during the previous years, namely, the mitigation of funds from modernization accounts to the funding of ongoing operations. This was especially crucial in the face of more expensive technology and procurement given the advanced weapons, sensors, and command and control systems that were moving into place (a process that widely became known as transformation of the military). The QDR replaced the MRC model with the 2-Major-Theater-Wars (MTW) force-sizing metric, recognized adversary asymmetric means in warfare, and emphasized peacetime engagement and smaller-scale contingencies (SSC). Nevertheless, end strength decreased. CJCS General John Shalikashvili came out with the report before the civilian lead-

superiority. Phase IV is the “Stabilize” round where security is established and pre-conflict services (such as governance, infrastructure, etc.) are restored. Phase V contains the transfer of responsibility to a civilian authority and the military’s redeployment; it is known as “Enable Civil Authority”.


288 In 1998, the National Defense Panel (NDP) Report, a congressionally-mandated alternative vision to the Pentagon’s QDR, remained skeptical of the two-MTW Metric as strategy. Instead, it argued for ‘transformation’ and experimentation as immediate US defense priority (Swartz 2012b: 27, slide 54).
ers of OSD were able to influence it significantly. Secretary of Defense William Cohen had little leverage within the policy process (Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner 2001: 83-84).

These three national strategic capstone documents (Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review) underlined the broad consequences that changes in global circumstances and presidential administrations can have on military planning. In addition to the tectonic political and geostrategic rifts, the overarching capstone documents of the 1990s were increasingly informed and influenced by technology-based war-fighting concepts sometimes perceived as revolutionary. Full-spectrum dominance, dominant battle-space knowledge, rapid decisive operations, shock and awe, halt phase, network-centric operations, and effects based operations (EBO) became a familiar and increasingly popular vocabulary (Swartz 2012b: 23, slide 45).

9.4 Developing and Promulgating USN Strategy 1989-2001

While “The Maritime Strategy” was a series of documents under one name and one large geostrategic naval concept, the 1990s was not afforded such luxury by the Navy. Accordingly, rather than discussing the evolution of the documents and the sea-strategic concepts behind it sequentially, this chapter will present each document’s genesis and evolution followed by the analysis of its strategic scope. A synopsis at the end of this chapter will point out aspects of continuity and change.

The April 1990 issue of Proceedings, the U.S. Naval Institute’s professional magazine, featured a strikingly candid illustration that was aimed directly at the ‘steady as she goes’ mentality of some admirals. The photograph showed a print of “The Maritime Strategy” being consumed by flames (Golightly 1990: 33). As the 1980s capstone document of American sea power went up in flames, it provided the opportunity for a fresh start. This do-over resulted in several attempts by the Navy leadership to promulgate core thinking about the role of naval power in this new world. In the process, however, the Navy’s message diluted. The capstone documents were not addressing a naval way of thinking about the political ends of war. Instead, they increasingly limited themselves to how the Navy would fight the next war. With little in the way of major threats or peer competitors on the horizon, the defense establishment was hard to convince why a large, balanced Navy was necessary in the first place. Two successive presidential administrations did not help to push back such concerns. The service’s

289 It was flanked by a notable increase in books from third parties on topics of American and world naval history including strategy, military innovation, and tactics (for a list, see Swartz 2012b: 50-59). In part, this intellectual-academic influence strove to explain how the U.S. Navy had dealt with strategic change before, hoping to provide some template for the 1990s force- and strategic-planning communities.
strategies were often no longer comprehended as how to make a strategic difference akin to “The Maritime Strategy”, but rather as simple war plans and justifications for its force structure.

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<td>unclassified</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Navy Policy Book</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
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<tr>
<td>… From the Sea</td>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Warfare (NDP1)</td>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<td>Forward… From the Sea</td>
<td>Strategic Concept</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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Illustration 27: Main1990s USN capstone documents (Swartz 2012a: 2, slide 3, 75, slide 149, 98, slide 195).

These capstone documents also struggled with a secondary rationale, namely, providing the Navy internally with a sense of cohesion much like “The Maritime Strategy” had achieved. Initially, U.S. Navy expectations for its post-Cold War role were relatively far-reaching and widely optimistic. The Navy leadership considered its political and operational postures and the way it did business as very adaptable to the aftermath of the superpower conflict. It could be reasonably confident that by all indications (and providing an unchanging if not larger share of the budget) that it would be very, if not most relevant in the future security environment (Swartz 2012b: 8, slide 16). This amounted to political wishful thinking on the part of the Navy. The Navy misjudged the persuasive power of geostrategic shifts, public expectations toward post-Cold War peace and serenity, and of two successive administrations. President Bush’s “New World Order” ideas were cut short by his surprising defeat after one term in office (Bush acknowledged not subscribing to “the vision thing” in the first place [Bush/Scowcroft 1998: 16-18]; in fact, he sought a much more pragmatic approach to national defense affairs). President Clinton’s attempt at a single cohesive and comprehensive idea of integrating economic and political enlargement eventually faltered mostly due to do-

290 A view that epitomized in an article penned by the outgoing CNO titled “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s” (Trost 1990).
mestic political dynamics and the persistently violent nature of international relations. Hence-forth, in particular during Clinton’s second term, international problems were considered without applying a larger template or idea. Consequently, none of the single crises and challenges that the U.S. faced in the 1990s proved compelling enough to threaten U.S. national survival. The role of the military in general and the Navy in particular in addressing these threats was a one-off as the definition of American interests. The Navy was eventually unable to drive home to Congress and the American public the need to keep up a large force, as useful and sound their arguments for a balanced fleet may have sounded to themselves.


a) Evolution

The 1991 document drew significantly from an informal working group of Navy Department staff officers which got together on a regular basis to discuss Navy and Marine Corps issues.291 Parallel to a few non-starting formal efforts, an informal association of Navy and Marine Corps officers – the self-titled “Ancient Mariners” (consisting of OPNAV and outside staff) – took it upon themselves to come up with a new concept to address the changing world. A meeting on a Saturday morning in March 1990 featured presentations by action officers for a large audience that included many flag officers. It yielded a number of themes that provided insight for the changing strategic landscape. The concept was consequently tested and expanded and “thus, this early developmental work became an ancestor to the series of statements that were soon to follow” (Hattendorf 2006: 11). One of them was “The Way Ahead”, published as an article in the April 1991 issue of Proceedings magazine. It was signed by the Secretary of the Navy Garrett, CNO Kelso, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred Gray. Therefore, it provided overarching bureaucratic and intellectual clout without fully discarding “The Maritime Strategy” (which so many admirals still held dear) in the process. Hedging against a resurgent Soviet Union remained an objective because it was unclear what the next steps for Moscow’s decaying empire would look like. Despite the momentous geopolitical shift of 1989-1991, neither CNO Trost nor CNO Kelso asked for a formal replacement of “The Maritime Strategy”.

“The Way Ahead” identified three overriding challenges for the Navy Department. These were the identification of efficiencies and the cost-effectiveness of the industrial base, the force size (in light of a foreseeable adverse fiscal situation), and the shape and size of the twenty-first century Navy (Garrett/Kelso/Gray 1991, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 24-26).

291 This paragraph is based on John Hattendorf’s lucid description of the process (2006: 7-11).
Navy leaders at the time were indifferent to a really comprehensive new maritime strategy, whereas mid-level naval strategists – strategically-thinking staff officers with tours in the OP-603 branch and experience in the fleet – saw the need for an ambitious post-Cold War document almost immediately (Haynes 2013: 76). To Kelso, cost-effectiveness was more desirable than a grand-strategic marching direction for the Navy. For this reason the CNO lobbied heavily on the publication of “The Navy Policy Book”, a 1992 medium length internal U.S. Navy booklet whose audience was the officer corps and the enlisted ranks of the Navy. Kelso saw it as a complementary work to “The Way Ahead” and “The Maritime Strategy” (which was officially shelved). With the trio of publications as an intellectual foundation, Kelso sought to implement business-world inspired “Total Quality Leadership” principles in the Navy. Published shortly before the 1992 Presidential election but three years into the post-Cold War world, the “Navy Policy Book” (reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 39-86) was drafted in the CNO’s office (Captain James Stark) and received input from the Navy’s strategic branch, OP-603 (Captain Dick Diamond). In response to a number of bad press issues for the Navy – catastrophic technology failures, bribery, and sexual assault scandals mentioned previously – it focused heavily on the Navy as an organization, its values, traditions, and heritage. As a guideline policy document, it sought to explain the Navy – to the Navy. Its en passant mentioning of the USMC and the clear lack of an ambitious way-means-ends correlation contributed to its limited influence and, consequently, it was never updated or repeated. It was soon overshadowed by the course of events: Secretary of the Navy Garret left office just one month after the publication of “The Navy Policy Book”. In November 1992, four months after its printing, a new capstone document was presented, one that would have considerably more lasting influence.

b) Strategic Concept

“The Way Ahead”, as noted above, drew on some catalyst ideas and themes discussed in an informal D.C.-based Navy study group in 1990. Their ideas included the Navy-Marine Corps’ understanding of itself as an enabler for follow-on operations and a decisive crisis response capability by its inherent forward presence and expeditionary nature. It also discarded one of Mahan’s most sacred principles in that it postulated that the U.S. Navy’s future was seen in supporting the land battle, not exclusively the conduct of war at sea (although ASW and AAW were to be maintained to shield against future capable sea-going adversaries) (Hattendorf 2006: 9, Haynes 2013: 76-77). Those concerns were motivated principally by the U.S. experience of the Gulf War, notwithstanding that the Navy was left somewhat marginalized in the actual fight. The Navy’s ideas continued to be groomed by these staff and flag of-
ficers, who tested them for various audiences in the greater politico-military community until they were ready for prime time. The Base Force study call for of 450 Navy ships served as the definite bottom line for the Navy’s deliberations. The Base Force designed U.S. military objectives along four principles: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstruction. The Navy heavily focused on the first three aspects. “The Way Ahead” called for sea-based strategic forces for deterrence of a nuclear attack, coordinated surge forces designed to react rapidly to any crisis, coordinated forward-deployed expeditionary forces with comprehensive logistic, medical, and repair support, and a sea-based maritime prepositioned force (reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 30). It also emphasized humanitarian assistance, nationbuilding, security assistance, peacekeeping, counter-narcotic/ -terrorism/ –insurgency operations, and crisis response (Swartz 2012a: 14, slide 27).

Sea control, a longstanding and well-established naval mission, was only mentioned in passing. This reflected a Navy sentiment that its control of the sea, at least on the high seas, would be uncontested in the near- and mid-term. Amid criticism of its lack of priorities and the perception that the Navy’s ideas were not radical enough, “The Way Ahead” by all accounts had negligible influence and impact (not least because the Air Force and the Army came out of the Gulf War with considerably higher morale and sense of achievement, pushing over the Navy’s initially optimistic post-Cold War standpoint of attaining more influence and budget share).

“The Navy Policy Book” was aimed at an internal Navy audience. It focused on “policy”, not “strategy” or “strategic concepts”. It vaguely discussed naval missions but did little to connect the dots. In addition, it failed to address such crucial issues as the nature of U.S. enemies, the role of naval force in the broader maritime arena (e.g., with the Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the merchant marine), and to provide a link to force-level planning, programming, and budgeting (Swartz 2012a: 28, slide 55).

9.4.2 …From the Sea (1992)

a) Evolution

“…From the Sea” was the work of subsequent working groups, using a standardized OP-603 strategy brief as a basis for continuous refinement between October 1991 and March 1992.

Swartz notes that “‘The Way Ahead’ was ‘way ahead’ of its time. [It was] A vision for the early 2000s, but not for the 1990s” (Swartz 2012a: 19).

The name is a clear attempt to provide something that would stick and be marketable and the three dots and the capital ‘F’ are a deliberate play on readers’ expectations. The initial product was designed to have different titles such as “Power from the Sea”, “Diplomacy from the Sea”, or “Engagement from the Sea”. Based on suggestions of Admiral Kendall Pease, it also included warfare areas from the sea (“Naval aviation… from the Sea”, “Amphibious warfare… from the Sea”, “Submarine warfare… from the Sea”) (Scott Truver interview 2012, 00:53:11-00:53:50). According to Admiral Smith, it was him who realized one morning at breakfast upon glanc-
With the memories of the Gulf War fresh on their minds, the Center for Naval Analyses hosted a project called Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE). The NFCPE brought seasoned naval officers together with civilian academics, Congressional staffers, and people from the think tank community. The group’s goal was to exert upward pressure. It sought to position the Navy and the Marine Corps in national strategic plans and provide long-range perspective for mid- and long-term national security threats. Using a historical interval case study, the participants assessed the future environment and the Navy’s role in it. The group utilized what became known as the “Manthorpe Curve,” a graph briefed by Captain William H.J. Manthorpe. He had determined that historically, the period between the end of one global hegemonic power and the rise of another was roughly twenty years. In other words, the next one would materialize around 2011, and if it were not a resurgent Soviet Union, it would be a Eurasian power, or a coalition of states. Independent of that cycle, there was a second dynamic connected to a continuous, low level of conflict (i.e., limited wars) that drew in larger powers. Extrapolating from the wars in Korea (1950-1953), Vietnam (1965-1975), and the Gulf War (1990-1991), Manthorpe calculated that crisis interval to be fifteen years. That gave the U.S. roughly until 2005. The study concluded that the U.S. had some time until the next global threat emerged. For the time being, it was at liberty to concentrate on the rest-of-the-world threats (Haynes 2013: 98).

How these challenges were to be addressed remained more controversial. Warfare area specialists brought forward different arguments, underlining their respective platform or operating area’s particular relevance. Analysis of past Navy/Marine Corps crisis response had shown even in a volatile, Cold War bipolar environment, American sea power had overwhelmingly been applied to counter land-based threats, not fight the decisive battle at sea. This was surprising even to seasoned naval officers, given that “The Maritime Strategy” had focused extensively on the global at-sea struggle against the Soviet Union. For their work, the authors from the NFCPE utilized that revelation. It was relatively safe to assume that the trend for sea power to influence events ashore, driven by geopolitical developments and policy decisions in Washington, D.C., was likely to continue and even deepen. In consensus, it was thus argued that regional wars and the related instability they conveyed, but not great-power competition was the most pressing problem for the United States.

(Stillingwell, Leighton W. Smith interview #9, 13 March 2006: 644)

For a list of participants of the NFCPE, see Hattendorf (2006: 88, footnote *).
In the course of spring and summer 1992, “…From the Sea” was further sharpened by extensive, multi-personality re-writing iterations to turn it from an internal paper into a publication and, according to Vice Admiral Leighton Smith, to make sure that people on the Hill understood it (Stillwell 2006). The drafts were unclassified and designated “For official use only” (FOUO) to broaden the eventual audience as much as possible. Thus, it was thus not only an internal paper for the Navy, but largely an attempt also to gain national political attention in the White House and traction on Capitol Hill. Contributors included flag and staff officers as well as outside contractors, but the recurring themes of forward presence and power projection remained. With the new Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe as a co-signer, “…From the Sea” was pushed out in the November 1992 issue of Proceedings magazine and the Marine Corps’ counterpart, the Marine Corps Gazette (Kelso/O’Keefe/Mundy 1992, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 87-99). The Navy and the Marine Corps sought to present themselves as having had understood and principally embraced the defense posture policies of the Bush administration. This would enable them to retain their services’ say for the next four years – not only in response to the changed geopolitical landscape, but also because the U.S. Air Force had recently published its own document with bumper sticker potential and significant political traction, “Global Reach, Global Power” (Department of the Air Force 1990). The content of the “…From the Sea” had been distributed previously as a press release. It is remarkable how timely the publication was, given the Presidential election of the same month. However, it was clearly driven by the need to get at least something out by election day. The results of the vote sent the Republican administration out and put a Democratic administration in. Consequently, the naval services made sure that unsigned copies of “…From the Sea” were circulated after Clinton’s inauguration (Swartz 2012a: 32, slide 63). The Navy wanted the publication to grab people’s attention just like the Air Force’s pamphlet had done. Thus it needed to be presented in an attractive (although somewhat budget-consuming) format. The January 1993 version, the third and final iteration of “…From the Sea”, reiterated the themes of

295 Scott Truver noted that he came on as an outside contractor overseeing draft 19B, seeing it through draft 65C (Interview 2012, 00:39:30 – 00:40:40). Admiral Smith’s quotation stems from that discussion.

296 The signature of Bush’s political appointee O’Keefe would not have helped. In fact, it would have conveyed a politicized impression to the incoming defense and national security staff. One of the contractors tasked with finishing the draft aptly called that process the act of “de-Bushifying” the document. The job after the election was to find out what Clinton had said about the Navy, a task that yielded little substantive results. As a candidate, Clinton had only made two speeches with Navy relevance, one in Charleston (South Carolina) and one in Groton (Connecticut) (Scott Truver interview 2012: 00:44:15 – 00:45:05).

297 Truver recalls that the Navy was not pleased by the initial appearance of the publication. The version that had been sent out on 30 September 1992 was not proof-read very closely, and software issues complicated the format. A reworked produced a second version dated 15 October, which was sent up the chain of command to approve it. The signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC were obtained by copy & paste from an earlier version (Truver interview 2012, 00:41:45 – 00:44:10).
the original drafts. The Navy now had a white paper with glossy pictures and illustrations that positioned it in the policy community. Although the selection of illustrations conveys the impression that the Navy consisted of surface and naval aviation mostly (submarine images do not appear until well into the brochure), “…From the Sea” tracked. It remained the Navy’s primary post-Cold War strategic and comprehensive approach for the rest of the decade.\(^{298}\)

\(^{298}\)In his official portrait painting on display at the Pentagon, Secretary of the Navy O’Keefe – whose tenure was cut short to just a few months by the change from the Republican to the Democrat administration – is seen carrying the “…From the Sea” magazine, thus illustrating and embracing the document’s thrust and scope.

\(b\) Strategic Concept

The working group that drafted “…From the Sea” emphasized the value of command of the sea (absent a peer-competitor, the broader ‘command of the sea’ became popular again, often used in conjunction with the narrower ‘sea control’). Earlier drafts of the paper (based on the output of projects like the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort, the cradle of “…From the Sea”) acknowledged command of the sea as the indivisible basis for protection of U.S. citizens and territory. Forward, sea-based operations to guard U.S. interests and promote commitment abroad were emphasized. Additionally, command of the sea was described as the basis for deterrence, power projection, and crisis response. All of these were long-standing constants in the U.S. Navy’s mission mindset. This effort energized the Navy’s thinking. Instead of reactively describing what the Navy would do different from the Air Force or the Army, the authors of “… From the Sea” sought to lay out the broad and flexible capabilities of the Navy. This narrative related naval purpose to warfighting as well as to broader American diplomatic and economic interests. Although naval force structure is primarily structured for war, the group asserted, holding and using command of the sea could very well influence events ashore at any time. The authors concluded that naval forces must, therefore, conduct geographically forward-deployed operations and focus increasingly on the coast and littoral areas instead of the high seas (Hattendorf 2006: 97).

While global sea control did not seem to be an issue for the Navy anymore, local and regional sea control in confined and shallow waters (straits, canals, or the littoral regions) were elevated to higher strategic importance. Consequently, “…From the Sea” focused on strike and power projection (underlining for example the use of the Tomahawk missile for surface and land attack). It deemphasized ASW and blue-water engagements, which primarily served winning and exercising sea control against peer enemy forces (ibid: 14).
Still, the final version of “...From the Sea” contained no less than six maritime capabilities: powerful presence, strategic deterrence, sea control, extended crisis response, power projection from the sea, and provision of sealift. It later cited four traditional operational means (forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift) to which it affixed another four required key operational capabilities (command, control, and surveillance, battle space dominance, power projection, and force sustainment) (Swartz 2012a: 45-46, slides 90-92). “...From the Sea” did not mention a particular country as a specific threat, but the context of its publication showed clearly that the Gulf War was seen as a template for future operations in that theater. It clearly raised the role of the Marine Corps to co-equality with the Navy, something that critics dismissed the undue influence of the USMC. To them, traditional and more comprehensive naval tasks on the high seas were unjustifiably overshadowed by the (smaller) effect-ashore faction. Additionally, the fact that sea control seemed to be taken for granted raised some eyebrows (ibid: 52, slides 103-104). Admittedly, the document displayed a much broader focus on political viability in Washington than on operational salience. When Clinton came into office, forward presence and peacetime crisis response in “...From the Sea” were deemphasized. They were considered to lack traction with the new decision-makers in the White House and on Capitol Hill. In essence, they were costly diversions from what the incoming administration perceived as a need to field a downsized, a less aggressive, and less ambitious American military posture worldwide. To the Navy, “...From the Sea” offered a sharpening of its outlook on the world. To policy-makers, the strategic concepts offered aspects that tracked with their general outlook on the world.

9.4.3 Naval Warfare (NDP1) (1994)

a) Evolution

Among the tasks proposed by “...From the Sea”, the restructuring of the Navy to carry out the new strategy was a high priority. This included the establishment of a new Naval Doctrine Command (NAVDOCCOM) in Norfolk (Virginia), home to the Navy’s largest fleet installations (and one of the largest naval bases worldwide). To support the concepts laid out in “...From the Sea”, the new command rolled out its first in a series of publications in 1994.299 NDP1 “Naval Warfare” attempted to provide a guideline account of official operational Navy behavior. It also responded to the prevalent “jointness and joint doctrinal frenzy” (Swartz 2012a: 63), a consequential event that undermined the other five volumes, the Naval Doctrine Command’s status, and the expectation that the Navy could develop coherent doctrine (Haynes 2013: 158).

299 The following other doctrinal publications were released: NDP2 Naval Intelligence, NDP4 Naval Logistics, NDP5 Naval Planning, and NDP6 Naval Command & Control. NDP 3 Naval Operations was never published over disagreements regarding command relationships between Navy and Marine Corps (Swartz 2012a: 63), a consequential event that undermined the other five volumes, the Naval Doctrine Command’s status, and the expectation that the Navy could develop coherent doctrine (Haynes 2013: 158).
2012a: 59, slide 117) amidst the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. With NDP1, the Navy sought to find a vehicle to explain itself and what it did to other services where doctrine (and the appreciation for doctrine) constituted elementary parts of the strategic culture. Therefore, NDP 1 used a format similar to that of the joint publications. This displayed that the Navy really wanted to arrive at a more coherent and joint articulation. It also conveyed that it understood the diction and the dynamics of the modern military. This capstone document during the tenure of CNO Frank Kelso was entirely drafted and published at NAVDOCCOM. This was a deliberately far cry from the bureaucratic power politics in the Pentagon and in Washington. Additionally, NDP1 did not seek outside contractors as advisors and it forfeited early-on participation of the Naval War College in the process. However, the Navy’s general uneasiness with written doctrine and how the publication was written contributed to its limited traction within the service. NDP1 also illustrated, as much as how the preceding three capstone documents did, Kelso’s limited strategic aspiration. In the face of General Powell’s accumulated power as CJCS, Admiral Kelso did not think he was responsible for much more than equipping, training, and organizing the force.

Admiral Kelso’s perspective was that his job, like that of OPNAV, was to focus on the means. The White House, OSD, and now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined the ends. The CINCs and their naval component commanders determined the ways. In the CNO’s view, strategy – the relating and orchestration of ways, means, and political ends – was someone else’s job (Haynes 2013: 87). Navy strategy by default did not work. Kelso departed office in April 1994 (shortly after NDP1 was issued). His successor as CNO was Jeremy Boorda, the first surface warfare officer in that position in 20 years.

b) Strategic Concept

NDP 1 was the fourth (and final) capstone document signed by CNO Kelso. The Navy’s somewhat uneasy relationship with doctrine (in contrast to other branches of the military), the problematic relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps, and the eventually incomplete roster of publications notwithstanding, NDP1 laid out naval objectives along the broad lines of maneuver over attrition warfare. It used historical examples from naval history to convey its key ideas and “its purpose was to explain the inherent nature of the enduring principles of naval force and to translate the vision and strategy of ‘…From the Sea’ into doctrinal reality” (Hattendorf 2006: 101). In citing Admiral Turner’s four missions of 1974 (sea control, projection of power ashore, naval presence, and strategic deterrence), NDP1 subsumed
established roles of naval forces and also spoke to general principles of war. Those were not new by any means; they were simply restated as the underlying objectives that naval warfare needed to keep in mind. More importantly, NDP1 listed a number of principles and mission-sets that previously had not been featured as prominently, including naval operations other than war. As such, NDP1 had some potential, but it was too broad in scope and widely seen as a product that let nowhere. To its critics, it was a diluted, goalless paper that emitted from a command down in Norfolk, not in Washington. It did not seem to be informed by any measurable input from major makers and shapers of American seapower, and NDP1 was eventually eclipsed by rival documents, “…From the Sea” (1992) and “Forward …From the Sea” (1994).

9.4.4  Forward…From the Sea (1994)

a) Evolution

Prior to being nominated as CNO, Boorda served as Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe and as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. In that capacity, he had commanded all NATO forces engaged in the Adriatic Sea. He was a naval officer uniquely experienced in conducting the real-world U.S. naval operations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Just months after Boorda’s ascension to the Navy’s highest billet, the December 1994 edition of Proceedings featured “Forward… From the Sea” (Boorda/Dalton/Mundy 1994, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 149-158). This strategic concept article had already appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette two months earlier and was published as a stand-alone 12-page booklet as well. “Forward…From the Sea” originated in N513, the Strategy and Concepts Branch of the Navy Department. It was signed by the CNO, CMC General Mundy, and Secretary of the Navy Dalton. “…From the Sea” was not outdated, but the Navy looked to utilize the momentum brought about by the change in the White House and picking up on the surprisingly good reception of “…From the Sea”. This indicates the higher political intent of “Forward…From the Sea”. In addition to serving as a yardstick of the incoming CNO, the document provided a testimonial of naval strategic thinking to the new (Clinton-administration) Secretary of Defense Perry and Secretary of the Navy Dalton. “Forward…From the Sea” included the conduct of contingency operations, noncombatant evacuation, combat of terrorism, aid to host nations through security assistance and foreign internal defense, assistance of other nations’ defenses, enforcement of U.N. sanctions, participation in peace-support operations, interdiction of vessels engaged in illegal migration, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, civil support operations, coordination of public health operations, and counter-drug operations (Hattendorf 2006: 115-116).
ward...From the Sea” was, therefore, designed to enable a Democratic imprint on a previous, Republican-signed strategy.  

As previously discussed, the Clinton administration had conducted the “Bottom-Up Review” of the Defense Department in 1993 and the President published his “National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” in 1994. The military services needed to align with these documents and reflect the overarching demands. In particular, the Navy sought to link force structure changes (the 1993 review) to forward presence demands (the 1994 NSS). The service wanted to demonstrate that it understood force structure consequences and policy demands of the new era. With “Forward...From the Sea”, Navy planners attempted to deliver. Nevertheless, in retrospect, the document was more of a political response than a larger strategy. “Forward... From the Sea” aimed to utilize the momentum of the “Bottom-Up Review” and to secure the Navy’s force structure, unmindful of the Marine Corps’ demands. “Forward... From the Sea” was not aligned with the presidential or Joint Staff planning cycles which hampered the work because the Navy could not reasonably predict what the Joint Staff might prioritize in the next go-around. Worse yet, the Navy believed it had now dealt sufficiently with proving its relevance to the political leadership. Consequently, strategy-making moved toward the bottom of the Navy’s priorities list. Instead, a focus on new platforms and keeping an otherwise low profile characterized Navy behavior for the remainder of the decade.

With five genuinely Navy-only capstone documents in just four years (not counting related documents and aborted efforts), the Navy had been incredibly busy continuously portraying itself to the post-Cold War senior political leadership. To the defense establishment and the bureaucracy – the Joint Staff, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense – as well as the public and on Capitol Hill, this amounted to the equivalent of a capstone document feeding frenzy. The Navy was increasingly blindsided by the jointness crowds. It was difficult and downright foolish to justify ad-hoc single-service thinking and planning in the increasingly joint, coordinated, and integrated force. In the future, a closer alignment to the overarching documents and planning cycles and a more formalized process inside OPNAV would be needed for the Navy’s strategic planning. For a service proud of its uniqueness and

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302 Haynes (2013: 136) concedes that “(Secretary of the Navy, S.B.) Dalton’s problem was straightforward” and citing Dalton’s speechwriter, then-Lieutenant Commander Sam Tangredi, “Critics would say that ‘Forward...From the Sea’ was really no different than ‘...From the Sea’ (except emphasizing forward presence). They were right. It was not meant to be different, it was meant to be signed.”

303 As previously mentioned, the “Bottom-Up Review” replaced the “Base Force” concept of the Bush years which had outlined a future military that would wage two simultaneous regional conflicts at once. The “Bottom-Up Review” saw the military engaged in two nearly simultaneous conflicts.
whose strategic culture was deeply rooted in the past, this promised to be a monumental challenge.\footnote{The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) signaled another demand of a new way of thinking for the Navy and the other services. The mutual relationship between technology in military affairs and the means to apply it for warfare – or in other words, compelling doctrine – has been subject to increasing interest in the literature. Innovation in peacetime offers unique challenges and opportunities for military breakthroughs that are likely to take some time (Rosen 1994). Historically, navies have often been less enthusiastic about adopting paradigm shifts in military technology that changed doctrine and organization of land warfare. This is rooted in their unique strategic culture and the established missions that were long considered unchanged and uninhibited by the latest fashion of armies (and later air forces). An exception to that observation is the advent of nuclear propulsion and the nuclear bomb, which from the 1940s for the first time gave the Navy the ability to strike the adversary’s center of gravity and thus decide global war (Tritten 1995: 130). Parsed to enhance military effectiveness, the RMA was about embracing technologies of the information age and implanting them into the heart of joint doctrine. In other words, advanced technology was supposed to shape doctrine. The RMA’s objective was to allow a smaller, but highly effective high-tech military to enable swift and decisive victory on the battlefield with comparatively few casualties. In general, the U.S. military in the 1990s experienced a bent towards reductionist warfare theories, jointness, and RMA. These big ideas drove defense thinking in the 1990s (Sloan 2002, Fitschen 2007). Inevitably, their advancement soon became an end in itself (Haynes 2013: 151-152).}

Even here, the Air Force and Army strategic cultures and operational validations provided the Navy with headwind. The Gulf War had seemingly validated the Army’s AirLand Battle concept and the Air Force’s strategic bombing doctrines. In addition, both services’ institutional influence (Army general Shalikashvili was a vocal Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) were overwhelmingly influential in the constitution of joint doctrine. Whether the Navy liked it or not, the forces of the time worked against the Navy, and the Navy in turn was unable to free itself and think more conceptually about its role in national defense. The overall dismal strategic state of play of the Navy affected the service’s standing, morale, and momentum.

\textit{b) Strategic Concept}

“Forward…From the Sea” restructured and expanded the strategic concepts of “…From the Sea”. It postulated power projection from sea on land, sea control, maritime supremacy, strategic sealift, and strategic deterrence as key enduring naval roles. That echoed the mission sets that Admiral Stansfield Turner postulated in the 1970s (and that John Lehman and others in the 1980s reiterated). “Forward…From the Sea” then added another enduring and fundamental function: naval presence. This notion of being-on-scene globally complemented the emphasis on regional threats. Its organizing construct, in a clear nod to “The Maritime Strategy” absent in most other post-Cold War Navy capstone documents, emphasized the continuum nature of forward operations. These ranged from peacetime presence to crisis response to regional conflict (with a merely academic distinction between the phases, not necessarily an operational or even strategic one). Forward-deployed (permanent or rotating) naval forces were hailed as a well-suited instrument of U.S. foreign policy to buttress American grand and military strategy.
Recognizing this relationship, which had been implied by the Clinton administration, was a central enabler for the Navy’s narrative to unfold. “Forward…From the Sea” also embraced jointness and combined operations. The political objective was an emphasis on conflict prevention rather than on contingency fighting, which the Navy said it would certainly also do. These presence requirements would have consequences for Navy force structure that needed to be addressed. It was simply not enough to rely on stand-off strike capabilities such as the Tomahawk missile alone. Instead, by implication the Navy wanted and needed a balanced fleet that featured both (and more of), high-end and low-end capabilities. Such a force mix could in turn only by exploited if the Navy actually was forward-deployed. Presence fulfilled the regional commanders’ requirements and provided a reason for the large fleet (due to the dynamics involved, it usually takes three vessels to keep one forward-stationed or forward deployed). The service realized that there was an opportunity in the Bottom-Up Review that needed to be transformed into a development that benefited the Navy. Nevertheless, “Forward… From the Sea” differed from “From the Sea” in several respects. It had a global perspective, not a regional, littoral, tactical, or overly expeditionary focus like its predecessor (Department of the Navy 1994). Terms such as “broad oceans”, “transoceanic”, and “highways of the seas” conveyed a global perspective that had been absent in “…From the Sea” (Haynes 2013: 140).

Unfortunately for the Navy, what began as an attempt to flesh out some concepts and improve “…From the Sea”, had a contrary effect. “Forward… From the Sea” clouded many of the achievements that “…From the Sea” already had provided. As Captain (ret.) Joe Bouchard recalls,

“‘…From the Sea’ was a very important document. They got it right. It really had significant impact on the Navy. Significant change in direction. ‘Forward… From the Sea’ was a waste of time – there was nothing new in it. And in fact, it was regressive. It eliminated some of the bold thought that ‘…From the Sea’ showed and tried to do more to preserve the Navy’s classic way of operating – in that sense, it went backward.” (Interview 2012, 00:59:30 – 01:00:30)

At the same time, the Navy opened itself up to criticism from Congress and its sister services. In particular, ‘presence’ was attacked. Its diplomatic and military effects were hard to quantify, and naval forces, so the critics argued, were designed, sized, and budgeted for war-fighting requirements, not peacetime engagement. It looked too much like the Navy’s Cold War way of doing business with others. Some cautioned that the Navy would be first in line for force-

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305 A combined operation is an operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for a single mission (Oxford 2002: 91).
level cuts if politics mandated a scaling-back of presence missions, whereas others noted regional challengers fielding anti-access and area-denial capabilities (such as sewing mines and maintaining capable diesel-electric submarines) could very well inhibit forward U.S. Navy presence. The Navy’s label “combat-credible forward presence” challenged some strategic convictions of the other military services. The Air Force considered its firepower more robust than that of the Navy. The Army hailed boots on the ground as the probable tool of influence. The Marine Corps could easily misinterpret the strong Navy role in the “Forward…From the Sea” capstone document as a step back from “…From the Sea,” although former deliberately stressed its connection to the latter. This infighting underscored that the military services battled continuously for resources and national attention. In addition, the warfare unions themselves were individually attempting to reverse the downsizing since the end of the Cold War, with the submariners arguing for more boats, the naval aviators for air wings for 15 carriers, and the surface warfare community producing a landing zone of 360-380 surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates). This beauty contest hardly served the overall goal of the Navy as a whole to do better in the budgetary processes. Consequently, the impact of such wish lists remained minimal at best.

9.4.5 Navy Operational Concept (1997)

a) Evolution

The Navy Operational Concept (Chief of Naval Information 1997, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 159-170) was published as a consequence of the Navy and the Marine Corps’ inability to overcome their operational differences. These substantial frictions (rooted in the Corps’ strategic culture and its perception of “Forward… From the Sea”) came to a head in the mid-1990s when a new concept (intended to operationalize “Forward…From the Sea”) was developed. The first such attempts in 1995/1996 proposed a Navy-Marine Corps Naval Operations Concept (naval = Navy and Marine Corps). It was intended to serve as a connector between the “…From the Sea” and “Forward…From the Sea” capstone documents, providing methodology and a modus operandi that the NDP series fed into. Ferocious struggles between competing commands and individuals led the Navy, which sought to emphasis its blue-water, high-seas capabilities much to the Corps’ disdain, to the abortion of this common plan in the course of 1996. In parallel, the CNO Executive Panel (N00K) headed by Captain Ed Smith drafted another white paper with the name “2020 Vision”, a companion piece for a “Navy
Long Range Planning Objectives” memorandum that was due to be signed later in 1996 (Haynes 2013: 162-166).306

When Admiral Jeremy Boorda took his own life in May 1996 amidst public allegations over his display of two Vietnam War service medals, these efforts came to a halt.

Admiral Jay Johnson, Boorda’s successor as CNO, struck a markedly calmer note during his tenure. He discarded his predecessor’s two draft strategic planning documents.307 His unenthusiastic indifference to the arsenal ship scuttled that particular idea as well. Johnson, “who was not a visionary or an innovator” (ibid. 177), instructed N513 (OPNAV’s Strategy and Concepts branch) under Commander Joe Bouchard to start over and draft a Navy-only operational concept. It was designed to provide guidance for programmers in OPNAV’s N8 branch, support training, and help with tactics, techniques, and procedures. Working together with Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski of the Space, Information Warfare, and Command and Control (N6) branch, the term ‘network-centric warfare’ was introduced into the discourse. A single-service Navy (not naval) Operational Concept was the result. It was not intended as a replacement for “Forward…From the Sea”, but rather as a complementary document. It was rolled out in January 1997, signed by Admiral Johnson, and distributed via e-mail, the internet, and later in Sea Power, the professional magazine of the Navy League (a civilian, non-profit military organization). Reflecting the general sentiment toward and the particular style of the document, its lead author concedes that, “It was less ambitious, but it worked” in providing a conceptual, programmatic underpinning for the Navy’s range of activities (Bouchard interview 2012, 01:13:40 – 01:13:45).

b) Strategic Concept

The Navy Operational Concept recognized that “…From the Sea” and “Forward…From the Sea” continued to drive the U.S. Navy’s destiny. In limiting its own level of ambition (and scope), the document merely pointed out that naval force could have a decisive role in small-scale contingencies and could be integral to bigger joint campaigns. In addition, the concept underscored that the Navy also saw a role in post-conflict situations as well, e.g., to secure

306 “2020 Vision” translated Admiral Boorda’s idea of an arsenal ship (yet to be designed and developed) into practice. The arsenal ship would have provided a massive barrage of sea-launched precision strikes against enemy command and control infrastructure and other targets. With it, the Navy would have again emphasized a shift in its focus from the littoral to a more regionally dispersed, blue-water approach (see Scott 1996, Federation of American Scientists 1999).

307 According to Scott Truver, the “2020 Vision” did make its way on Johnson’s desk eventually – through a backdoor. The draft was reworked slightly and incorporated into the annual Navy program guide “Vision, Presence, Power” (formerly “Force 2001”) as the chapter on strategy and policy: “In effect, Johnson signed out Boorda’s ‘Vision 2020’ [sic] and didn’t know it.” (Truver interview 2012, 01:00:55 – 01:02:30)
withdrawal of troops or to control sanctions regimes. The Navy Operational Concept presented two interconnected ideas. Naval operational maneuver (an idea lobbied by Captain Boucharp) and speed of command (Vice Admiral Cebrowski’s brainchild). Both were to invigorate network-centric warfare (a doctrine that translates information advantage provided by superior technology into an operational advantage on the battlefield). This required investments in advanced weapons, sensors, and platforms, and a naval force large enough and equipped to cater to the demands on the whole six-phase spectrum of conflict. The paper was notably silent of naval missions. As an operational document, it deliberately shied away from even discussion the larger strategic effects of naval force.

9.4.6 Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

a) Evolution

Just six months after the doctrinal publication, 1997 saw the second of three capstone documents produced under CNO Johnson. But in the meantime, two key policy documents had been interposed. The first congressionally-mandated QDR and an updated NMS were released in May of that year. On “Anytime, Anywhere”, which appeared in the November issue of Proceedings magazine (Johnson 1997, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 171-176), the CNO Executive Panel staff (N00K) (specifically Captain Ed Smith and Captain Robby Harris) took the helm in drafting the document. The ad-hoc working group undertook an effort to move the Navy’s focus away from over-emphasizing presence, and therefore stressed kinetic and war-fighting measures. This was especially crucial against the backdrop of the QDR’s stated goal of a U.S. Navy force-level goal of between 305 and 310 ships. With ever-declining budgets and single-digit procurement rates for new Navy ships per year, the service needed to underline its capabilities on the higher end of the conflict spectrum in order to rationalize itself to Congress and the American people. However, the short four-page statement did not gain much traction, mostly because it did not align itself very well with a national defense policy that increasingly emphasized non-military approaches. The self-proclaimed decisive role for U.S. naval forces in conflict was not validated in later campaigns such as the Kosovo War (1999). In essence, its “catchy title had more influence than [its] content” (Swartz 2012a: 131, slide 262).

b) Strategic Concept

“Anytime, Anywhere” showed remarkable continuity with its predecessors “…From the Sea”, “Forward…From the Sea”, and the “Navy Operations Concept”. “Anytime, Anywhere” focused on deterring conflict and shaping the conflict environment. It attempted to bolster the
Navy’s role with a focus on more sizeable missions. Instead of concentrating too heavily on presence, the paper emphasized power projection, sea control, and war-fighting as the service’s chief strategic and contributions to political ends. These were traditional Navy missions, principally again echoing Admiral Turner’s position. Littoral warfare, deterrence, the enabling capability of naval forces, sealift, and the Marine Corps were only mentioned in passing.

This reflected the drifting apart of the Marine Corps’ and the Navy’s strategic approaches and operational realities. The Marine Corps was increasingly busy in the 1990s (three times the number of deployments than in the Cold War), with a range of messy operations across the low- and mid-intensity spectrum of conflict. Concurrently, the Marine Corps developed what became known as the “three-block war” description for the demands of modern conflict. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), the modern soldier needed to be trained and equipped to sequentially and even simultaneously conduct war-fighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations, all within the range of three city blocks. This recognition was not simply a metaphor; it reflected the Marine Corps’ operational experiences of the previous decade. The Marines embraced these new challenges and the realities of the 1990s settled in the minds of the USMC planners. At the same time, the Navy— with “Anytime, Anywhere”— conceptually went back to the 1970s. While this was a markedly different approach in comparison to the Marines, the Navy also positioned itself against the Air Force and the redeeming promises of the Revolution in Military Affairs (Haynes 2013: 188).

9.4.7 Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999/2000)

a) Evolution

The final set of documents for Admiral Johnson’s tenure as CNO, and the last for the remainder of the decade, came out in 1999 and 2000. The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) documents were a set of two rather voluminous publications (the 1999 document had 55 pages, the 2000 one had 90). Both papers were drafted in OPNAV N51 under Rear Admiral Joseph Sestak, who had already been deeply involved in “Forward…From the Sea”. He

308 General (USMC) Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1995 to 1999, introduced the “Three Block War” concept in an essay for the January 1999 issue of Marines Magazine. In conjunction with describing the realities which Marines faced, Krulak argued that leadership had to be organized lower and lower in the chain of command in order to better reflect the demands of a complex operational environment. Ultimately, the responsibility would land on the corporal, the lowest-ranking non-commissioned officer, whose leadership decisions would bestow upon him a strategic function, thus creating the notion of the “Strategic Corporal” (Krulak 1999).

309 The NSPG 1999 was classified due to its substantial intelligence section, making it the only secret Navy declaratory capstone document of the decade. The NSPG 2000 (Chief of Naval Information 2000, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 177-266) was unclassified to facilitate a broader discussion at home and abroad.
and his staff utilized several earlier, aborted naval strategy drafts circulating in OPNAV. The NSPG represented the attempt for a continuous, cyclical update that was attuned to geostrategic and world environment changes, joint planning, and the QDR (the next of which was scheduled for 2001). In addition, it was intended as a link to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). As such, it would provide a long-term and truly strategic planning basis instead of one that simply looked to fulfill CINC demands. The 2000 version discussed the incipient process of globalization and the ascent of regional challengers to U.S. security and maritime access to key regions of the world. In keeping with the Manthorpe curve, it did not foresee that a peer competitor would arise until 2020. Until then, the fleet was to hedge against land-based rogue actors and their militaries. The NSPG 2000 underlined the Navy’s purpose to be maritime power projection. It proceeded to explain a means-ways-ends causality for the use of naval force. Significantly, it also proposed an innovative institutional process addressing long-term strategic planning objectives, thus making true strategic planning worthy of its name and a customary habit. The new format and the new vocabulary ceased to exist after the second go-around, although it was planned to be published annually. It was another failure to institutionalize a format, and the long document lacked traction with the Secretary of the Navy. Additionally, key figures in OPNAV and the CNO would soon move on from their respective postings. Admiral Vern Clark, a surface warfare officer, became the new CNO in July 2000 and immediately introduced new priorities. That year, a Presidential election year, it was particularly uncertain what the next four years would look like.

b) Strategic Concept

The “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” documents were framed by Clinton National Security doctrine regarding selective U.S. military engagement (The White House 1999) and the anticipation of a new administration after the upcoming November 2000 general election. In addition, the NSPG was published in the middle of the four-year cycle of the Quadrennial Defense Reviews. The QDR 1997 experiences were absorbed and the QDR 2001 was looming ahead. These factors explain why the capstone documents were largely directed at an internal audience and intended to convey that the Navy understood its place in time. At the same time, the (unclassified versions of the) NSPG 1999/2000 spent considerable time on developing a new organizational framework for the core-strategic causal relationship among ways, means, and ends. Maritime power projection became the overarching strategic imperative of naval forces. The naval means were forward presence and knowledge superiority. The ways were control of the battlespace (a newly introduced term), battlespace attack, and
battlespace sustainment. The four ends were: regional stability, deterrence, timely crisis response, and war fighting and winning (Swartz 2012a: 145, slide 290).

The documents provided a wealth of ideas that tied together established and novel missions (including homeland defense, information operations, maritime interception operations, counter-terrorism and counter-drug tasks, and humanitarian operations), identified rogue states and non-state actors as threats, made specific reference to the (rapidly evolving) process of globalization, emphasized the need for cooperation with other government and non-governmental security actors, and framed the Navy as an enabling force that focused on the littorals and beyond (ibid: 144-146, slides 287-292). The price for such an ambitious and comprehensive strategic document was its voluminous size which rendered it useless in the minds of many decision-makers. Another challenge lay in identifying the NSPG’s priorities. What were they, amidst the host of lists? The critics further asserted that the NSPG merely introduced yet another short-lived vocabulary into the debate. The NSPG also was never institutionalized and with the impending arrival of a new CNO, little momentum was generated. The established force structure left little room to accommodate the aspirations implicated in the NSPG’s wide-ranging claims. Its shortcomings were emblematic of many 1990s Navy capstone documents in its limited sustainability and its sense of disorientation.

For an overview of the sea-strategic missions – or core capabilities – that these documents declared, the following table is provided. It lists the strategies and, where applicable, the missions they (in their own words) foresaw for employment of U.S. sea power to attain strategic ends.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Missions Identified</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Way Ahead</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>20 characteristics of naval operations including sea control, projection of power, naval presence, strategic deterrence (“classic 4” from ADM Turner 1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Navy Policy Book</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>20 characteristics of naval operations including sea control, projection of power, naval presence, strategic deterrence (“classic 4” from ADM Turner 1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… From the Sea</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6 capabilities (“classic 4”, crises, sealift)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Warfare (NDP1)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10 characteristics of “what we do”, including “classic 4”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward… From the Sea</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5 fundamental and enduring roles (“classic 4” and sealift)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Operational Concept</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anytime, Anywhere</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4 broad missions (“classic 4” expanded): sea and area control, power projection, presence, deterrence (sea control as the prerequisite)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Planning Guidance</td>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>10-part multilevel model, including “classic 4” missions</td>
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For comparison: “The Maritime Strategy” envisioned only three primary missions. These were sea control, power projection, and sealift (two of which were among Turner’s ‘classic 4’).

On balance, the process of writing strategy between 1989 and 2001 was not nearly as organic as the one in the previous decade. The evolution of U.S. Navy capstone documents in the 1990s resembled a number of persistent trial-and-error processes. There was a sense of continuity despite changing geostrategic circumstances, alternating presidential administrations and leadership styles, rapid technological advancements, and shifting budgetary priorities. The strategic-planning efforts were complicated by inner-Navy rifts, inter-service rivalries, public backlash at Navy scandals, and a shrinking force. Individuals and organizations worked together or separately to create ever-new documents and ideas. To policy-makers, these lacked the coherence and thrust that is crucial for political deliberations in Washington. The Navy worked increasingly hard to shed its Cold War thinking and posture, but had difficulties in keeping up with the pace of the Air Force and the Army. Both of these services were fortunate in displaying their capabilities and how they made a strategic difference during a number of crises of the 1990s, something that the Navy could not realistically claim.
9.5 Force Structure

The U.S. Navy came out of the Cold War with a large fleet of almost 600 ships and a global strategy that rested on the division of the world into distinct areas of responsibility along the lines of the world oceans. In the 1990s, jointness, integration, and new command structures increasingly subordinated Navy prerogatives. The Base Force proposal of 1990 curbed any expectations that the high count in ship numbers would be politically viable in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s break-up. The Navy, as much as the other branches of the military, would have to cut back. For the Navy, it meant reducing the fleet from 540 to 451 ships, which was the size of the fleet in 1977, and the number of carriers from 15 to 12 (Haynes 2013: 50). The floor number of the desired force was eventually reduced even further to 416 ships. The Base Force study calculated a basic need for 55-80 SSN, 12 aircraft carriers (conventional/nuclear powered), about 150 surface combatants, and 51 amphibious ships (Swartz 2012b: 37, slide 73). CNO Trost continued to advocate a large high-end fleet, stating that, “Survival […] requires advanced electronics and weapon systems and does not allow the luxury of ‘low-mix’ platforms. The ‘hi-tech,’ advanced military capability of the world’s nations is underscored by the British experience in the South Atlantic [Falklands War, in particular Royal Navy losses to Exocet missiles, S.B.] and our own in the Persian Gulf [the Exocet missile attack on Stark, S.B.]” (Trost 1990: 94)

To the Navy, the Cold War tactic of relying on the self-fulfilling prophecies of advanced technology and associated concepts was the most promising route in the budgetary process (Haynes 2013: 11). The Navy’s capstone document “…From the Sea” (1992) rested significantly on this predisposition (although the feeling was that this document did not fully justify the force that the Navy really wanted). The Bottom-Up Review (1993) was the first to state the obvious, namely, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a threat. More important (and unlike the Base Force study), the Bottom-Up Review promised unequal cuts among the services in the wake of projected defense budget savings, inflation-adjusted, of up to 40%. The Bottom-Up Review slashed the military by a third (the Base Force had cut only a quarter) and especially dug into funds and materiel for expeditionary operations at a time when the military’s overseas missions skyrocketed. The Navy was disproportionally carrying that burden.

310 At the same time, the fragmentation of the world ocean as distinctive theater(s) of war, especially the Atlantic Ocean, continued. Oceans were no longer seen as Navy theaters, but considered parts of functional and geographical commands. The world ocean was now divided among five different regional, multi-environment theater combatant commanders; the Atlantic and Indian Oceans were divided among three regional commanders; the Pacific and Arctic Ocean were still shared by two regional commanders (Swartz 2012b: 31, slides 61-62). In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command, established in 1992, obtained operational command of the Navy’s ballistic-missile submarines.
The tally of the BUR – the self-acclaimed “comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations” (Aspin 1993: iii) – recommended 346 ships, among which were just 45-55 SSN, 11 carriers (plus 1 in reserve), ~124 surface combatants, and 36 amphibious vessels (a disappointing low total in the eyes of many naval strategists). The 1997 QDR, the third major force structure review, had implicitly accepted that downsizing. The Navy provided a rationale for 50-55 SSN, 11 carriers (plus 1 in reserve), 116 surface combatants, and 36 amphibious vessels. The Navy’s force-level goal eventually tallied at 305, later adjusted to 310, ships (merely half the number of ships that Secretary Lehman and others had lobbied for just over a decade before).

Throughout the 1990s, the size of the Navy was driven by the requirement of meeting rotational needs of a 2.5 carrier presence globally – one in the Persian Gulf, one in the Western Pacific, and a half (that is, half a year in aggregate) in the Mediterranean, which signaled the changed geostrategic focus of the Navy that emerged over the post-Cold War era. The Mediterranean, absent a Soviet squadron (or any other challenger of its kind) to stir up the that body of water, rapidly lost geopolitical relevance to most strategic planners (even if the Balkan wars of the 1990s showed the utility of having strong naval forces and at least one aircraft carrier in the region to conduct crisis response). The regional war prism (North Korea, Iraq) was the prevalent metric and mandated a stronger, consistent, carrier-augmented presence in the Persian Gulf and the West Pacific. Traditionally thinking more globally than many civilian geostrategists, the Navy began to emphasize the Pacific and the Indian Ocean long before the term “Pivot to Asia” or the notion of a ‘rebalancing to Asia’ even entered public discourse. At the same time, the focus on military operations other than war (MOOTW) intensified.

311 A 2000 Department of the Navy Shipbuilding Report slightly upped those numbers, partially in preparation for the next QDR due in 2001, to 50-66 SSN, 11-15 active carriers (nuclear/conventional), 116-133 surface combatants, and 36-42 amphibious ships (Swartz 2012b: 37, slide 73).

312 For a forward-deployed, rotational force such as the U.S. Navy, for any ship that is on station, two more need to be available. A second unit returns from a deployment and is being refurbished, while a third unit parallel prepares for a deployment or undergoes major maintenance.

313 Such transitions hardly went smooth. For instance, the U.S. Navy had to bear its share of BRAC closures, as described above. The withdrawal from Subic Bay (Philippines) in 1992, the largest U.S. naval base in Asia, meant a shift of 7th Fleet activities to Guam (U.S. territory) and Japan. On the far side of the Indian Ocean, in Bahrain, base expansion and modernization to welcome the newly-established 5th Fleet ensued.

314 Evidently unmindful of Samuel Huntington’s warning (1954) that “A military service may at times, of course, perform functions unrelated to external security, such as internal policing, disaster relief, and citizenship training. These are, however, subordinate and collateral responsibilities. A military service does not exist to perform these functions; rather it performs these functions because it has already been called into existence to meet some threat to the national security.”
The following graph shows the various U.S. Navy force-level goals and the actual numbers. Again, the CRS and the NHHC use slightly different metrics to arrive at their fleet tally.

Illustration 29: USN 1990s ship levels (Swartz 2012b: 35-37, slides 70-73). The Base Force and the QDR did not postulate a single number as a force goal but rather opted for a ‘landing zone’ quantity.

The graph illustrates that force level goals, with the exception of the last couple of years in the decade, were progressively lower than the actual Navy inventory. In other words, the Navy had more ships than the political planners granted it. The following table breaks down the total numbers of the inventory.

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<td>Destroyers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>Auxiliary</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>Surface Total</td>
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<td>148</td>
<td>127</td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
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<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Active</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>318</td>
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Two distinct challenges arose for the Navy. First, it needed to balance high-end capabilities with the demand for low-intensity conflict prevention. Conceptually, the Navy moved faster into the littorals than it could field corresponding technology. Second, the Navy did not give up on the blue-water focus. Therefore, it needed to modernize its assets accordingly, also presenting an old-vs.-new dichotomy. Against the background of the RMA and shrinking, ever-finite military budgets, this spelled hard choices for the Navy.

The cost-and-manpower-intensive battleships of the Iowa-class were retired, but only some of their capabilities would be replaced by modern ships. Battle at sea, after all, was highly unlikely and the concept of a battleship was seen as anachronistic. With the behemoths of World War II also went all ships whose major task in Cold War days was fleet air defense (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 33). On occasion, this included relatively new ships that still had some time to serve the Navy. All nine nuclear-powered cruisers (CGN) and the Leahy- and Belknap-classes were decommissioned; the Ticonderoga-class remained as the only cruiser type in service and as an indispensable asset to the fleet. Consequently, 22 of the 27 ships were selected for a comprehensive weapons-systems upgrade and modernization in 1999. Another Aegis-capable addition to the fleet in the 1990s was the 9,000-ton guided missile destroyer of the Arleigh-Burke-class (DDG 51 etc.), today’s backbone of the U.S. Navy surface fleet (and the numerically strongest class of destroyers in any navy worldwide). The lead ship joined the Navy in 1991. These destroyers, much like the larger cruisers, were equipped with VLS launch tubes to carry cruise missiles. The most dramatic shift occurred in the mission area of ASW operations and programs. A wide-ranging dismantling of Cold War ASW capabilities stripped the Navy of whole classes of ships. For example, all 46 Knox-class frigates were decommissioned. The Kidd-class destroyers and ocean surveillance ships of the T-AGOS-type were eased out, and the SOSUS array was shut down. The numbers of attack submarines, Perry-class frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, carrier-based ASW planes (i.e. S-3 Viking) and helicopters (i.e. SH-3 Sea King) were cut back considerably (Swartz 2012b: 41, slide 81). The decade was also characterized by transformative technology. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) research, development, and testing began in earnest. Widespread use of personal computers, cell phones, and networks dramatically changed the way the Navy did business. In terms of

315 The Marines, however, criticized the capability gap that now occurred in naval gun-fire support (NGFS). Shelling of shore targets became an issue that the cruisers and destroyers could only marginally deliver. With the addition of the new DDG-1000 into the fleet from 2014, this shortcoming is hoped to be offset, although only three units of the futuristic vessel will be built. Closing the NGFS capability gap will likely continue to be a central objective for future naval planning.

316 The U.S. Coast Guard had an important role in Cold War ASW. Absent an enemy submarine threat, it lost its ASW missions and equipment.
tactics, visit/board/search/seizure (VBSS) capabilities were increasingly developed and tested for maritime security operations. Capable software supported the development and use of precision guided munitions, a revolutionary aspect first demonstrated to a broader audience during the Gulf War. The Tomahawk cruise missile was the premier standoff weapon against long-, mid-range and tactical targets. Software also empowered the networking of ships, sensors, and systems that was previously unseen and unheard of.

In the 1990s, the Navy’s undersea roster included the last boats of the Ohio-class. At the same time, the four oldest SSBN (SSBN 726 through SSBN 729: Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, and Florida) underwent a conversion to guided-missile submarines, retaining their pennant numbers (SSGN). After the costly procurement of the Seawolf-class submarines (SSN 21 through SSN 23) – a product of the Cold War that was ultimately cut to only three units – the Virginia-class nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSN 774, etc.) entered service. They were a cheaper and timelier alternative to the Seawolf. They followed (and ultimately will replace) the Los-Angeles-class fast attack submarines that were procured until the mid-1990s.

In the surface fleet, the Whidbey-Island/Harpers-Ferry-class dock landing ships (LSD 41/LSD 49) helped sustain the vertical and horizontal insertion capabilities of the Marine Corps, providing well decks and deck space for the new tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey aircraft that appeared towards the end of the decade. Much larger than the LSD (and designed to replace the older tank- and dock-landing vessels of the Newport-, Austin-, and Anchorage-classes) was the new San-Antonio-class amphibious transport dock. The first four vessels of that 24,900-ton type were procured in FY 1996, 1999, and 2000 (2) respectively. Dry cargo ships of the Lewis-and-Clarke-class (T-AKE 1 through T-AKE 14) were also procured, providing one platform for transport and supply of ammunition and combat stores previously divided on separate classes of auxiliary ships.

Rapid technological innovation, the sweeping transformation of the military, and the contrasting ideas for the size and design of the 21st century fleet spurred the growth of debate

317 For more on this conversion, see O’Rourke (2008).
318 For more information on the Virginia-class attack submarines, see O’Rourke (2014a).
319 With its innovative and technologically complex design, the aircraft combines the functionality and V/STOL capability of a helicopter with the long range of a conventional turboprop airplane. Its tilt rotors allow a combination of both functions. The V-22 underwent an extended testing and training phase. To date, only the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps operate this model. The USMC makes heavy use of the multi-mission airframe. It will eventually replace the Corps’ CH-46 Sea Knight twin-rotor helicopter. The Navy has not yet ordered V-22 aircraft although the service is looking for future replacement for its C-2 Greyhound carrier onboard delivery (COD) aircraft. Future Navy missions for an organic V-22 could also include SAR, ASW, and transport.
320 For more information on the program, see O’Rourke (2011).
about future platforms. The 1990s witnessed some ambitious design and procurement plans for a new generation of warships. A new class of command ships, the JCC(X), was studied, but never built. The Surface Combatant for the Twenty-First Century (SC-21) program proposed three main ship types designed for naval gunfire support. This fell in line with the Navy’s strategic and operational power projection into the littorals. The SC-21 study envisaged a future destroyer-like combatant for power projection ashore, a cruiser-like warship for ballistic missile defense and carrier battle group operations, and an arsenal ship. The latter, a completely new type of warship, was proposed to be much more cost-effective than the high-maintenance battleships of the past. This combatant would have up to 500 VLS tubes for cruise missiles, ride low in the water, and have a drastically reduced crew. Deploying such a ship to a crisis area would, in the mind of the new platform’s supporters, signal U.S. resolve without endangering too many American lives (Federation of American Scientists 1999). With cost overruns and conflicting ideas about the future force, all but one of the concepts was abandoned by the early 2000s. The DDG-1000, the single surviving concept, will remain a sliver class. The more feasible replacement of such drastic and perhaps all-too-innovative ideas came in the form of the SSGNs conversions and, more importantly, new flights of Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers.

Naval aviation was undergoing modernization as well. The new A-12 Avenger II carrier-based stealth aircraft was cancelled amidst dramatic cost overruns in 1991. Instead, the Navy picked the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet to replace the A-6 Intruder attack plane and the F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft.321 Meanwhile, new versions of Sikorsky’s Seahawk MH-60 helicopter joined the fleet and replaced older models in missions such as transport, MCM, and ASuW.

During the 1990s, the U.S. Navy’s conventional and nuclear forces declined in real numbers, tonnage, and construction/upkeep budgets. Smaller units were decommissioned more often than larger ones, yielding an imbalance in the fleet toward the capital units. It is ironic that the Navy, which would have been better suited for most Clinton-era policies than, e.g., the Air Force or the Army, was disproportionally affected by the drawdown in numbers and capabilities. Still, with the fleet inventory and the investment into research of future platforms, the United States remained the world’s dominant naval force.

321 With the F/A-18 E/F, the Air Force-only F-22 Raptor, and the proposed F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense had no less than six tactical aircraft in design, production, and procurement during the 1990s. The F-35, built in three variants for the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, emerged from plans in the early 1990s to develop a joint forces airplane (Gertler 2014).
9.6 Strategic and Operational Implementation: Planned vs. Actual

U.S. Navy operations throughout the 1990s continued to be shaped by the requirements of forward-based (U.S. Seventh Fleet) and forward-deployed naval forces (U.S. Fifth and Sixth fleet). Two more fleets at the U.S. East and West Coast, respectively, allowed for routine deployment schedules. The Navy’s considerably high operational tempo rested on experience and expertise gained over the final years of the Cold War. The majority of combat operations were against shore targets, while warfare and, consequently, experience at sea were minimal (Swartz 2012b: 38, slide 76). The introduction of Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles (TLAM) throughout the fleet altered operations. During the Clinton years, the missile quickly emerged as the number-one weapon for convenient strike operations – for example, against Iraq, but also against Sudan and Afghanistan in response to the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa in 1998. The Gulf War marked the operational debut of these weapons which could be delivered from cruisers, destroyers, attack submarines, and even battleships (Friedman 2006: 565-568). As it were, TLAM became a strategic weapon at the discretion of the President that could be used indiscriminately. It saved the president from making hard choices regarding the deployment of ground troops or order air force bombers. Concurrently, there were now more expeditionary operations that the Navy had to cater.

9.6.1 Major U.S. Naval Operations

Between 1989 and 2001, the U.S. Navy remained active, engaged, and forward-operating. On balance, there are at least four major naval operations (or series thereof) that characterized the 1990s from a U.S. Navy operational perspective with strategic ramifications. American sea power was directed as a natural extension of U.S. grand strategic goals and postulations – sometimes powerful, often hesitantly and dosed. As in the 1980s, the U.S. relied on technologically advanced, forward-based or forward-deployed assets and a blue-water fleet grouped around the capital ships. Unlike the 1980s, the pretext for these uses of naval force was neither a bipolar conflict nor an adversary fleet. Sea control outside of the littorals was uncontested, but the littoral zone mandated a conceptual and intellectual strategic shift in Navy thinking and operations. Consequently, the 1990s demanded a conscious appreciation of the fuller range of sea power measures across the whole spectrum of naval operations.

322 TLAMs were the preferred weapon for strafing Iraq in the 1990s. Concerted cruise missiles strikes against Iraq were conducted in 1993, 1996, and 1998.

323 Major naval operations understood as the sustained commitment of forces engaged in expeditionary operations against a shore or a fleet. On the problem of definitions, see Vego (2008: 7-39). In this chapter, these are selected naval operations designed to illustrate the real-world operations that the U.S. Navy conducted in the 1990s. For a chronological list of Navy-Marine Corps crisis response and combat actions in the period between January 1991 and 9/11, see the U.S. Navy’s 2004 Program Guide (Department of the Navy 2004: 169-173).

The Gulf War at the transition from the Cold War to the emerging new world (dis-)order was one of the largest U.S. Navy operations of the post-World War II era. The Navy fielded up to seven aircraft carrier groups and two battleships groups. The conflict essentially consisted of four phases.

- “Operation Desert Shield” featured a defensive phase of Saudi-Arabia (August through October 1990) and
- Preparation for the offensive against Hussein’s troops (November through mid-January 1991).
- “Operation Desert Storm” was the designation for the push of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. It featured a four-week air campaign against Iraqi targets in Kuwait and Iraq that began on 17 January 1991, followed by a 100-hour ground war.
- The aftermath of the war kept the U.S. disproportionately busy for the rest of the decade.324

The Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean served as staging areas for the naval component of the broad international military coalition that Bush Sr. and his senior experts assembled; naval supply routes were essential in ferrying supplies into the theater.325 Iraq at the time fielded (at least on paper) the world’s fourth largest army and the sixth largest air force. Its considerably smaller navy (a coastal defense force) consisted of 165 warships and boats. In the course of the war, Iraq – encircled by adversaries, threatened by a land invasion, and cut off from the Gulf (its only maritime supply route) – conducted increasingly desperate attacks against coalition military, but the Navy’s ability to control the seaways and littorals to and project power ashore proved critical to the success of Desert Shield (Schneller 2007: 20). There was a robust U.S. political and military push-back of Iraqi aggression, although the Joint Staff initially was much more inclined to safeguard Saudi-Arabia rather than to fight (or plan for fighting) for Kuwaiti liberation (Rearden 2012: 509-510).

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325 The logistics train that spanned from the U.S. into the Persian Gulf region carried over 2.3 million tons of equipment, more than 535,000 tons of supplies, and 4.3 million tons of petroleum products during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm phases of the conflict. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) fielded a total of 393 cargo ships to facilitate this (Schneller 2007: 23-24).
Within days after the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait, two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups centered on Independence (CV 62) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) were on station in the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea, respectively. The naval armada that was assembled through early 1991 eventually consisted of more than 150 warships from 14 allied countries. The U.S. Navy contributed 108 of these vessels, including the carriers Midway (CV 41), Saratoga (CV 60), Ranger (CV 61), America (CV 66), John F. Kennedy (CV 67), and Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). Carrier aviation accounted for almost 1/3 of anti-Iraqi coalition air forces (Pemsel 2006: 1287). The aircraft carrier once again underlined its operational and strategic utility even as the geopolitical landscape was shifting from global superpower conflict to regional wars. Two battleships, 13 submarines, and a large amphibious force complemented the overwhelming display of American sea power. 282 cruise missiles were launched throughout the war.

The Gulf War was the first major test of integrated planning, interoperability, and procurement as laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Navy’s strategic culture of independence from the other services was severely tested during the military campaign. The coalition air component commander’s Air Tasking Order (ATO), a flight operations management system to coordinate and integrate the air campaign, had to be flown out to the carriers every day instead of being transmitted electronically. The Navy simply did not field the systems to process these orders automatically. In addition, the Navy’s commander in theater preferred to be on his flagship instead of being at the U.S. HQ ashore. This issue amplified the Navy’s joint organizational and operational problems in the modern combat environment (Schneller 2007: 22). The swift military victory, “one of the most decisive victories in military history” (ibid: 30), overshadowed other subsidiary Navy-related concerns that occurred, such as the missile-boat threat and the enduring challenge of mine warfare.

326 The Navy used ten of the eleven available aircraft carriers either in Desert Shield or as replacements for forward-deployed carriers (Love 1992: 813).
327 The other primary mission of U.S. naval forces in the Gulf – next to supporting the air war – was the staging of an amphibious invasion on Iraq’s southern flank, thus rendering a massing of Iraqi troops on the main battle line (Kuwait/Saudi-Arabia) impossible. The Marines were used for a deception operation in February 1991.
329 Most Iraqi missile boats were neutralized (sunk or rendered unusable) in January 1991, effectively establishing uncontested U.S. sea control in the Northern Persian Gulf. Notably, the battleship Missouri (BB 63) and accompanying smaller units were targeted by an Iraqi land-based Silkworm missile on 25 February, in the middle of the ground campaign to expel Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. One of the missiles fell short while the other one was shot down by the British destroyer (HMS) Gloucester (D 96) (Schneller 2007: 30).
330 On 18 February 1991, within three hours and just ten nautical miles apart, the veteran amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH 10) and the two-year old AEGIS guided-missile cruiser Princeton (CG 59) struck mines while conducting operations in the northern Arabian Gulf. Both vessels sustained extensive damages, but no loss of life.
Containment of Iraq remained on the forefront of U.S. strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region throughout the 1990s, with naval forces as a major leveraging tool toward that objective. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. military aircraft enforced a no-fly zone over parts of Iraq (“Operation Northern Watch”/ “Operation Southern Watch”). U.S. cruise missiles pounded Iraq in June 1993 and September 1996. From October to December 1994, U.S. forces were rushed into the Persian Gulf region to hedge against another possible Iraqi assault on Kuwait. In December 1998, coordinated U.S. cruise missiles and air strikes codenamed “Operation Desert Fox” targeted infrastructure in response to the Iraqi regime’s repeated failure to cooperate in the enforcement of the U.N. sanctions regime and to adhere to the no-fly zones (Ministry of Defence 2009: 2-7).


In 1991, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts that followed pitted newly independent states against each other in a violent civil war. The conflict, which unraveled as a result of the end of the Cold War and the demise of Yugoslav ruler Josip Broz Tito, required concerted international military engagement including naval assets. After the outbreak of hostilities, NATO and West European Union (WEU) member states began to provide assets to a U.N. force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enforce a no-fly zone over Yugoslavia (now only consisting of Serbia and Montenegro). When it became evident that Serbian aggression against its neighboring states was not deterred and European nations by themselves would be unable to achieve a peaceful outcome of the conflict, a weapons embargo was imposed (Prince/Brett 2013: 48-49). On 15 June 1993, NATO and the WEU began a combined maritime mission in the Adriatic Sea called “Operation Sharp Guard”. Its objective was to monitor and enforce sanctions and to provide leverage for U.N. Security Council resolutions to that end. “Operation Sharp Guard” was significant in that it constituted the alliance’s first out-of-area mission.331 The mission drew forces from established multinational naval command structures, namely Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Standing
Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), and the Western European Union Contingency Maritime Force (WEUCONMARFOR). Airborne early warning aircraft such as NATO AWACS E-3A jets featuring a multinational crew patrolled the skies and provided surveillance, command, control, and communication. Necessary operational arrangements were put into place to overcome tensions stemming from conflicting U.N. and NATO objectives for their respective Balkans missions. These measures also reduced the frictional loss among navies due to their differing rules of engagement (ROE).

To U.S. naval planners and operators, “Operation Sharp Guard” provided a markedly different example of naval engagement for the 6th Fleet AOR than in the years of the Cold War (cf. chapter 8.7.1). Over the course of the operation, the U.S. Navy dispatched guided missile cruisers (such as Dale [CG 19] and Monterey [CG 61]) as well as destroyers (such as Comte de Grasse [DD 974]), frigates (e.g. Boone [FFG 28], Nicolas [FFG 47], and Samuel B. Roberts [FFG 58]), and numerous P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to the area of operations. In its 43 months of activity before being terminated in June 1996, “Operation Sharp Guard” and its preceding missions challenged 74,192 merchant vessels en route to Balkan ports and boarded over one-twelfth of them in search of contraband. More than 1,400 ships were diverted away for further inspection and six violators of U.N. sanctions were identified. Maritime patrol aircraft flew over 7,000 sorties. Sharp Guard, NATO’s first combat operation, was a large-scale and successful effort (Papadopoulos 2013: 95).

In parallel, NATO and the United Nations conducted “Operation Deliberate Force” between 30 August and 20 September 1995 to guard U.N.-designated safe areas from attack by Bosnian Serbs. 400 NATO aircraft participated in the operation. They launched precision strikes against Serb-held positions and installations in Bosnia, served C4ISR needs, and provided aerial refueling. The naval contributions to the operation included three aircraft carriers (the French Foch [R 99], the Royal Navy’s Invincible [R 05], and the U.S. Navy’s America [CV

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332 This frigate stands emblematic for the enormous versatility of U.S. Navy vessels and the broad range of missions that the service undertakes. The ship, known colloquially as “Sammy B”, was (as previously described) subject to a mine hit on 14 April 1988, while deployed in the Persian Gulf in support of the U.S. operations in the “Tanker War”. The warship returned the Persian Gulf after repairs in time for participation in allied operations against Saddam Hussein as part of Operation Desert Storm (1991). Years later, it operated in the embargo operations in the Mediterranean described here. In 1996, the Navy’s workhorse vessel participated in joint interagency task force (JIATF) drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean, the Eastern and the South Pacific with a number of sister ships. As of 2014, the frigate is still in active service.

333 For a concise review of the U.S. Navy’s contribution to “Operation Sharp Guard” and the context of joint and combined operations, see Papadopoulos (2013).

334 A lessons-learned report (Reddy 1997: 1) formulated with considerable foresight that, “Operation Sharp Guard proved that NATO and WEU can work well together, at least on joint naval operations and under NATO command. However, until the EU matures and can present a common front on foreign policy issues with more regularity, the U.S. should not expect the WEU to take on an operational task and go it alone.”

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in the Adriatic Sea and Tomahawk cruise missile launches against Serbian targets. NATO forces were under the command of U.S. Navy admiral Leighton Smith in his role as Commander, Allied Forces South. Smith subsequently commanded the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia (Stillwell interview with Smith, 2006/2010).  

U.S. and coalition forces returned to the Balkans in 1999 when the Kosovo War led NATO to conduct a sustained air campaign against Serbia. Here, the U.S. Navy’s contribution to “Operation Allied Force” (March-June) and its follow-up peace-keeping “Operation Joint Guardian”, a standalone case of air power exclusively achieving political results, included the carriers Enterprise (CVN 65) and Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) CVBGs as well as the Kearsarge (LHD 3) ARG. Carrier aviation provided a part of military leverage against Serbian targets in the 78-day-long campaign. The presence of U.S. warships after the conclusion of hostilities deterred Serbia from attacking Kosovo again. These operations underlined that continued U.S. engagement in European security affairs remained imperative due to the lack of organic European capabilities and, perhaps more importantly, political will (Hendrickson 2006).

c) Haiti (1994-1996)

In America’s backyard, the early 1990s held yet another crisis for the new Clinton administration. In Haiti, a Caribbean island some 1,200 km from Florida, a coup d’état by the Haitian military ousted the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and placed a series of de-facto rulers in the leadership of the country. In 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution that authorized the establishment of a multinational force (MNF). The United States planned for two military contingencies: a forced entry (codename “Operation Restore Democracy”) and a permissive entry (codename “Operation Uphold Democracy”) to reinstate Aristide’s presidency. The operation was designed as a comprehensive joint and combined operation, including at the high-point more than 20,000 service members from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard (and more than 5,000 troops from 24 U.S. allies on the line as well). The Navy’s role began in June 1993 when the international embargo against the regime in Port-au-Prince began to be enforced. The Navy conducted maritime interception operations to put pressure on the Haitian government. In addition, the Navy and the Coast Guard supported the interdiction and processing of some 75,000 refugees who

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335 For an analysis of the operation, see Ripley (1999).
336 For a lessons-learned report, see U.S. Congress (1999), in particular testimony by Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Jr., Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet and Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe; Brigadier General Robert M. Flanagan, Deputy Commander, II Marine Expeditionary Force; and Vice Admiral James F. Amerault, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), excerpted at Naval History and Heritage Command 2004 (http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq127-1.htm).
had attempted to flee the conflict-torn country, often on sea-unworthy vessels.\textsuperscript{337} U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 (31 July 1994) allowed member states to make use of all necessary means for the removal of the military government and to re-establish order and legitimate rule.

On 18 September 1994, within hours of conduction a military invasion, President Clinton dispatched a last-minute diplomatic task force headed by former president Jimmy Carter, (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) General (ret.) Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn to Haiti. The effort was an eleventh-hour success (most of the paratrooper force was already airborne and en route to the drop areas when the solution came through) and the forced entry turned into a compliant intervention (the tight timetable has prompted some to describe “Operation Uphold Democracy” as an “intervasion”). A potential reprisal of the Mogadishu events a year before was averted and the operation took on much more of a humanitarian, almost altruistic face (catering to the idealist strain of U.S. foreign-policy thinking). An exit plan, echoing the Weinberger and Powell doctrines discussed previously, provided a schedule for the reduction of U.S. forces and eventual transition of peacekeeping functions within the MNF to the United Nations. The international military coalition was able to ensure a peaceful restoration of Aristide’s government, restore governance and good order on the island, and prepare for general elections in 1996. For the U.S. military, Haiti provided a demonstration of a joint campaign (it still identified some problems to overcome in planning contingencies). The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard worked in close partnership (recalling the diplomatic, military, and constabulary uses of the ‘use of the sea’ triangle). The maritime services’ contributions included the \textit{America} (CV 66) and \textit{Dwight D. Eisenhower} (CVN 69) carrier battle groups, the \textit{Wasp} (LHD 1) amphibious ready group, 14 RRF vessels crewed by civilian seafarers in support of the American troops, Seabees (USN military construction battalion), and various Coast Guard assets. The operation underlined that multi-mission capable naval forces could provide a range of options even in a joint, inter-agency, and coalition environment (Siegel 1996, Kretchik \textit{et al.} 1998).

\textit{d) Taiwan Strait (1994-1996)}

Another series of highlighted U.S. naval operations occurred in the West Pacific in 1995 and 1996 in the context of American-Chinese confrontations over Taiwan.\textsuperscript{338} Since the Chinese civil war between 1927 and 1950 and the ensuing division of the country, the Communist-

\textsuperscript{337} The main processing point ashore for refugees was the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

\textsuperscript{338} This section substantially draws on Marolda’s comprehensive and lucid description of the Taiwan Strait crisis (2012: 113-118).
held mainland (the People’s Republic of China) and the democratically-ruled island (the Republic of China) emerged as two de-facto states that laid claim to representing the legitimate government of China. U.S.-Chinese relations had blossomed cautiously since the late 1970s when diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing were first established. Subsequently, U.S. recognition of core China shifted from Taiwan to China. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, China did not require as close a relationship with the United States as before and began increasingly assertive actions against Taiwan and others. The massacre on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in June 1989, amidst the thawing Cold War in Europe, furthered the deterioration of Chinese standing in the region and the world.

In the mid-1990s, Taiwan emerged as a free-market economy and a booming Asian economic powerhouse. A democratic leadership that openly discussed Taiwanese independence competed with Beijing’s claim to reunite the nation on mainland Chinese terms. A visit by Taiwanese president Lee Tung-hui to the United States in May 1995 for a commencement address at his alma mater tipped the situation over the edge. During July and August, the Chinese PLAN undertook missile launches and live firings less than 130 kilometers from the Taiwanese mainland to inhibit Taiwan and send a strong signal to the U.S. administration that it disapproved of Washington’s de-facto recognition of Taiwanese independence.

That December President Clinton ordered an aircraft carrier group led by Nimitz (CVN 68) through the strait separating Taiwan from China. In January 1996, the amphibious assault ship Belleau Wood (LHA 3) also transited the choke point. Both instances signaled to Beijing American intent to defend Taiwan’s right of self-determination. Dispatching Air Force or Army units to achieve a similar effect would have been considerably more difficult than employing the naval assets forward-deployed in the area. However, China was hardly deterred and commenced a major exercise the next month. Beginning in February 1996, nuclear and conventionally powered submarines, destroyers, frigates, patrol craft, and amphibious vessels from each of China’s three fleets converged on the coast of Fujian Province across from Taiwan. 150,000 Chinese troops were deployed along with hundreds of capable fighters, bombers, and attack planes (Marolda 2012: 115).

In preparation for the week-long presidential campaign in March of that year, the Chinese military conducted concerted large-scale exercises, some of which were barely outside of Taiwanese territorial waters. This time, the American response was considerably stronger. Days after diplomats condemned Chinese coercion, the aircraft carrier Independence (CV 62), the guided missile cruiser Bunker Hill (CG 52), the destroyers Hewitt (DD 966) and O’Brien
(DD 975), and the frigate *McClusky* (FFG 41) had assumed station near Taiwan. A second carrier group – led by *Nimitz* and consisting of the guided missile cruiser *Port Royal* (CG 73), the destroyers *Oldendorf* (DD 972) and *Callaghan* (DD 994) as well as the frigate *Ford* (FFG 54), two attack submarines (*Columbus* [SSN 762] and *Bremerton* [SSN 698]), and a couple of support ships – was dispatched to the region 24 hours later. Although there is no indication that the carriers actually transited the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. naval commitment sent a strong signal to China that the leadership in Beijing had failed to anticipate.

However, cordial Chinese-American relations were soon restored, not least for economic reasons. Taiwan emerged from the crisis unscathed (and has begun to consider closer ties with mainland China in recent years); the U.S. underlined its unambiguous commitment to Taiwan; and it brought closer ties between the U.S. and other Asian nations such as Singapore and Japan, the latter historically a competitor with China for regional influence. Forward-deployed naval assets (including a forward-based aircraft carrier) in the 7th Fleet AOR had sent a strong signal to the countries affected. They provided options that only sea power could offer.

### 9.6.2 Relationships to Sister Services: Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force

#### a) USMC

With its closest sister service, the Navy continued to practice operational cooperation. This is remarkable given that at the strategic level, some conceptual, bureaucratic, and budgetary differences between the Navy and the Marine Corps hardened. In principle, the services had differing views of the littoral area. Whereas the Navy considered amphibious operations as one mission among many on or from the sea, the Marine Corps saw its dominance in the littoral. To the Marines, the high seas simply functioned as a staging area for such amphibious operations and they wanted to shape their strategic plans accordingly (Swartz 2012b: 82-83, slides 164-165). This conceptual division is most visible in the USMC’s non-involvement in Navy capstone documents of later part of decade. Instead, the Marines produced its own statements of declaratory intent. Intellectually and strategically, the Marine Corps and the Navy parted ways for the second half of the decade as the Marines emphasized thinking about the littorals when the Navy oscillated between a reemphasize of traditional sea control operations thinking about the littorals (Lundesgaard 2011: 13-15).

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339 The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy Jr., co-signed “The Way Ahead”, “… From the Sea”, “NDP 1”, and “Forward… From the Sea”.

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The 1990s witnessed numerous amphibious operations across the whole range of the conflict spectrum. These ranged from actual combat to show of force, peace operations, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief in such diverse regions of the world as Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Bangladesh, and the Caribbean. In many ways, the Marine Corps achieved a sense of parity and equality with the Navy – not least because the Corps’ proportion in the Navy’s battle force stabilized with the advent of seven amphibious assault ships of the Wasp-class (LHD 1 through LHD 8), the largest such warships in the world (Swartz 2012b: 77, slide 154).

b) USCG

The Coast Guard remained under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation throughout the decade. Stripped of its Cold War missions, the service continued to be engaged in counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, and Cuban and Haitian refugee handling. In addition, law-enforcement detachment (LEDET) teams served as an adjunct to U.S. Navy maritime security and safety missions. For example, they supported VBSS operations during the Gulf War. Port security was another increasingly important subject and the Coast Guard’s involvement in the military intelligence community subsequently deepened. In 2000, a comprehensive, presidentially-mandated interagency review of U.S. Coast Guard roles and missions in the future security environment was published (President’s Interagency Task Force on United States Coast Guard Roles and Missions 2000), codifying many aspects of the deepening relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard (Swartz 2012b: 88-93, slides 176-185).

c) USA & USAF

During the 1990s, jointness emerged as the new norm pursuant to the Goldwater-Nichols provisions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Combatant Commanders (COCOMS) wielded increasing influence over strategic military planning.

The demise of the Soviet Union and its Navy shifted interest in the Navy and the Air Force toward strike operations and forward presence. Previous emphasis on strategic deterrence, sea control and counter-sea operations and capabilities receded in importance (Swartz 2012b: 94, slide 187). With the Air Force, the Navy deepened the integration of carrier aviation with land-based Air Force strike forces. Navy-Air Force operations over Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Southern Watch” and “Deliberate Force”, respectively) demonstrated organically the value of deeper integration (Haynes 2013: 171-172) after the Navy had been sidelined by the USAF for much of the Gulf War. After suboptimal operational relations during that con-
flict, the Navy sought closer cooperation and even joint integration with the Air Force on a number of fields (Swartz 2012b: 94, slide 188).

With the Army, the Navy’s relationship was a bit rockier. The Army, as much as the Navy, was subject to tremendous budget cuts. Operationally, the Navy provided partial ground support for the Army when requested. But the Navy now increasingly focused on influencing and orchestrating events on land (the traditional Army domain) whereas in the Cold War, the Navy had principally limited its strategic view to the oceans and the sea. Three Army four-star generals (Powell, Shakilashvili, and Shelton) served as Clinton’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This further raised Army morale, reputation, and visibility within the administration in comparison to the other services (Swartz 2012b: 110-115, slides 220-229).

9.6.3 Relationships to Allies

The Navy’s relationship to its international partner services was tested repeatedly in the 1990s in real-world contingencies. As much as on the joint front, combined operations were now also increasingly more common and integrated (not merely coordinated). Naval action in the Persian Gulf in 1990/1991 set the tone, and other multinational naval operations such as in the Adriatic Sea – the first real-life NATO contingency since the Cold War – followed. Allies were increasingly interested in investing resources in technologies, sensors, and platforms developed by the United States (a prominent example for the 1990s is the introduction of the U.S.-made Aegis system by the Japanese Self-Defense Maritime Force [JSDMF] in 1993 on their Atago- and Kongo-class destroyers [Kim 1999: 18-45, Cole 2013: 61-77] and later the Spanish and Norwegian navies). In turn, the U.S. Navy also began to be interested in advanced allied systems such as air-independent propulsion submarines or high-speed catamarans.

Many European partners radically cut their defense budgets, often in hope of re-distributing substantial Cold War military expenditures into more popular social welfare programs. Navies were obviously affected as well by these indiscriminate cuts. At the same time, the U.S. Navy continued to practice and engage with allied nations, most visibly in such long-standing exercises as BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea and RIMPAC in the Pacific. Remarkably, the “…From the Sea” capstone document was cited in Australian, British, Canadian, and Indian capstone documents.

340 Author’s note: In contrast to the “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s, the various U.S. Navy strategies of the 1990s were less outspoken about their global aspirations and often treated the integration of allies as secondary topics. In lieu of an analysis of every single Navy capstone document’s relationship to U.S. allies, this section briefly outlines the most enduring trends across the decade instead.
documents between 1997 and 2007 (Swartz 2012a: 56, slide 111) and thus indicated the quality and lasting impression of that document in allied naval forces.

9.6.4 Significant Organizational Changes
To reflect the changes in the security environment, the 1990s witnessed wide-ranging changes to bureaucratic structures and processes. Most of all, this reflected the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s taking full effect. It shifted power from the branches – i.e., the Navy – to OSD, the Joint Staff, and the CINC. In essence, it reduced the purpose of the services to that of a force provider. In 1992, a major OPNAV reorganization and re-designation was implemented to reflect the expansion and vision of the Joint Staff. A substantial reorganization resulted in the breaking of the previously powerful warfare community barons (surface, submarine, and aviation). Instead, programming offices gained substantial power. N8, the newly-designated branch for strategic programming, subsumed 400 of the 1,200 personnel assigned to OPNAV (Swartz 2012b: 43-45, slides 86-89), dubbed “Super N8”.

Admiral Kelso’s changes were significant in that they implemented the joint thinking into the Navy bureaucracy, with sweeping consequences. Instead of basing priorities on naval warfare areas (such as antisubmarine or strike warfare), they were now based on joint warfare areas. Program sponsors now had to justify their programs across all seven of these joint mission areas (Haynes 2013: 124).

Kelso’s successors, Boorda and Johnson, fine-tuned many of the processes that were kicked off in the early 1990s. While the changes in the Navy and OSD bureaucracy were significant in their own right, one of the more immediately visible innovations was the creation of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in 1995, a dedicated fleet responsible for the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz. This was a direct lesson of the large-scale contingencies during the Gulf War, where U.S. Navy assets and organization were deemed unfit for handling the major operation.

From a strategic point of view, the long 1990s were a challenging period for the Navy. Navy budgets shrank, ship and aircraft numbers went down, manpower was reduced drastically, and new warship procurement was reduced significantly. At the same time, the fleet was in high operational demand. Crises such as in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti were exactly the kind of brush-

341 These were Joint Strike, Joint Littoral Warfare, Joint Surveillance, Joint Space and Electronic Warfare/Intelligence, Strategic Deterrence, Strategic Sealift/Protection, and Presence.
342 The establishment of the Fifth Fleet complemented the 1983 installation of the U.S. Central Command and the subsidiary Naval Forces Central Command. Until the creation of its own numbered fleet, the naval part of USCENTCOM had relied on forces temporarily assigned to it. The Gulf War surge forces came from the U.S. home fleets and were 6th/7th Fleet assets.
fires that the Navy anticipated after shelving “The Maritime Strategy”. Navy capstone documents of the 1990s are characterized by the attempt to grasp this new geostrategic and geopolitical environment and translate those implications into declaratory strategies. The considerably higher number of strategies (and different names and designs to them) in comparison to the single “Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s reflected growing uncertainty about the environment and what the next war would look like.

At the same time, the sheer number of documents – eight – is a function of changes in leadership and associated (actual or anticipated) changes in priorities. In part, the collection reflects the desire by the Navy as well as a by individuals to have their own defining statements (Hattendorf 2006: 4). To a degree, such measures are necessary when political administrations change, but they run the risk of introducing new vocabulary and different points of reference along the way, thus providing more confusion than clarity. A document’s half life can be severely curtailed under such circumstances.

Transformation was neither the inevitable consequence of changes in the international environment nor dictated by individuals or groups outside of the naval service (Trubowitz/Rhodes 1999: 8). The Navy needed to balance high-end capabilities with low-end scenarios (that it did right) and also balance high-end capabilities with the need for numbers (that it did not achieve as a look at the ship procurements of the decade will illustrate). In addition, the processes of formulating capstone documents in the 1990s for the Navy were often confusing, ineffective, repetitive, and erratic. Therefore, strategic adjustment – or in other words, the transformation of the service – rested principally on the institutionalization of ideas in the Navy itself.

Only after “The Maritime Strategy” was dropped, the Navy was able to muster intellectual capital and utilize timing to draft the white paper, “…From the Sea”. It was a lucid, strategic concept in Samuel Huntington’s sense. The most important message contained in “…From the Sea” was that the Navy now concentrated on naval operations in the framework of a joint task force involved in a major regional contingency rather than engaging in a global conventional war as a a semi-independent force (Tritten 1995: 132). “…From the Sea” also marked a departure from a classic naval strategy that concerned itself with blue-water events. Instead, it shifted the focus. Sea control was not an end in itself, but should better enable land control,
thereby broadening the Navy’s naval scope to a more comprehensive, even maritime one (which assumed increasing jointness and combined arms operations). 343

As a conceptual framework, it organized unified efforts from the sea toward the land, emphasizing the focus on strike and littoral operations. Unlike many other documents of the 1990s, it also gave the Navy a sense of institutional rationality. Its lasting influence can be explained by the real innovation that it brought intellectually for the service and by acknowledging that the Navy was increasingly silent – at least strategically – for the remainder of the decade. In a move reminiscent of behavior in the years after World War II, the 1990s American defense establishment focused on how the military fought, not why (Haynes 2013: 189).

Burdened by inter- and intra-service rivalry and a diminished public image in the wake of high-visibility scandals, the Navy increasingly looked inward. Goldwater-Nichols brought a joint operational environment that was dominated by the CINC force requirements. These demands reflected and also fueled a much more regional operational instead of a necessary global strategic-political outlook. Meanwhile, the promises of new technology lured the Navy further away from comprehending and explaining to others how it sought to make a real strategic difference in the next war. Instead, technology increasingly shaped traditional naval operations and missions. This was relatively easy to sell to Congress. Emphasizing pricey gear was a tactic that allowed the Navy to procrastinate on more strategic ambitions, e.g., what its geopolitical roles and missions were, and how it could contribute to the political ends of sea power.

Bush and Clinton began with foreign policies that contained interventionist notions. Both also put a prime on increasing diplomacy and economic engagement as tools for foreign and security policy ends. In theory, this would have put the Navy into the spotlight, given sea power’s inherent opportunities (such as presence, maritime security, etc.) and the fact that naval forces have the luxury of providing an inherently more diplomatic military tool that armies or air forces cannot afford (Forster 2013: 14). The opportunity for transitioning to a truly maritime American grand strategy which diplomatically would have allowed the U.S. to assume the role of an off-shore “balancer” and a “grand-facilitator” (Owens 1993: 13) was missed. Ironically, both presidential administrations (sensing public and Congressional desire to draw

343 Breemer (1994: 45-46) declared “… From the Sea“ to be the end of naval strategy as the world knew it (emphasis added), although he was not quite sure how final that end would really be given the inherent uncertainty that surrounds strategy (ibid: 48).
down the American military posture after the Cold War) engaged in substantial across-the-board spending cuts, with the Navy disproportionately affected.

The lack of a template for American sea power in the 1990s let the Navy to manage itself instead of reflecting on what it was organized, trained, and equipped for in the first place. A systemic role for the Navy emerged only very slowly toward the end of the decade when the effects of globalization began to be felt. After all, the American-led liberal economic and political system had prevailed – “a system whose designers understood the notion that economic power is the father of military power” (Haynes 2013: 2). For the time being, little was done to disseminate that observation and introduce such observations into its capstone documents or even national, overarching concepts to make U.S. grand strategy for the 1990s truly maritime. Instead, the Navy increasingly went in medias res, for example with “Naval Doctrine Publication 1” (NDP1). Of note is the naval services’ embrace of the levels of warfare, the Clausewitzian concepts of center of gravity and critical vulnerability, and the principles of armed conflict. None of these were truly doctrine, but all of which were major statements because they signaled that the Navy embraced jointness (Tritten 1995: 132).

The Navy ended the decade with mixed morale. It was understandably proud of its operational record. Its intellectual focus on forward presence and the emphasis of strike capabilities from different platforms invigorated the service. The Navy was successful in fielding a number of new ship types that began to form the backbone of the fleet for years to come. In addition, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier continued to be procured and operated. Shedding legacy platforms as part of the mandated reductions was a necessary but ultimately helpful exercise. The Navy was able to have the defense establishment accept and embrace the consensus that buttressed “…From the Sea”, particularly its primacy of power projection. However, there was a concern about further waning ship numbers and the degree of readiness. ASW and ASuW capabilities were declining at a time when regional powers such as China or Iran began to concentrate on A2AD measures to keep the U.S. Navy at bay. A physical and intellectual restructuring of the blue-water fleet to focus more on constabulary and diplomatic roles did not occur.

After the attack on the Cole, force protection became a major concern for operators, emblematic of the Navy’s overall focus on sub-strategic issues during the better part of the 1990s. The Navy strategies of the 1990s were, therefore, an expression of a desire to comprehend the complex post-Cold War world in transition. They sought to give strategic direction to a technological-enhanced Navy, while trying to strike a conceptual balance between the ‘high end’
conventional high-seas capabilities and dawning ‘low end’ littoral proficiency, asymmetric challenges, and other hybrid missions. The 1990s were replete with challenges related to military and political planning in the face of uncertainty. Those dynamics interposed the careful crafting of a truly maritime national strategy, and the Navy only occasionally achieved some success in their subordinate naval programs. The American *fin de siècle* was characterized by scattered crises, conflicts, wars, and policy conditions at home which bore little resemblance to the Cold War days. This illustrates that strategy often emerges pragmatically. There are inherent limits to designing it academically. Numerous demands or events may lure strategic planners to shed any strategic aspirations whatsoever. Scandals, lack of direction (deliberate or accidental), or simply the wrong people at the wrong time inhibit the most logical and sensible strategic-planning template. The art of strategy needs talent, and talent needs to be groomed. If conditions are adverse, even the most motivated artist will eventually be discouraged.
10 Implementing a Sea Power Rationale for the 21st Century (2001-2011)

As the view went forward in 2000 as to what the 21st century may hold, the full ramifications of the information age and the consequences of globalization were emerging slowly. And certainly hardly anyone was considering the impact of a series of coordinated terrorist attacks, beginning with 11 September 2001, which effectively ended the first post-Cold War decade and, as some would have it, America’s “holiday from history” in the 1990s.

10.1 Prelude

For America and much of the rest of the world, the election of George W. Bush as 43rd President of the United States reigned in the new decade politically. Due to the chaotic course of the November 2000 election, the Bush team had substantially less time than previous administrations to transition into office. It is not without a degree of irony that Bush’s initial foreign and national security policy until 11 September 2001 bore little resemblance to the policies that followed after the terrorist strikes. In fact, Bush was more domestically focused, even nationalist, than his predecessor. Much like all presidents, Bush was relatively cautious on the international scene. The Bush administration had focused its foreign policy attention on Russia and China, on determining whether a Middle East peace settlement was in the cards, and on building a ballistic missile defense system (Leffler 2011). Rogue states (like Iraq) as emerging challengers were also discussed, not least because Saddam Hussein continued to be a nuisance (vast amounts of military resources were being tied up enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones as well as the sanctions program).

Initially, no single dominant threat emerged for the Bush team. Radical Islam, for one, was not seen as a major challenge, and international terrorism was not perceived as a major national security or defense issue per se (Naftali 2006). Instead, Bush saw an opportunity to implement an ambitious program of domestic military transformation driven by a sustained belief in modularity, precision-guided ammunition, information technology, high-tech weaponry, and stealth, in short: Transformation. In essence, this concept tied together the promises of network-centric warfare with the range of state and non-state actors that were seen as having potential to undermine American security. It promised cost-effectiveness and reduced the likelihood of the U.S. being dragged into murky wars and conflicts with substantial ground

345 In an incident in April 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 jet collided in international airspace over the South China Sea. The Navy airplane made an emergency landing on the Chinese Hainan Island, where the crew of 24 was detained by Chinese authorities for 11 days. The bilateral crisis was eventually defused through negotiations. See Shirley Khan et al. (2001) for details.
troops. As it were, military transformation was increasingly not evaluated by its contribution to political goals, but slowly morphed into becoming an end in itself. Once again, this touched the delicate question that every president has to find an answer for: Just what kind of armed conflict the United States would use its military for? For a president that had underlined in his campaign that the military should not be used for nation-building purposes, hailing the promises of transformation fit well into an idealistic outlook (Bush 1999).

10.2 U.S. Navy Strategy 2001-2011: The Macro Level

10.2.1 Global Trends & Challengers to U.S. Security

One of the most striking developments, at least in hindsight, is the relatively quick narrowing of the power and influence gap between the implicit leader United States – the benevolent hegemon – and other nations. The web of interdependencies that was created significantly influenced political leverages. Economic globalization induced political dependencies (and vice versa). The sea-borne proportion of global trade leveled off at approximately 90%, underlining the importance of maritime security to facilitate trade and exchange. The cyber domain finally evolved into a global common akin to sea, air, and space. With its vast opportunities also came the increasingly visible threat of cybercrime by organized syndicates and even states, as well as comprehensive surveillance and tracing opportunities for federal authorities.

The far-reaching global financial crisis of 2008 signaled an end to unipolarity, the post-Cold War arrangement that replaced the bipolar U.S.-Soviet bloc order. It gave way to a diffuse form of multipolarity (which the incoming Obama administration initially embraced as a foundation for its defense policy only to witness its limits militarily in operations such as “Odyssey Dawn” against Libya in 2011, or the crisis management in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea littorals 2013/2014). This order substituted predominant U.S. primacy with the emergence of more than one power center. Between 2001 and 2011, a number of regional blocs and relationships increasingly integrated to qualify, and sometimes hinder, U.S. influence. The world witnessed mounting competition over natural resources and intangible goods such as knowledge, education, and access to markets and regions. Demographic shifts in the composition and displacement of the population entered the minds of decision-makers

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346 On the tightening and deepening of interdependencies of the world since 1945, see Iriye (2014).  
347 This development is all the more dramatic given the fierce intellectual debates that came with it. In the U.S., conservative columnist and opinion-leader Charles Krauthammer, after postulating the “unipolar moment” in a 1990 Foreign Affairs journal article, went as far as describing a “unipolar era” in a National Interest article in 2003. His views were countered by Francis Fukuyama, who criticized the offensive nature of neo-conservative thinking that underlined such a worldview (Krauthammer 1990, 2002; Fukuyama 2004).
as a factor for strategic planning. China built up its military, especially its naval forces. In 2001, China founded the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Initiative (SCO), a Eurasian political, military, and economic organization headquartered in Beijing (Boland 2011).  

U.S. relations with Russia were less cordial than in the 1990s, when Moscow was fervently attempting to halt the disintegration of what was left of the post-Cold War political influence and coherence. The Arctic emerged as a potential area of contention between Russia, the U.S., and other littoral states. The balance of power in Europe between 2001 and 2011 was stable and by-and-large favorable to U.S. security interests (the recent, relatively unforeseen resurgence of Russian military power in the 2014 Crimea/Ukraine crisis may change that) (Stent 2014). U.S. military forces held a sustained presence with peacekeeping efforts on the Balkans. In addition, NATO and the EU underwent increasing consolidation, integration, and political expansion (while their militaries shrank at precipitous rates) (Giegerich 2012, Weidenfeld 2013).  

The Middle East and the African continent, however, remained among the most chaotic and dangerous regions of the world. Rogue states such as Syria challenged American (and by implication Western) primacy regionally. North Korea emerged as a new, albeit unofficial and certainly very much unwelcome member of the exclusive club of countries fielding a nuclear arsenal (Niksch 2010, Chanlet-Avery/Rinehart 2014). Iran, on the other hand, continued to be suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program (Crist 2012: 489-491). Both countries allegedly thrived from a proliferation network administered by a Pakistani nuclear scientist. Undoubtedly, such powerful weapons in the hands of aggressive rogue regimes posed a significant threat to U.S. security and global well-being, not least because they serve as tools to dominate regional balances of power. The problem was amplified when such states were on the verge of collapse, and/or provided their nuclear material to non-state rogue actors. Failing or failed states spawned a number of problems and potential threats that informed and motivated U.S. action under the umbrella of a “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) (Feickert 2005).  

348 The SCO evolved from the Shanghai Five group of states and forms a Eurasian political, military, and economic organization – without the United States.  
349 NATO welcomed Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999 as new members to the alliance. In 2004, it added Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined, bringing the membership count to 28 states as of July 2014. The European Union was enlarged by 10 countries in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, and Cyprus) and added two more during the decade, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. With Croatia, which joined in 2013, the EU stands at 28 member states as well.  
350 The expression was first used by President Bush Jr. on 20 September 2001 in an address before a Joint Session of Congress (Bush 2001). Subsequently, the phrase – and derivations such as “War on Terror” – was used to
decade, the U.S. remained the only comprehensive superpower for much of the time. It retained the ability to field the most advanced military and, until the deep and sustained economic crisis 2007-2009, rested on an economic preponderance.

Five broad challenges to U.S. security characterized the first decade of the 21st century. First, states like China, Iran, and North Korea remained focal points in military planning and Iraq drew a lot of attention. Before 9/11, the military was in a holding pattern, waiting for something bad to happen. With the events of 9/11, terrorism – the second broad challenge – took center-stage. Prior to the attacks in New York and Washington, terrorism in the eyes of the Department of Defense was primarily a law-enforcement task. The attack on the guided-missile destroyer Cole (DDG 67) in Aden (Yemen) on 12 October 2000 began to change that, not least because this particular act of maritime terrorism was in retaliation to cruise missile launches against Sudan in 1998, which in turn were ordered after the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania that year (see chapter 9). Connecting the dots, however, was an arduous task and did not yield palpable results before 9/11. Terrorism in its new form – unlike the first generation in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s which often centered on political representatives of a system although a lot of civilians lost their lives, too – targeted Americans per se, often in frustration about perceived or actual backwardness in the Islamic world (Hacke 2005: 635). The high number of civilians killed in a single attack and the means of hijacked commercial airliners were fundamentally novel. It was quickly determined that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin-Laden and his organization were behind the attacks that killed 3,000 people. Al-Qaeda’s sanctuary was Afghanistan, a Central Asian country ravaged by decades of Soviet intervention from 1979 to 1988 and a subsequent bloody civil war. The Taliban, a radical Islamic group that ruled large parts of the country since 1996, provided al-Qaeda with a safe haven. Even with this sanctuary routed, pockets and regional affiliate of al-Qaeda spawned. In the process, al-Qaeda utilized weak, failing, and failed states to establish regional terrorism organizations that participated in a religiously-motivated global campaign against “the West”. Examples include al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, on the Arab peninsula, and loosely-organized Islamic subsidiaries in several other regions of the world (Krause 2014: 21-24). The number of

describe the comprehensive anti-terrorism national security and foreign policies of the early 2000s. In the meantime, the term has further evolved into the more politically-correct “Overseas Contingency Operations” (OCO). The War on Terror was also adopted by allies to implement sweeping changes in their foreign, defense, and homeland security policies – but perhaps none of which were as far-reaching as the changes that were instituted in and by the U.S. itself.

351 When American Airlines flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon that day taking the lives of 189 people aboard and on the ground, it also significantly decimated the Navy’s Strategic Concepts Group (N513). That OPNAV branch’s office spaces were located in the E-Ring portion of the building where the jet impacted. For details, see Goldberg/Papadopoulos/Putney et al. (2007).
transnational terrorist incidents (some of them maritime) climbed from 2001 and their lethality soared.\footnote{National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland (2014). Despite wide-reaching expectations to the contrary, maritime terrorism has been a rather rare occurrence. Only a fraction of all terrorist attacks happen at sea or against a maritime/naval target. See Murphy (2009: 183-375) and Lehr (2013) for detailed discussions of the seldom use of explosives, suicide bombers, stand-off missiles, and shaft mines at and from the sea.}

A third major challenge arose from the ascent of the BRICS, a loosely organized group of countries consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. These rising or resurging powers are understood as coming contenders in the markets of information technology, defense industry, and other vital areas. In contrast to the G-7/G-8, this group is often considered as a counterweight to more developed economies. Their rapid ascension usually rests on dynamics inherent in these particular developing countries, including favorable demographics (with the exception of Russia), inexpensive labor, and centralized systems of government (Looney 2014).

The fourth challenge came with the proliferation of nuclear weapons (as well as, negligibly, biological and chemical agents). While the safety and security of the arsenal of established nuclear powers and signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) continued to be an objective, the first decade of the 2000s saw an increasingly worrisome trend of rogue states, renegade regimes, terrorist networks, and non-state actors attempting to obtain such ultimate weapons of mass destruction. The fear of proliferated nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (or components thereof) drove the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003. From an American point of view, it was the prospect of rogue regimes, organized criminals, or terrorists fielding a bomb – even if it was a crude (“dirty”) one – against U.S. or allied targets (Medalia 2011).

A fifth challenge to U.S. national security arose from overstretching America’s funds, forces, and political capital in the wake of 9/11. A complex amalgam of the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (both in capital and in human costs), the large investments in security and safety on the home front, an impending recession, and a rising unwillingness of the people to support the ground wars in Southwest Asia contributed to an overstretched and increasingly hollowed American position. While the U.S. retained military and economic primacy, it also learned the limits and legacies of costly, sustained military nation-building campaigns (Bilmes 2013, Katz 2014).
These roughly sketched global trends and the related challengers to U.S. security once again determined what kind of wars America wanted to fight and what kinds of conflicts it would contend with.

10.2.2 Conflicts, Crises, and Wars

“I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you. And the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon!”

(President George W. Bush speaking to rescue workers on 14 September 2001 at ‘Ground Zero’, New York City)

The armed conflicts that characterized the decade in most fundamental geopolitical and doctrinal terms were the U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although both wars were in principle conducted under the umbrella of the global campaign against terrorism, there are obvious fundamental differences between the two. What does hold true for both is that the collective shock and anger that the U.S. experienced over the attack on America on 9/11 (which earned compassion and solidarity with the United States around the world immediately following the catastrophe) dramatically changed American politics and policies. After 9/11, the U.S. was determined to target regimes that actively supported or even harbored terrorists, fully aware that strikes against elusive non-state adversaries such as al-Qaida would be significantly more difficult to conduct than to go after their sponsors. Following that notion and based on intelligence available and processed immediately after 9/11, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was identified as providing al-Qaida with an impeccable safe haven. On 7 October 2001, little under a month after the terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched military strikes in an effort to unseat the regime in Kabul and rid the terrorist network of its major sanctuary. In conjunction with British forces and in support of a drive by the Northern Alliance (a loose anti-Taliban coalition) toward the Afghan capital, the primary objective was quickly achieved (Woodward 2002). However, al-Qaida and in particular its leader Osama Bin Laden remained on the run as the fighting shifted into the ungoverned mountainous areas of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. After the quick military victory over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, U.N. Security Council resolution 1386 (December 2001) paved the way for the

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353 For an analyses of the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks and the circumstances under which they happened, see the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004).

354 Pakistan fields nuclear weapons but is instable internally. Nevertheless, it rose to become an important ally of the U.S. in the war on terrorism. Wreaked with a weak central government and caught in a three-way conflict with India, Afghanistan, and the U.S., Pakistan also became a major policy burden. Successive U.S. administrations sought to confront the dilemma by a sticks-and-carrot policies. The paradoxical relationship between Pakistan and the United States is best characterized by the fact that Osama bin Laden spent the last years of his life under cover in a house in the Abbottabad in North Eastern Pakistan. He was killed in a night raid conducted by Navy Special Warfare unit (“Operation Neptune’s Spear”) in the morning hours of 2 May 2011 (Bergen 2012, Owen/Maurer 2012).
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whose objective was training and support of indigenous Afghan national security forces. More than 40 countries ultimately contributed forces or other support for the mission. In 2003, NATO assumed the responsibility for ISAF. The U.S. continued to contribute, but the bulk of forces remained under a separate, national (American) command (Dale 2011). Under pressure from the resurging violent Taliban movement, foreign extremists infiltrating the country, diverging and contradicting political and military objectives in the coalition and in civil-military affairs, ravaging corruption in the Afghan government, and mounting costs and casualties for ISAF, the comprehensive nation-building attempt came to a grinding halt. The international community remained increasingly bogged down in Afghanistan (Dale 2014). By late 2002 the United States had already opened a second major front in its global campaign against terrorism (Woodward 2004).

In the course of that year, it became apparent that the Bush administration focused on Saddam Hussein and Iraq as the subject of regime change. This time, the international community was divided about the path forward. Like his father, Bush enlisted the United Nations as a forum to obtain an international mandate for removing Hussein from power. After the U.N. Security Council remained unconvinced of Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction plans and his connection to international terrorism, the United States forfeited a legal mandate and assembled a “coalition of the willing” instead. While European allies like the U.K., Spain, Denmark, or Poland sided with the U.S., others such as France and Germany remained in opposition. The U.S.-led intervention dubbed “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (OIF) succeeded in quickly driving Hussein from power and routing Iraq’s regular military forces. In a speech aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) on 1 May 2003, a triumphant President Bush declared major combat operations over. However, Iraq soon descended into a violent civil war. The U.S. military and political leadership found itself unprepared for the unexpected insurgency that ensued. The transition from a large standing Cold War military to a smaller, agile, and flexible posture to address 21st century warfare demands was in full swing, but post-invasion planning and the nation-building challenges remained largely unaccounted for in 2002 and 2003. Only after a concerted effort to revamp U.S. military thinking and operations – a process that yielded the development of a 21st century counterinsurgency doctrine between 2005 and 2007 – could the violence in Iraq be contained.

355 For authoritative analyses of the War in Afghanistan, see Jones (2010) and Tomsen (2013: 517-712), 356 For the utilization of the U.N. for Bush’s policies, see Bruns (2008: 81-122). 357 Weapons of mass destruction, the principal justification for removing Hussein from power (and keeping in mind the use of chemical weapons, these grounds were not completely groundless), were not found. Saddam Hussein was arrested by U.S. troops on 13 December 2003 near his home town Tikrit. A special tribunal found him guilty and he was executed on 30 December 2006 in Baghdad.
A similar approach was attempted for Afghanistan, where the insurgency had substantially different characteristics.\footnote{The development of counterinsurgency doctrine in light of the events in Iraq and Afghanistan is a key study in how military is forced to adapt to changing strategic, operational, and tactical parameters. This process occurred in the middle of sweeping changes to post-Cold War force structure, technology and thinking. The push for modernized, or transformed, military force heavily relying on network-centric warfare while U.S. forces on the ground were bitterly fighting an asymmetric war therefore pitted against each other very contrasting threads and understandings of how to the next war would be fought (and won). On the genesis of counterinsurgency doctrine from the hard lessons in Iraq, see Ricks (2006), West (2008), and Crane (2010). On the development of that doctrine in the view of one key participant, see Nagl (forthcoming). ISAF’s strategic restart in light of previous mistakes is described by Schroeder (2014).}

The deepening of tensions in Iraq especially between 2004 and 2006 shifted valuable resources and public attention away from Afghanistan. The Iraq War, an Albatross around America’s neck, formally concluded in December 2011 with the withdrawal of the last U.S. military advisors. In his Presidential campaign in 2008, Democratic candidate Barack Obama promised to end the costly and widely unpopular U.S. deadlock in Southwest and Central Asia.\footnote{According to the report issued by Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government in March 2013, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cost the U.S. between $4 and $6 trillion dollars including long-term medical care and veteran compensation (Bilmes 2013). According to the website icasualties.org, 4,804 coalition military died, 4,486 of which (~ 93%) were American. Estimates for Iraqi civilian and military casualties usually range well above 100,000. For the (on-going) operations in Afghanistan, icasualties.org (as of 25 July 2014) listed 3,462 coalition troops deaths, 2,335 of which (~67%) were American. Estimates for Afghan civilian and insurgent casualties usually range well above.} Accordingly, once elected as President, he decided to send an additional 30,000 combat troops to Afghanistan to focus on that particular arena (Gates 2014). Recognizing the asymmetric nature of the conflict, the overwhelming American military edge, its technological innovation, and the potent military-industrial base at home drove an intensification of the campaign using increasingly more covert and technologically advanced methods (i.e., intelligence, Special Forces, and unmanned systems). Notwithstanding the focus areas of Afghanistan and Iraq, the global nature of the war on terrorism remained in place. For example, “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) featured operations off the Horn of Africa, in the Philippines, in the Sahara, in the Caribbean, and in Central America. In addition, the U.S. intensified military, intelligence, and anti-terrorism cooperation with many allied and friendly nations worldwide. The number of al-Qaida-related terrorist attacks rose visibly between 2001 and 2011. It included high-profile attacks on civilian targets in Indonesia (2002), Tunisia (2002), Turkey (2003), Saudi-Arabia (2003), Spain (2004), and Great Britain (2005). Numerous other plots were thwarted. At the same time, al-Qaida and affiliates dispersed from their
bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan and spread out to other areas including North Africa, Somalia, and the Arabian Peninsula (Rollins 2011).

The strategic landscape that formed the focal point of the Global War on Terrorism had a colossal maritime and littoral dimension. From East to West, it encompassed the world’s most important maritime chokepoints (such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Bosporus/Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Straits of Malacca), major trading and transit routes, extensive coastlines, and most importantly a significant portion of the world’s oil reserves. The concurrence of Islamist fundamentalism in areas indispensable to the global economy spelled a theoretical scenario in which isolated small-group terrorist actions could single-handedly curtail or even stop the flow of petroleum and throw the international system (in particular in the Western Hemisphere where dependence on Middle East natural resources is paramount) into chaos (Murphy 2008: 183-375). Such a threat-oriented perception yielded the insight that national and systemic security – that is, the national security of the United States on the one hand, but also the systemic security of the international order that the U.S. underwrote in part by its military might – were so subtly intertwined as to be indistinguishable in practice. This had fundamental consequences for policy planners and military leaders if the military’s purpose should accordingly be viewed in relation to systemic requirements (Haynes 2013: 283).

Even when the war against terrorist networks and their sponsors as well as the two expeditionary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan notoriously dominated America’s security concerns, more traditional dynamics of power play returned to center-stage. The short Russo-Georgian War (2008) highlighted a more assertive Russia in Eastern Europe that routinely used military and economic coercion to attain political objectives. In Southeast Asia, where a devastating tsunami in December 2004 provided insight into the force and fallout of a natural disaster, China and North Korea desired continued attention as their regional military aspirations fueled crises and concerns. China increasingly fielded global power and influence and American-Chinese economic interdependence deepened significantly by 2008. China’s

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361 China served as the second largest trading partner for the U.S. and its largest source of imports; for the U.S., China was the largest holder of U.S. public debt and the third-largest U.S. export market. In turn, the U.S. was China’s largest single trading partner, its fourth largest source of imports, and its largest export market (Swartz 2011j: 20, slide 39).
military modernization drove sustained change in East Asia, with conflicts over dominion in the East and South China Seas but one example. While the U.S. Navy carefully eyed Chinese naval growth with a mixture of uncertainty and professional interest, other states in the region such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore quickly began to modernize their military forces (in particular their navies) in the 2000s (Till/Chan 2013). For example, India began a comprehensive update and expansion of its naval force (most recently by laying the keel for its first indigenously-built aircraft carrier Vikrant, and commissioning its first SSBN in 2009). Japan and South Korea, uneasy about China’s ascendance, began to upgrade their forces as well. In addition, North Korean hostility against Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. continued. Diplomatic efforts to limit the North’s nuclear capabilities and attempts for détente yielded little progress. The development of nuclear weapons and their testing (9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009, respectively) signaled the regime’s desperate conviction that only nuclear capability would significantly offset its own collapse. This occurred against the backdrop of a continued change of conventional power on the peninsula in favor of South Korea, which became a major economic and military player in East Asia, increasingly fielding blue-water naval forces with oceanic reach (including three Aegis-equipped destroyers and a helicopter carrier) (Till 2012).

More militarily subtle but nevertheless fundamental global issues rose in urgency throughout the 2000s: Increasing globalization underlined the imperative to hedge against the widening gap (and resulting conflict potential) between the poor and the rich. Climate change (the scope of which is still a hotly disputed issue in some U.S. political quarters) signaled by a significant rise in natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, droughts, and devastating storms, could potentially undermine fragile societies and thus create security and stability problems (Burke et al. 2008). In addition, after the 2000 Millennium Summit in New York the U.N. called attention to addressing major fundamental grievances of the Third World population. The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were a blueprint in a hope to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, achieve universal primary education, combat major diseases, and achieve global sustainability by the year 2015. In the classical sense, these did not concern military (much less naval or maritime) strategy; in the contemporary understanding of networked and comprehensive security, one that contributes to stabilizing the global

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It should be noted that while PLAN-USN relations continued to be professional but marked with concerns about Chinese naval assertiveness (in particular anti-access and area denial in the Western Pacific), U.S. Coast Guard relations with the Chinese Coast Guard flourished during the 2000s and included routine port USCG port visits to China, coordinated fishery enforcement patrols, and best practice exchanges (Swartz 2011j: 32, slide 64).
system, they are very much of relevance to strategic planners (Blanchfield/Lawson 2010, Archer/Willi 2012).

10.3 Personalities, Domestic Conditions, and National Security Strategies

10.3.1 Presidents, Secretaries, and Policy/Strategy Leaders

The presidency of George W. Bush (‘Bush 43’ in the American differentiation) drew on a number of seasoned individuals who had served in national security related positions reaching back to the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush (‘Bush 41’ in the American differentiation). The expertise that Bush 43 thus was able to enlist helped propel the national security roster of the former Texan governor (who was by and large inexperienced in security policy and defense affairs) to substantial quality. As a foreign policy novice, he relied heavily on his experienced team that offset his public image. His relatively casual managerial style at first fell in line with a more nationalist foreign policy plan that echoed Bush’s election campaign in 2000. After 9/11, and in particular in the 2004 Presidential campaign, he pursued a very activist foreign and security policy underwritten by a Manichean philosophy and fashioned himself a war president. Throughout his presidency, Bush left considerable leverage to his more experienced cabinet and staff (Woodward 2002, Woodward 2004, Mann 2004).

Vice President Richard “Dick” Cheney consolidated conservative influence and considerable shaping power of Bush’s foreign policy. Cheney had been Secretary of Defense 1989-1993 for Bush 41 and in that capacity oversaw the end of the Cold War and “Operation Desert Storm” (Cheney had also been White House Chief of Staff during the Ford Presidency). Donald Rumsfeld joined the Bush 43 administration as Secretary of Defense (2001-2006) after having served in the same capacity (1975-1977) under President Ford. Rumsfeld was an ardent supporter of the Revolution in Military Affairs, which promised a far leaner, more agile, and principally smaller military footprint in support of U.S. security and defense objectives. He was also highly motivated to re-assert civilian control over the Joint Staff and the military services. For him, the military leaders could produce doctrine and vision statements and were encouraged to think in global terms, but they could not and should not do strategy.

365 Rumsfeld was arguably the senior administration official to be directly affected by the terrorist attacks of 9/11: he was in the Pentagon on 11 September when the building was attacked. His office and those of other senior military leaders (save for the Navy Command Center) were spared, but Rumsfeld helped survivors at the crash site (Goldberg et al. 2007).
For the services to develop strategic concepts on their own amounted to gross insubordination (Haynes 2013: 227). The Deputy Secretary of Defense was Paul Wolfowitz, a former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy for Bush Sr. At the State Department, Colin Powell – former Reagan National Security Advisor (1987-1989) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush 41 (1989-1993) – took the lead. Richard Armitage (among others, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under Reagan and a former naval officer involved in the evacuation operations of South Vietnam in April 1975) became Deputy Secretary of State. As his National Security Advisor, George W. Bush picked Condoleezza Rice, the former professor at Stanford University who as an NSC staffer had played a key role in managing the end of the Cold War and relations with the Soviet Union for Bush’s father. In January 2005, she replaced Powell at the top of the State Department (Rice 2011).

In short, Bush 43 fundamentally relied on people whose outlook was shaped by their experiences during and toward the end of the Cold War. With a few notable exceptions such as Secretary Powell, many of these seasoned “Cold Warriors” were also part of a resurging intellectual movement. These so-called neoconservatives were an idealistic and missionary group whose ideas rooted in disappointment with liberalism and protest against counter-culture. Their central security-policy views included a push for a strong military, the call for unilateral U.S. interventionism to safeguard national interests, and criticism of international forums.

Bush 43’s foreign and security policy advisory circle (dubbed the “Vulcans” after a statue of the Roman god by the same name in Condoleezza Rice’s Alabama hometown) found considerable overlapping of their own career views and these intellectual currents. With problems looming large for the administration when the campaign in Iraq did not progress as envisioned, changes were made in the administration’s line-up during the second term. Most prominently, these included Rumsfeld’s demis; he was replaced by Robert “Bob” Gates in December 2006. Among other things, Gates made the troops surges in Afghanistan and Iraq his immediate priority. He also oversaw the production of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense

366 A critical acclaimed study of that mission led by the Knox-class frigate Kirk (FF 1087) is Jan Herman’s The Lucky Few (2013).

367 In his study on the idea’s influence on U.S. foreign policy, Patrick Keller argued that Bush was hardly an instrument for the neocons (2008: 168-169). Instead, neoconservatism was rather part of a canon of ideas which helped shape Bush’s policy and give it an intellectual underpinning. On Bush’s war cabinet, see Mann (2004). Except for Powell and Rice, many members of the Bush administration were also directly involved the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). In 1998, this think tank issued an open letter to President Clinton. In it, a team of well-known conservatives called to remove Saddam Hussein from power to offset the threat of weapons of mass destruction and wide instability and insecurity to the Middle East and American interests. Signatories included Armitage, John Bolton, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalizad, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Rumsfeld, James Woolsey, and Wolfowitz. The letter was widely regarded as a blueprint for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Many of the supporters of the letter rose to important positions in the administration of Bush 43.
Review. Gates, who previously had a career with the Central Intelligence Agency, remained in office until July 2011. He thus became the first Secretary of Defense to serve successive Presidential administration from opposing political parties.

Barack Obama, previously a Democratic Senator from Illinois, was elected as 44th President of the United States in November 2008. His charisma and eloquence allowed him a stellar rise inside his party and his popularity with many Americans (and very significantly with people all over the world) soared. Obama’s election promised a renewed political spirit and a less militaristic foreign-policy tone. He focused strongly on overcoming what was perceived as the spirit of the Bush years. Obama invested considerable personal and political capital in the establishment of a general health care system in the United States which ate away at the time and energy to be spent on foreign policy. Ironically, Obama pursued very idealist, almost utopian goals in the international arena. Obama – a novice to this area like so many of his predecessors – promised, among other things, closing the terrorist detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, ending the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, extending an outstretched hand to the Muslim world, an effort to dismantle all nuclear weapons worldwide (“Global Zero”), and a re-set in U.S.-Russian relations. The sheer aspiration of all of this earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009.

His security policy team included Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman Mullen (both of which were carried over from Bush 43). Hillary Clinton (Obama’s presidential primary rival) served as Secretary of State. With such a seasoned staff, the president aimed to offset his foreign policy inexperience and create a bipartisan thrust to clear the strategic and military problems that the U.S. faced. He also hoped to create momentum that supported his decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan by mid-2010. As such, Obama sought to equilibrate his new ideas with the enduring political, military, and strategic demands of a nation that at the time had also been at war for more than five years. This balancing act strained the Obama presidency as the crisis of the U.S. economy deepened. His foreign policy until 2011 was seen increasingly unenforceable and considered lacking direction and traction. That was exacerbated by a White House team that was often perceived as too young, isolated, inexperi-

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368 Gates was succeeded by Leon Panetta (2011-2013) who in turn was relieved by Chuck Hagel (since 2013). Clinton was succeeded by John Kerry after Obama’s reelection for a second presidential term. Other high-level appointees include General (retired) James Jones, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, as National Security Advisor (2009-2011), veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan (2009-2010), and experienced emissary and former Democratic Senator George John Mitchell as special envoy for Middle East peace.
enced, and distrustful of a military altogether, which it increasingly sought to micromanage (Gates 2013).

On Capitol Hill, the Bush administration could count on a Republican majority in the Senate from 2003 to 2007 and the House of Representatives from 2001 to 2007. In the 110th Congress (2006-2008), the Democrats wrested control of both chambers from the Republicans and for two years, with newly-elected Democratic President Obama in the White House, that party enjoyed a brief period of united government (through the 111th Congress, 2008-2010); the 2010 midterm (for the 112th Congress) elections then brought a landslide victory for Republicans, which won a substantial majority in the House. A major driver behind that development was the ascendancy of the so-called Tea Party, a conglomerate of libertarian and conservative interest groups that sought to roll back government influence, taxation, and social welfare program spending. Often vigorously opposed to President Obama as an individual, it began to dominate many Republican primaries and the political day-to-day discourse (Jacobson 2011).

Back in the Pentagon, the Department of the Navy witnessed considerable continuity in the early 2000s. Gordon England, who had had a career in the defense industry, served as the 72nd and as the 73rd Secretary of the Navy (2001-2003, 2003-2006) (Department of the Navy 2009). England’s priorities were a focus on current operational demands (e.g., the war on terrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and homeland security) and maintenance of a surge capability. “Naval Power 21…A Naval Vision” (2002) was the only Navy strategic capstone document that England co-signed. Despite spending almost as much time as Secretary of the Navy as his Reagan-era predecessor John Lehman, England was considerably less activist in formulating the strategic importance of American sea power. After five years in the top civilian position of the Navy, England ascended to Deputy Secretary of Defense for the remainder of the Bush presidency. His successor at the top of the Navy Department was Donald Winter, a businessman who held the top civilian position of the Department of the Navy from 2006-2009. Winter continued the focus on the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and taking care of veterans and their families, building of the future fleet of ships, and acquisition reform (Department of Defense 2009). None of the capstone documents of that period bore Winter’s signature. After the transition to the Obama Presidency, Ray Mabus, a former gov-

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369 His tenure was interrupted by an eight-month period in 2003 when England became the first Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the new department established in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
ernor of Mississippi, was confirmed as Secretary of the Navy in 2009. Mabus still holds that position today.

Admiral Vern Clark served as Chief of Naval Operations for the first half of the decade. From 2000-2005, Clark oversaw the aftermath of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the global campaign against terrorism. In contrast to many of his predecessors, Clark embraced jointness in that he did not see the Navy as responsible for developing its own strategic narratives. In addition, Clark wanted to carefully groom the politically important relationships to the Pentagon leadership. The first CNO with a Master in Business Administration (MBA), he sought to optimize many of the Navy’s habitual business procedures. He was an advocate of the Lean 6 Sigma management philosophy, a business principle that focused on eliminating inefficiencies. Although Clark’s interest in a glossy strategy publication was limited, it occurred to him that he still needed a tool to broadcast his priorities. During his tenure, no less than five OPNAV offices worked on U.S. Navy strategic statements and similar projects simultaneously (Swartz 2011i: 4, slides 7-8). Clark co-signed major capstone documents such as “Sea Power 21” (2002), which concentrated on projection of sea power from the littorals ashore. The “Fleet Response Plan” (2003), which Clark also signed, altered the way the Navy deployed (it introduced surging the fleet from its continental U.S. bases in times of crisis as a complementary measure to dogmatic forward naval presence). Under Clark’s direction, the Navy introduced the concept of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). This was a new task force built on the previous Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which now integrated amphibious warships and the U.S. Marine Corps with combat power delivered by guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, a frigate, and a fast-attack submarine. These improved operational formations complemented, and in some case compensated for, aircraft carrier groups (CSG) centered on big-deck carriers. Clarke was the second-longest serving CNO when he retired in 2005 (Department of Defense 2005). His successor was Admiral Michael “Mike” Mullen (previously Commander, Allied Forces Europe, and Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples). A surface warfare officer, Mullen was a strategically sensitive CNO with an appreciation for integration of capabilities and resources. Mullen actively engaged and presided over the development of a new strategy that included a principally system-centric approach, be carried by the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, and feature new

370 A tour that was crucial to Mullen’s take on the military, as Haynes (2013: 278) states: “Mullen blossomed intellectually during his tour as commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe. Given that he basically had no shops to command, he had to find more nuanced ways to advance U.S. security policy. He grew to appreciate […] ‘soft power’ […] through personal relationships […] with officials from other nations, U.S. federal agencies, and international organizations, governmental and non-governmental alike.”
global initiatives under the umbrella of cooperation and common responsibility. Before submitting the strategy that became “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (or CS-21), Mullen’s tenure as CNO was cut unexpectedly short when he (as the first naval officer since the end of the Cold War) was nominated as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2007. Admiral Gary Roughead, who succeeded Mullen as CNO, built on his predecessor’s ideas before submitting CS-21 (and other signature policies), and held the position as CNO between 2007 and 2011. Roughead, with experience as fleet commander in the Pacific and the Atlantic under his belt, was the third surface warfare officer in a row to serve as Chief of Naval Operations. He was able to build on Mullen’s previous work, although he made some significant alterations to his predecessor’s initiatives, both in wording and substance (Fellman 2011).

General Richard Myers (USAF) held the top military position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 2001 to 2005. He had relieved General Hugh Shelton (USA), who served as CJCS from 1997-2001. Myers was tasked with the initial planning and execution of the operations in Afghanistan and against Iraq, in which the Air Force played a pivotal role. Myers’ successor was General Peter Pace (USMC), the first Marine to hold the position of Chairman in the history of the Joint Chiefs. Pace officiated from 2005-2007. After one term, he was – unexpectedly to many observers at the time – replaced.371 Secretary of Defense Gates recommended Admiral Mullen’s nomination as Chairman to President Bush in 2007 and to President Obama in 2009.372 Mullen’s priorities were the advocacy of a wider security and defense focus beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the reconstitution of the strained force (in particular the Army and the Marine Corps), and an embrace of the virtue of global partnerships and networks to confront the broad range of threats to U.S. security and interests.

Mullen’s nomination was the most visible in a series of naval flag officers rising to elevated national security and combatant command positions. Others included the selection of Vice Admiral Mike McConnell as Director of National Intelligence (serving from 2007 to 2009), Admiral William “Bill” McRaven as Commander, Special Operations Command (since 2011), Admiral William “Fox” Raven as Commander, Central Command (the first naval officer in that position, serving from 2007 to 2008), and Admiral Jim Stavridis as Commander,

371 Pace’s comments over the progress of the Iraq War cost him the second nomination. There were also grave concerns that the confirmation hearings in the Senate would have turned into a tribunal by the Democrats to attack the Republican foreign and security policy under Bush 43 (Gates 2014: 64-66).

372 Mullen retired in 2011 and was succeeded by General Martin Dempsey, USA.
10.3.2 Domestic Conditions

Gallup public opinion polls showed a steady decline in the perception of terrorism threats between 1996 and 2001, but the number unsurprisingly rose sharply after 9/11. It leveled off at roughly 40% of the participants being “worried” or “somewhat worried” (Gallup 2014). Domestically, the terrorist attack led to the strengthening and expansion of the national security state. This included increasing funds for surveillance, intelligence collection, data compiling and analysis, border security, and other law enforcement measures. A number of organizational reviews and realignments after 9/11 revealed critical gaps in counter-terrorism policy. In response, the Department of Homeland Security was created in March 2003. It pooled many responsibilities for national disaster preparation and relief (among which was the U.S. Coast Guard, previously under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation). Additionally, the national intelligence and security apparatus was substantially expanded and integrated. These measures reflected the momentary elevation of anti-terrorism to the top position of the U.S. national interest grid. This hardly changed, but certainly temporarily overshadowed established patterns of strategic decision-making. Security and military strategy were for the time being increasingly dominated by the new threat assessment. More and more funds poured into programs that could be justified as anti-terrorism measures. However, such wide-ranging decisions borne from fear of terrorist attack were also a visible demonstration of the mixing up of internal and external security. The “War on Terrorism” was the desperate attempt to fight an idea and a tactic by using military means. In effect, for many incidents that occurred in the 2000s, terrorism (and by implication fundamental Islam) was a convenient and often used template to frame such attacks, thus serving the broader narrative of the truly global struggle against terrorism. Undoubtedly, the domestic threat was real as a number of averted attacks suggest. By far, terrorism – or the perceived threat thereof to the homeland – was

373 These tenures were not always free of confrontation with senior leadership. Mullen had complained in public that the war in Iraq drew necessary resources from the war in Afghanistan, Fallon had urged not to go to war with Iran, and McConnell gave an interview for The New Yorker in which he characterized the controversial interrogation tactic of water boarding as torture, all of which did not fare well with President Bush (and prompting the president to ask his secretary of Defense, ‘What is it with these admirals?’) (Gates 2014: 187).

374 Many of these were codified in the USA PATRIOT Act (shorthand for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) which was signed into law on 26 October 2001. It yielded comprehensive counter-terrorism policies. The Act has been extended several times since, including by President Obama.

375 For a list of 40 foiled terrorism plots on American soil since 11 September 2001, see Carafano/Zuckerman (2011). One of the most significant events that could not be averted, although it was not conducted by al-Qaida directly, was the rampage at the Fort Hood (Texas) army base on 5 November 2009. Major Nidal Hassan, a U.S.
not the only domestic event of note that created a new sense of national security. Natural disasters also played a role in underlining the growing concern for homeland security. Two visible examples with distinct maritime dimensions were Hurricane ‘Katrina’ (August 2005)\(^376\) and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (April-July 2010).\(^377\)

Economically, the time between 2001 and 2011 was a tumultuous decade for the U.S. including stock market crashes, deep recessions, and rising income inequality. Despite that, the U.S. GDP climbed by more than 10% across the decade (2000: $12.68 trillion, 2010: $14.94 trillion, inflation-adjusted). Against the backdrop of a low inflation rate, modest economic growth during the first Bush administration was followed by a deep recession. It began as a subprime mortgage crisis in the summer 2007 and evolved into a full global banking and financial crisis by the summer of 2009.\(^378\) In the U.S., where the jobless rate was at a modest rate of 4.6% in 2006 and 2007, the numbers rose sharply to 9.3% (2009) and 9.6% (2010) as several million jobs were lost. The problem was magnified by the return of fiscal deficits caused by extended government outlays. It was compounded by Bush-era policies such as tax cuts and increasing defense-budget spending to cover the on-going costs of overseas operations.

For the 2009-2010 budget cycle this left the incoming Obama administration with one of the highest deficits since World War II (Montgomery/Connolly 2009). To bail out struggling industries such as the U.S. automobile branch, and to fund ambitious but contentious social welfare programs, the Obama administration followed inclinations of deficit spending. Conse-

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Army psychiatrist, killed 13 and wounded more than 30 others. It was a the deadliest shooting on a U.S. military base, with the rampage by a civilian contractor at the Washington Navy Yard on 16 September 2013 which left 12 dead and 8 others wounded a close second. Hassan had been in an e-mail exchange with the American-Yemini Islamic militant Anwar al-Awlaki, an al-Qaida associate. The incident confounded the internal and external dimensions of the long, straining war on terrorism and the effect that this could have on susceptible individuals.

\(^{376}\) The category 5 storm pummeled the Gulf of Mexico littorals in the summer of 2005. It devastated large areas in the Caribbean and from Louisiana to Florida, killing more than 1,800 people on its track and destroying large parts of New Orleans, Louisiana. The U.S. Navy assisted in the joint disaster response by dispatching search and rescue (SAR) assets and deploying a more than twenty ships – including the amphibious assault ship Bataan (LHD 5), the aircraft carrier Harry S Truman (CVN 75), the hospital ship Comfort (T-AH 20), and an expeditionary strike group centered on Iwo Jima (LHD 7) – within days after the catastrophe.

\(^{377}\) In April 2010, not far from where the hurricane had made landfall five years earlier, the oil-drilling platform Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank in the Gulf of Mexico. The event left 11 dead, but the ensuing oil spill – the largest in U.S. history – gushed until July and polluted vast areas of the U.S. Gulf Coast. It was estimated that about 4.9 million barrels were uncontrollably released into the sea. The Navy’s response included 60 skimming ships and boats as well as more than 300 personnel. For a detailed report of the Navy’s response to the Deepwater Horizon incident, see Naval Sea Systems Command, Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (2011).

\(^{378}\) The financial and economic collapse had its roots in flawed mortgage underwriting practices masked by complex derivative financial instruments. With many U.S. citizens bogged down in debt, consumption collapsed and the ensuing demand shortfall created massive unemployment.
quently, the budget deficit situation for the U.S. has worsened continuously amidst deepening political infighting between Congress and the White House. To fund the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the defense budget nearly doubled, rising from $408 billion in 2001 to $713 billion by 2010. Considerable chunks of the budget were also devoted to investments in defense procurements and the military buildup during the decade. Since 2003, the long-standing rule of thumb that the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy budgets would be roughly equal, was broken. The Army and the Marines were subject to increasing demands stemming from their central role in the ground wars on terrorism abroad, and consequently they were allocated more money. With that came a substantially increased public and political focus on these two branches of the military. According to Gallup polls, the Navy was seen as least important to national defense, ranking fourth behind the Marines, the Army, and the Air Force (Goldich/Swift 2014). The Navy’s story and its strategic place, it appeared, did not have a desired effect with the wider public, which increasingly began to grow accustomed to the Army and the Marines bearing the brunt of casualties in the “War on Terror”. In losing public support, the Navy risked undermining of the two of the three elements of a military service; namely (first) its purpose or role in implementing national policy and (second) the human and material resources it required to implement a strategic concept (Huntington 1954).

Illustration 31: U.S. Defense Budget, Department of the Navy share, FY 2001-FY 2011, in FY 12 billion US-$; GDP DoD share in % (Swartz 2011: 28, slide 56 and 57, slide 113). Congress failed to pass the budget for the FY 2011 (October 2010 – September 2011) by the deadline (30 September 2010) and the federal government operated on a series of continuing resolutions which kept spending at or near FY 2010 levels. The legislative deadlock cumulated in the threat of a government shutdown, but the budget bill was eventually enacted on 15 April 2011.
Three fundamentally domestic trends regarding the composition of the force, its reputation across the country, and the military-industrial base are also worth of mentioning.

- First, there was a further consolidation of the U.S. defense sector. It still centered on five large companies that offered across-the-board products and services (Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop-Grumman, and Raytheon).
- Second, 2005 saw another base realignment and closure (BRAC) round.\(^{379}\)
- Third, the American public generally supported the comprehensive military reaction to 9/11 and the buildup of forces that came with it. Large-scale anti-war protests were relatively rare occurrences, unlike the mass protest against the Vietnam War more than three decades earlier. However, the despicable human rights violations at the Abu Ghraib prison (Iraq) in 2003 and 2004, the questionable conditions at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (Cuba), and the widespread practices of “enhanced interrogation practices” (or in other words, torture) caused a significant dent in the reputation of military and civilian leaders in the U.S. and worldwide (Hersh 2004).

The national security consensus that emerged after 9/11 remained by-and-large intact, although the war in Iraq became so unpopular that ending the U.S. engagement became one of the chief campaign issues in the 2008 Presidential election. U.S. postwar planning for Afghanistan and more so for Iraq had been conducted on partially flawed expectations of short, decisive campaigns that could shed any nation-building tasks and quickly enable and empower democratic structures. As neither the troops nor their military and political leaders seemed to be prepared enough for the quagmires that emerged in Southwest Asia, discontent with the way the wars progressed began to grow. On the home front, the flood of wounded warriors overwhelmed hospitals and care facilities. Extended tours for servicemen and women put severe strains on many military families. It also appeared that the government bureaucracy (namely, the Department of Veterans Affairs) was ill-prepared for the massive numbers of veterans that returned from the battlefields (Gates 2014: 135-142).

10.3.3 Selected U.S. National Security Policies, Doctrines and Capstone Documents

It is instructive to consider the initial administration policies of the incoming Bush 43 administration in 2001 in order to understand the fundamental scope of his changed policy after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. His distinctively nationalist policies – some of

\(^{379}\) In addition to merging single-service installations to create joint bases, this round eliminated or relocated naval air stations in Maine, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Texas. The Naval Submarine Base in New London, Connecticut, and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, were both removed from the initial BRAC target list.
which survived the 9/11 watershed – marked a significant contrast to the Clinton years. Early examples include pursuing a national missile defense (NMD) shield, dismissing the Kyoto Protocol (an international agreement committing signatories to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in order to offset the effects of climate change), and a refusal to accept the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a legitimate body of international law. Bush also abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In addition, the administration did not make an effort to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which had been rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999. The U.S. Senate also prevented the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty. Perhaps most strikingly, the administration initially discarded the objective of nation-building as a task for the military. Instead, it proposed leaner, smaller, more agile forces fielding technological superiority to deter aggressors and quickly attain military ends in a future conflict. In the view of the president, the military’s purpose was not to engage in vague, aimless, and endless deployments. Instead, the future U.S. military was to deter wars and win the wars it was inevitably drawn into if deterrence failed.

After 9/11, Bush’s rhetoric and many policies changed visibly. Increasingly, a dialectical view not unlike the one from the Cold War days came to dominate the discourse. The threat this time was not the Soviet Union, but international terrorism administered by the al-Qaeda network. In his address before a joint session of Congress on 20 September, just nine days after the attacks, Bush began to break down the complexities of the new threat into a simplified rationalization (Bush 2001). The world consisted of two irreconcilable camps, who were either with the U.S. or with the terrorists; a military strike at al-Qaeda was to be imminent. Infused with a high degree of public empathy and international support, the swift and successful removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan seemed to vindicate the administration’s approach. Empowered by the progress, American grand strategy post-9/11 gradually changed to now include a stronger emphasis on regime change, preemptive warfare, and promotion of democracy abroad. In the minds of the decision-makers in Washington, such “Wilsonianism in boots” (a term coined by the French political scientist Pierre Hassner) underpinned global U.S. primacy. This approach hardened the Bush administration’s defense and national security policies. Buttressed by increasing spending on military hardware and research, development, and testing of the next-generation materiel, U.S. primacy in the global commons – the sea, the air, space, and cyberspace – was declared an open goal. Technological transformation to make use of 21st century resources was paired with an intellectual transformation to adapt to the global theater. In the American view, both served to change the world for the better by empowering the military to face the challenges it met in the global theater.
This required a new mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare. After all, transnational terrorist networks, the newly encountered enemy, were certainly hard to deter by nuclear force, although the latter obviously remained a steadfast pillar in the American policy arsenal just as the U.S. sought to cover the full spectrum of warfare and deterrence.\footnote{The naval leg of the U.S. nuclear triad remained a combination of Boeing E-6B Mercury airborne command post and relay aircraft and the SSBN fleet.}

The necessities of adapting to the new environment, however, came at an intellectual cost. Previously, in the early months of the Bush presidency, the focus of strategic thinking in the defense realm rested principally on the revolution in military affairs. Shock-and-awe strikes, effects-based operations, the willingness to accept certain risks, network-centric warfare, and precision-guided munitions were cornerstones of this loosely defined post-Cold War force transformation. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review declared (Department of Defense 2001: 29):

“Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate.”

“Transformation mania” (Haynes 2013: 223), a post-1990 process amplified after 2001, swept through the Pentagon. It quickly became the singular yardstick by which all military services needed to demonstrate their relevance on the battlefield of the future. By contrast, classic objectives of a forward-deployed global military such as power projection, control of vital sea lanes, and deterring nation states became almost a subordinate category in the thinking inside Washington. In principle, this constituted yet another major challenge to the Navy’s strategic narrative. It had to demonstrate its relevance (once again) to a public and politicians who increasingly lost sight of and appreciation for sea power means and ends.

The 2001 QDR, the second of its kind after 1997, was essentially driven by the RMA’s transformation goal (Department of Defense 2001). It focused strongly on the capabilities instead of the threats as the yardstick against that defense planning would occur. A new strategic objective was introduced: Dubbed the 1-4-2-1 approach, the U.S. military would be postured to defend the homeland (an aspect hastily introduced into the force-planning metric after 9/11), deter threats in four critical regions worldwide (Europe, Northeast Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East), be able to conduct two major combat operations (MCO), and win one of them. For the Navy, it included a requirement for 12 active aircraft carriers and a force-level goal of
310 ships. In principle, this national capstone document remained rooted in pre-9/11 thinking. Consequently, its influence was curtailed during the tumultuous times in late 2001 and the emergence of a personality-focused policy that emerged over the course of 2002. The Bush doctrine (understood as a set of dogmatic ideas about the importance and consequentiality of American principles and interests in 21st century world politics [Keller 2008b: 177]), was laid out in his State of the Union address in January, his speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on 1 June, and the National Security Strategy published in September. The speech before a joint session of Congress was the first of its kind in a number of years that focused heavily on foreign and security policy (traditionally, State of the Union addresses usually focus on domestic issues). In it, the President established the ground rules for the “War on Terrorism”. Bush framed it in boastful non-partisan terms, reminding his audience of the ongoing principaled fight of good versus evil and America’s purpose in finding and bringing to trial those who perpetrated the attacks of September 11. He also singled out three countries in particular: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

“The argument devised a link between weapons of mass destruction and terrorist networks. Such grim rhetoric signaled a forceful, preemptive, and activist global policy underwritten by superior military force to deter and defeat such challengers. The singling out of three U.S. adversaries in particular turned the page toward more military operations beyond the operations in Afghanistan. Bush’s speech at West Point (2002b), five months after his State of the Union address, fleshed out some of his previous points such as the reasoning for preemptive warfare (“We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge”) and his dichotomous world view (“We are in a conflict between good and evil. And America will call evil by its name”). Those notions were codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy (The White House 2002), the third cornerstone of the Bush Doctrine. The document identified the combination of terrorism, tyranny, and technology –

381 For a discussion of the objectives that were to be represented in the 2001 QDR, see Flournoy (2001).
i.e., weapons of mass destruction – as the key threat to U.S. security (Haine/Lindström 2002). It recognized the vulnerable state of U.S. hegemony and proposed a grand strategy that would defeat terrorism in the long run. That required an assertive use of military force on short notice and the assembly of make-shift coalitions beyond practiced and established forums of security cooperation and mutual defense. The American military, as part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, would be employed in time-consuming, long-lasting nation-building efforts that – in accordance with the preemptive and preventive war mantra – needed to undertaken swiftly.

The NSS 2002 elevated transnational terrorism to the top of the list of threats. Actually, terrorism had been an increasingly important part in the National Security Strategies in Clinton’s second term. It figured high on the calendar of the National Security Council meetings, in particular after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August 1998. During the Clinton years, al-Qaida as a trans-national network was considered a bigger (terrorism) threat than any single terrorism-sponsoring country. In part motivated by their Cold War mindset, the Bush administration instead went back to a classic Reagan-era focus on nations as terrorism-sponsors. The thinking behind this was that a transnational terrorist organization could not sustain itself without the resources of a sponsoring government somewhere. More so, the Bush administration charged the Clinton administration with failing to control the behavior of other nations, which in their eyes resulted in the emergence of al-Qaida and terrorist threats in the first place. Captain (ret.) Joe Bouchard characterized this as “the most bizarre, strategically inept conclusion […] since Pearl Harbor.” (Interview 2012, 02:10:20 – 02:11:00) Evidence suggests that Iraq was not involved in any major terrorist attack, and that it neither owned nor planned to obtain operational weapons of mass destruction (it did, however, have a history of employing chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988). Iraq’s containment had become increasingly costly and ineffective since the termination of the Gulf War and regime change in Baghdad was seen as the best way to solve that problem. The Iraq War began on 20 March 2003.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) 2004, produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2005, issued by the Secretary of Defense, further elaborated on the NSS’s goals in that they supported the protection of the U.S. against external attacks and aggression, prevention of conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing against adversaries. In the face of the insurgency that began to plague Iraq in late 2003, the Bush Administration in March 2004 produced a major (and at the time classified) document
called the Strategic Planning Guidance. It laid the foundation for the NDS 2005 in that it forcefully shifted the American planning from transformation and reliance on expensive, advanced technology to the immediate task at hand, namely to win the simultaneous campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq by conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. This effectively undermined the goals of the RMA. In fact, the military underwent two transformations at the same time. The problem was that both were leading into opposite directions. The top-down transformative demands triggered by the global war on terrorism mandated a reappraisal of counterinsurgency tactics and technology; these could include high-tech as much as low-tech assets on the murky ground, all of which seemed long forgotten. The bottom-up transformative demands triggered by the revolution in military affairs (the original “transformation”) hailed next-generation high tech and a lean, swift, stand-off force. Together, this was an expression of the more complex environment where a ‘one-size-fits-all’ military was not suitable. The early days of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had seemingly validated the promises of the revolution in military affairs, but the later stages of the wars showed the flawed assumptions that senior military planners had fallen prey to. Pressed by realities on the ground, U.S. strategy needed to concentrate on asymmetric warfare at the expense of more established military roles. By all indications from the civilian leadership, this was a necessary and sensible way forward, because it was largely expected that the U.S. stood in the early stages of a generation-long conflict that would keep the American military very busy. In contrast, those who cautioned that future planning also needed to take into account other, more conventional and state-centric threats, had to push back against the dismissal of their arguments.

The National Military Strategy and the National Defense Strategy top-level documents were the attempt to square that circle. They remained the principal statements on the military’s role in the ways-means-ends relationship described by the NSS. Among other things, they called for more fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable forces that would master decision superiority and provide lethality when needed. This occurred against the background of the ongoing war against terrorism, the further enhancement of joint warfighting, and the transformation of the force for the future (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004: viii). The 2003-2004 realization that the war in Iraq (after major combat operations were declared over) might not go as planned for the U.S. provided an unwarranted but timely shock to policy and strategic planners.

Bush secured a second term as President of the United States (after defeating Democrat candidate John Kerry in the 2004 election). Against the background of a deteriorating security
situation in Iraq and the ongoing global war on terrorism (including the hunt for Osama bin Laden), preparations for the next QDR went ahead. The Bush White House published its (second) National Security Strategy in mid-March 2006, a month and a half after the QDR (The White House 2006; Department of Defense 2006b). Traditionally, whereas the QDR focuses on national defense in general and defense procurement issues in particular, the NSS takes a strategic perspective in the broadest of terms. It is thus remarkable that the overarching whole-of-government National Security Strategy was presented only after the Department of Defense strategy, when the causal and logical chain of events should have been the other way around. In the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense England (Department of Defense 2006a: 3), the QDR was designed to enable the Pentagon to “continue to move in the direction of speed, agility, precision and lethality in force posture, shifting emphasis farther away from the Cold War construct.” However, the responses to the terrorist attacks chastened the momentum for transformation of the military. Instead, doctrines such as a 21st-century counterinsurgency plan (then in development) were increasingly occupying the minds of senior planners.

The QDR 2006 was, at its core, a capstone document developed during wartime. Nevertheless, the QDR’s new threat matrix of four challenges to U.S. security – irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive – committed the military to increase cooperative measures with each other and develop and deepen partnerships with other nations as well. For the military, the QDR prescribed a combination of extended expeditionary operations that expanded the focus beyond fighting two nation states nearly simultaneously. Its objective was to better address the four major challenges of defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland, shaping the actions of rising powers like China, and preventing state and non-state actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (Gunzinger 2013: 10). In addition, the QDR proposed to increase forces in the Pacific, effectively preempting the “rebalance to Asia” that filled many commentators’ notepads in the 2010s. The Navy planned to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and sustainable CVNs and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence, and deterrence (Department of Defense 2006b: 47). The 2006 National Security Strategy reaffirmed the theme of a nation at war. The concepts of the previous, 2002 National Security Strategy were reiterated and progress in selected areas was assessed. Significantly, the close link between the promotion of democracy and economic participation worldwide on the one hand and U.S. security

382 The Department of Defense’s Global Defense Posture Review from 2002-2004 had already mandated an increase in Pacific bases while conducting a drawdown in European bases. It also demanded a more adaptive and flexible network of operating locations (Swartz 2011j: 43, slide 86).
and well-being on the other hand was underlined. Such emphasis placed a premium on the systemic value of joint and interagency forces, i.e., those working to improve good governance in areas of interest and those – naval/maritime forces – that would secure and keep open maritime trade routes. This system was understood as one based on rules, and maritime and naval forces were consequently seen as most appropriate means to enforce these rules.

The QDR and the NSS 2006 were the two last major grand strategic and national defense capstone documents of the Bush era. The major national capstone documents of the new Obama administration (during the first half of the first term) included the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review that were issued in 2010 (The White House 2010, Department of Defense 2010). The NSS struck a markedly more somber, less ambitious tone than Bush’s documents had. As Obama’s first such work, it tried “to blend the idealism of Mr. Obama’s campaign promises with the realities of his confrontations with a fractious and threatening world” (Sanger/Baker 2010). The QDR was the sixth full-scale post-Cold War force review after the 1990 Base Force analysis, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the three previous QDRs completed in 1997, 2001, and 2006. The 2010 QDR’s objectives included recalibrating U.S. defense priorities to support the ongoing campaigns in Southwest Asia, while trying to strike a balance between the established two-aggressor standard that had been used as a force-sizing measure and a broadened approach. The force review outlined four national security objectives – prevailing in today’s wars, prevention and deterrence of conflict, preparation to defeat adversaries in a wide range of contingencies, and preservation and enhancement of an all-volunteer force. Regarding the Navy, the QDR described a force size for the fiscal years 2011-2015 of 255-289 ships plus strategic ballistic missile submarines, ships with prepositioning equipment, and 51 strategic sealift vessels (Swartz 2011j: 43, slide 85).

383 On 20 September 2005, the Bush administration released its first “National Strategy for Maritime Security” (the only such document to date) (The White House 2005). The year before, the Departments of Defense (for the Navy/Marine Corps) and Homeland Security (for the Coast Guard) were directed by the President to develop a comprehensive policy to coordinate and integrate their respective policies regarding threats to security and good order at sea and in port stemming from illegal activity such as terrorism, organized crime, and sabotage. For the Navy, these activities fall under military operations other than war (MOOTW). The strategy signaled the development of eight individual plans on key areas of maritime security. The National Strategy for Maritime Security is not a Navy capstone document per definition because it lacked the sustained involvement of the Navy Department’s strategy shop and the signature of the CNO or the Secretary of the Navy. Its level of ambition is different from that of the capstone documents discussed here.

384 Beyond the principal period of research interest to this study, the flow of overarching strategic defense documents continued into the 2010s (for a list of Bush and Obama era national security directives and policy reviews, see Swartz 2011j: 50-56, slides 100-112 The latest QDR (2014) and the Defense Planning Guidance (2012) offer points of reference and their influence and relevance to American sea power but remain beyond the focus of this study.
10.4 Developing and Promulgating USN Strategy (2001-2011)

The Navy’s first capstone document came out in the year after the assaults of 9/11. Over the course of the decade, the U.S. Navy published fourteen capstone documents of strategic, declaratory intent (some of which remain classified and thus unavailable to public analysis), almost twice the number as in the 1990s. They were self-titled visions, concepts, strategic plans, strategic guidance, or just a simple plan (speaking once again to the overwhelming and confusing power of semantics in the world of military and U.S. Navy strategy). A list of these strategic documents from 2001 to 2011 (including their classification status) is below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Self-titled format</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Sea Power 21 &amp; Global CONOPS</td>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Power 21 … A Naval Vision</td>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Response Plan</td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operations Concept</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11</td>
<td>Strategic Guidance</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operations Concept</td>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare</td>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13</td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>secret</td>
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The large number of documents reflected the broad uncertainty that surrounded the Navy’s role in coping with the political and military consequences of 9/11 and the attempt to develop a larger maritime and more systemic narrative regarding the use of sea power (toward the end of the decade). Both aspects in part echoed divergent expectations in the Navy and the Pentagon about what the future of U.S. military engagements worldwide would look like (in other words, whether the United States needed to plan for a long, asymmetric, generational war against terrorists and other hybrid state/non-state actors, or whether the post-9/11 expedition-
ary operations reflected a departure from the norm of planning for state-on-state conflicts). The plurality of documents is thus also a function of an environment where Secretary Rumsfeld reasserted civilian management over the Joint Staff and the services. During the Rumsfeld years, Admiral Vern Clark, an emphatically operations- and resources-oriented CNO, played along. To the CNO and many of his senior staff, strategy that went beyond the next budget submission (designed to legitimize the Navy’s programs) was a lesser-included task at best. Consequently, Clark’s selective actions in establishing strategic-thinking subordinate offices were erratic and weakened strategic naval planning when it was arguably needed most in the years of the emerging Bush Doctrine. In addition to N51 (the Strategy and Policy Division itself) there were no less than four separate offices under the OPNAV umbrella working on five partially overlapping strategy projects during 2002 and 2003. Consequently, confusion and rivalry ensued. Effective strategy-making was impoverished. Clarke’s tenure was characterized by a significant disparity between the number and quality of strategic planners in the Navy and their actual, lasting, and sustainable output (Haynes 2013: 225-226). After Rumsfeld’s demission and with CNO Mullen at the helm, the Navy was reenergized.

Only in the second half of the decade, with the preparation and publication of “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (2007) and the subsequent “Naval Operations Concept” (2010) under CNOs Mike Mullen and Gary Roughead, respectively, did the fog of war lift with respect to Navy strategic thinking. Products were better coordinated and streamlined. Processes were optimized, thus ending a period of strategic under-ambition and naval-strategic disarray.

10.4.1 Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS

a) Evolution

The first concerted effort to create a strategy for the 21st century resulted in “Sea Power 21”, a multi-volume series of articles including a global Concept of Naval Operations (CONOPS) (Clark 2002b). “Sea Power 21” was signed by CNO Clark and other admirals. It originated from the Strategic Action Group (N00K) and the Assessments Division (N81). As an unclassified vision, it appeared in the Navy’s professional magazine, Proceedings, in back-to-back issues between October 2002 and January 2004 (Clark 2002a, Corbett/Goulding 2002). These were “Deep Blue”, the Navy’s former QDR cell which was expanded after 9/11 to evolve into a distinct operationally focused multi-purpose think tank; N00Z, the code for the Strategic Actions Group which like “Deep Blue” also reported directly to the CNO and which took over a number of tasks from the CNO’s executive panel, code-named N00K; N00K itself, which retained some strategy-making projects; the Strategy and Concepts branch (N513) which was still tasked with the big picture of connecting strategy and operations; and N81, the Assessments Division that held the important access to integrated program planning (Haynes 2013: 225-226).
Bucchi/Mullen 2002, Dawson/Nathman 2002, Moore/Hanlon 2003, Mayo/Nathman 2003, Mullen 2003, Harms/Boening/Totushek 2003, Natter 2003, and Mullen 2004). In parallel, it was posted on the internet and published as a stand-alone pamphlet. In referencing the three most influential Navy strategies to date – “The Maritime Strategy” (1986), “…From the Sea” (1992), and “Forward… From the Sea” (1994) – “Sea Power 21” forged a bridge to what it considered efficient declarations of naval intent and placed itself in a historical context. It was also tied to previous documents such as the “Naval Strategic Planning Guidance” (1999/2000). The publication date reflected that the Bush administration had settled in office and that it continuously pushed its transformation agendas. With “Sea Power 21”, the Navy presented itself as fully integrated into the joint force. It finally (at least on paper) embraced the mandate of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Critics, however, found a number of problem areas, including budgets. They slammed the Navy for pursuing an unattainable budget goal in light of available funds (although defense spending was substantially on the rise following 9/11). The 375-ship goal that was the hallmark of CNO Clark’s plan was never reached. The tactical focus of “Sea Power 21” and its companion piece (Global CONOPS) was also subject to criticism. The recital of concepts and programs potentially overshadowed the core messages of the capstone document (Haynes describes it as a “complex, sprawling, and multi-faceted beast” [2013:233] and “janus-faced” [ibid: 239]). “Sea Power 21” nevertheless retained considerable influence within OPNAV and other Navy commands. It instigated internal frameworks and organizing templates within OPNAV for the rest of the decade. It was promoted by referring to it frequently in speeches and congressional testimony by senior Navy leaders throughout the 2000s. It was also relatively catchy and easy to remember; but in all of that, the document was much more influential inside the service than as an external statement of Navy vision (Swartz 2011i: 27-30, slides 53-60).

b) Strategic Concept

“Sea Power 21” emphasized presence of naval forces in a given theater of operations, perhaps in part energized by the Navy’s swift role in the military response to 9/11. Within hours, naval assets had redeployed to provide the initial capabilities for the combat action that were to follow. The Navy was able to demonstrate to senior military leaders that their organic, carrier-borne strike warfare was just as good as that of the Air Force, yet had exceptional advantages in flexibility, sustainability, speed, and diplomatic ramifications courtesy of sea power. Such joint assimilation dovetailed with the promotion and value of naval presence. It echoed concepts of the Cold War derived from the understanding that forward defense-in-depth as well as sea and area control required geographically-pulled forward forces.
Based on this rationale, it was assumed that with the rising threat of terrorist attacks and WMD proliferation, U.S. bases ashore might be increasingly at risk. Therefore, “Sea Power 21” elevated sea-basing (using the sea as a staging area) to a preferable course of action. Thus, “Sea Power 21” represented a confirmation of the close affiliation between the Navy and the Marine Corps to command the littorals and project power ashore.\textsuperscript{386} The return to focus on global joint operations signaled a farewell to the previous planning metric (just two “major” combat operations) and its more regional focus (Swartz 2011i: 18, slide 36). The Global CONOPS underwrote such developments visibly. It served to implement the QDR 2001’s “1-4-2-1” planning metric, but it emphasized global presence and dispersed combat striking power, and it also downgraded the importance of forward hubs (a convenient cover-up of the Navy’s inability to maintain and the political leadership’s unwillingness to fund three forward hubs as it did during the Cold War: the Mediterranean was the one to give way). The force repackaging (with the integration of SSGN submarines and BMD surface ships) was designed to provide flexible combat response capability. “Sea Power 21” used the easily identifiably prefix “Sea” to convey its networked and integrated thinking. At sea, Sea Strike (power projection, ISR, information operations, force delivery/insertion), Sea Shield (sea-based theater and strategic defense, and homeland defense), and Sea Basing (enabler for Sea Strike and Sea Shield) were to be facilitated by FORCEnet (the only deliberate divergence from the prefix), which in turn was understood as the information-age integrating glue that would bind the three former concepts together. Sea Warrior (the recruitment of the future force), Sea Trial (research, development, testing, and rapid fielding of superior equipment), and Sea Enterprise (streamlining the Navy’s business practices to identify efficiencies in every part of the service) were designed as the ashore components. These measures were rooted in the hailed management principles of Lean 6 Sigma. Behind this fancy vocabulary lurked established naval missions: sea control, deterrence, power projection, forward presence (Admiral Turner’s ‘classic 4’), and sealift.

“Sea Power 21” was an ambitious attempt to square a circle: it attempted to innovatively address both the strike warfare demands of combatant commanders in theater and those ashore, and at the same time identify cost efficiencies to fund the expansion of the fleet. Its legacy is

\textsuperscript{386}One of the key assets to this was the USMC-backed Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) – or MPF(F) – concept. It argued for the construction of tailored vessels to continue the strategic forward-stationing of materiel around the globe in regions of U.S. interest. In some Navy circles, making sea basing a pillar of the Navy’s capstone document represented an unwarranted concession to the USMC (Swartz 2011i: 26, slide 51).
therefore more of a managerial, internal one. Compared to previous Navy statements from the 1990s, it benefited from the higher degree of certainty regarding the threats that the U.S. faced: Terrorism, failing states, conventional (asymmetric) warfare, A2AD, organized crime, and WMD and their direct relation to (U.S.) homeland security were all encompassed in “Sea Power 21”. The document represented an important step of the U.S. Navy toward becoming a “post-modern” force (Lundesgaard 2011: 18). Such systemic navies do not limit themselves to the classic roles of naval forces (i.e., protection of sea lanes, delivery of combat power ashore, etc.), but also guard the global system and its underlying values. They do so by sea control, expeditionary operations, enforcing good order at sea, and a broad cooperative maintenance of the maritime consensus (Till 2009: 7). Precision-strike warfare, however, remained at the core of even the most post-modern navies. This emphasizes that naval strategy was evolutionary, not revolutionary. It also underlined the comprehensive tasks navies had to deal with in the beginning of the 21st century. Finally, it suggested how difficult it can be for navies to adapt to rapidly changing environments.

10.4.2 Naval Power 21 ... A Naval Vision

a) Evolution

The following capstone document, “Naval Power 21... A Naval Vision” (England et al. 2002) struck a similar note. It was signed by Secretary of the Navy England, CNO Clark, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Jones. The unclassified short pamphlet was distributed exclusively via the internet. In principle, this document sought to staple the messages of the Navy’s “Sea Power 21” and the Marine Corps’ own “Strategy 21” together and distinguish them with the Secretary’s endorsement – who saw the benefit of thus promoting his own agenda. It was the first truly joint Navy-Marine Corps (naval) strategic capstone document since “Forward... From the Sea” (1994). The six-page self-ascribed vision was authored by OPNAV’s “Deep Blue” think tank, securing contribution from OPNAV N513. Personalities involved included the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Will Dossel (N513), and Rear Admiral – later full admiral, Commander U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) – James G. “Jim” Stavridis (the document, for

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387 This is not necessarily a negative verdict keeping in mind that the promulgation of strategy must go hand in hand with its implementation, or in other words: Making strategy and executing it are two sides of the same coin.
388 “Marine Corps Strategy 21” was published on 3 November 2000. It emphasized readiness, expeditionary culture of the service, combined arms (air, ground, and logistics) approach, and the Task Force organization of the Corps. Moreover, it reaffirmed the Corps’ intimate relationship with the Navy, promulgated the capability of integrating it into the Joint Force, emphasized the value of reservists, and spoke to providing – with the Navy – forcible entry from the sea (in other words, amphibious capabilities and vertical/horizontal insertion) (Department of the Navy 2000b: 2).
lack of conceptual leverage, remained most remarkable for the involvement of these individuals and the signatures of the three Navy Department and service leaders) (Swartz 2011i: 33, slide 65).

b) Strategic Concept

“Naval Power 21… A Naval Vision” (2002) fell far behind strategic aspirations. Its limited impact inside and outside the Navy can be attributed to its unfortunate timing – it was simply overshadowed by other Navy-related capstone documents. In addition, Secretary England did little to rally consensus for his document. The cost-effectiveness measures that the document proposed had little leverage in the big picture (and the proposed growth in fleet size by 25% not even closely materialized). More precisely, “Naval Power 21” worked with a force-planning metric that reiterated ideas that could be found in preceding documents, but these were not strategic missions. Its 3/4/8 framework contained three fundamental pillars – assured access, fighting to win, and continuous transformation – as well as four “fundamental qualities of naval forces”: decisiveness, sustainability, responsiveness, and agility. It also reiterated the seven distinct concepts that were already seen in “Seapower 21” (Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing enabled by FORCEnet, and Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, and Sea Enterprise) (Swartz 2011i: 38, slide 75). On balance, the impact of “Naval Power 21” on other Navy strategic capstone publications, the Navy, or the strategic community was minimal at best. It did initiate the next capstone document, however.

10.4.3 Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations

a) Evolution

The development of a new operational concept was a task that was identified in “Naval Power 21” (2002). Consequently, a concept that addressed the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ joint operational contribution to national defense was signed in April 2003 by CNO Clark and the (new) CMC General Michael Hagee (USMC) (Department of the Navy 2003a). It was unclassified and published on the web shortly thereafter. The “Naval Operations Concept for Joint Operations” aimed to close the ranks of the Navy and the Marine Corps in that it was designed as the Navy Department’s consensual contribution to the “Joint Operations Concepts” (JOC).389 Drafted by OPNAV’s N513 and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command

389 The JOC was published by Secretary Rumsfeld in November 2003. It outlined how the U.S. military intended to operate in the coming 15 to 20 years, proposing to link the larger strategic guidance of the Bush administration to the integrated application of military capabilities. As such, it presented itself as the conceptual framework and guidance for future joint operations and across-the-board concept development and experimentation. This would include “the development and acquisition of new capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization,
(MCCDC) in 2002, the paper was completed by the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and MCCDC in 2003. It proposed to outline how the two naval services would operate across the spectrum of military operations through the year 2020. Whereas the document sought to meet the “1-4-2-1” metric mandated by overarching strategic documents (QDR 2001, NSS 2002), it drew criticism for its inability to set real priorities. As Swartz noted (2011i: 51, slide 102), the Navy and the Marine Corps covered nothing less than the whole playing field. The operating concept wanted to provide a rationale for surge forces at home and forward presence, outlined near-term, mid-term, and long-term (to 2020) visions, discussed how to meet conventional and unconventional threats, and surveyed nation-state and non-state adversaries. The document cited and underscored the ideas that were proposed in “Sea Power 21” and the Global CONOPS. Not unlike “Naval Power 21”, it had little lasting impact beyond the doctrinal commands. “Naval Power 21” and the “Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations” were small pieces in a larger puzzle, namely how to generate more efficient and effective combat naval input for U.S. strategy; these documents did not speak to the larger political roles and goals of naval forces in peace, crisis, and war and thus remained limited in impact.

b) Strategic Concept

The document pitched a long-term temporal horizon (until 2020), but its primary focus was the currently serving Navy and Marine Corps officers corps. That internal audience, so the reasoning went, needed to be brought on the same page regarding their joint operations, not their strategy (that could happen later). Such a technical, sea-operational paper that sought to strengthen the Navy-Marine Corps consensus on issues like sea-basing provided little in the sense of a larger sea-strategic concept; it simply reaffirmed what had been said before, thus providing little emotion and innovation (the specific linkage to Special Operations Forces [SOF] concepts can be considered an exception to prove the rule). If anything, the “Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations” advocated a more capability-based approach versus generic state/non-state, conventional, and unconventional threats. This essentially reprised the Navy’s long-standing narrative, but lacked any more comprehensive explanation of American sea power. In the following months and years, the document foundered because it was hardly embraced by the Navy Department leadership. It was seldom mentioned in successive speeches and testimony and was eclipsed by larger strategic capstone documents such as “Sea Power 21”.

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF)” (Department of Defense 2003: 4).
10.4.4 Fleet Response Plan

a) Evolution

It was up to the “Fleet Response Plan” (FRP) to address a looming shortcoming connected with the Navy’s traditional forward-deployed culture (Department of the Navy 2003b). Prior to 2003 (from about 1986), the Navy dispatched its carrier groups on the predictable basis of the 18-month Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC). Mandated by the complexity of a deployment in an overseas area of operations (with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleet), the associated maintenance and work-up (including training, equipping, and manning) were calibrated so that a given unit had a relatively secure planning schedule. Between their six-month long tours on station, there was a total of twelve months reserved in the schedule for post-operational power-down, repairs, and preparation until the carrier (and its escorting ships) put to sea again. On the one hand, this was sensible to reduce wear and tear on the machinery, and allow relatively reliable personnel planning. On the other hand, it appeared that the surge potential of the force was not being utilized. In the words of Bush-era Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David Chu, “There is in the Navy and Marine Corps a substantial portion of the structure that is unavailable to the president on short notice, short of heroic measures” (cited in Swartz 2011i: 64, slide 128).

The “Fleet Response Plan” was designed to modify that. Its focus on readiness and speed of response were planned to better align the Navy’s culture and operational practices with the crisis response and anti-terror needs of the Bush administration. Preemptive military action was a hallmark of the 2002 National Security Strategy – much like Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) – and required a substantial surge capability on the part of naval forces. In the minds of the planners, such actions hardly allowed a 12-month planning schedule. Instead, anticipation of more short-notice campaigns like OIF reigned. For that, the Navy needed to be ready and deployable. Consequently, OPNAV’s “Deep Blue” cell developed – and later passed on to the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (then Admiral Robert Natter) for refining – a concept that altered maintenance and deployment cycles accordingly. As a warranted side effect, it would henceforth also be more difficult for American adversaries to pre-calculate U.S. carrier presence off their coast. The “Fleet Response Plan” appeared in the spring of 2003 and included a metric that had six carrier strike groups (CSG) deployable within 30 days (with

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390 This schedule explains the demand for three warships of a certain class/type if one unit is to be operational and deployed at any given time; the second unit is on post-deployment stand-down while the third warship is on pre-deployment work-up.
additional surge of CSG within 90 days). The new readiness mandate was accompanied by a public relations campaign and comprehensively tested in the exercise Summer Pulse 04 which incorporated the near-simultaneous forward operation of seven CSGs around the world. In the exercises Valiant Shield 2006 and 2007 in the Pacific, three CSGs tested their simultaneous operating capabilities.

This demonstrated that the Navy embraced short-notice surges as a coming fact of life. These aspects form the true legacy of the program, the last capstone document that bore the signature of CNO Clark. However, it could only thinly veil that by 2004 the Iraq War exposed and unraveled the American strategic approach to war-fighting. The U.S. military for too long hailed its transformed, reductionist and even minimalist strike warfare based on information dominance. In the face of the mounting insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. military had to redefine the larger political purpose for which wars would be undertaken in the first place. Even though the NDS 2005 (with its focus on forward-deployed defense-in-depth homeland defense, security of access to strategic regions, building and fostering of alliances, and establishment of favorable security conditions worldwide) presented the Navy in principle with a chance to underline its inherent capabilities through orchestrating military, constabulary, and diplomatic roles, it was unable to embrace that. More dramatically, the strategic shift that drove the NDS 2005 rendered the Navy’s “Sea Power 21” focus on precision-strike power projection warfare unfashionable. Consequently, the service descended into its most fundamental institutional crisis since the 1970s (Haynes 2013: 262-263). To add insult to injury, the Navy also faced a dramatic budget and shipbuilding cutback. Shipbuilding had been low on Clark’s list of priorities because he was more concerned with readiness and cost efficiencies. However, the money his activities saved was not reinvested in the Navy and went to fund U.S. Army and Marine Corps operations in Iraq instead.

b) Strategic Concept

On the sea-strategic level, naval presence can be a valuable asset for deterrence, coercion, and defense-in-depth policy; for example, the leading role of naval forces in the early stages of OEF and OIF, respectively, had demonstrated that to U.S. policy-makers. For the Navy, the regional commanders had already based their requirements for assets on the notion of “combat-credible forward presence”. But if presence became an end in itself, it risked being too

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391 From 2007, it included three CSG on deployment, three more deployable within a month’s notice, and one deployable within 90 days. The same year, the rigorous scheme was somewhat relaxed for the carriers as the “Fleet Response Plan” was extended to the Expeditionary Strike Groups and the total number of Navy carriers fell from 12 to 11 between 2004 and 2007. John F. Kennedy (CV 67), although in commission, did not deploy (Swartz 2011: 68, slides 135-136).
predictable and detached from the larger strategic picture. Under a national policy that required services to be better prepared for more surged deployments in an era where one third of overseas bases were slated for closure, the Navy’s whole force structure was threatened. The president’s strategic direction meanwhile was not so much concerned about where a future enemy would fight, but how. Consequently, the “Fleet Response Plan” (2003) signaled an intellectual change from the Navy’s cultural fixation on scheduled forward presence towards emphasizing the surge capabilities of the fleet. The plan’s main thrust – presence – spoke for itself; larger strategic rationales were not discussed. Such a forced, top-down cultural re-education can be a problematic exercise for it requires the generic change that often rapidly alters the ground rules which the individuals at the bottom signed up to. For example, extended readiness status undermined the planning reliability of sailors, which in turn had an adverse effect on retention. Conceptually, one of the major shortcomings of the “Fleet Response Plan” was that the war on terrorism was its only policy driver. It was too narrowly focused on readiness to surge instead of framing it within a comprehensive Navy narrative (Swartz 2011i: 70, slide 140). It was too carrier-centric and hardly mentioned other components of the balanced fleet and the routine deployments that could bring about strategic effects as well; in short, it did not situate itself well into the broad American sea power narrative.\footnote{Still, the Navy’s program was well-received with senior policy-makers such as the Secretary of Defense. Consecutive naval leaders would also return to the “Fleet Response Plan” in their own speeches, testimonies and documents (especially the surge portion) for the remainder of the decade although it has yet to be fully endorsed and implemented as a national policy, part of the joint force (Swartz 2011i: 75, slide 149).} With the publication of the Pentagon’s Security Cooperation Guidance (which underlined the need increased cooperative focus of the U.S. military with foreign defense establishments), the Navy found itself on a fine line between having to demonstrate its surge capabilities while continuously fulfilling forward presence cooperative needs (Haynes 2013: 250-251).

Interregnum: The influx of fresh ideas

It was up to Vice Admiral John Morgan Jr., from August 2004 on serving as the new Director of OPNAV’s N3/N5 division (Plans, Policies, and Operations), to provide the Navy with a broader and fresher perspective on the strategic environment and, more importantly, the fundamental role of American sea power in it. He was the key driver within OPNAV for a genuinely new maritime strategy that went beyond annual reports or budget requests. Morgan argued that the Navy needed a coherent, overarching strategy that would place the service – or in other words, naval assets in the broadest sense – into the maritime overall component, which in turn buttressed U.S. military and grand strategy. He and his staff developed a narrative that would reach from the bottom end to the higher echelons.
In January 2005 Morgan and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio (Director of OPNAV’s Strategy and Policy Division, N51) briefed a new initiative that set out to rearrange the Navy’s joint capabilities. It became known as the “3/1 Strategy” (although its accompanying slide reminded many of a feral limb, thus coining the more colloquial description of ‘Bear Paw’ [Department of the Navy 2005]). Although it never made it beyond draft status, it served as a point of departure for the capstone documents that followed. The paper’s fundamental innovation was that it reshaped the understanding of the Navy’s principle missions. Along with the enduring need to be prepared for major combat operations, the new model described Homeland Security and Defense, Stability Operations, and the Global War on Terror as three distinct areas that demanded specialized capabilities. They could – and indeed should – no longer be understood as subsets of the pre-9/11 planning metric that had outlined two major regional conflicts/major theater wars as governing force-planning. Such a bold move emphasized that the Navy could succeed in the traditional and the non-traditional mission set, but only when it was forward-deployed. Inside the Navy, such notions met some concerted resistance, for instance by those blue-water navy advocates who found that the service had indeed adapted to use high-end capabilities being used for lesser tasks.

Under Admiral Mike Mullen, the new CNO from July 2005, the Navy gravitated toward a more formalized and structuralized process of drafting its capstone objectives. Once in office, Mullen aggressively pursued an analysis of the Navy’s composition, fleet size, and according shipbuilding budget. The Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006) was the first document that Mullen was responsible for. Two signature initiatives, the “1,000-ship Navy” and “Global Fleet Stations” were developed at the time by CNO Mullen and his major collaborator, Deputy CNO Morgan. These were a departure from the strike focus and a fundamentally novel version of U.S. power projection.

The “1,000-ship Navy” was based on the understanding that maritime security was the responsibility of likeminded, international partners. In an environment that had gained vast complexity through the interdependencies that were created by globalization, the “1,000-ship Navy” was the tool that knit together navies, coast guards, and maritime constabulary units in a self-organizing and self-governing cooperative security network. Together, this global coast guard could pursue the protection of ports and harbors, territorial waters, the high seas and the international straits from terrorists, pirates, illegal migration, human smuggling, drug traffick-

393 He also publically fired Vice Admiral Joe Sestak, Deputy CNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7), a protégé of Mullen’s predecessor CNO Clark.
ing, environmental abuse, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Morgan/Martoglio 2005: 14). \footnote{The challenge of how to respond if the new cooperative concept drew out navies that were not exactly allies, such as the Chinese, was not openly addressed. On particular challenges of building and maintaining the “1,000-ship navy” capabilities, see Ratcliff (2007) and Reveron (2007).} “Global Fleet Stations” (GFS), another project shepherded by Vice Admiral Morgan, was a project that emerged from N00Z and N5’s Strategy and Concepts office (N5SC) in OPNAV. In an unpublished draft White Paper (cited in Haynes 2013: 297), the concept was described as a self-sustaining base comprised of one of more large amphibious ships that (safe for the occasional port visit) lingered off a country’s coast to play host and coordinate the activities of U.S. small-craft and riverine boats, helicopters, trainers, engineers, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, salvage divers, medical teams, U.S. federal agencies, NGOs, and others. GFS were to operate in cooperation with host nations and support those ships and units of other nations that cooperated with the U.S. Navy in a particular region. For both ends, maritime domain awareness, or MDA (the pooling and sharing of actionable intelligence accumulated from commercial maritime traffic identification systems such as automated identification systems [AIS]) was promoted as a measure to track ships at sea and significantly improve the situational picture. Knowing what happened at sea was designed as a means for drastically improved understanding and oversight. It also offered the opportunity to cooperate with likeminded navies and coast guards worldwide. In principle, such an approach substantially limited the need for a costly and potentially politically contentious footprint ashore. Such support functions were now elevated to reflect the conceptual adaptation to the demands of the early 2000s. That vocabulary and the underlying concepts that were behind it – although the “1,000-ship Navy” was quickly changed into a less-unilateralist (and perhaps less-Reagan-era) sounding “Global Maritime Partnership” – resonated throughout the Navy and its capstone documents. Many foreign partners (some of them still troubled by the Iraq War) remained skeptical of the concept. It reminded them of American unilateralism, militarization of foreign and security policy, and cannon-boat diplomacy.

\section*{10.4.5 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08}

\textit{a) Evolution}

The “Navy Strategic Plan” was designed to support the FY 2008 budget submission and the 2006 QDR, both of which were due within a few weeks (Department of Defense 2006c). That put a high degree of pressure on the drafters, a momentous task given the need for collaboration, coordination, management buy-in, and consensus-building in a wired and complex bureaucracy such as OPNAV. Although the capstone document was a single-service, top-down
strategic and policy guidance, it took almost one year from the initial task (July 2005) to the publications of the two versions in April 2006 (for the secret, 42-page version) and May 2006 (for the unclassified, 23-page version). The plan’s intellectual underpinning was the “3/1 strategy” (Vice Admiral Morgan) from 2004/2005, which stated that the Navy’s stability, anti-terrorism, and homeland defense missions were not merely lesser-included cases and subsets of major combat operations, but instead critical mission sets in their own right, demanding their own dedicated force structure and strategic (as well as budgetary) attention (Swartz 2011i: 91, slide 181). That approach was not without its critics. Led by Admiral John Nathman, Commander of the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command (FFC), this group charged against what they saw was an unjustified focus on the low-end, asymmetric, systemic roles and missions of the Navy. They advocated looking beyond current operations (OEF, OIF) – in that, their view did not substantially differ from that of Vice Admiral Morgan and his team – and argued that a concentration on high-end competition against nation-states was the Navy’s future. Despite a number of rewrites and the pushback from Admiral Nathman and his command (which by all accounts engaged in constructive criticism), the position of the CNO and his deputies eventually prevailed. A major support for Mullen’s and Morgan’s position came from the “National Strategy for Maritime Security”, a collaborative effort by DOD and DHS signed by President Bush in September 2005. That document supported Mullen’s and Morgan’s arguments on the relationship among sea power, cooperative maritime security, and global systemic affluence (Haynes 2013: 298).

b) Strategic Concept

As a reapplication of the “3/1 strategy”, the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08” was fundamentally a proclamation that was designed to inform investments. It also reflected the fundamental change in U.S. strategy brought about by the post-9/11 response (the 2006 QDR later codified that shift in that it proclaimed that the United States needed to be as competent in waging irregular conflicts as it was in fighting and winning conventional wars). The “Navy Strategic Plan” leveraged the QDR in that it picked up on the three mission sets that this overarching document proposed. These focus areas were the “Global War on Terror” and its associated irregular warfare, homeland security and defense (e.g., the Navy’s role in the war on drugs, border security, and national disasters), and conventional campaign mission sets. The Navy document emphasized the systemic value of liberalist, hegemonic sea power that served the international system. It also provided its audiences – principally U.S. Navy program and planning officers – with three maritime focus areas for the future force. These were (1) the Western Pacific (in particular Southeast Asia), (2) the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and
the Mediterranean (the increasing responsibility of NATO in that area, it was noted, freed up U.S. assets for operations elsewhere) (Swartz 2011i: 95, slide 189-190).  

This tied what the Navy did and where it did it together. It provided a rationale for its 313-ship force-level goal. At the same time, the paper called for significantly smaller force packages (such as SEALs and independent Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or Navy expeditionary teams operating on ships and submarines), once again reflecting the operational realities of OEF and OIF. These forces were to be used in regions of secondary strategic importance like Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Eastern Pacific. The Navy now recognized that it need not only move into the littorals, but also into coastal and internal, green- and brown-water areas. The document’s focus on stability operations (constabulary roles of sea power such as anti-piracy operations, sanctions, embargo enforcement, peacekeeping, counter-drug, counter-terrorism, and others) overshadowed the conventional deterrence and war-fighting missions for the time being. The paper did succeed in making a case for the merits of naval forces in shaping the environment and providing leverages which air forces or armies could not. At the same time, in relating U.S. military force to larger and more systemic goals (something that the NSS 2006 had also argued for) it helped a more population-centric view inside the Navy gain increasing traction. The “Strategic Plan” document provided the “means” and another declaratory statement of strategic intent named the “Naval Operations Concepts” – the “ways” – was already underway.

10.4.6 Naval Operations Concept (2006)

a) Evolution

The Naval Operations Concept (NOC) was first drafted as a single-service Navy Operation Concept in December 2005. It sought to identify the determining principles that were at the core of contemporary naval operations with those overarching strategic demands that the senior civilian leaders in OSD and the White House set forth (e.g., homeland defense, conventional and nuclear deterrence, war on terrorism, irregular warfare, conventional campaigns, security and stability operations). The paper was overseen by senior Navy and Marine Corps flag officers. However, for the Navy, responsibilities shifted throughout the process and while

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395 Although the creation of U.S. African Command in 2006 signaled the increasing importance of the continent, it was not identified as a maritime focus area.

396 This trifecta sequence was established only in hindsight with the drafting of the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (= “the ends”). In November 2007, VADM Morgan (quoted in Swartz 2011i: 142, slide 284) admitted that the logical chain had been turned on its head before, “We knew we were doing the process [of formulating strategy, S.B.] in a backwards way. […] Now… we want the strategy to lead.” The characterization of the “Navy Strategic Plan”, the “Naval Operations Concept”, and “CS-21” as sequential integrals to overall U.S. naval strategy is also used by Haynes (2013: 307-315).
USN-USMC relationships were relatively smooth, there was some friction within the Navy over ownership of the document (Swartz 2011i: 115, slides 229-230). The final document was signed by CMC General Michael Hagee (USMC) and CNO Admiral Mullen. It was published in September 2006 and formally succeeded the “Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations” (2003). General James Conway (USMC), the incoming CMC, endorsed the publication and thus provided some consistency over service leadership transition (Department of the Navy 2006).

b) Strategic Concept

Although the “Naval Operations Concept” focused on the same long-standing areas of U.S. naval force engagement (the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, the Western Pacific) and the same three emerging areas of operations (the Gulf of Guinea, East Africa’s littorals, and Latin American waters) as the “Naval Strategic Plan ISO POM 08”, it broadened its level of ambition considerably. It referred to the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges to American national security identified in Secretary Rumsfeld’s National Military Strategy (2005). It cited three guiding principles from the “National Strategy for Maritime Security” (2005) (preservation of the freedom of the seas, defense of free movement of seaborne goods, and cross-U.S.-border situational awareness), and it discussed the mission set construct of the 2006 QDR (homeland defense, war on terror/irregular warfare, conventional campaigns). The authors of the paper thus sought to demonstrate that the Navy had understood and embraced the geostrategic, military, and operational realities of the 21st century.

The downside was that the document overreached. It identified no less than 13 naval missions for the Navy and the Marine Corps. It named nine permanent naval principles. On top of that, it mentioned four foundations of its narrative (including global maritime and littoral domain awareness [understanding and processing of anything related to the maritime domain]), nine methods (including globally networked operations, adaptive force-packaging [modular

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397 The paper itself fed from the USMC’s own “Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC)”, published in March 2006; a corresponding Navy-only operating concept was debated, but was never drafted.
398 In addition to the “classic 4” from Vice Admiral Turner (forward naval presence, power projection, sea control, and strategic deterrence), it called for crisis response, maritime security operations, security cooperation, civil-military operations, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, air and missile defense, and information operations. Notably absent from the list was one of the three key missions of “The Maritime Strategy”: sealift. Some of these were long-standing tasks that the Navy had considerable experience in; other reflected the emerging security environment of the 1990s and in particular the Navy and Marine Corps’ operations after 9/11.
399 These were: agility, adaptive force packaging, coordinated global influence, precision, ability to deploy and employ forces, speed, interoperability, a persistent presence, and unpredictability for adversaries (as well as reliability for allies).
platforms, equipment, and gear that can be assembled quickly and connected swiftly to provide the most-fitting military package for a given operation or mission], aggregation and disaggregation, sea-basing, and cultural awareness [the knowledge and ability to interact with people from different cultures and socio-economic milieus]), and five strategic objectives/outcomes (support in winning the nation’s wars, establishment of favorable security conditions, securing of strategic access and retaining global freedom of action, strengthening of alliances and partnerships, and securing the U.S. from attack). The capstone document encompassed, for the first time, maritime security operations as a distinct and genuine mission area. It recognized globalization as a driving force of global change, and briefly mentioned hybrid forms of conflict and warfare. However, the document is notably unspecific regarding which countries or non-state actors really were meant by this large scope. The NOC 2006 is also mute on such other important naval issues as mine warfare, convoy and blockade operations, and strategic sealift (Swartz 2011i: 120-121, slides 239-242).

While the document’s scope is laudable, its mentioning of strategic objectives demonstrates a broader consideration of the naval services’ strategic effects, and it elevation of the Navy’s constabulary role in relation to its military and diplomatic ones was remarkable (Haynes 2013: 314-315), its methodology produced too many lists to remember and to use practically, let alone understand. Consequentially, for the time being the paper had limited influence outside of the Navy, although it informed drafts for such follow-up documents like CS-21 and a revised NOC in 2010. However, in elevating the diplomatic and constabulary roles of naval forces, which to many sailors and officers were already deep-seated experiences of the post-Cold War operational world, the NOC 2006 embraced the gradually changing nature of sea power from combat at and from the sea to include the littorals. In this, the document partially reflected the intellectual journey that the Navy had undertaken (albeit with some detours and occasional hesitance) since the end of the Cold War.

10.4.7 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (September 2007)

a) Evolution

Before CS-21 entered the stage, another publication was slated to appear: the secret, single-service “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10”.400 Just like its predecessor (2006), it was designed to inform the Department of the Navy’s leadership, the programmers, and the budget staff about the future direction of the service. The memo for the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO

400 The discussion of this particular document’s procedural evolution and its strategic scope is based on the open information provided by Swartz (2011i: 126-140, slides 252-279).
POM 08” had directed that the process to draft a strategic plan, once established, was to be repeated at least biennially. The 2007 version happened to be the first Navy capstone document to be finalized after Robert Gates succeeded Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Gates’ initial objectives focused heavily on providing the troops in the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with the right amount of material and political support; he was not a strategic aspirant. At the time, both the irregular warfare challenges (in Iraq and Afghanistan with the development and implementation of a revised counterinsurgency doctrine) and the more conventional security challenges (such as the anticipated recovery of Russian nationalism or the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs) signaled a murky and challenging environment for the application of military force. The process of writing the document was overseen by those in N3/N5 (such as Vice Admiral Morgan), with considerable input from N81 (the programming division). Through the end, it remained a Navy-only concept. It appeared before the (public) unveiling of CS-21, therefore lingering in between more publicized documents. It was rushed and signed by Admiral Mullen during his last week on the job as CNO prior to becoming the 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*b) Strategic Concept*

The document was designed to “translate national strategic guidance into USN guidance; translate new concurrently drafted maritime strategy into a plan to inform Navy investments; [and] continue to build consensus in Navy around new strategic ideas” (Swartz 2011i: 128, slide 256). It was intended to serve as a bridge to “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (2007) and the “Naval Operations Concept” (2006). Unfortunately, its classified status prohibited any wider distribution and discussion of strategic effects. The document’s far-reaching assessment of the strategic context confronting the Navy remains unavailable for this study. The concept’s impact, for all purposes of this dissertation, is negligible.

10.4.8 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

*a) Evolution*

In the summer of 2006, at the annual Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Newport (Rhode Island), Admiral Mullen publically called for the development of a new maritime strategy for all sea services. This was not just a Navy effort, but a comprehensive maritime (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) document with a clear nod to “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s. Commander Bryan McGrath, an experienced surface warfare officer with previous tours on a cruiser and in command of the guided-missile destroyer Bulkeley (DDG 84), was selected by Vice Admiral Morgan (once again a major facilitator for a strate-
McGrath formed a core team that fleshed out the strategy over the course of one and a half years. The authors were provided with a wealth of resources and also given freedom of action in order to devise a strategy that did not simply rationalize the Navy’s current or future force levels. In fact, they were encouraged to follow the notions that an American maritime strategy was indeed a national U.S. strategy, thus allowing exertion of upward pressure through the bureaucratic layers. The sea services, it was hoped, could develop a narrative for Congress, the White House, and the American people to support the Navy’s energetic and assertive ideas. In the first phase (August 2006-January 2007), drawing from strategic history and a number of generic models of international relations, five strategy models were developed and discussed among the group, senior naval strategy academics, and senior flag officers. These options were:

- A primacist strategy (which focused force on areas of particular strategic interest);
- A sea control strategy inspired by Corbett (which included a focus on countering enemy naval forces and commerce, the protection of the sea lines of communication, and the establishment of superiority in a joint environment for areas of naval operations);
- A global systems strategy (which highlighted the cooperative safeguarding of the globalized system of integrated trade and security),
- A high-low mix strategy built around Admiral Zumwalt’s 1970s idea (that borrowed from legacy forces to stiffen the high-end and low-end capabilities), and;
- A minimalist, offshore-balancing strategy (which limited standing U.S. naval deployments to the Arabian Gulf while the rest of the fleet was maintained in readiness and surged as the situation required and the senior leaders directed).

The latter two were eventually eliminated and McGrath and his team in a second phase (March-June 2007) created a hybrid strategy. This utilized the big, system-centric idea (that only the United States could reasonably secure), integrated the primacy idea (for the Far East and the Arabian Sea), and combined that with the sea control and partnership notions. These ideas were carefully fleshed out by vetting them through the chains of command, incorporating the Naval War College for war-gaming, conducting various briefings and symposia (with

401 Colonel Doug King (USMC) and Captain Sam Neill (USCG) were the principle drafters for their service, respectively.
402 Although the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps were equal and demonstrated solidarity, the Navy as the largest of these institutions was be the one that would dominate the public understanding and political discourse and consequently have the most ownership.
403 On the development of these maritime strategy options, see McGrath (2007) and Haynes (2013: 325-333).
institutions such as CNA), enlisting feeder articles, and by testing them in a number of executive seminars, conferences, and other public forums (dubbed “Conversations with the Country”). In the third stage, the core team (the “Strategic Action Group” in OPNAV N3/N5) eventually became the writing team and set out to finalize the strategy between June and October 2007.

The title that was chosen for the document could speak volumes on the scope of the strategy. In what has been established in the course of this study, the spelling and capitalization could be interpreted as deliberate references to the institutional, systemic dimension of sea power; the ultimate tie-in of universal functional, geographic, and institutional dimensions of naval power. Even if such reasoning was sound, the position of the strategy’s lead author is equally compelling: “[I] Deliberately [used] one word, deliberately capitalized [it]. I am unaware of a distinction between the concepts of a one word or two word version, I just liked one better.”

As the third member of the family of documents that NOC 2006 and the “Navy Strategic Plan” had begun, CS-21 was able to draw from these previous documents and use their frames of reference to structure its own ambitions. Only once the document neared completion in the summer of 2007 was Secretary of the Navy Winter briefed; he was by all accounts not pleased with what he saw as an overemphasis on “soft power.” Consequently, the CNO directed that some aspects of the document be hardened to emphasize the “hard power” spectrum as well. Eventually, the new strategy was signed by the CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead, CMC General James Conway (USMC), and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen in October 2007. The same month, the strategy was unveiled publically (although the process had been unclassified and inclusive from day one) at the Naval War College. The final product, which at its heart is a 16-page booklet available on the Navy’s website, was disseminated widely (the Chief of Navy Information, the highest Navy public relations officer, in charge) (Department of the Navy/U.S. Coast Guard 2007). This included articles in professional magazines and journals, CNO testimony before Congress, brochures,

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404 Bryan McGrath, e-mail to author, 22 July 2014.
405 Soft power is an approach in international relations that emphasizes persuasive economic and cultural influence. It is complementary to the more coercive, often military-heavy hard power. Soft power as a concept was introduced by Harvard University political scientist Joseph Nye (Nye 1990).
406 It was thus the first capstone document signed by all three service chiefs, and the first unified strategy since “The Maritime Strategy”.

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Downloadable posters, a video clip, and utilizing an increasingly important medium—military blogs.

b) Strategic Concept

The strategy emphasized the significance of the international global system for trade and security. CS-21 was the innovative conceptual framework that Vice Admiral Morgan sought to implement in order to reverse the existing process of strategy-making. Before that, programmatic decisions derived from the annual Navy budget submissions shaped the service’s strategy. Morgan wanted to turn around that causality. Recognition of the interdependencies, the energy demands, and the unhindered exchange of goods and information in the global system was the central enabler for CS-21. By tying itself directly to American grand strategy and the systemic notion of international security and stability (that the U.S. had a fundamental interest in a safe global system and at the same time fielded the capabilities to orchestrate its protection), the Navy as an institution attempted to rise above the Southwest Asian ground wars and the annual budget submissions that dominated much of the discourse at the time. It also sought to broaden the nation’s view again, i.e., that there was more to American hegemony than messy and obscure counterinsurgency wars. The Navy wanted to provide military and political leaders with a compelling strategic concept that offered an alternative to unwinnable asymmetric ground wars.

In highlighting the Navy’s role in guarding the liberal international system, sustained American sea power was linked to global prosperity and the advancement of democratic principles. In its deliberately benign characterization of American power, the strategy dovetailed the American understanding of its role in the world as a benevolent hegemon. It moved enthusiastically beyond the merely military role of naval forces and elevated constabulary and diplomatic uses of the sea. With that, it discarded the counter-societal and counter-military visions that had long dominated the understanding of strategic effects navies could have. That did not imply that the prospect of major hostilities was ruled out altogether; in fact, major-power war, regional conflicts, terrorism, and organized crime were all recognized as potentially threatening U.S. national security and (by implication) world prosperity. Strategically, CS-21 linked key naval tasks to strategic imperatives. These included regionally concentrated credible combat power in the Western Pacific, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean to deter major-
power war, win those armed conflicts that the U.S. did have to fight, and contain regional wars. Additionally, the strategy recommended globally distributed and tailored forces with a focus on Africa and the Western Hemisphere. The hindrance of local disruptions, the contribution of the sea services to homeland defense-in-depth, and the imperative for sustained cooperation were also highlighted. For that, the strategy extrapolated six core capabilities for the sea services, namely forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection (these were Admiral Turner’s original naval missions) as well as maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions along a descending level of violence. In elevating the latter two soft power missions to strategic importance, the strategy sought to generate more resources and visibility for these aspects.

The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard fashioned themselves as essential guardians of the system that underpinned globalization. Critics charged that a specific threat (a country or non-state actor) was deliberately missing and that the strategy’s key assumptions were simplistic (Pendley 2008). Many traditional naval warfare missions were only implied and some operating areas notably absent from the strategy (Work/van Tool 2008). The document’s explanatory narrative sidelined all Navy strategic conceptual efforts since “The Maritime Strategy” (which raised some irritation), but did not provide a compelling force-level planning, programming, and budgeting link. Instead, cooperation and trust were emphasized, undertaking of a long view was encouraged, and war prevention was elevated to the same importance as winning wars. This gave the Navy both: a tie to the systemic dimension of international relations and a linkage to the population-centric roles and missions of the military that were fashionable at the time. The strategy was also forward-looking in that it anticipated the presidential election of 2008, subsequent national security strategies, and the 2010 QDR. The value of its innovative ideas was recognized after the change brought about by the election in 2008. Admiral Mullen was able to shepherd the document’s main points through his tenure as CJCS and aspects of CS-21 were echoed in the top-level strategic documents of the Obama administration (The White House 2010, Department of Defense 2010). The central themes of CS-21 resonated well in many circles in the U.S. and abroad – except for Congress, which was more concerned with warfighting and not interested in the peace-time engagement of the sea services.

410 The link to Admiral Turner’s missions is remarkably close: Zumwalt and Turner discussed sea control and presence in reaction to Vietnam War power-projection focus; CS-21 discussed sea control and presence in reaction to 1990s power projection focus (Swartz 2011 i: 179, slide 358).

411 This is illustrated by the notion in the strategy that, contrary to military force and materiel, trust could not be surged.
10.4.9 Building on “CS-21”: Navy Strategic Plans and Guidance, Naval Operations Concept (2010), Naval Doctrine Pub 1 – Naval Warfare

The development of capstone documents and the formulation of Navy contributions to U.S. strategy obviously did not stop with the publication of CS-21. There were in fact six Navy capstone documents to round out the decade, namely the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)” (Roughead’s revision of outgoing Mullen’s strategic plan of the same name [2007]), the “Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11” (2009), the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12” (2009), the pertinent “Naval Operations Concept” (2010), the equally important “Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare” (2010), and the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13” (2010).

The “Navy Strategic Guidance” document (2009) remains classified. What little is publically available underlines the notion that this document reiterated the strategic imperatives that CS-21 had formulated and linked them to Navy core capabilities, thus sharpening the Navy’s arguments what maritime missions such as sea control, deterrence, power projection, forward presence, maritime security operations, and HA/DR could provide. The document also mentioned a number of additional naval objectives and capabilities, namely using the sea as a staging area (sea basing), superiority in the space and cyber domains, global domain awareness, maritime BMD, and expeditionary logistics. As a programming support tool for the incoming administration, it laid out the larger objectives of Secretary of Defense Gates and CNO Roughead. The “Navy Strategic Plans” (2009/2010) were in principle, much like the “Navy Strategic Guidance”, directed internally (hence their classification). They continued the by then routine output of such specialized documents, which were increasingly aligned with other budgetary and programming cycles so that they could have more leverage. These documents used the constructs that CS-21 established and thus increasingly provided some much-needed intellectual cohesion and continuity.

More importantly in the longer run and more closely related to the overarching, larger scope of this study are the two final documents for the decade. To provide the “ways” for the “ends” that the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” described, an updated and expanded “Naval Operations Concept” (NOC) to implement the new strategy was issued in May

412 Still classified and thus not available to public analysis; for an overview, see Swartz (2011i: 194-203, slides 387-405).
2010 (it was signed by the same three service chiefs as “CS-21”) (Department of the Navy 2010a). Again, the process of drafting and implementing the concept was also a tri-service effort of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. Whereas the larger strategic aspirations and objectives of these sea services were comparatively easy to align, the NOC needed to address all of the diverse current operations. Essentially, it covered the whole spectrum of challenges between global nuclear war on the high end, counter-drug operations on the low (irregular) end, and a plethora of conventional and hybrid challenges in between. This yielded an extended drafting process and a lengthy final, unclassified product (with 102 pages, it was larger than all previous NOC combined). At least three major sets of pressures affected the drafting process:

- First, it proved to be challenging to define and articulate how sailors, marines, and coast guardsmen actually fought.
- Second, the authors needed to provide fodder for the development of future joint/Navy concepts and doctrines.
- Third, it needed to explain the linkage between “CS-21” and the Navy’s force-level goals (i.e., “the means”) to Congress and defense policy analysts (an effort to publish a force-structure plan that built on “CS-21” had been abandoned earlier) (Swartz 2011i: 237, slide 437).

In describing how naval forces contributed to U.S. national security in a range of operations, the document aimed to reiterate primarily to itself (although Congress, the Obama administration, and the American public were certainly secondary audiences) that the Navy was not just about blue-water operations, the Marine Corps did not simply constitute a second land army, and the Coast Guard was not simply a coastal gendarmerie but a true military partner. Integrated and orchestrated, all of them could embrace all uses of the sea according to their relative leanings.

Dozens of drafts circulated among a large number of stakeholders in the services. The incoming administration and their capstone documents slowed down the process and dragged the completion. Operationally, the document accentuated the sea as a maneuver space for all three services. It employed the six core capabilities of CS-21 (forward presence, maritime security, HA/DR, sea control, power projection, and deterrence) and related them to the various classes of naval vessels to describe each ship’s place and role in the overall picture. Critics charged that the end product was too simplistic and obvious, a doctrinal instead of a conceptual pro-
ject, bore little Navy ownership, and did not include risks and trade-offs (Swartz 2011i: 269, slides 537-538). As a document, it always was in the shadow of CS-21. The NOC’s influence was further curtailed in that it provide too voluminous and took too long to roll out.

Just three months after the publication of the NOC, another Navy capstone document was issued. “NDP 1: Naval Warfare” (a doctrine aimed at the men and women in uniform, naval service civilians, and the policy community) superseded the first such pamphlet by the same name issued in 1994 (and in fact, NDP 1 through NDP 6) (Department of the Navy 2010b). The 2010 version included the contribution of the Coast Guard and subsequently bore the signature of its service chief, too. The pamphlet made heavy reference to joint documents as well as Navy and Marine Corps warfare publications. The NWDC held the responsibility for NDP1. It encountered a sluggish attitude toward the necessary revision in OPNAV and the Marine Corps (on the USMC side, the MCCDC was in charge; for the Coast Guard, the HQCG’s Office of Counterterrorism and Defense Operations oversaw the effort). Eventually, NDP1’s drafting dragged on for more than eighteen months. Its public release was deliberately held back so that the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) could be issued first. NDP1 included sections on the very general nature of naval service, the employment of its forces, and the conduct of naval operations (in addition, it provided service core values, mentioned the levels of war, and included some naval history). Its construct – six strategic imperatives and six core capabilities – was derived from CS-21 and used as a template across the six-phase joint campaign model (phase 0 – shape, phase I – deter, phase II – seize the initiative, phase III – dominate, phase IV – stabilize, phase V – enable civil authority) (Swartz 2011i: 296-297, slides 592-593). Given the Navy’s aversion to written doctrine, the document’s influence remained as limited as that of its 16-year old predecessor, not least because it failed to speak to the political role of naval forces and to future force structure.

The naval missions that the documents from the 2001-2011 timeframe provided to achieve strategic goals are reprinted in the following illustration. The table shows that only three of these capstone documents identified naval missions. The other documents were notably silent on missions. They took a markedly less ambitious tone and concentrated on sub-strategic levels (although it should be cautioned that absence of outspoken naval missions does not per se indicate a lack of strategic ambition or scope of such a document).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Missions Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea Power 21 &amp; Global CONOPS</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5 enduring missions (“classic 4” plus sealift)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Power 21 … A Naval Vision</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operations Concept for Joint Operations</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Response Plan</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08</td>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operations Concept</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13 naval missions, including “classic 4” (no mention of sealift)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6 expanded core capabilities (“classic 4” plus maritime security operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; no mention of sealift)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Operations Concept</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 33: 2000s Capstone Documents and Navy Sea-Strategic Concepts (Forster 2013: 21)

10.5 Force Structure

At the turn of the century, the quantitative decline in U.S. Navy forces continued slowly but steadily. This led to a scaled down version of the Cold War fleet, but with individually more capable ships that were still grouped around the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (Lundesgaard 2011: 24). The carriers were once again validated in that they provided the first wave of attacks against Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan. However, trouble was quickly brewing for the Navy’s force structure. To fund the U.S. military’s unexpectedly higher expenses in the ground campaigns in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, the Navy shipbuilding budget accounts were drained. Carriers, submarines, and destroyer programs suffered. In addition, legacy platforms that had joined the fleet since the late 1970s and early 1980s were decommissioned in increasingly large numbers. Their maintenance was deemed too costly against the background of the pressing demands of the current wars. With the beginning of the withdrawal of the Oliver-Hazard-Perry-class frigates from service and the decommissioning of the five oldest Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers, the Navy lost one fifth of its cruiser and its frigate inventory between FY 1999 and FY 2009, respectively.
The Global CONOPS (2002) had included new force package labels in an attempt to better utilize the flexibility of naval forces, maximize combat capability, and provide intellectual backing for the 375-ship battle fleet goal. By rearranging and re-labeling carrier and expeditionary groups, establishing surface action groups, and adding the four converted Ohio-class SSGN (capable of carrying 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each), the Navy went from twenty-four formal strike groups to thirty-seven. The assertion, that expeditionary strike groups (ESG), surface action groups (SAG), or guided-missile submarines (SSGN) could somehow replace a carrier strike group (CSG), was often scrutinized.

In the early 2000s, the introduction of newer ships was imminent. On 1 November 2001, the Navy announced its Future Surface Combatant Program. This family of next-generation surface warships included three classes of ships: a destroyer program dubbed DD(X) (later DDG-1000) for long-strike and naval gunfire support missions, a cruiser program called CG(X) for fleet air defense and ballistic missile roles, and a whole new platform called the littoral combat ship (LCS).\textsuperscript{414} In contrast to the other, multi-mission-capable ships of the Navy, the LCS was designed to be fitted with specific modules that are interchangeable and thus allow a tailored employment in mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare missions.\textsuperscript{415} Although the design stemmed from the time before the September 11 attacks and the assault on the destroyer 

\textit{Cole} in Yemen (2000), the LCS promised to be the suitable and efficient response to the challenges of asymmetry that emerged with the long war against terrorism as well. It would be easier, more effective, and more efficient to send a littoral combat ship than an expensive cruiser or a valued destroyer into the murky and dangerous littorals of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. As such, the LCS enjoyed strong support by CNO Clark.

However, the next-generation surface combatant suffered epochal blows. The CG(X) program was terminated in 2010 for cost reasons and never got beyond the initial design phase. The DDG-1000 program, which had its roots in the early 1990s designs for a 21\textsuperscript{st}-century destroyer, was reduced to just three (from 32) units in 2009. The Navy instead opted to procure optimized destroyers of the Arleigh-Burke-class to fill the widening capability gap. The LCS program, built in two different sea frames (a conventional mono hull and a futuristic trimaran...

\textsuperscript{414} For more details on these shipbuilding programs, see the comprehensive CRS reports on CG(X) (O’Rourke 2010), DDG-1000 (O’Rourke 2014b), and the LCS (O’Rourke 2014c).

\textsuperscript{415} The LCS evolved from the “Streetfighter” concept (1999). These inexpensive, small, but agile and capable warships were designed with their expendability in mind (a concept that fundamentally challenged the foundations of naval strategic culture). In other words, these ships could go into harms’ way near an enemy coast without risking the deployment of a larger, more expensive vessel. It rested on the conviction that in order to make a strategic difference, the Navy had to forcefully embrace littoral warfare and accept all the challenges (and opportunities) that came with it.
design), was capped at 32 units as recently as 2014 in favor of an agile, more versatile, and larger frigate-type ship that is yet to be constructed.\(^{416}\) Like many other military procurement projects, the LCS is also affected by cost-overruns. As of 2014, the prototypes are still in the process of operational testing and introduction into the fleet.

The fate of the family of next-generation surface combatants weighed on the image of the Navy in the public and with Congress. In the larger context, the debate about the advantages and shortfalls of each class of ships reflected the debate between two well-known and established schools of thought. Should the U.S. try to maintain a balanced fleet, and what exactly were the kinds of missions that the Navy should be tasked with? On the one hand, people like Admiral Nathman (Commander, FFC) argued against eroding the precious service life of the fleet by chasing terrorists or conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts (a notion that echoed Samuel Huntington’s 1954 similar warning). These lesser-included missions were of little overall value and thus should not be elevated to strategic importance. On the other hand, there were those like CNO Admiral Mullen and Vice Admiral Morgan who lobbied for a broader, less militarized understanding of sea power, which needed to be reflected better in the force structure.\(^{417}\) The Navy’s force structure decisions for the time being also muted the smoldering argument between the proponents of flexible, multi-mission warships and the fans of specialized platforms for niche missions. Even more fundamentally, this debate echoed the “high-low” force structure discussions of the 1970s. Mullen and Morgan’s argument that a trade-off was unnecessary resounded with much of the Navy and Congress. It reflected the desire for a balanced fleet of high- and low-end assets that was able to be forward-deployed as well as surge-capable to address the whole range of imaginable threats on the spectrum. The energetic approach could not conceal that Navy force structure is a very conservative business and cannot be turned around within a few years.

The next-generation surface warships were not the only ship-building programs affected by cost overruns, procurement delays, and design flaws. The 24,900-ton amphibious transport

\(^{416}\) If the original plans for the LCS had gone through, that class of ships would have accounted for 1/6 of the total Navy battle fleet inventory, signaling a focus on the littorals but weakening blue-water capabilities of the U.S. Navy. The two LCS classes are the Freedom-class mono hull (odd-numbered LCS 1 etc.) built by Marinette Marine, Marinette (Wisconsin) and the Independence-class (even-numbered LCS 2 etc.) built by Austal USA, Mobile (Alabama), respectively.

\(^{417}\) The “3/1 strategy” draft from 2006 declared that the Navy could no longer allow the inefficiency that came with utilizing high-end platforms for lesser-included missions. Counter-piracy, -narcotics, and -terrorism operations wore the fleet out and peacekeeping, disaster response, and humanitarian assistance took their toll as well. However, the “3/1 strategy” asserted that these missions were now significant for prevailing in the global, generational, long-war. Consequently, they needed to be dealt with in a coherent and fitting way that was represented in strategic plans, shipbuilding, and the budget.
The San-Antonio-class (LPD 17 etc.) were commissioned beginning in 2006 (to date, nine are in service and two more are under construction) but numerous mechanical failures and a doubling of the price for each ship yielded bad press and spun the program out of control.\footnote{The next-generation amphibious ship, designed to replace the aging Whidbey-Island-class/Harpers-Ferry-class from the 2020s, is already in planning. For the program dubbed LX(R), see O’Rourke (2014d).} The Navy of the 21st century, despite all lip-service paid to irregular warfare and asymmetric threats by the proponents of the long war against terrorism and the cheerleaders for small boats, remained grouped around aircraft carriers. The nuclear-powered Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) were procured.\footnote{For an overview of other aircraft carrier missions and leveraging their potential, see Gordon IV et al. (2006).} Large-deck flat-tops were also added with the Iwo Jima (LHD 7) and Makin Island (LHD 8).\footnote{On a related note, the inventory of naval aviation was also modernized. Whereas the last F-14 “Tomcat” fighters were decommissioned and the last S-3 “Viking” ASW aircraft paid off during the decade, 369 new F/A-18E/F “Super Hornet” multipurpose carrier-based jets, 78 EA-18G “Growler” EW aircraft, and 300 MH-60R/S multipurpose “Sea Hawk” helicopters were added (Swartz 2011j: 65, slide 126). The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the fifth-generation multirole fighter jet, began design and production in the mid-2000s. The program, which will deliver variants to USAF (conventional), USN (carrier), and USMC (V/STOL), remains under pressure from cost overruns and technological challenges.} Many classes retained constant in numbers, others suffered from continued cuts of Cold-War-era ships. Others, like all 12 Osprey-class minesweepers, were decommissioned between 2006 and 2007 (further degrading the Navy’s organic, sea-frame MCM capabilities). Mid-decade decreases in other classes, for example, in the destroyer category (the Spruance-class warships were decommissioned and disposed of) were offset with the purchase of newer Arleigh Burkes. The first LCS warships at sea and new joint high-speed catamarans for Army/Navy intra-theater lift (JHSV) in the building yards foreshadowed new ship designs and capabilities. On balance, the Navy remained a big-ship navy with further reduced overall numbers.

The following table breaks down the total numbers of the actual inventory.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>9/01</th>
<th>9/02</th>
<th>9/03</th>
<th>9/04</th>
<th>9/05</th>
<th>9/06</th>
<th>9/07</th>
<th>9/08</th>
<th>9/09</th>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
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<td>Frigates</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LCS</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBNs</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>SSGNs</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Mine Warfare</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Active</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 34: U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 2001-2011 (Navy History and Heritage Command 2011). To clarify the ship numbers included in this table, the year 2000 entries include active commissioned ships, those in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) and ships operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Row entries are self-explanatory, with the auxiliary category including combat logistic ships (such as oilers, ammunition, and combat store ships), mobile logistics ships (such as submarine tenders) and support ships (such as command, salvage, tugs and research ships). Command ships have been subsumed into that category and the separate line entry removed. A new row has been added for guided missile submarines (SSGN) and for the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). The battleship category has been removed.

With the debate around the balancing of high-seas, blue-water options with littoral, green- and brown-water orientation carried over from the 1990s and reflected in the declaratory documents of the time, force composition became an increasingly popular subject of study. The proposed forces would continue to be structured around aircraft carriers. The following chart illustrates the suggestions of some of the major reports and studies. The table is reprinted here to illustrate the range and scope of force-level plans that the Navy was faced with in various reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ship type: Total battle force ships</td>
<td>305-360</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>260-325</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack submarines</td>
<td>50-66</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>37-41</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface combatants</td>
<td>116-133</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>130-174</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious ships</td>
<td>36-42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17-24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustration 35: 2000s USN Force Level Goals (Swartz 2011j: 58, slide 116)
Despite the occasional lobbying efforts to reverse the quantitative attrition of the fleet and a host of studies that analyzed current and future fleet design, the Navy’s force structure degraded over the 2000s. Most of the decade was a tailwind period for the service in terms of budget and national standing. With CS-21, the service wanted to gain momentum to change that and develop a narrative that supported force growth. However, CS-21 was not a shipbuilding strategy. It was a deliberately declaratory document. It was designed as a growth strategy, recognizing that 313 ships were too low a number to account for all the missions that the Navy was tasked to do (and that the Navy asserted through its strategy). The final tally would have been more in the vicinity of 342 warships, including 38 amphibious ships. However, a force-structure plan that was to follow within six months of CS-21 never materialized. With such a document, Congress would likely have been more interested and engaged; as it were, “CS-21” was pretty readily dismissed and the focus remained on current shipbuilding plans and associated problems. The following figure shows that force levels shrunk and did not pick up until the end of the decade.


422 The Navy’s 30-year-shipbuilding plan has in recent years been a central subject of deliberations on Capitol Hill, e.g., in the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee and its appropriate subcommittee, the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. In many discourses, numbers have replaced any strategic reasoning in that regard.
The graph illustrates that declaratory force level goals, with the exception of the first year, were never met. The Navy routinely fell short of that goal by 30 ships or more. In 2005, when a force level goal of somewhere between 260 and 325 ships was postulated, the inventory would have been made to fit. Given the conservative structure of a Navy and the long-term dynamics of warship design, construction, procurement, and service life, a significant change in the structure of the force (a decrease of force levels notwithstanding) is still not observable.

10.6 Strategic and Operational Implementation: Planned vs. Actual

The intimate relationship between U.S. naval strategy and naval operations remained as relevant in the 2000s as it did during any other time covered in this study. Operational experiences influenced the making of strategy as commanders rotated into OPNAV billets. The fleet, in turn, set out to operationalize the strategies that were handed down to them. At the same time, the Navy worked hard to answer when called to serve American foreign policy interests and ends. It followed that the Navy’s operational tempo was high. This brought larger operating and manpower costs but also provided the service with considerable expertise and experience. In the following, three major naval operations will be discussed briefly to illustrate the real-world operations that shaped Navy thinking and conduct after 2001.
10.6.1 Major U.S. Naval Operations

a) Horn of Africa (since 2002)

In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. orchestrated military strikes against targets in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Dubbed “Operation Enduring Freedom”, the operation’s strategic goal was toppling the Taliban government, capturing Osama bin Laden (the mastermind behind the attacks), destroying the terrorist network al-Qaida, and establishing the conditions to introduce a democratic regime in the landlocked Central Asian country. With neither the patience of senior U.S. leaders nor the infrastructure in the region in place to reprise Gulf-War-style invasion plans, a more unconventional CIA plan was adopted. Using proxy tribal armed forces of a loose anti-Taliban alliance that was managed and paid by the agency’s operatives, U.S. naval air power (together with the USAF and allied air forces) provided the bulk of the initial combat thrust against Afghanistan (Haynes 2013: 222). Innovatively, the carrier Kitty Hawk (CV 63) was used as an improvised afloat forward-staging base for SOF helicopters (part of the carrier’s organic air wing departed for the course of that mission).

OEF has since merged into a larger concept that encompasses several subordinate operations that spanned from the Caribbean to the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. The war in Afghanistan accounted for the overwhelming majority of OEF operations and despite the landlocked character of the operating area, the Navy is involved in joint operations there. It provided (and in many cases still does) C^4ISR, strike and special operations, Seabees engineers and Navy specialists from a wide range of disciplines (e.g., intelligence, medical, supply and logistics, explosive ordnance removal and demolition, legal, personnel, IT/information dominance, and law enforcement) for the range of tasks that come with working in the irregular warfare environment. In addition, the Marine Corps was increasingly engaged in the ground war around the country. The most visible naval subordinate operation is the OEF component at the Horn of Africa (HOA). Just like the operations in Afghanistan, OEF-HOA falls in the area of responsibility for U.S. Central Command. Its main objectives, covering the whole western Indian Ocean, were the physical protection of maritime traffic from terrorist attacks, force protection, and providing stability against re-grouping terrorist networks. Al-Qaida was very active in the Horn of Africa region in the 1990s and U.S. leaders considered

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423 Major naval operations understood as the sustained commitment of forces engaged in expeditionary operations against a shore or a fleet. On the problem of definitions, see Vego (2008: 7-39). In this chapter, these are selected naval operations designed to illustrate the real-world operations that the U.S. Navy conducted in the 2000s.

424 For a description of the USMC’s operations against Afghanistan 2001-2002 from the sea, see Lowry (2013).
that area a likely destination for terrorists fleeing from combat operations in Afghanistan. Navy operations typically involved maritime monitoring, boarding, search and seizure of suspect ships and dhows. This helped to gather intelligence, inhibit terrorism, curb armed robbery, and limit smuggling (Schneller 2007: 100-101). As much as in OEF support for the war in Afghanistan, the naval presence in the Arabian Sea was also multinational in nature (many countries contributed to some degree in both, obviously restricted by their respective capabilities, rules of engagement, and U.S. requirements). Participants at the Horn of Africa included long-time NATO partners, other allies, and recently-arrived countries that joined the U.S. effort in the “Global War on Terror”. Beyond the operations discussed, OEF-HOA forces were also engaged in humanitarian assistance, counter-proliferation, and counter-piracy efforts. Piracy began to affect maritime security in the region in earnest beginning in 2008 (after having plagued African coasts and Southeast Asia, although qualitatively different in the Strait of Malacca, for many years prior to that escalation). Consequently, the European Union (“Operation Atalanta” since December 2008), NATO (“Operation Allied Provider” October-December 2008, “Operation Allied Protector” March-June 2009, “Operation Ocean Shield” since August 2009), and the U.S.-administered CTF-151 (since January 2009) have been stood up complementary to OEF-HOA and U.S. national (Fifth Fleet) efforts in order to protect shipping and fight piracy off the Horn of Africa. After high points in 2009 and 2010, the quantity and quality of piracy incidents has decreased remarkably due to a combination of naval force presence, shipping industry best-management practices, and anti-piracy operations ashore. To date, anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, some with U.S. participation, others under individual national mandates, continue. In addition to the immediate curbing of piracy, the host of naval platforms in the area provides geostrategic results: naval presence matters in ways that armies and air forces cannot fulfill. The operational cooperation is an example of a global maritime partnership in action (Bruns 2009).

425 A picture from 14 September 2001 made considerable headlines on the brotherhood in arms after 9/11: The U.S. guided-missile destroyer *Winston Churchill* (DDG 81) and the German Charles-F.-Adams-class guided-missile destroyer *Lütjens* (D 185) met on the Atlantic. The crew of the (U.S.-manufactured) German warship manned the rails and presented a banner that read “We stand by you”, Germany participated in the naval side of OEF at the Horn of Africa with destroyers, frigates, fast-patrol boats, submarines, tenders, and MPA between 2002 and 2010 (Bundeswehr 2014).

426 For a discussion of the particulars of piracy and maritime terrorism, in particular an analysis against confounding the two phenomena in designing suitable counter-strategies, see Murphy (2008) and Chalk (2008).

427 One of the most notable piracy events at the Horn of Africa with U.S. involvement was the hijacking of the container ship *M/V Maersk Alabama* in April 2009. The ship was subsequently released and the pirates made off with the master towards the Somali coast. Bainbridge (DDG 96), Halyburton (FFG 40), Boxer (LHD 4), a SEAL team, and a P3-C Orion MPA were dispatched to end the hostage-taking. Eventually, three pirates were killed, two more were arrested, and the victim was released.
b) Arabian Gulf and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011)

After the decision was made to attack Iraq in the context of the “Global War on Terrorism” (Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney were instrumental in the inner-administration persuasion), operational plans for the Arabian Gulf region needed to be revamped (Ricks 2007, Cheney 2011). The premise of a “Desert Storm II” plan approved in 1998 consisted of a six-month buildup of 400,000 troops and was not viewed favorably by Rumsfeld, who wanted something faster and much leaner (Ricks 2007, Rumsfeld 2012). Iraqi forces were degraded since their defeat in the first Gulf War more than a decade earlier, but to the “coalition of the willing” that assembled for this operation it was still a formidable opponent (on land). On the naval side, five carrier battle groups, two amphibious ready groups, two amphibious task forces, and a Royal Navy amphibious task group were assigned to CENTCOM (Schneller 2007: 92) at the outset of the campaign against Iraq. The surge of half of the Navy’s operational carrier strike groups and ten expeditionary strike groups (a remarkable demonstration of U.S. sea power) was a function of the emerging “Fleet Response Plan” (2003) and an overwhelming and inhibiting display. Sealift moved cargo, fuel, and equipment to the troops and did so with even less opposition than during “Operation Desert Shield”/“Operation Desert Storm” (early in the war, Navy special forces seized Iraqi oil fields and terminals, and thwarted the covert sewing of mines). Joint operations against Iraq were, in another marked contrast to 1990/1991, relatively smooth because the Navy had practiced and learned to interoperate with the other military branches during the long decade of aerial warfare, while enforcing no-fly zones over Iraq. Naval aviation (especially the F/A-18 workhorses) flew 65% of the strike, reconnaissance, and power-projection sorties over Iraq and 35 allied warships fired more than 750 Tomahawk missiles against targets ashore (Schneller 2007: 96). The fast drive to oust Saddam Hussein from power confirmed many promises of the transformation agenda that “Sea Power 21” had attempted to codify for the Navy just a year earlier. But after President Bush declared major combat operations over on 1 May 2003, Iraq soon descended into a full-fledged civil war and a defining insurgency. Although the Army and the Marine Corps bore the brunt of this onslaught, Navy and Coast Guard (e.g., EOD teams, MCM personnel, Seabees construction battalions, riverine forces, etc.) were also drawn into the deteriorating security situation and the quagmire that was left behind. The
emerging counterinsurgency doctrine required much intellectual flexibility from the Marine Corps and, to a much lesser degree, the Navy.  

\textit{c) Tsunami Relief (2004/2005)}

In the middle of the two major U.S. ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a natural disaster in Southeast Asia demonstrated the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities of naval forces. On 26 December 2004, a 9.1-magnitude earthquake northwest of the Indonesian island of Sumatra resulted in a massive tsunami that swept through the whole Indian Ocean littorals. More than 230,000 people (165,000 in Indonesia alone) were killed and upwards of one million inhabitants were left homeless. The international community responded swiftly and dispatched substantial goods, personnel, and emergency services into the worst-affected regions (Margesson 2005, Elleman 2007). Military forces, in particular navies, of many countries played an indispensable role in providing medical help, serving as floating hospitals, functioning as command centers, and providing highly demanded water-purification facilities. The military also provided vital security in the devastated areas ashore. In “Operation Unified Assistance”, the U.S. Navy’s response included the \textit{Abraham Lincoln} (CVN 72) carrier strike group and the \textit{Bonhomme Richard} (LHD 6) expeditionary strike group (later relieved by \textit{Essex} [LHD 2]). One of the most important parts of this reactive disaster response was the deployment of the hospital ship \textit{Mercy} (T-AH 19), a converted oil tanker commissioned in 1986 (the U.S. Navy operates two of these ships). Combined, more than 100,000 patient services were provided. The U.S. Navy’s contribution to the relief operation amounted to more than 25 ships in 2004/2005. The Navy adopted these successful operations and increasingly conducted proactive humanitarian assistance deployments. Hospital ships or LHD helicopter carriers were dispatched increasingly to provide Pacific and Latin American countries support. This practice (which also improved U.S. reputation in the affected regions) was later codified in the “Global Fleet Stations” concepts that formed an integral part of “CS-21” (Department of the Navy/U.S. Coast Guard 2007, Sohn 2009).  

\textsuperscript{429} The response to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010 reiterated the Navy’s disaster response role: The Navy surged 112 ship task force grouped around aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers, and amphibious assault ships. That operation underlined the themes of cooperation and trust that “CS-21” articulated.  

\textsuperscript{428} A good introduction to the Marine Corps’ embrace of operational aspects of counterinsurgency is Hoffman (2010). The Navy did counterinsurgency during in Vietnam, which by virtue of its geography provided a much more suitable terrain than Iraq or Afghanistan ever could. For an introduction on the naval support to counterinsurgency, see Murphy (2010).
10.6.2 Relationships to Sister Services: Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force

a) USMC

The major naval operations of the 2000s displayed the improved Navy-Marine Corps relations. That is not to say that there were not contentious issues between the two services (e.g., the number of amphibious ships, the characteristics of new vessels, and the JSF variants). The Marine Corps’ growing end-strength reflected the increasing operational demands of the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At sea and in the littorals, maritime security operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief dominated the operational experience. At the same time, the Marines had to focus increasingly on counterinsurgency operations ashore and risked a degradation of their amphibious competency (Feickert 2014).

By and large, the services collaborated on many conceptual and strategic documents during the first decade of the 21st century with the highpoint of CS-21. Simultaneously, the services also pursued single-service vision, concept, strategy, and doctrinal publications. The naval capstone documents offered a close degree of coherence between the Navy and the Marine Corps, although both services usually engaged in different roles. The Marine Corps continued to rise to co-equality with the Navy and the other branches of the military (a trend that has been ongoing since the Vietnam War) through operational emancipation and such high-profile developments as the tenure of General Pace as CJCS (2005-2007). To the public and Congress, the versatility of the Navy-Marine Corps team was demonstrated by such measures as the increased use of amphibious ships for non-amphibious roles (i.e. Global Fleet Stations) (Bruns 2010b).

b) USCG

The U.S. government’s responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 fundamentally enhanced the role of the Coast Guard. With the increasingly value of homeland security, the Navy and the Coast Guard moved closer together. A 2008 memorandum of understanding formalized the Coast Guard’s national defense capabilities in support of DOD (including maritime interdiction, counter-terrorism, port security, military environmental responses, coastal sea-control, maritime operational threat responses, helicopter air-interception operations, and support for area security cooperation initiatives). The Coast Guard was engaged in comprehensive military operations such as “Nobel Eagle” and “Iraqi Freedom.” It participated increasingly in “Global Fleet Stations” worldwide and continued its counter-drug operations in the Caribbe-

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431 “Operation Noble Eagle” was the code name for the post-9/11 homeland security operation.
an. The “National Strategy for Maritime Security” (2005) codified the significant role that the Coast Guard played in national security and defense. In conjunction with the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard engaged in writing CS-21 (2007). That document provided a significant coherence for sea services that in fact often do very different things.\textsuperscript{432} With the tie-in to the overarching maritime strategy, the Coast Guard’s ageing fleet needs to be drastically modernized (Bruns 2013a: 179).

c) Army & Air Force

The relationship between the Army and the Navy after 2001 was rocky. The Navy spent much of the decade under the impression that it had been marginalized in the eyes of successive administrations and the American public due to the Pentagon’s focus (and the adjacent publicity) on two land-forces centric ground wars to which the Army was central (no matter how much support the Navy provided). After narrowly averting a defeat in Iraq in the face of a violent insurgency (2004-2006) that called into question the political-military planning on heavy combat forces, the Army became energized and transformed itself into a capable COIN force to turn around the momentum of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{433} However, by 2010 the tide had turned and the American public and its senior leaders (much to the dismay of the Army) appeared desirous to leave the irregular conflicts behind.\textsuperscript{434} Pressed by operational military realities, the Navy mentioned some contributions to COIN in its capstone documents (e.g., maritime security operations, riverine operations, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief tactics). The JHSV were initially designed (as the classification suggests) as a joint Army-Navy program where the Army was slated to take responsibility of half of the units procured. The program has since moved completely into the hands of the Navy. Operationally, intellectually, and strategically, the Army and the Navy traveled on diverging tracks in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{435}

The Air Force (which came out of the 1990s on a high note after it had ostensibly demonstrated the decisive power of aerial warfare in the Kosovo War) was in a situation similar to the Navy. The evolving geostrategic situation underlined the need for overcoming other countries’ A2AD capabilities (in particular China and Iran). This sparked an interest in air defense,

\textsuperscript{432} For more on Navy-Coast Guard relations in the 2000s, see Swartz (2011j: 136-147, slides 272-293).
\textsuperscript{433} For an introduction to the Army’s embrace of operational aspects of counterinsurgency, see Mansoor (2010).
\textsuperscript{434} Emblematic is Secretary of Defense Gates’ dictum during a speech at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, NY: “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” (cited in Shanker, “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq an Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 25 February 2011)
\textsuperscript{435} For more on Navy-Army relations, see Swartz (2011j: 167-180, slides 334-360).
sea control, and counter-sea operations and capabilities (Swartz 2011i: 148, slide 296). By virtue of their operational focus, both services were extraordinarily well positioned for this. Another commonality was that the Air Force also played little more than a supporting role in the ground-centric COIN operations in Southwest Asia.\(^{436}\) In finding common ground and shared understanding regarding the future primary warfighting domain, the Air Force and the Navy reached an unprecedented degree of cooperation and integration. This culminated in the development of a classified Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept directed by the Secretary of Defense at the end of the decade. Although a deliberate echo of the Air-Land Battle doctrine of the 1970s and 1980s (which tied together Army and Air Force at the Central Front in Europe), the ASB concept focused on smarter acquisition, not smarter warfighting like the former.\(^{437}\) With the Joint Strike Fighter variants, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines are likely to be tied together even closer in terms of equipment and doctrine in the coming decade.\(^{438}\)

10.6.3 Relationships to Allies

9/11 and the “Global War on Terrorism” sparked an unprecedented degree of multilateral naval cooperation. These were no longer limited to traditional alliances; instead, the U.S. Navy increasingly also relied on coalitions of the willing and other non-binding partnerships (at sea, navies historically have frequently trained and interoperated with each other). This was less instrumental in support of the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where coalitions by-and-large worked. It was all the more significant in the global littorals and at sea. CNO Admiral Mullen’s “1,000-ship Navy” concept to engage maritime forces around the world (later expanded and rebranded “Global Maritime Partnership” under CNO Admiral Roughead) had two focal points. “Global Fleet Stations” engaged local and regional navies, coast guards, harbor police, NGOs, and local government entities to facilitate capacity-building in the naval realm and enhance U.S. (and by implication, Western) standing in a given region.\(^{439}\) On the higher end, combined operations and exercises, information-sharing, and technology transfer between the U.S. Navy and its allies continued (e.g., integration of allied warships into U.S. Navy carrier strike groups, operational testing of leased foreign catamarans by the Navy, par-

\(^{436}\) The airpower and air support that was in demand in the ground wars was often provided by organic Army/Marine Corps forces. For an introduction to the role of airpower in counterinsurgency, see Dunlap (2010).

\(^{437}\) In the process, the Pentagon appears to have lost control of the message – if there ever was one beyond the implicit call on the Navy and the Air Force to eliminate redundancies – of ASB. Army and Marine Corps were unhappy that they were not included and China, the ASB concept’s apparent objective, understandably not amused.

\(^{438}\) For more on Navy-Air Force relations (including weapons systems, platforms, operational aspects, and space domain perspectives) see Swartz (2011j: 147-167, slides 294-333).

\(^{439}\) In 2008, Robert Work suggested seven of these global fleet stations (Work 2009: 64). For an analysis of the strategy, see Sohn (2009) and for short assessments of those GFS already in place (African Partnership Station, APS; Southern Partnership Station, SPS; and Pacific Partnership, PP), see Bruns (2010b, 2013b: 10-13).
ticipation of foreign navies in Aegis- and JSF-programs, etc.). The anti-terror “Operation Active Endeavour” (OAE)\(^{440}\) in the Mediterranean (since 2001), Proliferation Security Initiative (since 2003) operations, and the multilateral anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa (since 2008) provided an unparalleled degree of naval cooperation and operational integration.

In 2007, the fleet balance shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. More ships were now operating in Asian waters than in European and African waters. In 2008, after ten years of being forward-stationed in Yokosuka (Japan), the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63) was relieved by the significantly larger nuclear-powered *George Washington* (CVN 73). Established USN-led maneuvers and exercises continued to be conducted (e.g., Baltsops in the Baltic Sea, Malabar exercises in the Indian Ocean, CARAT in Southeast Asia, UNITAS in the Americas, and RIMPAC in the Pacific) just as new forums were developed and implemented (e.g., Valiant Shield in the Pacific since 2006). U.S. leadership was not limited to these recurring exercises but also included organizational (command) support. As NATO expanded and integrated in the 2000s, the U.S. Navy permanently contributed naval assets.\(^ {441}\) The drafting of NATO’s new “Alliance Maritime Strategy” began in 2009. It was published in March of 2011. Meanwhile, China had its “coming out” as a blue-water navy in 2009. Throughout the decade, navy-to-navy relations were problematic and incidents such as PLAN ships harassing U.S. Navy ships were emblematic of an uncertain bilateral future.

### 10.6.4 Significant Organizational Changes

On the home front, the Navy also implemented some changes. The creation of the Fleet Forces Command (FFC) reinforced the Navy’s focus on operations and resource management that was popularized under CNO Clark. FFC served a vehicle for OPNAV to organize, train, and equip the force and while that excluded strategic thinking, senior commanders from this shore establishment were actively engaged in trying to shape the future direction of the Navy. More publicly visible was the creation of USAFRICOM on 1 October 2008, a separate geographic command for Africa (headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany) (Ploch 2011). The same year, the 4th Fleet under USSOUTHCOM was re-established to provide a more suitable framework for U.S. naval operations in Latin America, the Caribbean, and South America.\(^ {442}\) In 2006, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was stood up to bracket together EOD mis-

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\(^{440}\) OAE was one of the first military responses to the invocation of Article 5 North Atlantic Treaty after the 9/11 attacks.

\(^{441}\) Examples include USN participation in standing NATO maritime groups and hosting the newly-established Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk (Virginia) since 2003.

\(^{442}\) For a reflection of the strategic context and the roles and missions in the 4th Fleet AOR, see Stavridis (2010).
sions, navy construction forces (Seabees), maritime civil affairs groups, and riverine forces (in 2007, the Navy conducted the first riverine combat operations in 34 years) (Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 2011). In January 2010, the 10th Fleet was re-established as a naval component and force provider to the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (Chief of Naval Operations 2010).


The Navy ended the first decade of the 2000s on a mixed note. After the shock of 9/11 and the marginalization by the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the service was energized by the impact of the trifecta family of strategic capstone documents.\textsuperscript{443} This deliberately connected group of documents replaced the single line of documents of the 1980s and the more erratic, often isolated documents that characterized Navy strategy-making in the 1990s. Throughout the 2000s, Navy budgets increased (in contrast to the 1990s) and the battle fleet inventory finally recovered after years of reductions in numbers. Previously, a disappointing record of shipbuilding and procurement tainted the Navy’s track record in this field.

At the beginning of the decade, 9/11 fundamentally changed the security perception of Americans. The terrorist attacks heralded a decade that was dominated largely by ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a global campaign against illicit actors. Non-state actors and those who provided them with a safe haven increasingly moved into the focus of security policy. Like in the past, the Navy occasionally pushed back against the view of land-power focused “continentalists” who saw the generation-long war against international terrorism as emblematic for the future U.S. military. Along that narrative, the U.S. was never fully at war nor fully at peace. Sea power theorists and practitioners needed to grasp that trend and turn it around in their favor.

They rediscovered that the Navy had always operated across the spectrum and, if made aware of its conceptual roots, was well suited to provide the senior civilian leaders with a range of options. The Navy needed to align better to the grand strategy and if possible translate such knowledge into suitable contributions to the policy of the Bush administration. Cornered by the public and political focus on the ground wars and burdened by the growing demands of the ongoing missions and naval operations, the Navy looked toward regaining the conceptual

\textsuperscript{443} These were the “Naval Operations Concept”, the “Navy Strategic Plan”, and “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”. The new spirit is recently also characterized by the Navy’s advertisement slogan, “A Global Force for Good” (http://www.navy.com/about/gffg.html).
initiative. First, naval planners remembered and restated the naval missions that had been codified by Admiral Turner forty years earlier. Second, these same officers returned to the realization that forward-deployed navies have always had a very distinct position to play in shaping events ashore and in the littorals, thereby uniquely influencing events and strategic outcomes. Animated by the top-cover provided by the Navy leadership, revitalized by input from formal and informal study groups, think tanks, and other discussion forums, and sensing momentum, CS-21 emerged as genuinely new maritime (not just a naval) strategy. It fashioned the Navy as a post-modern force that defended the global system. Strikingly, its development went against the prevailing currents of military and political planning. Mullen and his collaborators managed to design a strategy that was at once in line with the overarching grand-strategic demands that the Bush administration directed (even if Bush 43’s foreign policy was seen by some as increasingly belligerent and unilateral) and fashioned a concerted, forward-looking, and systemic approach at the same time. In fact, the selection of the strategy’s title is a revelation. In proposing a seapower (one word) strategy for this century, CS-21 forged a bridge between the universal and institutional meaning of the concept (given that the globalized world is so interconnected and integrated that it can indeed be understood as one system – or more precisely, a system of systems) and the physical political, diplomatic, constabulary, and military exercise of sea power (two words).

Meanwhile, in the Pentagon thinking was dominated by the focus on terrorism. The need to transform in stride by developing future capabilities to achieve the vision of full spectrum dominance was met by greater financial resources, better technology, more reliance on activating reserve forces, and a growth in Army and Marine Corps force structure (Meinhard 2012:81). CS-21 also helped to overcome the previous, rather limited focus on operations and budget submissions. This was a politically safe way to rationalize the service to a Congress that was very concerned with war-fighting and weapons systems, but otherwise had eclipsed any visions that earlier strategic documents had partially offered. This had caused strategic thinking and the art of strategy to degenerate. As surface warfare officers, Vice Admiral Morgan and Admiral Mullen were better suited to identify and embrace a more population-centric role of sea power. Due to the indisputable facts that Kabul and Bagdad were not exactly major port cities and Afghanistan’s and Iraq’s sea power marginal, the Navy needed to develop something completely different and novel. At the time, the demand for specialist prowess such as counter-IED capabilities, cultural and language abilities, and the more comprehensive view that sea power needed to affect the littoral sea- and land-wards had eclipsed the fashionable vocabularies related to transformation and capabilities-based planning. Conceptually,
CS-21 refocused the understanding of the value of sea power for foreign-policy ends and elevated it. For much of the post-Cold War time, the Navy (e.g., for a lack of ambition, institutional coherence, or intellectual vigor) had conveniently concentrated on operational, doctrinal, and tactical aspects of naval warfare.

Toward the end of the decade, U.S. security policy began to look beyond the hostilities in the Middle East and Central Asia arenas. The rise of China (and to lesser degrees Brazil, Russia, and India) epitomized that emergence of peer competitors who looked for access to resources and influence. They have the potential to challenge U.S. sea power, which had been uncontested for over a decade. By 2010, the world had changed. Shortly after the publication of the 2007 “CS-21” document, the stock market took a dive. One of the main implicit assumptions of the strategy (continuous mutual prosperity) faded away. In Washington, the assumption of rising defense budgets turned out to be incorrect as the U.S. economy went into a downward spiral. The global financial crisis deeply shocked the global economy and international trade nearly collapsed. China began to challenge the United States in the Pacific and by extension in the South and East China Sea. Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia foreshadowed Moscow’s resurrecting geopolitical ambitions. The nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran continued unabatedly despite sanction regimes and political-military pressure. These are fundamental, considerably more violent shocks to the global system that CS-21 outlined. With the Arab Spring of 2011, a major part of the Middle East and North Africa descended into an (ongoing) mélange of civil war, insurgency, and terror. In Libya, the international community intervened using a combination of naval and air forces in the U.S.-led “Operation Odyssey Dawn” (March 2011) and later as the NATO-led “Operation Unified Protector” (March-October 2011). The military operation demonstrated some fundamental shortcomings in naval power of the U.S. and its allies (McGrath 2013, Smith-Windsor 2013).

With “CS-21”, the Navy was well underway to develop upward pressure and to fashion a national, systemic, and truly maritime strategy. The intermittent failure to develop the idea further and implement the document – due to economic events, a changing administration that was more focused on domestic politics and generally shy of executable strategic and military ideas, political gridlock in Washington, more immediate concerns about the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and an ever-shifting geopolitical situation – is regrettable. Navy strategies between 2001 and 2011 demonstrate the enduring value of the four core naval missions. These documents underlined that only a strategy that addresses political ends in naval warfare can be assured some impact. Concurrently, naval strategy by default (e.g., force-planning by
the FY budget requests) was, and is, a dead end. These missions are a common theme over more than three decades and a link to what the future may hold for U.S. Navy strategy and the exercise of American sea power around the world.
11 Synopsis

11.1 A Few General Conclusions

This study analyses the evolution of U.S. Navy strategy and American sea power over the course of three decades framed by major Navy capstone documents. To arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the concepts involved, the survey first discussed the relationship between seapower and sea power, the political and military uses of the sea, relevant theory, the links between different levels of strategy, naval missions, and some particulars of the maritime domain that guide formulation of naval and maritime strategy. The analysis also showed the intimate relationship among strategy, planning, and force structure.

The role of navies in foreign policy and as strategic tools of security policy is underappreciated and widely unexplored in practical policy as well as in the academy. The reasons for this remain speculative; perhaps it is due to the service’s specialized strategic culture or its operations out at sea and thus out of sight that often lets it appear inaccessible to outsiders. However, the military and political effects of navies and naval power are ultimately felt ashore. Strategic planners must take this into account, and analysts are well-served to conceptualize this. This warrants the study of modern seapower and sea power. Ken Booth’s work of 1979 deserves to be dusted off.

More than just a semantic egg dance, one has to be careful in teasing apart the different meanings of the concepts at hand. An assessment of the role (and relative value) of a navy in the national security construct of a state requires a sustainable methodology and a careful differentiation. Terminology is not always helpful: After all, what exactly constitutes U.S. Navy strategy in the first place? What can be subsumed under the umbrella of “sea power”? The terms involved are so comprehensive that they can easily mean something entirely else to anyone. To hedge against such confusion, this dissertation broke the concept down into seapower (one word) as an institutional and geographical quality of a nation and sea power (two words) as a universal, comprehensive, and conscious political choice in the application of military power.

There are some general aspects. Sea power includes diplomatic, constabulary, and military roles. These require a balanced fleet of different but multi-mission capable ships. To rationalize a balanced fleet, a navy must produce declaratory statements for various internal and external audiences such as policy and military leaders, legislators, programmers, the public, officers and enlisted men and women, allies, and by implication even competitors. These de-
claratory capstone documents are the hinges that connect seapower with sea power. For the researcher, the strategic concepts offer a unique prism through which intellectual, fiscal, geo-strategic, technological, programming, personnel, and domestic political currents must be assessed. These aspects govern the effectiveness and efficiency of sea power. In turn, a look at how these declaratory documents played out in the real world – in force structure, naval operations, public support, relationship to allies, etc. – is also justified to arrive at a better placement of strategy into context.

A causal relation between strategies (general or naval), their practical employment, and whether a strategy was a success, is difficult to trace much less to verify. Decision-making processes and institutional learning rarely conform to theoretical models. Instead, they are subject to diverse internal dynamics and external influences of a political nature. In short, they are contingent on changing world conditions, national polices, and personalities (Swartz 2009b: 18). Moreover, the strategic orientation of a navy, its roles, missions, and force structure are never determined in a political vacuum. They hardly adhere to orderly hierarchical processes in which strategy follows from an articulation of national interests, an identification of threats, the establishment of political-military objectives, the matching of goals with available resources, and corresponding operations. Although strategy is the attempt to control events, in reality, making strategy is more often a complicated and even chaotic process (Hattendorf 2004: viii). Naval strategy and its underlying policies are both a product of and a factor in the competitions, interactions, and ambiguities of statecraft; they are an input and an output. Individuals, events, or adverse decisions can interpose even in the most rational and theoretical logic of these processes. Naval strategies can thus often only approximately align with overarching strategies. At best, they offer narratives that are compelling and substantiated enough to exert upward political pressure, enhance service cohesion, and provide a comprehensive and optimistic general marching order. A study of naval strategy must reflect these limitations and dynamics or else render itself meaningless.

11.2 American Seapower

America sports determinants of functional (geographic) as well as horizontal (institutional) seapower. “From Sea to Shining Sea,” as the famous hymn “America, the Beautiful” declares, America is an island nation with extended coastlines in the East and West, some of the largest and best-served ports in the world, and a potent maritime industrial base. Although the quality and quantity of American shipbuilding is waning compared to many other nations, the domestic maritime industry supports nearly 500,000 jobs and almost $100 billion in annual econom-
ic output (Hunter/Scalise 2014). The United States’ division of the world into areas of military responsibility is unique, but it is a function of the island nation and the established practice of forward presence.

Institutionally, there are a number of actors that make, as well as factors that shape, the constitution of American seapower and, by implication, relevant statements of strategic quality and intent. The President, Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and its Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, and the regional and functional military commanders all matter. As principally laid out in the U.S. Constitution and Title 10, U.S. Code, they have codified responsibilities and obligations that they continually exercise to shifting degrees and in the face of interpersonal dynamics and influences. The president is important for overarching leadership and direction, i.e., where he wants the nation to go. The U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives are in charge of modifying presidential politics although historically they have been more interested in people and equipment which they are asked to fund, and less so in the larger strategic designs of the Navy (Swartz 2009b: 70).

In a world where the military is thinking and acting progressively more jointly (and single-service strategies and programs are increasingly looked down on), the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs have a central role in the formulation of military strategy and in advising the president on security and defense policy matters (although the chain of command now essentially bypasses them). The unified combatant commanders also have an important role. Their requirements for forces are based on what they assess as the demands on the ground. Even if these requests are more geared toward fulfilling current needs, they can exert upward pressure through the chain of command.

The Secretary of Defense is important in coordinating the programming efforts of the services and departments. OPNAV and the Department of the Navy are the cores where service strategy, or more precisely Navy capstone documents, originate and emerge in the overwhelming majority of instances. Such projects are naturally subject to available budgets, specializations, individual and collective ambition, classification statuses, and many more influences. It follows – and a look at the history of the documents will prove – that in terms of strategy-making and institutional seapower, Chiefs of Naval Operations usually matter a lot, whereas the Secretaries of the Navy only sometimes matter (Swartz 2011b: 84, slides 167-168).

In the discussion of American seapower, a host of shapers must be considered as secondary influences, although they neither have the constitutional nor legal rights and obligations to
make and shape U.S. Navy strategy. For example, there is inherent competition between departments like the Department of Defense and the Department of State. To leverage American sea power, it is advisable to analyze if and how far general directions, subordinate policies, and even capstone documents are aligned (if not directed by the president). Similar recommendations can be made for other branches of the military in the perpetual quest for resources and national attention.

It also behooves to consider the unique qualities and capabilities that the other military services bring to bear. Where service strategies previously wrestled with influence and thrust, in an increasingly joint environment a service can now better attempt to affect coming legislation and even joint policy and strategy to their advantage by deliberately joining hands. This must be taken into account in an analysis. Interest groups and the media are further aspects that can – however briefly – interpose. Although they often merely focus on individual issues or events far below the truly strategic level, their actions influence policy-makers to eventually make strategically-relevant choices. This, in turn, can affect program planning and the crafting of strategy.

The underlying ideas and ideals that frame grand, security, and military strategy are the ones that are most interesting to the political scientist. These range from overarching, great visions (e.g., why does America go to war, to what ends, and against which targets does it direct political-military force) to more practical, but long-established naval missions (e.g., what and how does the Navy do at sea to contribute effectively and efficiently to foreign-policy objectives). Ideally, the former and the latter both factor equally. The current practice in strategy-making as well as in its analyses, however, appears to be more about missions than about visions.

This is where the overlap between seapower theory and sea power theory is at its largest. Seapower is a fundamental national security quality with sea power as its indispensable instrument. These general hypotheses have evolved since the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, or Stansfield Turner. Despite the advent of many technologies and the fundamental complexities of the modern age, there are a number of patterns that help understand and explain the enduring value of sea power for a seapower like the United States. It follows that naval strategy is not revolutionary, but evolutionary. Technologically advanced, well-equipped, flexible and forward-present naval forces can serve the nation across a spectrum that ranges from alliance-building and humanitarian assistance to surveillance and from economic coercion, show of/use of force to limited and larger wars in ways that other military
and diplomatic tools do not offer. Obviously, such a wide array of opportunities must be embedded in political and military guidance. In fact, the effects of a navy were seldom a problem for such a high-tech force; the determination what to reach out and touch and whether that makes a difference is the supreme challenge.

11.3 U.S. Navy Strategy and American Sea Power in Perspective

The evolution of U.S. Navy strategy is deeply rooted in the normative and political history of the country, and its role and place in the world. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States emerged as a truly global power. For the United States, World War I and World War II were inherently maritime and naval in nature; for Washington, the entanglement in both conflicts was signaled by events at or from the sea. After 1945, nuclear weapons began to dominate strategic thinking. In the absence of a capable sea control challenger, the Navy began to focus on deterrence. Strategic bombing and massive retaliation became central political and military vocabulary even when real-world events showed that limited, non-nuclear armed conflicts were still a real possibility. The end of the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems and the introduction of missile technology and nuclear propulsion guided the development of a sea-based strategic deterrent. That SSBN force supplanted aircraft carriers in their nuclear strike role and turned out to be a milestone in the revival of a conventional naval strategy (Center for Naval Analyses 1992: 47). This timely development occurred against the background of the Vietnam War years where the Navy’s mission was reduced to power projection at the expense of sea control capabilities. Emerging Soviet high seas power required a renewed concentration on giving the Navy a broader mission set just as the nation licked its wounds from the defeat in Southeast Asia and the fallout of Watergate. The strategic renaissance of a comprehensive sea power strategy slowly began inside the Navy but for the time being faced countercurrents in a mainly anti-naval Carter administration.

With the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the top cover of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, “The Maritime Strategy” could eventually unfold. It was a timely reaction to increasing Soviet confidence and came amidst deteriorating superpower relations in the ‘Second Cold War’ 1979-1985. Buoyed by rising defense spending and fervent presidential rhetoric, the new strategy and the accompanying 600-ship force structure energized the navy. The coming war, in the words of Admiral Jim Stavridis (who was a young lieutenant in the office that helped draft the strategy) (Interview 2012: 00:09:45 – 00:12:20),
“was all about fighting the Soviet Union, it was about the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap […]], it was about the ‘Hunt for Red October’, the great undersea battle that would transpire. It was a very, very large, almost galactic struggle across the Atlantic and really around the world.”

Reagan’s second presidential term was characterized by eased relations with the Soviet Union. Defense reorganization and acquisition reforms changed the way the military went about its business. In short, “The Maritime Strategy” was a meaningful maritime piece of U.S. overall strategy, even if that meant running the risk of unbalancing the Soviets through offensive carrier and attack submarine operations in the vicinity of Moscow’s strategic SSBN reserves. “The Maritime Strategy” tracked with the President, Congress, the Navy, and – after the documents were unclassified – with the public and American allies. The U.S. Navy was also very busy with limited conflicts throughout the 1980s, which underlined naval roles across the spectrum of conflict and the presence-crisis-war continuum that “The Maritime Strategy” described.

After the end of the Cold War, dramatically shrinking defense and naval budgets put significant pressure on the service and the global existential threat of the Cold War was replaced by more nuanced, but vague regional scenarios (and, in the words of President George H.W. Bush, a new world order). This uncertain environment yielded an abundance of overarching strategies and policies from senior political and military leaders, in particular during the presidency of Bill Clinton, who tried to manage and grasp the different era. The Navy sought to react accordingly. It produced a host of (usually already unclassified) strategic concepts and documents with different names to influence the debate. With “…From the Sea” (1992) and “Forward…From the Sea” (1994), the Navy accepted power projection and refocused from the high seas to the littorals, while retaining a blue-water navy. At the same time, the United States enjoyed uncontested maritime supremacy and was rushing to draw down its Cold-War force level (which for the Navy was consistently higher than strategic documents requested) rationally. Some of the substantial intellectual gains of “…From the Sea” and “Forward…From the Sea” unfortunately were eclipsed by the series of scandals that unsettled the Navy at the time. The Navy’s capstone documents of the second half of the decade must therefore also be understood as a low-key effort to right the service’s culture and to provide it with doctrinal and operational consolidation instead of grander strategic and political-military visions. The naval operations of the 1990s (with increasing integration of allies) reaffirmed the versatility of naval forces as adaptable instruments in the foreign policy toolkit. From mere peacetime presence to limited armed conflict, the Navy was engaged in many short wars.
and incidents. These operations were buttressed by significant advancements in technology, computerization, and shipbuilding.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Navy was once again asked to adapt and adjust, having just recently submitted its “Seapower 21” capstone document. Homeland security and counter-terrorism now became a yardstick by which many programs and strategies were justified. Throughout the decade, the Navy’s force level goals were higher than the current inventory. From the confined waters of the Persian Gulf or the open seaways of the Arabian Sea, the U.S. Navy supported the ground, air, and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with close air support, long-range strike, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection. The Navy also forward-deployed thousands of troops on the ground who provided explosive ordnance disposal, communications, security, training, special operations, and additional missions in conjunction with the other military branches, allies, and partners. The U.S. military was in the middle of a bottom-up transformation process when the demands of the asymmetric and hybrid war against terrorism mandated yet another change in posture and thinking, another transformative shock. This affected the Army and the Marine Corps most, which bore the brunt of the campaigns in Southwest Asia. Despite rising defense budgets and the Navy’s quest to identify inefficiencies, the service benefited comparatively little from the militarization under President George W. Bush. Cost and schedule overruns plagued the modernization of the fleet. In the mid-2000s, the Navy came up with a concept that was built around the dynamics and implications of globalization (and repudiated the popular and prevailing general assumption of a generational long war against irregular fighters). More implicitly, the strategic focus also shifted to near-peer competitors like China. This family of related documents included the participation of the Marines and the Coast Guard. Much of the Navy’s strategic outlook survived the transition to President Barack Obama although the future, as always, remained uncertain. Since 2009, geopolitical shifts, an ongoing, comprehensive economic and financial crisis, an erosion of American/EU political leadership and amicable transatlantic ties, political gridlock in Washington, and an increasingly weak president have weighed down on American drive and will to lead the world.

The various Navy strategic documents can be interwoven with the golden thread that is American foreign and security policy from 1981 on, but a definite appraisal is hard (not least because naval strategic documents have been drafted differently over the decades and no two documents or contexts are alike).
The victories of sea power are often silent (Cropsey 2013: 94). The exceptional flexibility of sea power has played an important role for the United States of America, but the appreciation for the Navy in the White House, on Capitol Hill, in the Pentagon leadership, and in the public has waxed and waned. This is especially true for the tilting balance in favor of continental and land-based conflicts that America has encountered since the end of the Cold War. The service carries its share of responsibility for that. Problems along the way of creating, crafting, and implementing strategy range stem from the pressures of jointness, a lack of appreciation for policy dynamics and terminology, the Navy’s inherent tactical and operational focus, internal problems, a fear of debate and discussion, budgetary concerns, Navy-Marine Corps issues, classification, or the lack of senior leader involvement (Swartz 2009b: 32). Other issues include timing and alignment with joint planning circles and joint documents like the Quadrennial Defense Review or the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. The Navy’s documents can never satisfy all audiences. Hence, the service can do naval strategy (like “…From the Sea” and “Sea Power 21”), but a maritime strategy (like “The Maritime Strategy” or CS-21) is more difficult to develop.

Most important of all, real-world actions usually interpose and undermine the attempt of strategy-makers to control the course of events. This means that only process is a viable key to comprehending U.S. Navy strategy and understanding American sea power, even if that is academically unsatisfying. The quality and assertiveness of naval strategic thought fluctuates. It requires constant grooming, consciousness of best practices, and a harking back to traditional virtues. Enduring naval missions offer insights into what the future might hold for the U.S. Navy and the prospective exercise of American naval power around the world in the years to come.
12 Afterword

When the topic and scope of this study were first drawn up in late 2007 and early 2008, the fundamentally innovative “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” had just been published. When the doctoral candidateship in Kiel was secured and research began in earnest in 2010 (after a two-year career-building interregnum in the public/private sector), the “Naval Operations Concept” emerged as a guidance memorandum to execute the maritime strategy was rolled out. During extended stays in Washington, D.C. in 2010-2011 and again in 2012, the essence of public and private discussions with key naval and policy stakeholders was that a revised version of CS-21 was in the making and should be revealed soon. As of July 2014, these suggestions continue when one monitors the debate in policy and naval circles, but an updated or revised version of the capstone document has yet to be published (what the revised strategy should encompass has been subject of comprehensive debate; for samples, see McGrath 2010, Moore 2011, Hill 2012, 2013).

444 The particulars of a moving target aside, the world has obviously moved on and in many respects looks different than on the eve of the military intervention in Libya in March 2011. Despite some careful recovery, the repercussions of the economic and financial crisis are still felt around the world. Parts of Japan continue to battle with the fallout of the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear catastrophe more than three years ago.445 Since early 2011, the protests and civil unrest of the “Arab Spring” have sent shockwaves through North Africa and the Middle East. To date, the civil war in Syria has cost the lives of at least 150,000 people, displaced millions more, given rise to transnational jihadist fighters, and led to the employment of chemical weapons of mass destruction.446

Meanwhile, Barack Obama secured a second presidential term in 2012. He and his national security team447 have concentrated on the nation’s wars in Iraq, which currently appears to descend into chaos again, and Afghanistan, where U.S. and allied troops were surged and are

445 The U.S. Navy played a significant role in first response efforts, utilizing the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) in the process despite safety and health concerns for the crew.
446 The U.S. Navy partnered with allied navies to help coerce the regime of Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad to hand over the remaining stockpiles and neutralized the WMD at sea.
447 Secretary of Defense Gates was relieved in July 2011 by Leon Panetta. Panetta’s successor (since February 2013) is Chuck Hagel.
The continuing war against terrorists is best epitomized by the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles and targeted strikes against individuals and groups under President Obama.

As of 22 July 2014, the Navy’s battle fleet stood at 290 warships, 99 (or 34%) of which were deployed. For an up-to-date listing, see the regularly updated official Navy website listing, Status of the Navy, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146.

E.g., unmanned systems, the cyber domain, green fuels, the littoral combat ship and its planned, larger frigate-type successor, the next generation aircraft carrier etc.

now set to depart later this year. The proposed rebalance (or “pivot”) to the Asia-Pacific region (issued as part of a Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012) and the associated AirSea Battle concept have drawn a lot of commentary and criticism for shaking up European and Middle East allies, while unnecessarily rousing China. Meanwhile, the U.S. fiscal and budget crisis has continually worsened. It led to across-the-board spending cuts and a government shutdown in October 2013. Ongoing territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, resurging Russian nationalism in the wake of the Crimean/Ukrainian crisis since February 2014, and the rise of other economies and political players have reinvigorated notions of peer-competitor conflict for the United States. The QDR 2014 (issued in March of this year) only partially reflects these trends in its call for a military that is tasked to defend the homeland, build international security partnerships, project power, and win its conflicts decisively (Department of Defense 2014).

The U.S. Navy retains a forward-deployed and combat-credible status, although the force is increasingly strained. Questions remain about alternatives to these unsustainable deployments (Whiteneck et al. 2010). Coupled with the cold winds of fiscal austerity, changing demographics, and transforming energy dependencies, the American ability and will to use sea power as a comprehensive geopolitical instrument could be in fundamental question. Allies will be pressured to increasingly provide their own combat-credible naval presence in order to free U.S. assets elsewhere (Bruns 2014). At the same time, U.S. investments in new research, development, and testing of new platforms and capabilities continue. How these trends and demands can and will be reflected in future Navy strategies and capstone documents, remains to be seen.
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* = The author of this study conducted these interviews himself. He also interviewed Mr. Norman Polmar (Washington, D.C., 17 September 2012) and Captain (United States Navy, retired) Steve Richter (via Skype from Kiel, 15 October 2012). After concluding the conversations, these two interviewees requested that their statements not to be used on the record.

The author holds copies of all recordings.

d) Television/Fiction


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### 13.2 Secondary Sources


14 Acknowledgment

A dissertation is much like a round-the-world sailing trip. The course is staked somewhere on a map, the adventurer has a fair supply of stocked goods, but what the journey may hold, much less what it feels like reaching the final destination, remains elusive for long periods of time. Amidst port hopping, occasional disorientation ensues and recalibrating the itinerary becomes imperative. Stormy seas alternate with tail winds and slacks. Professional and personal disappointments can present major obstacles. Emotional and physical injuries have to be dealt with, although for every such instance there are at least double the number of positive experiences along the way. Motivation and optimism are thus a perpetual force multiplier when desperation can be a frequent companion.

I could not have facilitated this journey without the help and support of a few great people. These individuals were instrumental in recognizing my talent, fostering it, and cheering me to stay the course. What is more, they provided strategic and methodological lighthouses along the way as well emotional and material “replenishment-at-sea”. In 2010, I was literally putting to sea and had little experience in the field of navies or sea power studies: I had never taken a class on naval strategy or naval history before (simply because it was not offered at any of my universities). I also lacked first-hand experience of serving in a navy. First and foremost, I am therefore indebted to my three naval mentors. Their encouragement, insight, energy, and guidance have benefited me greatly.

Dr. Sarandis “Randy” Papadopoulos, now the Department of the Navy historian in Washington, D.C., was my supervisor when I first got into contact with the U.S. Navy during an internship in 2005. He got me hooked on naval strategy and history. Even more importantly, he saw enough talent in me to pursue a doctoral dissertation. I have always benefited from Randy’s calm, fatherly backing for my project. His enthusiasm for naval history has certainly rubbed off on me and his knowledge and wisdom in the field are simply superb. Randy and his colleague Dr. John Sherwood, who is still with the Naval History and Heritage Command, were instrumental in framing my research interest in naval issues and strategy. They also knew how to foster it during the long years between the internship and the beginning of my doctoral studies. Among many other things, John facilitated a grant in 2012 that allowed me to interview some key naval strategy decision-makers in the Washington, D.C. area and in Norfolk, Virginia. Last, but not least, Peter Swartz, Captain (ret.) United States Navy: He was one of the individuals I got to sit down with during said research trip. Peter was the principal action officer for “The Maritime Strategy” in the 1980s. His compendium on the development of U.S. Navy Strategy since the 1970s provided motivation for my dissertation. His continuous insight and inspiration carried me through my work. I first met him in early 2011, and I have enjoyed every single conversation and personal exchange we have had to date. Peter is an incredibly knowledgeable individual with remarkable wit and wisdom. Without the encouragement, inspiration and altruistic support these people bestowed upon me, this dissertation would have looked very, very different indeed. I am honored to have these three gentlemen as colleagues and mentors, and I am proud to call Randy, John and Peter my friends.

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Special thanks to Congressman Todd Young, Captain USMC (ret.), and his staff for taking me onboard as a military legislative aide-equivalent in 2010-2011. This insight into the engine room of U.S. politics and Congressional military and defense policy decision-making was a life-altering experience. An honest and deep-felt appreciation goes to the German Marshall Fund for providing me with the financial backing for that opportunity. I would like to express my gratitude to Jan Asmussen, Jim Dolbow, Jannis Jost, Christian Patz, and Michael Haas who (in addition to my supervisor and my second reader) provided indispensable comments on earlier drafts of this study and the German executive summary, respectively. It goes without saying that all omissions and errors in the text remain mine. I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues at the Institute for Political Science, especially my fellow PhD candidates, who spent numerous weekends and nights with me at the office and motivated me to pull through. Special thanks to Michael (Zurich) and Felix Seidler (Berlin), partners in crime on advancing the research into naval strategy issues from a Central European perspective. All of them often provided an opportunity to joke and laugh when comic relief was in high demand (we will go ahead with the stand-up comedian tour if the Political Science route does not work out). Much appreciated is the help and support of my true friends near and far that have provided enduring compassion, love, and support in rough times.

Finally, my endless gratitude goes out to my beloved family. My parents have given me the freedom to pursue my dreams, and I cannot thank them enough for what they have done for me. They provided financial support and forced me to focus when I was in danger of losing track. My grandmother, Oma Edith, has also been outstandingly supportive to me over the years. She continues to be a tremendous inspiration. She was also the only person who sensibly noted how difficult writing a PhD dissertation can be – all without ever having gone to a university herself. They are an enduring encouragement, and I dedicate this work to them. Finally, I have also found comfort in the music of Mark Knopfler and the Dire Straits, and returned many times to the “13 rules of leadership” by Colin Powell, General USA (ret.), reprinted in the annex for your inspiration on your own sailing trip. Until then!
15 Annex

15.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations

A2AD = Anti-Access/Area Denial
AAW = Anti-Air Warfare
ABM = Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACUS = Atlantic Council of the United States
ACT = Allied Command Transformation
AEI = American Enterprise Institute
AFB = Air Force Base
AIPAC = American-Israeli Political Action Committee
AIS = Automated Identification System
ALB = AirLand Battle
AOR = Area of Responsibility
ARG = Amphibious Ready Group
APS = African Partnership Station
ASB = Air-Sea Battle
ASuW = Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW = Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATO = Air Tasking Order
AWACS = Airborne Warning and Control System
BB = Battleship
BBAG = Battleship Action Group
BMD = Ballistic Missile Defense
BRAC = Base Realignment and Closure
BUR = Bottom-Up Review
C⁴ISR = Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CBO = Congressional Budget Office
CFR = Council on Foreign Relations
CG = Guided Missile Cruiser
CG(X) = Guided Missile Cruiser, future
CGN = Guide Missile Cruiser, Nuclear
CIA = Central Intelligence Agency
CIC = Command Information Center
CINC = Commander in Chief
CIWS = Close-In Weapon System
CJCS = Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMC = Commandant Marine Corps
CNA = Center for Naval Analyses
CNN = Cable News Network
CNO = Chief of Naval Operations
COCOM = Combatant Commander
COD = Carrier Onboard Delivery
COIN = Counterinsurgency
CONOPS = Concept of Naval Operations
CPG = Contingency Planning Guidance
CRS = Congressional Research Service
CS-21 = A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
CSG = Carrier Strike Group
CSI = Container Security Initiative
CSIS = Center for Strategic and International Studies
CTBT = Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
CV = Carrier, General Purpose
CVBG = Carrier Battle Group
CVL = Light Aircraft Carrier
CVN = Carrier, Fixed Wing Aircraft, Nuclear
CVV = Aircraft Carrier, Medium Size
CVW = Carrier Air Wing
DD = Destroyer
DDG = Guided Missile Destroyer
DD(X) = Destroyer, Future
DHS = Department of Homeland Security
DOD = Department of Defense
DON = Department of the Navy
DOT = Department of Transportation
DOTMLPF = Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities
DPG = Defense Planning Guidance
JCC(X) = Joint Command Ship, future
JCS = Joint Chiefs of Staff
JHSV = Joint High-Speed Vessel
JIATF = Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
JMSDF = Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
JOC = Joint Operations Concept
JSCP = Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSF = Joint Strike Fighter
JSPS = Joint Strategic Planning System
KAL = Korean Airlines
LCS = Littoral Combat Ship
LEDET = Law Enforcement Detachment
LHA = Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose)
LHD = Amphibious Assault Ship (Multipurpose)
LPD = Amphibious Transport Dock
LPH = Amphibious Assault Ship (Helicopter)
LSD = Landing Ship, Dock
MAB = Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAF = Marine Amphibious Force
MAGTF = Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARAD = Maritime Administration
MBA = Master in Business Administration
MCCDC = Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCM = Mine Countermeasures
MCO = Medium Contingency Operation
MDG = Millennium Development Goals
MEU = Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIO = Maritime Interdiction Operations/Maritime Interception Operations
MNF = Multinational Force
MOOTW = Military Operations Other Than War
MPA = Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MPF (F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
MPS = Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MRC = Medium Regional Contingency
MSC = Military Sealift Command
MSO = Maritime Security Operations
MTW = Major Theater War
MX = Missile Experimental
N00K = CNO Executive Panel
N513 = OPNAV’s Strategy and Concepts Branch
NAFTA = North-American Free Trade Association
NAS = Naval Air Station
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVDOCCOM = Naval Doctrine Command
NDRF = National Defense Reserve Fleet
NFCPE = Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort
NHHC = Naval History and Heritage Command
NDP = National Defense Policy
NDP = Naval Doctrine Publication
NDS = National Defense Strategy
NECC = Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
NGFS = Naval Gunfire Support
NGO = Nongovernmental Organization
NIE = National Intelligence Estimate
NM = Nautical Mile
NMD = National Missile Defense
NMS = National Military Strategy
NOC = Naval Operations Concept
NOCJO = Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations
NPT = Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC = National Security Council
NSD = National Security Directive
NSDD = National Security Decision Directive
NSPG = Navy Strategic Planning Guidance
NSS = National Security Strategy
NWDC = Naval Warfare Development Command
OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations
OEF = Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF = Operation Iraqi Freedom
OLA = Office of Legislative Affairs
OPA = Office of Program Appraisal
OPNAV = Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSD = Office of the Secretary of Defense
PDD = Presidential Decision Directive
PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy
PLO = Palestine Liberation Organization
POM = Program Objective Memoranda
PP = Pacific Partnership
PPBS = Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PRM = Presidential Review Memorandum
PSI = Proliferation Security Initiative
PT = Patrol Torpedo Boat
QDR = Quadrennial Defense Review
RAS = Replenishment at Sea
RD&T = Research, Development, and Testing
RHIB = Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boat
RIMPAC = Rim of the Pacific
RMA = Revolution in Military Affairs
ROE = Rules of Engagement
RRF = Ready Reserve Force
SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAG = Surface Action Group
SAM = Surface to Air Missile
SAR = Search and Rescue
SASC = Senate Armed Services Committee
SC-21 = Surface Combatant for the 21st Century
SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Initiative
SDI = Strategic Defense Initiative
SEAL = Sea-Air-Land
SECDEF = Secretary of Defense
SECNAV = Secretary of the Navy
SLEP = Service Life Extension Program
SLOC = Sea Lines of Communication
SNMG = Standing NATO Maritime Group
SNMCMG = Standing NATO Mine-Countermeasures Group
SOF = Special Operations Forces
SOSUS = Sound Surveillance System
SLBM = Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile
SPS = Southern Partnership Station
SSC = Small Surface Combatant
SSN = Ship, Submersible, Nuclear
SSBN = Ship, Submersible, Ballistic Missile, Nuclear
SSG = Strategic Studies Group
SSGN = Ship, Submersible, Guided Missile, Nuclear
STANAVFORLANT = Standing Naval Force Atlantic
STANAVFORMED = Standing Naval Force Mediterranean
START = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
T-AH = Hospital Ship (MSC)
T-AKE = Replenishment Naval Vessel (MSC)
T-AKR = Large, Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (MSC)
T-AO = Replenishment Oiler (MSC)
T-AGOS = Oceanographic Research Ship, General Ocean Surveillance (MSC)
TEU = Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
TLAM = Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile
TWA = Trans-World Airlines
UN = United Nations
UNITAF = United Task Force
USA = United States Army
USAF = United States Air Force
USAFRICOM = United States Africa Command
USCENTCOM = United States Central Command
USCG = United States Coast Guard
USEUCOM = United States European Command
USMC = United States Marine Corps
USN = United States Navy
USNA = United States Naval Academy
USNI = United States Naval Institute
USNORTHCOM = United States Northern Command
USNR = United States Navy Reserve
USNWC = United States Naval War College
USPACOM = United States Pacific Command
USS = United States Ship
USSOUTHCOM = United States Southern Command
USSOCOM = United States Special Operations Command
USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USSTRATCOM = United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM = United States Transportation Command
VBBS = Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure
VLS = Vertical Launch System
V/STOL = Vertical and/or Short Take-off and Landing
WEU = Western European Union
WEUCONMARFOR = Western European Union Contingency Maritime Force
WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO = World Trade Organization
### 15.2 List of Illustrations

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<td>Major (MAJ)</td>
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15.4 Colin Powell’s “13 rules of leadership”

First printed in the August 13, 1989 issue of Parade Magazine, these are Colin Powell's 13 Rules of Leadership.

1. It ain't as bad as you think.
2. Get mad, then get over it.
3. Avoid having your ego so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego goes with it.
4. It can be done.
5. Be careful what you choose. You may get it.
6. Don't let adverse facts stand in the way of a good decision.
7. You can't make someone else's choices.
8. Check small things.
9. Share credit.
11. Have a vision.
12. Don't take counsel of your fears or naysayers.
13. Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.
# U.S. Navy Capstone Documents, 1970-2010 and classification status as of December 2011

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Carrier Strike Group (CSG)

- CSG Cmd/Staff element
- DESRON Cmd/Staff element

Guided Missile Cruiser (CG)
USS Ticonderoga class, [22 ships]
Crew: 24 Officers, 340 Enlisted

Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG)
USS Arleigh Burke class [51ships]
Crew: 23 Officers, 300 Enlisted

Aircraft Carrier – CVN
USS Enterprise class (CVN 65), [1ship]
USS Nimitz class (CVN 68), [10 ships]
Crew: Ship's Company: 3,200 + Air Wing: 2,480

Logistics Support Ship
USNS Supply class (T-AOE), [4 ships]
USNS Lewis & Clark class (T-AKE), [*2/4 ships]
USNS Henry J. Kaiser class (T-AO) [14 ships]
USNS Kilauea class (T-AE) [5 ships]
Crew: up to 160 Civilian, 30 Military

Guided Missile Frigate (FFG)
USS Oliver Hazard Perry class, [30 ships]
Crew: 17 Officers, 198 Enlisted

Attack Submarine – SSN
USS Virginia class (SSN 774), [5 ships]
USS Seawolf class (SSN 21), [3 ships]
USS Los Angeles class (SSN 688), [48 ships]
Crew: 13/14 Officers, 120/126 Enlisted

PLUS
Carrier Air Wing
Carrier Air Wing (CVW)

A typical air wing aboard a Nimitz class aircraft carrier may contain up to 75 combat and support aircraft

- (1) FA-18E Squadron (12 aircraft)
- (1) FA-18F Squadron (12 aircraft)
- (2) FA-18C Squadrons (20 aircraft)
- (1) EA-6B Squadron (4-5 aircraft)
- (1) EA-18G Squadron (5 aircraft)
- (1) C-2A Det (2-3 aircraft)
- (1) E-2C Squadron (4 aircraft)
- (1) H-60 Squadron (6-8 aircraft)

Though this organization is officially named a Carrier Air Wing (CVW) by the US Navy, the Commander of the Air Wing is still referred to by the older, historic title of “CAG,” Commander, Air Group
CSG Capabilities

• Protection
• Joint Logistics
  – Agile sustainment
  – Theater logistics
• Land Operations
  – Provide Fires
• Access
  – LOC Protection
  – Sea Basing
  – FON
  – Blockade

• Maritime Operations
  – Surface Warfare
  – Antisubmarine Warfare
  – Maritime Interdiction
  – Fires
  – Expeditionary Operations
• Air Operations
  – OCA
  – Strategic Attack
  – Air Interdiction
  – TACAIR/CAS
  – TBMD
• Spec Operations
  – CMO
  – PSYOPS
CSG Capabilities

• **IO/PAO**
  – EW
  – CNO
  – MILDEC
  – PA
  – COMREL

• **Shaping**
  – Military/Naval Diplomacy
  – Security Cooperation
  – Presence

• **Stability Operations**
  – Security Cooperation
  – HA/DR
  – Reconstruction

• **Don’t Forget:**
  – Neutralize CDCM
  – Neutralize C2
  – ISR
  – Targeting
  – CSAR
  – Demonstration/Feint
  – Establish SPODs
  – NGO/PVO Support
  – Medical
  – Counter-Piracy
  – C2 JFACC/JSOTF/JTF
    • Command Ship
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)

Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA)
USS Tarawa class (LHA 1), [4 ships]
Crew: Ship’s Company: 82 Officers, 882 Enlisted;
Marines: ~1,900+

OR

Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD)
USS Wasp class (LHD 1), [8 ships]
Crew: Ship’s Company: 104 Officers, 1,004 Enlisted;
Marines: ~1,894+

Dock Landing Ship (LSD)*
USS Harpers Ferry class (LSD 49), [4 ships]
USS Whidbey Island class (LSD 41), [8 Ships]
Crew: Ships Company: 22 Officers, 395 Enlisted;
Marines: 402, +102 surge

Guided Missile Cruiser (CG)*

Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)*
USS San Antonio class (LPD 17), [3 ships]
p's Company: 28 Officers, 332 Enlisted;
Marines: 699, +800 surge
Austin class (LPD 4), [11 ships]
p's Company: 24 Officers, 396 Enlisted;
Marines: 900

Expedtionary Strike Group (ESG)

PLUS

Attack Submarine – SSN

Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG)

Guided Missile Frigate (FFG)

• ESG Cmd/Staff element

PLUS
Aviation Combat Element
Aviation Combat Element (ACE)

A typical air element attached to an ARG/ESG may contain up to 33 combat and support aircraft

(12) CH-46E Medium Lift Helos
(4-6) CH-53E Heavy Lift-Aslt Helos
(2) UH-1N Utility Helos

(4) AH-1W Attack Helos
(6) AV-8B V/STOL attack aircraft
(2) KC-130 Support aircraft

MV-22 Osprey
CH-46E Sea Knight
CH-53E Sea Stallion
UH-1N Huey

AH-1W Cobra
AV-8B Harrier
KC-130 Hercules

The MV-22 Osprey began its planned phased introduction to replace the CH-46 in 2006. Although the ACE is expecting to receive only eight Ospreys initially, the plan calls for each element to receive ten until FY10, when the number assigned will increase to twelve.

More detail to follow in the USMC lesson!
ESG Capabilities

• Protection
• Joint Logistics
  – Agile Sustainment
  – Oper Engineering
  – Health Protection
• Land Operations
  – Provide Fires
• Access
  – Forcible Entry
  – Contingency Basing
  – Sea Basing
  – Support: FON, LOC Protection, Blockade

• Maritime Operations
  – Surface Warfare
  – Antisubmarine Warfare
  – Maritime Interdiction
  – Fires
  – Expeditionary Operations

• Air Operations
  – OCA
  – Strategic Attack
  – Air Interdiction
  – TACAIR/CAS

• Spec Operations
  – CMO
  – PSYOPS
ESG Capabilities

• **IO/PAO**
  – EW
  – CNO
  – MILDEC
  – PA
  – COMREL

• **Shaping**
  – Military Diplomacy
  – Security Cooperation
  – Presence

• **Stability Operations**
  – Security Cooperation
  – HA/DR
  – Reconstruction

• **Don’t Forget:**
  – Neutralize CDCM
  – Neutralize C2
  – ISR
  – Targeting
  – CSAR
  – Demonstration/Feint
  – Establish SPODs
  – NGO/PVO Support
  – Medical
  – Counter-Piracy
  – C2 (JSOTF)
ESG- (MEU) Capabilities

**Amphibious Operations:**
- Amphibious Assault
- Amphibious Raid
- Amphibious Demonstration
- Amphibious Withdrawal

**Maritime Special Operations:**
- Direct Action
- Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities (GOPLAT)
- Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS)
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel

**Military Operations Other Than War:**
- Peace Operations Peacekeeping Peace Enforcement
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

**Supporting Operations:**
- Rapid Response Planning
- Terminal Guidance Operations
- Enhanced Urban Operations
- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
- Reconnaissance and Surveillance
- Counter Intelligence
- Signals Intelligence
- Fire Support Planning, Coordination, Control in a Joint/Combined Environment
- Provide Command, Control, Communications, Computers
- Airfield/Port Seizure
- Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations
- Security Operations

More detail to follow in the USMC lesson!...
Surface Strike Group (SSG)

Guided Missile Cruiser (CG)
USS Ticonderoga class, [22 ships]
Crew: 24 Officers, 340 Enlisted

Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG)
USS Arleigh Burke class [51 ships]
Crew: 23 Officers, 300 Enlisted

Guided Missile Frigate (FFG)
USS Oliver Hazard Perry class, [30 ships]
Crew: 17 Officers, 198 Enlisted
SSG Capabilities

• Protection

• Land Operations
  – Provide Fires

• Access
  – LOC Protection
  – Sea Basing
  – FON
  – Blockade

• Maritime Operations
  – Surface Warfare
  – Antisubmarine Warfare
  – Maritime Interdiction
  – Mine Warfare
  – Fires
  – Expeditionary Operations

• Air Operations
  – Strategic Attack
  – Air Interdiction
  – TBMD
SSG Capabilities

• IO/PAO
  – EW
  – CNO
  – MILDEC
  – PA
  – COMREL

• Shaping
  – Support Diplomacy
  – Security Cooperation
  – Presence

• Stability Operations
  – Security Cooperation
  – HA/DR
  – Reconstruction

• Don’t Forget:
  – Neutralize CDCM
  – Neutralize C2
  – ISR
  – Targeting
  – CSAR
  – Demonstration/Feint
  – Establish SPODs
  – NGO/PVO Support
  – Medical
  – Counter-Piracy
Independent Deployers

**Guided Missile Cruiser (CG)**
USS Ticonderoga class, [22 ships]
Crew: 24 Officers, 340 Enlisted

**Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG)**
USS Arleigh Burke class [51 ships]
Crew: 23 Officers, 300 Enlisted

**Guided Missile Frigate (FFG)**
USS Oliver Hazard Perry class, [30 ships]
Crew: 17 Officers, 198 Enlisted

- **Examples:**
  - Counter-Narcotics
  - GWOT
  - Standing Naval Forces
  - UNITAS
  - Maritime Security Ops
SSGN Capabilities

- Protection
- Land Operations
  - Provide Fires
- Access
- Maritime Operations
  - Surface Warfare
  - Antisubmarine Warfare
- Spec Operations
  - SOF Mission Planning
  - SOF Delivery
  - SOF Support
- Don’t Forget:
  - ISR
  - Targeting
  - Combat SAR
Patrol Squadron (PATRON)

Capabilities

- Anti-Ship/Anti-Submarine Warfare
- Maritime Surveillance (SSC)
- Overland Surveillance (ISR) / Targeting
- CSG / ESG Support
- FON / LOC / Counter-piracy / HADR
- SAR
1. Einführung


Der deutsche Admiral Edward Wegener formulierte einst: „Weltpolitik und Weltmachtstreben sind ohne ozeanische Seeherrschaft zum Scheitern verurteilt. In einer globalen Machtauseinandersetzung [fällt] der Beherrschung der Ozeane eine Schlüsselrolle zu […].“ Diese Seemacht ist vornehmlich militärisch zu verstehen, obschon sie auch wirtschaftliche, geographi-

Seemacht ist ein rationales Instrument staatlicher Macht und ein langfristiges Phänomen, denn Schiffe, Designs, die industrielle Basis und die Erfahrungen können nicht kurzfristig improvisiert werden.8 Marinestategische Dokumente stellen das Scharnier zwischen der institutionellen Seemacht (also Faktoren und Akteure, die Seemachtformulierung und Ausübung beeinflussen) und der funktionalen Seemacht (also der weltweiten Ausübung maritimer Macht zum Zweck der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik) dar. Das Interesse dieser Studie konzentriert sich auf (1.) die Analyse von Seemacht im amerikanischen Kontext samt der Bewertung als Instrument der nationalen Sicherheit; (2.) die Untersuchung weiterer einflussreicher Faktoren und Akteure; (3.) die politischen, strategischen, programmatischen, budgetären und personellen Rahmenbedingungen in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten; (4.) die Prüfung, wie, wo und warum die US-Marine in diesem Zeitraum einsetzte wurde (und inwiefern sich ein Bezug zu den strategischen Dokumenten herstellen lässt); (5.) die wiederkehrenden Themen und Lektionen in der Anwendung amerikanischer Seemacht.


2. Politische und militärische Macht über See

Sicherheitspolitisch fallen der See drei Funktionen zu, die Seestreitkräfte entsprechend abbilden können: Die diplomatische Rolle (Flaggenzeigen und Kanonenbootpolitik), die polizeiliche Rolle (Aufrechterhaltung der guten Ordnung und Souveränität auf See, Sicherung von Ressourcen und Handelswegen und internationale Friedenssicherung) und die militärische Rolle (Machtprojektion an Land, Kontrolle der See und Verwehrung gegnerischer Seemacht) vermengen sich dabei durchaus.9 Es bedarf folglich eines dezidierten politischen, rechtlichen


3. \textbf{Von der Gesamt- zur Marinestrategie}


\(^\text{14}\) Als Fleet-in-Being bezeichnet man ein strategisches Konzept, bei dem eine Flotte durch bloße Präsenz (vornehmlich im eigenen Stützpunkt in ausreichender Entfernung) einen Gegner zwingt, ausreichend Kräfte vorzuhalten, um im Falle des Einsatz diese Flotte bekämpfen zu können.

\(^\text{15}\) Andere Missionen wie humanitäre Hilfe, Evakuierungs- und Katastrophenhilfe oder der Kampf gegen moderne Piraterie und den internationalen Terrorismus (zur See) sind hingegen herrschender Meinung nach vorherrschender Meinung lediglich substrategische Rollen von Seestreitkräften und sollten in der Seemachtstrategie nur einen nachgelagerten Platz einnehmen.
4. Die Verknüpfung von Strategie, Planung und Streitkräftestruktur


5. Methodik für die Analyse


6. Die Besonderheiten der marinenstrategischen Kultur und ihre Bedeutung für Strategie und Einsatz

Die Mehrdimensionalität des Einsatzraumes – die Luftwaffe oder das Heer haben vergleichbare Probleme nicht – bedarf zwangsläufig einer entsprechenden intellektuellen Herange-

Die physische Beschaffenheit und rechtliche Ordnung der Welt beeinflusst maßgeblich, was Seeoffiziere tun – und wie sie es tun. Zu nennen sind die Abhängigkeit von funktionierender Technologie, die gegen die Gefahren der See, des Wetters und der Feindeinwirkung schützt; die Aufteilung des Operationsgebiets entlang unverrückbarer Knotenpunkte (diese Flaschenhälse können natürliche oder künstliche Engstellen wie Kanäle oder Meerengen sein, an denen sich der maritime Verkehr bündelt und deren Kontrolle von überragender strategischer Bedeutung ist); das Völkerrecht (UN-Seerechtsabkommen), der die Hohe See jenseits der 12-Seemeilen-Grenze eines Nationalstaats als Allgemeingut der Menschheit anerkannt hat und die u.a. maritime Präsenz, Abschreckung, Machtprojektion und Kontrolle der Seewege in nächster Nähe von Alliierten oder Antagonisten erlaubt. Folglich unterscheidet sich Kriegsführung auf und von See in einigen zentralen Aspekten deutlich von der Land- und Luftkriegsführung.17

Ferner bietet die Flotte durch ihre Mobilität, ihre Flexibilität und ihre Skalierbarkeit politischen Planern entsprechend variable Möglichkeiten. Die meisten Kriegsschiffe sind daher nicht auf eine Mission oder Rolle beschränkt; ihr strategischer Wert ergibt sich vielmehr aus dem Zusammenwirken mit anderen Einheiten (auch aus befreundeten Nationen) und im Übri-

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7. **Genese amerikanischer Seemacht**

Zunächst in aller Kürze zur horizontalen Dimension von Seemacht (Elemente der funktionalen Seemacht USA): Es handelt sich hierbei vor allem um die Distanzen zwischen den Einheiten der Flotte, die Qualität und Quantität von entsprechenden Häfen und Marinestützpunkten, die Entfernung zu den wichtigsten maritimen Flaschenhalsen, die Distanz zu den eigenen maritimen Aufgaben (die Distanz zu den eigenen strategischen Rollen und Operationsgebieten), die Beschaffenheit der See, welche das Land und seine maritimen Verpflichtungen trennt; ferner Bevölkerungsschemata und Siedlungsstrukturen, Städte, Befestigungsanlagen, kritische Infrastruktur im Küstenbereich (Häfen, Schleusen, Kanäle, Verkehrswege, Werften, Pipelines etc.), Position und Beschaffenheit der Landmasse, usw.\footnote{19}

Von größerer Bedeutung ist die vertikale Dimension von Seemacht (Elemente der institutionellen Seemacht USA): Zu nennen sind hier allgemeine verfassungsrechtliche oder andere gesetzliche Zuständigkeiten sowie die Planungs- und Lernabläufe hierarchisch strukturierter Organisationen. Es sind vor allen Dingen diese Prozesse, die ebenso undurchschaubar wie unabdingbar für das Verständnis sind, wie US-Marinestrategie entsteht und umgesetzt wird.\footnote{20}


\footnote{19} Eine solche geographische Studie zur funktionalen Seemacht USA wäre durchaus wünschenswert. Entsprechende Daten zu den Vereinigten Staaten sind bis auf Weiteres den einschlägigen Werken und Datenbanken zu entnehmen. Die funktionale Seemacht ausübung der USA ist nicht Gegenstand dieser Analyse.

\footnote{20} Da solche Prozesse methodisch nicht nachvollziehbar sind, haben Jon Sumida und David Rosenberg die Analysekategorien unter den fünf „M“ zusammengefasst: Demnach sind für die Auswertung *machines, men, manu-
Der strategische Planungsprozess besteht aus sechs abgestimmten Schritten. Aus den artikulierten nationalen Interessen (erstens) ergeben sich (zweitens) die Gefahren für ebenjene. Um diesen Gefahren zu begegnen, werden (drittens) die politisch-militärischen Zielvorstellungen formuliert. Bevor sich daraus (viertens) die bevorzugte Militärstrategie ableitet, machen innen- und außenpolitische Faktoren ihren Einfluss gelten. Schließlich werden (fünftens) die dafür notwendigen Ressourcen mit den vorhandenen Mitteln abgeprüft und eine Risikoanalyse vorgenommen. Schließlich werden (sechstens) die Strategie, die Ressourcenbereitstellung oder beides angepasst.

Zum Zweck der Analyse der Seemacht USA lassen sich verschiedene Akteure, Faktoren und Ideen identifizieren, die auf die Strategiegestaltung Einfluss ausüben. Zu den zentralen Akteuren zählen der amerikanische Präsident (als Oberbefehlshaber, Staats- und Regierungschef in Personalunion und Balance gegen die Legislative) und der Kongress (als Verteiler der Haushaltsmittel und Balance gegen die Exekutive), die Vereinigten Stabschefs der Teilstreitkräfte (ihnen obliegt die generelle konzeptionelle Kriegsplanung), der Verteidigungsminister (der die Bemühungen der einzelnen Teilstreitkräfte, ihre Beschaffungs- und Einsatzprogramme koordiniert) und die Regionalen Oberbefehlshaber (die Vereinigten Staaten sind das einzige Land weltweit, das den Globus in regionale und funktionale Zuständigkeitsgebiete aufgeteilt hat). Zu den Faktoren, die keine verfassungsmäßigen Kompetenzen mit Blick auf Strategie und Seemacht besitzen, aber dennoch in die Prozesse hineinwirken, zählen andere Ministerien (etwa das Außenministerium als zentrales diplomatisches Instrument oder das Heimatschutzministerium, in dessen Zuständigkeit die US-Küstenwache fällt) ebenso wie die anderen Teilstreitkräfte (Heer, Luftwaffe und Marineinfanterie – obgleich letztere Teil des Marineministeriums ist – kämpfen um Einfluss und Budgetmittel). Interessengruppen (z.B. Veteranenverbände, Lobbyisten oder Industrievereinigungen), die Medien (als oft gescholtene vierte Gewalt im Staat) und mit Abstrichen die Gerichte bzw. der Oberste Gerichtshof (durch entspre-


22 Für eine Aufstellung siehe Karte im Anhang.


25 Für eine Aufstellung über die Entwicklung der Flottengröße siehe Tabelle im Anhang.
durchgeführt werden – eine Abkehr der Swing Strategy aus der Carter-Zeit, die Seestreitkräfte auf den Atlantik konzentrieren und im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum lediglich rudimentäre Kräfte stationieren wollte, die zu allem Überfluss im Bedarfsfall auch noch gen Atlantik verschoben werden würden.


Die strategische Umorientierung in den neunziger Jahren und die reduzierten Mittel führten zu einigen Verwerfungen innerhalb der Streitkräfte (so war bspw. die Luftwaffe überzeugt, dass ausschließlich sie die zentralen Plattformen für künftige bewaffnete Konflikte stellen würde). Die anfänglich gute Kooperation zwischen Marine und Marineinfanterie wurde zunehmend davon belastet, welche Balance zwischen Hochsee- und amphibischen Operationen gewählt werden sollte (das Marine Corps arbeitete zunehmend eigene Konzeptionen, die küstennahe Einsätze im land- und seeseitigen Küstenstreifen in den Mittelpunkt stellten).


Unter der Ägide von Bushs Nachfolger Barack Obama ist es zu einem Abzug amerikanischer Truppen aus dem Irak gekommen, während die Konzentration auf Afghanistan und Pakistan nochmals intensiviert wurde (u.a. mit der Verlegung zusätzlicher Truppen an den Hindukusch und der Tötung von al-Qaida-Führer Osama bin Laden). Der Arabische Frühling seit 2010 hat die kooperative Politik Obamas, die auf Restauration des amerikanischen Ansehens zielte, unterminiert und eine Weltregion von zentralem strategischem Interesse für die USA in schwere Turbulenzen gestürzt.

Die Streitkräfstuktur im ersten Jahrzehnt des neuen Jahrtausends war weiterhin von großen Einheiten (v.a. den nuklearbetriebenen Flugzeugträgern sowie den konventionell angetriebenen amphibischen Schiffen) geprägt. Erst mühsam erlernte die Marine, ihre Flotte effizienter zu nutzen und für kooperative Maßnahmen (z.B. die Verwendung von Hospitalschiffen bei Naturkatastrophen oder von Docklandungsschiffen für Ausbildungsmissionen afrikanischer


11. Zusammenfassung und Fazit


Forster, Larissa, Influence without Boots on the Ground, Newport (Rhode Island) 2013.


Haynes, Peter, American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era, Monterey (California) 2013.


Rudolf, Peter, Amerikanische Seemachtpolitik und maritime Rüstungskontrolle unter Carter und Reagan, Frankfurt/Main 1990.


27 Nur für diese Zusammenfassung verwendete Werke.


14. Danksagung

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15. Anhang

- Regionalkommandos
- Übersicht amerikanischer Marinestrategiedokumente
- Entwicklung des Flottenbestands 1981-2011

Anmerkung: Eine ergänzte Fassung dieser Kurzstudie wurde im März 2015 in der Reihe Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik des Instituts fürs Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Kiel publiziert.
### US-Marinestrategiedokumente 1970-2011 und deren Klassifizierung (Stand Dezember 2011)²⁸

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Illustration 1: US-Flottengröße im Wandel der Zeit
Lebenslauf
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