

ELICITING INFORMATION FROM SOURCES AND SUSPECTS

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Abstract

Gathering information in human interactions is a critical aspect for police and intelligence interviewers. However, quite recently and rather slowly researchers have started to focus on using available information in order to collect case-related information in such interactions. This thesis advances this line of research by conducting three studies on how to use available information to elicit new information from sources and suspects. Two of the studies were about the Scharff-technique and one was about the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)-technique. **Study I** compared two combinations of the Scharff tactics and the Direct Approach. Participants (N = 93) took the role of a source and were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too little or too much information. Overall, the sources in both Scharff conditions revealed more new information, perceived the interviewer to hold more knowledge, and found it more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives, compared to the sources in the Direct Approach. The sources interviewed by the Scharff conditions underestimated how much new information they revealed, whereas the sources interviewed by the Direct Approach overestimated the amount of new information revealed. **Study II** examined two ways of introducing the presentation of the known information when using the illusion of knowing it all tactic of the Scharff-technique. Again, participants took the role of a source but without having the chance to reveal information. In two separate experiments (each N = 60), the sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge and knowledge gaps were mapped. This study found that by just starting the presentation of the known information made the sources believe the interviewer had more knowledge and they searched less actively for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge, compared to when the interviewer used an extreme convinced introductory statement about his or her case-related knowledge. **Study III** tested two different ways of eliciting and disclosing statement-evidence inconsistencies using the SUE-technique against an early disclosure of the evidence. Participants (N = 88) performed a mock crime and were instructed to claim innocence. Both SUE conditions resulted in more inconsistencies and the suspects overestimated the interviewer's knowledge to a higher extent than the Early disclosure condition. However, only the non-judgemental version of the SUE-technique resulted in more new information (vs. the Early disclosure condition) and created a more fostering interview atmosphere (vs. the confrontational version of the SUE-technique). In line with the three studies, this thesis developed an interviewing framework consisting of a conceptual and tactical tier. The conceptual tier explains the cognitive and verbal processes of the sources/suspects in interviews and the mechanisms behind the Scharff and SUE tactics. The tactical tier includes the Scharff-technique and SUE-technique and shows ways in order to influence the sources'/suspects' perceptions and verbal behaviours. Overall, the developed two-tier interviewing framework can help to train practitioners and initiate further research.

Keywords: HUMINT interview, Suspect interview, Information gathering, Information elicitation, Scharff, Strategic use of evidence

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
Defining the Scope of this Thesis	2
Research on Suspect Interviewing	3
Research on HUMINT Interviewing.....	9
Two-Tier Interviewing Framework.....	14
Conceptual Tier	14
Tactical Tier	22
Scharff-technique	23
Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)-technique	28
SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES.....	32
General and Specific Aims	32
Study I.....	33
Study II.....	36
Study III	40
GENERAL DISCUSSION	43
Scharff Tactics	44
Explaining the Scharff Tactics with the Conceptual Tier	49
SUE Tactics.....	51
Explaining the SUE Tactics with the Conceptual Tier	55
Extending the Conceptual Tier for Training and Research Purposes	58
Ethical Considerations	62
Limitations and Further Reflections.....	64
Conclusions	66
REFERENECES	67
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	80
APPENDICES	81
A Publications	81
B German Summary.....	121
C Curriculum Vitae.....	133

INTRODUCTION

For several decades, suspect interviews have been the focus of psycho-legal research. As a result of this, researchers have identified the risk factors of false confessions and have developed alternatives on how to better conduct suspect interviews (for an overview see Bull, 2014). However, research to date has provided few specific “tools” on how to exactly gather information from suspects. The research on human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering is still at an early stage, and therefore hardly any “tools” are available in the field of intelligence interviewing. This thesis sets out to develop an *interviewing framework* for eliciting information from suspects and sources. For this purpose, the research presented here employed an experimental approach, which is useful for examining interviewing interactions in a controlled setting (Meissner, Hartwig, & Russano, 2010).




Figure 1. The two-tier structure of the interviewing framework developed in this thesis.

This thesis starts with a brief overview of the current research on suspect and HUMINT interviewing. Next, the interviewing framework developed in this thesis is presented. Figure 1 illustrates this interviewing framework which consists of a conceptual and tactical tier, drawing inspiration from Granhag and Hartwig’s (2015) model. These two tiers set the stage for this thesis. Broadly speaking, the conceptual tier describes general assumptions on the suspects’/sources’ cognitive and verbal processes. By taking the interviewees’ perspective the interviewer can use these assumptions strategically in order to obtain new information in the interview. The tactical tier includes practical ways to reach sub-goals during the interview. In this thesis, two sets of tactics are examined: the Scharff-technique and the Strategic Use of

Evidence (SUE)-technique. After introducing the developed interviewing framework, the empirical studies of this thesis are summarized. Then, the findings are discussed in the scope of the tactical and conceptual tier of the interviewing framework. Finally, further considerations on the conceptual tier will be discussed for training and research purposes.

Defining the Scope of this Thesis

Gathering information from humans is a critical aspect in solving and preventing crimes (Memon, Vrij, & Bull, 2003; Redlich, 2007). Specifically, in criminal settings the police interviewer often strives for new information about past activities from suspects (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). This information can be of relevance in order to confirm or drop the suspicion against the suspects and ultimately solve crimes. In contrast, in HUMINT settings the police or intelligence interviewer typically aims to collect new information about past or future activities from sources (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). Sources are persons showing a link to terrorist organizations, organised crime or other types of serious crimes. The information collected by sources is critical in solving committed crimes and also preventing planned crimes (Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2014).

This thesis is about a specific form of information-gathering in criminal and HUMINT settings, which is called *information elicitation*. Here, information elicitation is defined as a sophisticated interviewing style that incorporates interviewees' perspectives in order to collect new information. This description includes three points that are critical for this thesis. First, independent of the exact time-relation described above (past vs. future), the interviewer in a criminal and HUMINT setting has the primary goal to collect new information that was previously unknown to him or her (Evans et al., 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2014). Second, in order to approach this goal, the interviewer continuously considers the interviewees' goals, strategies and verbal responses. Third, the interviewer typically holds information prior to the interviews, which s/he can use strategically in order to achieve his or her goal. Specifically, in countries

such as Germany, interviewing a person as a suspect postulates that there is at least some evidence indicating that s/he was involved in a crime (Eisenberg, 2015). Similarly, the HUMINT interviewer often already holds information before the interview that is collected by other HUMINT interactions or other means (e.g. Open Source Intelligence or Signal Intelligence; e.g. personal communication with police/intelligence service members, 2016; Soufan, 2011). In general, suspects and sources can differ in their willingness to share information. This thesis assumes that information elicitation is especially relevant when interviewing suspects and sources who are willing to reveal a limited amount of information, i.e., they are willing to reveal some information but not their whole knowledge of the topic in question.

Considering these key points, this thesis has the goal to establish an interviewing framework for information elicitation in a criminal and HUMINT context that achieves two broad objectives. First, the developed interviewing framework aims to provide conceptual notions that explain suspects'/sources' cognitive and verbal processes during the interview and the tactical mechanism for training and research purposes. Second, the developed interviewing framework aims to provide tactical ways on how to use the available information in order to collect new information from suspects and sources that are motivated to share only a limited amount of information. Before presenting this interviewing framework in more detail, the relevant literature on suspect and HUMINT interviewing must first be outlined first.

Research on Suspect Interviewing

In general, there is a vast body of international research on suspect interviewing. In the past this research was accelerated due to spectacular false confession cases for serious offences in the United States (e.g. the Central Park Jogger Case) and the United Kingdom (e.g. the Birmingham Six). In many of these cases, innocent suspects falsely confessed due to coercive police interviewing behaviours (for an overview see Gudjonsson, 2003).

Early research on suspect interviewing. In the years after these high-profile false confession cases in the US and the UK, the scientific community focused mainly on two contrary interview approaches¹: the Reid-technique as “the bad guy” and the PEACE-model as “the good guy”.

The *Reid-technique* consists of a pre-interrogation phase aiming to determine whether suspects are guilty or innocent, and an interrogation phase aiming to get a confession (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jane, 2013). The pre-interrogation phase should be conducted in a non-custodial setting and without informing the suspects on their legal rights. In this phase the interrogator should establish rapport with the suspects, gather background information, and employ the behaviour analysis interview (BAI). According to Inbau and colleagues (2013) guilty suspects show more cues of deceit (vs. innocent suspects), and their BAI aims to detect deception by searching for verbal and non-verbal cues of deceit. However, this approach ignores empirical findings that have shown non-verbal cues to be unreliable (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003), and have found the BAI to be generally unreliable (Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006). Furthermore, it seems plausible, but is scientifically untested, that guilty suspects deceive more frequently than innocent suspects. That means, by employing the pre-interrogation phase the interrogator risks making a misjudgement about the suspects’ guilt (e.g. assess innocent suspects as guilty). Based on a guilty judgement the Reid-technique then

¹ According to Shepherd (2007) the term *interrogation* was used until 1990 to describe the questioning process aiming to obtain confessions, and in which the suspects were expected to be uncooperative, to resist and to lie. Shepherd introduced the term *investigative interview* in order to describe a new perspective of obtaining information (instead of confessions) through questioning without getting only confirmation of assumptions and beliefs. Loftus (2011) distinguished between interrogation and interview in the way that interrogations are conducted in a more coercive manner, whereas interviews are conducted in a more non-accusatory manner. According to Alison and colleagues (2013) the term interrogation is preferred in the US, whereas the term interview is favoured in Europe. The term interview is clearly preferred for the kind of research conducted in this thesis, however both terms are used interchangeably in order to hold on previous phrasings (e.g. counter-interrogation strategy). Moreover, in some contexts only the term interrogation is reasonable (e.g. enhanced interrogation techniques).

instructs the interrogator to introduce the actual interrogation phase and confirm his or her assumption of guilt by producing a confession. Therefore, this phase consists of nine steps of highly manipulative, persuasive and suggestive tactics in order to break down the suspects and force confessions (Kassin et al., 2010). Differently put, once entered into the main interrogation phase it is extremely difficult or impossible for an innocent suspect to show his or her innocence (on critical overviews on the Reid-technique see Gudjonsson, 2003; Kelly & Meissner, 2015).

Turning to the UK, as a consequence of the false confessions, the recording of suspect interviews was made mandatory (Home Office, 1991). This led to a large-scale assessment of suspect interviewing practices in the UK which revealed considerable deficiencies (Baldwin, 1993). A major change came from the introduction of the *PEACE model* that was developed by police practitioners and researchers (Bull, 2014). The PEACE model consists of five phases that build the acronym: Planning and preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure and Evaluation. The goal of this model is to gather accurate and reliable information from suspects or witnesses in order to establish the truth about the matter under investigation (Bull, 2014). In its initial stage it was mainly based on the cognitive interview and the conversation management approach (Milne & Bull, 2000). The *cognitive interview* was developed by Fisher and Geiselman (1992) to assist cooperative interviewees in retrieving information about an event by using psychological mnemonics (e.g. a “Report everything” instruction; for a meta-analysis on the cognitive interview see Köhnken, Milne, Memon, & Bull, 1999). The *conversation management* approach by Shepherd (2007) was developed for questioning interviewees who did not show sufficiently cooperative behaviour. Here, the interviewers were instructed to conduct *all* interviews in a fair and open-minded manner by accepting the suspects as conversational partners (see also Shepherd, 1991, 1993). Field studies showed that the widespread introduction of the PEACE model improved the general quality of police interviewing practice in the UK (Clarke & Milne, 2001). Overall, the PEACE-model can help the interviewer to structure the interview process by simultaneously ensuring flexibility, and

scientific knowledge can be assigned to each of the five phases. In line with this it is the intention of the developed interviewing framework for information elicitation to be compatible with the PEACE model.

As outlined, the Reid-technique and the PEACE model differ fundamentally on how the interviewer should face the suspects. For the Reid-technique, the interrogator assesses the suspects' guilt and then substantiates this assumption by breaking down the suspects and collecting confessions. In contrast, for the PEACE-model the interviewer conducts the full interview in an open-minded manner and consequently aims to collect incriminating and/or exonerating information. Comparing the efficacy of these two interview approaches, Meissner and colleagues (2014) conducted two meta-analyses. In the first meta-analysis including field studies, they found that information-gathering approaches (such as the PEACE model) and accusatory interrogation approaches (such as the Reid-technique) increased the likelihood of confessions. However, field studies typically suffer from a lack of ground truth, and hence the veracity of the confessions was rather unclear. In the second meta-analysis including experimental studies, they found that both interviewing approaches increased the likelihood of true confessions (vs. a direct questioning approach), but only the accusatory interrogation approach increased the likelihood of false confessions. That means, the information-gathering approach proved comparatively more diagnostic (i.e. ratio of true to false confessions), and outperformed the accusatory interrogation approach.

Further research on suspect interviewing. The PEACE model has also been introduced successfully in other countries, for example Australia (Cain, Westera, & Kebbell, 2016) and Norway (Fahsing, Jakobsen, & Öhrn, 2016). Furthermore, new research lines on suspect interviewing emerged, of which two areas will be outlined next.

First, researchers surveyed interviewers and suspects in order to gain insights into the interviewing interactions. For example, police officers in the US (Kassin et al., 2007) and in Slovenia (Areh, Walsh, & Bull, 2015) reported the use of some psychologically manipulative,

confrontational and pressuring tactics. Convicted suspects in turn reported that a main reason for false confessions was police pressure (Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 2001), and confessors perceived their interviewers' tactics as being more humane and ethical and less dominant compared to deniers (Holmberg & Christianson, 2002; Kebbell, Alison, Hurren, & Mazerolle, 2010; Snook, Brooks, & Bull, 2015). These findings indicate that interviewers use accusatorial interviewing tactics, even though these tactics increase the risk of false confessions. Furthermore, humane and ethical interviewing styles seem to be generally more fruitful when aiming for incriminating information (confessions). However, these interpretations need to be considered with caution, as also other case characteristics – other than the interviewing styles – might have influenced the dynamic of the interview (e.g. the perception of evidence). Also, it is not clear whether the ethical and humane interviewing styles led to the suspects confessing or whether the confessions led to humane and ethical interviewing styles.

Furthermore, there is traditionally large research interest on the detection of deception (for an overview see Vrij, 2008). For example, in experimental studies researchers have shown that the interviewer can elicit cues to deceit by requesting suspects to sketch localities (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2012) or to report the stories in reversed order (Vrij et al., 2008), and by asking unanticipated questions (Vrij et al., 2009) or asking questions before disclosing the evidence (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). However, the transfer of such empirical findings into practice seems partially challenging. In general, the credibility of the suspects' statement should be analysed after the interview as it is too complex to be done during the interview. This is a critical point as practitioners often rely on non-verbal behaviours in order to detect deception during the interaction (e.g. Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2014), which are in fact unreliable (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003). During the interview the interviewer should only compare the suspects' statement with the already available information. In doing so, s/he can estimate whether the information revealed is consistent or inconsistent with the known information. However, the interviewer should be

cautious with determining the reasons for inconsistencies during the interview (e.g. it could be the result of an intentional fabrication, suggestive process or misremembering).

Disclosure of evidence. An additional main research interest on suspect interviewing is the disclosure of evidence. Researchers have examined real-life, videotaped, audiotaped and transcribed interviews in order to map the disclosure of evidence. In the US, Leo (1996) found that interviewers typically started by confronting the suspects with the evidence in order to suggest their guilt. In contrast, Moston and Stephenson (1993) found that in the UK most interviewers opened the interview by asking offence-related questions and only a minority disclosed the evidence at the outset of the interview. Some research suggests that the disclosure of evidence may to some extent influence suspects' decision to shift from denying to confessing (Bull & Soukara 2010).

In line with this, further studies focused on when to disclose evidence in order to influence the interview outcome. Sellers and Kebbel (2011) found that asking for a free account before disclosing the evidence resulted in fewer incriminating statements, compared to the disclosure of the evidence before asking for a free account. An explanation for this finding is that the evidence was stronger in the cases where it was disclosed earlier, and this influenced the suspects to make an incriminating statement. Furthermore, Walsh and Bull (2015) showed that a gradual (stepwise) disclosure of the evidence resulted in more comprehensive accounts, compared to an early or late disclosure of the evidence. Examining the gradual disclosure in detail, they found that a deferred gradual disclosure, in which an account was fully obtained before the interviewers subsequently asked the suspects to explain the inconsistencies, resulted in more comprehensive accounts compared to a reactive gradual disclosure, in which the inconsistencies were disclosed at the same time as an account was gathered (i.e. the suspects were challenged immediately to explain the inconsistencies). Finally, in two recent experimental studies Tekin and colleagues (2015, 2016) found that a gradual elicitation and disclosure of statement-evidence inconsistencies resulted in more admissions from guilty

suspects, compared to an early disclosure of the evidence. Specifically, in these studies the inconsistencies were elicited (by asking questions on the evidence without disclosing it) and disclosed for two groups of evidence in two subsequent interview phases. Overall, the presented studies show that research can provide some suggestions on when to disclose the evidence in order to influence suspects' verbal responses. However, further research is needed in order to examine this highly relevant topic for practitioners in more detail (Smith & Bull, 2013).

Interview outcome. As outlined above there are different measures in order to evaluate suspect interviews. In the past, the effectiveness of suspect interviewing was typically captured by the extent of true and false confessions. This seems inappropriate as researchers themselves recommended that the interviewer should gather information in an open-minded manner instead of striving for confessions. The main argument for this is that the interviewer often cannot be sure about suspects' guilt. However, researchers often also cannot be sure about the veracity of confessions (e.g. by analysing interview recordings), but they ignore this limitation. Quite recently, researchers have started to introduce new measures. For example, Walsh and Bull (2015) classified interview outcomes as preferred or undesirable. A preferred outcome was defined as a comprehensive account (independent of whether the suspects confessed or not), which has been robustly tested by the interviewers for its veracity; an undesirable outcome described an account which was accepted without sufficient scrutiny. Furthermore, Tekin and colleagues (2015, 2016) captured admissions which referred to potentially incriminating information for the suspects but did not involve full confessions. In line with this shift of evaluating suspect interviews, this thesis focuses on the elicitation of *new information*, i.e., information that the suspects revealed and that was unknown to the interviewer previously.

Research on HUMINT Interviewing

While the body of research on suspect interviewing is steadily increasing, there is comparatively little research on HUMINT interviewing. Observing current public debates one

could argue that HUMINT is of less importance compared to information obtained through technical means. However, practitioners stress that there is information that can be gathered exclusively in human interactions and that HUMINT is also frequently needed to interpret intelligence gathered by technical means (personal communication with police/intelligence service members, 2016).

General HUMINT research. A considerable amount of the HUMINT research was initiated by the former US President Barack Obama. Specifically, Obama wanted to develop evidence-based alternatives to the so-called *enhanced interrogation techniques* (e.g. waterboarding or deprivation of sleep/food), which US intelligence services used after the 9/11 attacks in order to obtain information from sources (Hoffman et al., 2015). Critically, enhanced interrogations techniques are unethical, inhumane and generally contradict Human Rights Article 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The United Nations, 1948). Furthermore, there is no scientific evidence that these harsh and coercive interrogation techniques are effective in collecting information (Brandon, 2011; Costanzo & Redlich, 2010), and in fact rather increase the risk of obtaining unreliable information (Alison & Alison, 2017). In 2009, Obama founded the High Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG). The HIG aims to examine the effectiveness of the interviewing techniques specified in the Field Manual 2-22.3 of the US Army (2006) that is standard for US interrogators (US Government, 2009), and to develop new ways of lawful interviewing. In the following section, some studies of this research program will be outlined.

The HIG has initiated numerous experimental studies. For example, researchers found that truth tellers (vs. liars) reported more details when asked to report activities with closed eyes (Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hillman, & Hope, 2014), that truth tellers provided more details than liars when a second interviewer exhibited a supportive demeanour (vs. a neutral or suspicious demeanour; Mann et al., 2012), that asking anticipated and unanticipated questions can help to elicit cues to true and false intentions among small cells of truth tellers and liars (Sooniste,

Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2014), and that priming can result in an increased amount of information (Dawson, Hartwig, & Brimbal, 2015). This indicates that experimental HUMINT research is multifaceted and includes many different research areas.

Furthermore, researches gathered insights on what happens in real-life HUMINT interviews by surveying different persons involved in HUMINT interactions. For example, US military and federal-law interrogators (Redlich et al., 2014) and highly experienced US military and HUMINT interrogators (Russano, Narchet, Kleinman, & Meissner, 2014) reported that rapport and relationship building techniques were most frequently used and perceived as most effective for intelligence gathering. This perception is consistent with that of US analysts and interpreters (Russano, Narchet, & Kleinman, 2014), and with that of international interrogators and high-value detainees (Goodman-Delahunty, Martschuk, & Dhimi, 2014). By examining recordings of interviews with suspects, later convicted of terroristic activities in the UK and Ireland, Alison and colleagues (2014b) found five groups of counter-interrogation strategies: verbal (discussing unrelated topics, providing well known information and providing unscripted responses), passive-verbal (providing monosyllabic responses and claiming to have a lack of memory), passive (refusing to make eye contact with the interviewer and complete silence in response to police questions), retraction, and no comment. Furthermore, they found that a rapport-based approach reduced the suspects' use of passive, passive-verbal and no-comment counter-interrogation strategies (Alison et al., 2014a), and resulted in an increased amount of useful information (Alison et al., 2013). These studies illustrate the prominent role of building rapport in HUMINT interviews.

However, researchers and practitioners sometimes neglect the fact that *too much* rapport building can also be risky. For example, research has shown that suspects (and it is likely the case also for sources) can perceive situations as aversive due to the social isolation (Gudjonsson, 2003). An interviewer who engages in too much rapport building in such an aversive situation (e.g. by engaging the interviewee on an emotional level) can make an

innocent suspect to confess falsely or a source holding no relevant information to reveal unreliable information. The rationale of this is that the suspect/source wants to stop the aversive situation, please the interviewer and/or keep a social interaction with the interviewer, and therefore reveals information. Apart from the reliability of the information gathered, it is an ethical question of to what extent the interviewer should build rapport in order to influence interviewees' basic decisions (e.g. persuade the interviewees to talk with the interviewer). Arguably, general rapport building behaviours – such as showing respectful, friendly, conversational and non-judgemental behaviour (Alison & Alison, 2017) – should be seen as a minimum requirement of human interactions. However, rapport building behaviours should not be used to manipulate suspects/sources autonomy (e.g. by persuading the interviewees to cooperate).

HUMINT gathering research. Two lines of HUMINT research aiming to gather intelligence are of specific interest for this thesis. First, Evans and colleagues (2013) simulated a scenario, in which an interviewer questioned a detained individual who was believed to hold knowledge about relevant events but his or her personal involvement was unknown. In the experiment, the participants were informed that the study was a national assessment of college students' knowledge, and they answered questions in pairs (together with a confederate). Half of the participants were guilty (the confederate cheated by using a cheat sheet and getting help via a cell phone) and half were innocent but held guilty knowledge (that the confederate broke an experimental rule by using the cell phone in order to chat but did not cheat). When interviewing the “guilty and innocent persons”, the information-gathering approach resulted in more relevant information compared to the accusatorial approach. Using the same experimental paradigm, Evans and colleagues (Evans et al., 2014) compared three interview approaches derived from the Field Manual 2-22.3 (US Army, 2006): the positive emotional approach (aimed to reduce the detainees' fear and increase their self-esteem before asking open-ended questions), the negative emotional approach (aimed to increase the detainees' fear and lower

their self-esteem before asking open-ended questions) and the direct approach (asking only open-ended questions). When interviewing the guilty and innocent persons both emotional approaches resulted in more relevant information compared to the direct approach. Furthermore, the positive emotional approach reduced interviewees' perceptions of anxiety and increased their perceptions of a fostering atmosphere in comparison with the negative emotional approach. That means, these studies showed the effectiveness of the information-gathering approach and the positive emotional approach in a rather traditional police interview setting by questioning suspicious persons.

Second, Fisher and colleagues examined in two studies the gathering of intelligence about terrorist meetings by interviewing fully cooperative sources (Leins, Fisher, Pludwinski, Rivard, & Robertson, 2014; Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Mueller, 2014). More specifically, in interviewing student participants about family meetings they found that the cognitive interview resulted in more information compared to a control condition (free recall and direct questions; Leins et al., 2014). Furthermore, the cognitive interview resulted in more event-related information when experienced US investigators (trainers at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center) interviewed other trainers on different business meetings, compared to a standard five-step interview protocol trained and used by US investigators (Rivard et al., 2014). In sum, these studies show the effectiveness of the cognitive interview in recollecting intelligence from cooperative sources.

Overall, these two lines of HUMINT research examined the gathering of intelligence by interviewing suspicious or fully cooperative sources. This thesis aims to add to this research on HUMINT gathering by interviewing sources that are willing to share a limited amount of information.

Two-Tier Interviewing Framework

This thesis develops an interviewing framework aiming to elicit new information from suspects and sources (see Figure 1). This developed interviewing framework consists of a conceptual and a tactical tier, and is motivated by the SUE model (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). The *conceptual tier* is more abstract and contains several assumptions on the interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes that help the interviewer to plan and conduct the interview strategically. The *tactical tier* provides practical ways of how to meet sub-goals in the interview. In this thesis the tactical tier includes the Scharff-technique and SUE-technique. Using these techniques in a meaningful manner implies understanding and implementing the conceptual notions. Next, the two tiers will be described in more detail.

Conceptual Tier

The conceptual tier includes the interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes. Broadly speaking, it assumes that the suspects'/sources' interview goal influences their perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge, which in turn affects their choice of counter-interrogation strategy, and their verbal behaviour (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the conceptual tier assumes that the interviewer can use these assumptions of the interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes by taking the suspects'/sources' perspective. Below, the interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes will be outlined separately first, and then their relation to each other and to perspective-taking will be described.




Figure 2. The interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes.

Interview goals. Humans naturally behave in a goal-directed manner (Aarts, 2012). Accordingly, in interviews suspects and sources strive for goals, which can differ in the amount,

orientation and specific content. Sources can have a single goal (e.g. “I want money”) or multiple goals (e.g. “I want to have money, help the police and prevent the planned activities”; personal communication with police/intelligence service members, 2016; Scherp, 1992). Goals are “concurring” when they induce the sources to cooperate with the police (e.g. “I want to help the police and need the money”). In contrast, goals are “conflicting” when one goal induces the sources to cooperate with the police (e.g. “I want money from the police”) while another does not (e.g. “I do not want to betray the group”). That means, the *conflicting goals* can result in the sources’ willingness to reveal a limited amount of information. More precisely, conflicting goals result in the sources facing an *information management dilemma*: they need to reveal some information in order to pursue the focal goal but cannot reveal too much information in order to also pursue the conflicting goal.

Similar to sources, suspects’ interview goals can differ with respect to the amount, orientation and content. Suspects can pursue a single goal (e.g. “I want to get it off my chest”; Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 1994), multiple concurring goals (e.g. “I want to ease my conscience and mitigate the sentencing”; Volbert, May, Hausam, & Lau, 2016) or conflicting goals (e.g. “I want to get it off the chest but do not want to be viewed as a criminal”; Gudjonsson & Petursson, 1991). Certainly, interview goals can differ on further dimensions (e.g. their hierarchy). However, the three dimensions exemplified are crucial for the developed interviewing framework. Simply put, this thesis examines interactions in which the interviewees pursue conflicting goals that encourages them to reveal a limited amount of information.

Perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge. Suspects contemplate the interviewer’s knowledge in preparation of the interview (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Doering, 2010) and also during the interview (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Biographical works of HUMINT interviewers indicates that this also holds true for sources (e.g. Soufan, 2011). The interviewees’ cognitive processes of testing the interviewer’s knowledge can be explained with the concept of social hypothesis testing (Trope & Liberman, 1995). First, the interviewee may formulate a

hypothesis about the interviewer's knowledge (e.g. "The interviewer holds a lot of information"). Subsequently, the interviewee may test this hypothesis. Specifically, the interviewee may derive conditional if-then rules (e.g. "If the interviewer knows a lot, then s/he holds information A"), search for relevant information in his or her memory (e.g. "Previously, the interviewer talked about B") or in the social environment (e.g. "Currently, the interviewer is talking about A"), and interpret and categorize the collected information (e.g. "Talking about A and B implies the interviewer holds a lot of information"). Based on this testing the interviewee may draw an inference about whether the hypothesis is true or not (e.g. "The interviewer actually holds a lot of information"). The interviewee does not have to be aware of all these steps, and can return to and skip separate steps until s/he is able to draw an inference. For the developed interviewing framework it is vital that suspects/sources test and estimate the interviewer's knowledge concerning what information the interviewer holds about the case.

Furthermore, it is relevant to relate (a) the information the interviewees perceive the interviewer to hold, and (b) the information the interviewer actually holds. As illustrated in Figure 3, three broad combinations are possible. First, the interviewees can be approximately correct in estimating the interviewer's knowledge ($a \sim b$). Second, the interviewees can perceive the interviewer to hold less information than s/he actually knows. That means, the interviewees underestimate the interviewer's knowledge ($a < b$). Finally, the interviewees can overestimate the interviewer's knowledge and perceive the interviewer to know more information than s/he in fact holds ($a > b$). In certain situations, the interviewer aims to make the interviewees overestimate his or her knowledge, whereas in other situations it is beneficial if the interviewees underestimate it or perceive it approximately correct (described in detail below). Therefore, the interviewer needs to have tactics at his or her disposal that can influence the interviewees' perceptions of his or her knowledge in different directions.




Figure 3. Relating the interviewees' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge (above the scale) and the interviewer's actual knowledge (below the scale) on a scale ranging from no knowledge to all knowledge.

Counter-interrogation strategies. Based on research on deception detection, Clemens (2013) described counter-interrogation strategies as “attempts made by suspects to successfully withstand an interrogation or an investigative interview and appear convincing” (p. 5). In line with this, in experimental studies guilty lying suspects are reported to have had developed and used strategies such as “Avoid incriminating details”, “Include many details”, “Avoid lying” and “Try to keep it simple” (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). In contrast, in these studies most innocent truth telling suspects reported to have had prepared and used no strategy or prepared and used the strategy to “Tell the truth like it happened”. Furthermore, as described above, the field study by Alison and colleagues (2014b) has shown that suspects use verbal counter-interrogation strategies such as “Discussing unrelated topics”, “Providing well known information” and “Providing monosyllabic responses”. Similarly, biographical works of interviewees shows also that sources develop and employ counter-interrogation strategies such as “Reveal only less information”, “Reveal only known information” and “Figure out what the interviewer is after and then withhold this information” (Scharff, 1950; Soufan, 2011; Toliver, 1997).

Overall, the different types of literature show that suspects and sources devise and use several counter-interrogation strategies of what to say in the interview. In order to develop such verbal strategies, interviewees need to reflect on what information they hold and what

information to avoid, deny or admit. The suspects'/sources' actual choice to use a specific counter-interrogation strategy can change during the course of the interview. Simply put, the developed interviewing framework assumes that interviewees have a pool of counter-interrogation strategies from which they can continuously choose between to achieve their interview goals. In doing so the counter-interrogation strategies can differ in the extent of revealing case-related information, ranging from withholding (e.g. "Discuss unrelated topics") to forthcoming (e.g. "Tell it like it happened"). It is important to note that the developed interviewing framework focuses only on the *choice of verbal* counter-interrogation strategies.

The interviewees' counter-interrogation strategies can be linked to the theory on self-regulation, which describes how humans control and direct their actions, emotions and thoughts (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Specifically, humans set goals, plan their goal-directed behaviours and monitor their activities (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In line with this, the suspects/sources may formulate an interview goal (e.g. for a source: "I need money without betraying the group"), and choose counter-interrogation strategies accordingly (e.g. "It is meaningless to deny or withhold what they already know, hence I will reveal this information"). By employing goal-directed strategies, the goal presents a reference point and humans continuously compare their current state with the formulated goal (Carver & Scheier, 2002). Based on this comparison, they make adjustments to diminish the gap between their current state and the goal until they achieve their goal or give up. In the interview, the interviewees may compare their current state (e.g. "I will not get the money as I have not revealed enough information yet") with the intended goal (e.g. "I need the money without betraying the group"). Consequently, the interviewees may change the counter-interrogation strategies (e.g. from "I will reveal already known information" to "I will reveal little information that is new to the interviewer") until they achieve their interview goal. These considerations illustrate that counter-interrogation strategies are generally goal-oriented and its development and use implies cognitive work. Therefore, in this

this counter-interrogation strategies are viewed as the suspects' and sources' cognitively developed behaviours which they use to achieve their interview goal.

Verbal behaviour. All information suspects or sources reveal during the interview is defined as verbal behaviour. For the developed framework the information revealed can be classified into a matrix with two dimensions: the interviewer's actual knowledge, and the veracity of the information revealed (see Figure 4). Both dimensions can be divided in two broad categories. With respect to the interviewer's knowledge, the information revealed can be already known to the interviewer or new to him or her (i.e. previously unknown). The veracity dimension describes whether the information revealed is actually correct or false. Relating the two dimensions orthogonally results in a matrix with four quadrants: new correct information, new incorrect information, known correct information and known incorrect information. The interviewer's primary objective is to collect new correct information.




Figure 4. Simplified illustration of the interviewees' verbal behaviour considering the interviewer's knowledge and veracity of the information revealed.

Relating interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes. Surveying convicted suspects about their reasons to confess showed a link between their perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge (e.g. "The police will eventually prove I did it") or their interview goal (e.g. "I want to get it off my chest") with their verbal behaviour (confession; Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 1994). However, such simple relationships do not seem to cover all situations properly, such as

when the interviewees pursue conflicting goals. As described above, the conflicting goals place the interviewees in an information dilemma, and results in a limited willingness to share information (i.e. they want to reveal some information but do not want to share all their knowledge). This in turn leads them to use subtle counter-interrogation strategies. In order to choose productive counter-interrogation strategies the interviewees may attempt to access as much information as possible, and hence the perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge play a crucial role. This is in line with literature indicating that the suspects and sources typically reflect on the interviewer's knowledge and these perceptions affect their decisions during the interview (Moston & Engelberg, 2011; Soufan, 2011). Below, the relation of the interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes are illustrated in two cases.

First, consider a guilty suspect aiming to convince the interviewer that s/he is innocent. This suspect needs to reveal some information to show his or her innocence but cannot reveal too much information that would show his or her guilt. This suspect may access the interviewer's knowledge in order to use goal-directed counter-interrogation strategies. If the suspect perceives that the interviewer does not hold specific information, s/he will use more withholding counter-interrogation strategies (e.g. "I will not tell any information that might be incriminating for me"). These withholding strategies will likely result in known incorrect or new incorrect information. In contrast, if the suspect perceives the interviewer to hold specific information, s/he will use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies concerning this specific information (e.g. "I will reveal the information that is already known to the interviewer as it is meaningless to withhold this"). This in turn will likely result in correct known or correct new information.

Second, consider a source aiming to get money from the police while simultaneously sharing sympathy for his or her friends in the group. This source needs to reveal some information to get the money but cannot reveal too much information to not betray his or her friends. As above, the source may consider the interviewer's knowledge in order to choose

goal-directed counter-interrogation strategies. For example, concerning the information that the source perceives the interviewer is after, s/he will use a more withholding counter-interrogation strategy (e.g. “I will figure out what the interviewer is after, and then make sure not to give him or her what s/he wants”). This will likely result in known incorrect information or new incorrect information. In contrast, if the source perceives the interviewer to hold specific information, s/he will use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies with respect to this specific information (e.g. “I will reveal the information that is already known to the interviewer as it is meaningless to withhold this”). Consequently, this will result in known correct information or new correct information. These two examples illustrate that the suspects’/sources’ conflicting interview goal regulates their perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge, which in turn affects their choice of counter-interrogation strategy and verbal behaviour.

Perspective-taking. Galinsky and colleagues (2008) describe perspective taking as the “cognitive capacity to consider the world from other viewpoints and allows an individual to anticipate the behaviour and reactions of others” (p. 378). Taking the perspective of the opponents has shown to be effective in negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), and is of importance for the interviewer (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008, 2015). By taking the interviewees’ perspective the interviewer can use the knowledge about the interviewees’ cognitive and verbal processes in three ways (see also Figure 5). First, by considering the interviewees’ perspective during the interview planning, the interviewer can cognitively simulate alternative scenarios of how the interviewees could behave during the interview. Based on this, the interviewer can prepare tactics for how to conduct the interview and how to react depending on the interviewees’ statements. Second, by observing the interviewees’ verbal behaviours and taking their perspectives during the interview, the interviewer can anticipate the interviewees’ interview goals and counter-interrogation strategies. Based on this, the interviewer can employ tactics that counteract the interviewees’ choice of counter-interrogation strategies. Third, taking the interviewees’ perspective can help the interviewer to analyse the interview outcome. Based

on the interviewees' verbal behaviour the interviewer can seek to anticipate the interviewees' counter-interrogation strategies and interview goals, which in turn can help to assess the credibility of the information revealed and whether they revealed their knowledge. For example, knowing that a source shares sympathy with some group members but does not have sympathy for the group's interests can explain why the source withholds information on specific members (e.g. "I don't know that") but the information revealed on the group's planning of an attack is still rather credible. In the following sections, this thesis focuses mainly on the planning and implementation of the interview by considering the interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes.




Figure 5. Taking the perspective of the interviewees can help the interviewer to plan, conduct and analyse the interview.

Tactical Tier

The tactical tier described in this thesis includes two interview techniques both consisting of a collection of interview tactics. The two interview techniques aim to elicit new information by considering interviewees' cognitive and verbal processes. This section starts with the presentation of the research on HUMINT interviewing (namely the Scharff-technique) and then on suspect interviewing (namely the SUE-technique), as this order matches the chronology in which the studies were conducted.

Scharff-technique

Overview of the Scharff tactics. The scientific development of the Scharff-technique was inspired by Hanns Scharff (1907-1992; Toliver, 1997). Scharff worked in the textile industry in Johannesburg, South Africa, and was drafted into German military service during a home leave. During World War II, Scharff worked for the German Luftwaffe at the Intelligence and Evaluation Center West at Oberursel, Germany. After the war, Scharff moved to the US, advised security agencies and taught his style of interviewing before he moved on to work successfully as a mosaic artist in his own company.

Relevant for this thesis is Scharff's time during the war when he interviewed hundreds of US and British combat pilots (Scharff, 1950; Toliver, 1997). When Scharff came to Oberursel he first observed the prisoners of war (POWs) during the interrogations his colleagues conducted. By taking the POWs perspectives, Scharff identified the counter-interrogation strategies they used to resist the conventional interrogations. Based on his observations, Scharff developed his own way of interviewing which allowed him to counteract the POWs' counter-interrogation strategies. Broadly speaking, Scharff was known for his friendly, respectful and conversational interviews and that he appeared extremely knowledgeable. His approach was respected by superiors (e.g. sergeant Bert Nagel: "I read the reports each interrogator wrote and in this way knew which ones were best. Scharff was unbeatable!" Toliver, 1997, p. 308), by POWs (e.g. US Army Air Corps Colonel Hub Zemke: "What did he get out of me? There is no doubt in my mind that he did extract something, but I haven't the slightest idea what. If you talked to him about the weather or anything else, he no doubt got some information or confirmation from it. His technique was psychic, not physical. I had the feeling that he was truly Germany's Master Interrogator so my motto was beware." Toliver, 1997, p. 193), and recently also by leading psychological scientists (e.g. Professor Ray Bull: Scharff was "one of Germany's most successful interrogators", Bull, 2014, p. 178).

The empirical examination of the Scharff-technique in this thesis draws on both Hanns

Scharff's approach and the conceptual tier of the interviewing framework outlined above. The Scharff-technique consists of several tactics aiming to elicit new information from sources who face an information management dilemma (i.e. they want to reveal some information but do not want to share all known information). The first tactic is the *friendly approach*, which stipulates the interviewer should establish and maintain a pleasant, respectful and conversational atmosphere during the interview. The second tactic is *not pressing for information*. This tactic instructs the interviewer to ask very few (if any) questions, and open-ended questions instead of specific questions. The friendly approach tactic and the not pressing for information tactic form the foundation and should be implemented throughout the interview. The third tactic is the *illusion of knowing it all*, which directs the interviewer to present the already known information. In doing so the interviewer gives the sources the opportunity to add details. The fourth tactic is the *confirmation/disconfirmation*. HUMINT interviewers frequently have conflicting information about a topic (e.g. the place of the attack can be a main station or a shopping mall) or specific pieces of information for which the reliability is uncertain. In these cases, the interviewer can elicit new information by presenting the unreliable piece of information within a claim, waiting a second and hence giving the sources the chance to confirm or disconfirm the specific information. That means, the illusion of knowing it all tactic aims to collect generally new information, whereas the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic aims to collect the reliability of specific pieces of information. Finally, the fifth tactic is the *ignore new information*. This tactic encourages the interviewer conceal his or her interest for information and treat the information revealed as known or unimportant (e.g. by not repeating claims and not commenting on information revealed). These Scharff tactics have been examined in a line of experimental studies, which will be described next.

Previous research on the Scharff-technique. Examining a HUMINT interaction in which a source faces an information management dilemma requires a specific set of independent measures and experimental set-ups. Therefore, the following dependent measures

were proposed to capture information elicitation in such interactions (e.g. Granhag, 2010; Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015). First, the interviewer must have the primary goal of collecting *new information*. This is undoubtedly the most important objective in HUMINT interactions as new information can help to solve and prevent crimes. In the studies on the Scharff-technique, persons blind to the experimental hypotheses coded the new information revealed while listening to the audio records. Second, the interviewer needs to hide his or her *information objectives* in order to reduce the risk that the source will withhold this particular information or fabricate information about the knowledge gap (e.g. “I will try to figure out what the interviewer is after, and then make sure not to give him or her what s/he wants”). In the experiments, the participants’ perception of the interviewer’s information objectives was mapped by a Likert-scale question. Third, concerning the source’s *perception of the interviewer’s knowledge* the interviewer should want the source to overestimate it. The rationale of this is that the source should be forthcoming in terms of the information that s/he perceives the interviewer to hold (e.g. “It is meaningless to deny or hold back what the interviewer already knows, hence I will reveal this information”). The participants’ perception of the interviewer’s knowledge was captured using a Likert-scale or presenting a checklist that include all available information and where the participants marked the information that they believed was known to the interviewer. Finally, the interviewer should want the source to underestimate *the amount of new information revealed*. This is important because, for example, sources believing to have not revealed much new information could be motivated to talk to the interviewer again because they assume to have achieved their goal by revealing only little information. In order to capture this the participants were asked to mark in a further checklist the specific information they perceived to have revealed during the interview. By relating this perception of new information revealed to the objective amount of new information revealed it was possible to assess the extent to which each participant over-/underestimated the amount of new information revealed.

HUMINT interactions often have three features in common (Granhag, Montecinos, &

Oleszkiewicz, 2015). First, the interviewer holds some intelligence about a future crime but has knowledge gaps, which s/he wants to fill during the interview with the source. Second, the source holds information that can fill some of these information gaps but not necessarily all of them. Third, the source is in an information management dilemma (i.e. the source is motivated to reveal some information but not all the known information). In order to simulate these features Granhag, Montecinos and Oleszkiewicz (2015) introduced an experimental setting in which they instructed participants to prepare to play the role of a source in a phone interview. For this purpose, the participants received background information on a terrorist group planning an attack. Furthermore, they were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too little information as they need assistance from the police with their own problems and not revealing too much information as then they may risk retaliation from the group. Then they conducted a phone interview with a police contact, and finally filled out questionnaires. The experimental conditions differed with respect to the interview protocols the interviewer used during the phone call.

When this thesis research began, the Scharff-technique had been examined in three studies, all of which used the experimental set-up described above. In the first study (Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015), the Scharff-technique was conceptualized by the tactics described above and was compared against the open question technique (asking open-ended questions only) and the specific question technique (asking specific questions only). The Scharff-technique resulted in a similar amount of new information as the other two interview conditions. The authors explained this unexpected finding with a rather disorganised/mixed implementation of the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. However, the sources interviewed with the Scharff-technique found it more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives (vs. both control techniques), and they perceived themselves to have revealed less information (vs. the specific question technique).

The second (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Montecinos, 2014) and third study about the Scharff-technique (May, Granhag, & Oleszkiewicz, 2014) advanced the experimental set-up and the implementation of the Scharff tactics of the first study on three points. First, for the Scharff conditions, the illusion of knowing it all tactic was clearly implemented before presenting the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. Second, the Direct Approach was chosen as a point of comparison. The rationale for this was that US intelligence interviewers are instructed to open with the Direct Approach (US Army, 2006; US Government, 2009), and in line with this most US interviewers typically start with this approach (Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2011; Semel, 2013). In accordance with the Field Manual 2-22.3 (US Army, 2006) the Direct Approach was conceptualized as a combination of open-ended and specific questions. Finally, two subjective measures were calibrated. Specifically, the participants marked in checklists the information (a) they believed the interviewer held prior to the interview, and (b) they perceived to have revealed during the interview (in the first study by Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015 Likert-scale questions were used).

The main difference between the second (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Montecinos, 2014) and third study (May et al., 2014) was the implementation of the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic: While the second study examined only the confirmation tactic, the third study examined the confirmation tactic and the disconfirmation tactic separately in two interview conditions. In both studies the sources in the Scharff conditions revealed more new information compared to the sources questioned with the Direct Approach. The sources in the Scharff conditions perceived the interviewer to hold comparatively more information. Furthermore, the sources in the Scharff conditions underestimated how much new information they had revealed, whereas the sources in the Direct Approach overestimated it. Unexpectedly, in both studies no differences were found between the Scharff-technique and the Direct Approach with respect to the sources' difficulty to understand the interviewer's information objective. Examining the confirmation/disconfirmation-tactic more closely in the third study, the use of the confirmation

tactic made it more difficult for the sources to understand the interviewer's information objectives and made the sources overestimate the interviewer's knowledge to a higher extent, compared to the disconfirmation tactic. This thesis extends the examination on the Scharff tactics with two studies. However, before outlining these studies the SUE tactics must first be introduced.

Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)-technique

Overview of the SUE tactics. Past research has shown that the SUE-technique can be used to obtain verbal cues of deceit about past actions in interviews with single (e.g. Sorochinski et al., 2013) or small groups of suspects (Granhag, Rangmar, & Strömwall, 2014), and also about intended actions in interviews with single suspects (Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013; for a meta-analysis on the SUE-technique see Hartwig et al., 2014). Recently, the objective of the SUE-technique has shifted from eliciting cues of deceit to eliciting new information. In the following, this thesis focuses solely on this new line of research, which to date has been examined in two published studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016).

In general, the SUE-technique consists of questioning and disclosure tactics. An interviewer employing the SUE-technique needs to know different *types of questions*. For example, open-ended invitations/questions (e.g. "Tell me everything you did yesterday evening"), probing questions (i.e. WH-questions; e.g. "Who did you talk to at the party?"), and specific/closed-ended question (i.e. requesting of specific details; e.g. "Have you talked to Jane?"). The different types of questions can generate different types of answers. For example, open-ended invitations allow for a wider range of responses than specific questions. Researchers typically advise to use open-ended invitations (e.g. Milne & Bull, 2000), and classify specific questions as rather inappropriate (e.g. Oxburgh, Ost, & Cherryman, 2010). However, specific questions can be profitable when used deliberately. For example, a specific question may induce stating suspects to comment on a detail asked about in the question.

Therefore, specific questions may be suitable in order to elicit statement-evidence inconsistencies when asking questions about known information.

The *evidence disclosure tactics* concern the timing and framing (or manner) of the evidence disclosure. The timing refers to when to disclose the evidence. For example, an interviewer can disclose the evidence early, late or in a gradual manner (see Granhag, Strömwall, Willén, & Hartwig, 2013 for an incremental disclosure of one piece of evidence). In contrast, the framing describes how to disclose the evidence. Depending on the timing of the disclosure the framing of the evidence naturally differs. That means, when disclosing the evidence before asking questions, it is presented in a rather pure and neutral form (e.g. “We have CCTV footage that you were at the station”). In this case the suspects can subsequently use the evidence as a “brick to build the statement”. In contrast, when asking questions on the evidence before disclosing it, the evidence loses its pure and neutral form in relation to the interview. Specifically, when asking question on the evidence without disclosing it, it subsequently turns into statement-evidence consistencies (e.g. “What you say fits to CCTV footage showing that you were at the station”) or statement-evidence inconsistencies (e.g. “Your statement is inconsistent to CCTV footage showing that you were at the station”). The evidence then takes on an agreeing (statement-evidence consistency) or disagreeing component (statement-evidence inconsistency). Next the examination of the SUE tactics will be described.

Previous research on the SUE-technique. Examining information elicitation in suspect interviews requires a minimum of three dependent measures (e.g. Tekin et al., 2015). First, the interviewer’s primary goal is the amount of *new information revealed*, as this can help to solve crimes. For the experimental analysis, persons blind to the experimental hypotheses coded the new information revealed about a critical phase of the crime by listening to the interview records. Second, *statement-evidence inconsistencies* give the interviewer the chance to estimate and possibly change the suspects’ counter-interrogation strategies. Specifically, a statement-evidence inconsistency indicates that the suspect is using a more withholding

counter-interrogation strategy, whereas a statement-evidence consistency suggests that the suspect is using a more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy. As outlined below, by disclosing the inconsistencies the interviewer can attempt to change the suspects' choice of counter-interrogation strategy from more to less withholding. The statement-evidence inconsistencies refer to known incorrect information, whereas statement-evidence consistencies describe known correct information (described above). In the studies, the inconsistencies were captured by coding contradictions and omissions while listening to the interview recordings (i.e. by comparing the suspects' statement with the available pieces of evidence). Finally, the *suspects' perception of the interviewer's knowledge* is expected to be crucial in influencing the suspects' choice of counter-interrogation strategy. Broadly speaking, the suspects are expected to use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies for specific information that they perceive is known to the interviewer (e.g. "I will reveal the information that is already known to the interviewer as it is meaningless to withhold this"), and withholding counter-interrogation strategies for specific information that they perceive is unknown to the interviewer (e.g. "I will not tell any information that might be incriminating for me"). The perception of the interviewer's knowledge was captured by Likert-scale ratings or by completing a checklist.

Tekin and colleagues (2015) also introduced an experimental design that mirrors a crime scenario in which a person committed a crime consisting of several phases. The interviewer held information about some of the crime phases indicating the suspects' involvement in the crime but which did not prove their guilt. That means, the interviewer lacked information on the critical phase of the crime and aimed to collect this information during the interview. In the experiment, the participants committed a mock crime consisting of three phases (referred to here as phases A, B and C). The interviewer held information about two of the crime phases (Phase A and B) indicating the suspects' involvement in the crime but lacked information on the critical phase of the crime (Phase C). Then, the participants prepared for the interviews, and were instructed that it was their goal to convince the interviewer of their innocence. That is, all

suspects were guilty and denying. The interviewer questioned the suspects by using the evidence s/he held in different ways (depending on the interview condition). After the interview was finished the participants filled out a questionnaire.

When this thesis research on the SUE-technique started, two studies about the SUE tactics aiming to elicit new information had been conducted. In the first study a version of the SUE-technique was compared against early disclosure of the evidence (Tekin et al., 2015). The interview conditions were divided into three phases (referred to here as Phases 1, 2 and 3). For the Early disclosure condition, the interviewer disclosed all the evidence at the outset of the interview before asking questions about it in Phase 1 and 2. The Early disclosure mode was seen as a reasonable point of comparison because of its widespread real-world implementation (e.g. Leo, 1996). For the SUE confrontation condition, the interviewer started Phase 1 by asking specific and open-ended questions about crime Phase A without disclosing the evidence on it. The interviewer's objective of this step was to elicit statement-evidence inconsistencies. In a next step the interviewer then confronted the suspects with the in/consistencies without giving them the chance to comment on these (still Phase 1). In Phase 2, the interviewer repeated these two steps for the evidence on Phase B. The final questioning in Phase 3 was the same for both conditions; the interviewer asked open-ended questions about crime Phase C, for which s/he lacks information. The SUE confrontation condition resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies, more new information about the critical phase of the crime, and the suspects overestimated the interviewer's knowledge to a higher degree (vs. Early disclosure condition).

In the second study, two SUE versions were compared against the Early disclosure condition (Tekin et al., 2016). The two SUE conditions were implemented in three phases as described above, and differed only in the way the interviewer disclosed the statement-evidence inconsistencies (in Phase 1 and 2). For the SUE confrontation condition, the interviewer confronted the suspects with their inconsistencies without giving them the chance to comment on them. In contrast, for the SUE confrontation/explain condition the interviewer confronted

the suspects with their inconsistencies and asked them explicitly to explain them. The two SUE conditions generated more statement-evidence inconsistencies than the Early disclosure condition. However, only the SUE confrontation condition resulted in more new information compared to the Early disclosure condition. This was unexpected as the suspects in both SUE conditions overestimated the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime (Phase C) to a higher degree than the suspects in the Early disclosure condition. Further analyses showed that for the SUE confrontation/explain condition a small group of suspects were reluctant to explain their inconsistencies and these suspects revealed less new information about the critical phase of the crime compared to the suspects who explained their inconsistencies previously. This shows that in order to elicit new information at a later stage in the interview, the suspects need to use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies early on in the interview. Simply put, the interviewer needs to keep the suspect in the game in order to obtain new information.

SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES

General and Specific Aims

The overall objective of the empirical studies was to examine the developed interviewing framework aiming to elicit information from sources and suspects. As described above, the framework consists of the conceptual tier and the tactical tier. Within this thesis, two studies on the Scharff-technique and one study on the SUE-technique were conducted. The findings of these studies support the tactical and the conceptual tier. From the tactical tier, the studies can identify how to use the tactics in order to reach sub-goals and finally obtain new information. On the conceptual tier, the studies can map the mechanisms behind the tactics, which is valuable for training and research purposes. Derived from this rationale, the three studies focused on the following specific aims: Study I examined how to combine the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation tactic in order to influence the sources' perceptions of the interviewer's

knowledge and collect new information; Study II examined how to implement the illusion of knowing it all tactic in such a manner that encourages the sources to focus on the interviewer's knowledge and steer away from his or her knowledge gaps; and Study III examined how to disclose statement-evidence inconsistencies in order to make the suspects overestimate the interviewer's knowledge, to use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies and to collect new information. Below, these three studies are described briefly (see Appendix A for the complete publications).

Study I

This study was primarily about the combination of the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation tactic. Two variations of the Scharff-technique were compared with the Direct Approach (see Table 1 of Publication I in the Appendix for the processes of the three conditions). The Scharff conditions differed with respect to the order of an initial open-ended question and the confirmation tactic (used within three claims). Specifically, after employing the illusion of knowing it all tactic it differed in if the interviewer first asked the initial open-ended question and then employed the confirmation tactic (*Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition*), or first implemented the confirmation tactic and then asked the initial open-ended question (*Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition*). In both Scharff conditions the interviewer finished with a second open-ended question, and used both the friendly approach tactic and the not pressing for information tactic during the full interview. For the *Direct Approach* the interviewer started with an open-ended question, asked three specific questions (which s/he repeated if the sources failed to answer them), and finished with a final open-ended question.

Based on previous research it was predicted that the Scharff conditions (vs. the Direct Approach) would result in more new information in response to the initial open-ended question, to the claims and during the full interview. Comparing the Scharff conditions, it was predicted that the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition would result in more new information in response to

the initial open-ended question, the claims and during the full interview. The rationale of this was that for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the claims were the sources first opportunity to contribute to the interview, and this was expected to result in an increased willingness to comment on them. Furthermore, it was expected that for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the use of the confirmation tactic would reinforce the illusion of knowing it all tactic before asking the initial open-ended question, what should increase the outcome of this question.

Moreover, it was predicted that the sources in the Scharff conditions would perceive the interviewer to hold comparatively more information prior to the interview, and they would find it more difficult to understand his or her information objective. Finally, it was predicted that the sources in the Scharff conditions would underestimate the amount of new information revealed, whereas the sources in the Direct Approach would overestimate it.

Method. The participants (N = 93) took the role of a source in a phone interview with a police contact and were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too little information (in order to get help from the police) or too much information (as they had sympathy for the group members and interests). That is, they pursued conflicting goals and faced an information management dilemma. In comparison to previous studies, the participants received less case-related information which they had available during the phone call (24 pieces of information compared to, for example, 35 pieces of information in the study by May et al., 2014). That is, they had to use the information in a more sophisticated manner. The interviewer held 12 pieces of the information, and for the Scharff conditions used them all to implement the illusion of knowing it all tactic. After the interview which used one of the three interview protocols described above, the participants were asked to fill out questionnaires. Specifically, they were asked to rate how easy/difficult it was to understand the interviewer's information objective. Also, they were presented with two checklists, and marked the information they perceived they had revealed during the interview (Checklist 1), and the information they perceived the interviewer already held prior to the interview (Checklist 2). Two persons who

were blind to the experimental hypotheses coded the interview recordings with respect to what pieces of new information were revealed by the sources and at what times they were revealed during the interview.

Results. In line with the predictions, the two Scharff conditions resulted in more new information after the first open-ended question and during the full interview, compared to the Direct Approach. However, only for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition did the confirmation tactic result in more new information compared to the specific questions in the Direct Approach. Contrary to the predictions, no differences were found between the two Scharff conditions with respect to the new information revealed in response to the specific interview components or during the full interview.

As predicted, the sources in the Scharff conditions found it comparatively more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives, and perceived the interviewer to hold more information (vs. the Direct Approach). Further analyses showed that the sources in the Scharff conditions overestimated the interviewer's knowledge to a comparatively higher extent and this overestimation was mainly assigned to the pieces of information used for the confirmation tactic. Finally, in support of the prediction, the sources in the Scharff conditions underestimated the amount of new information revealed, whereas the sources in the Direct Approach overestimated it.

Discussion. Both combinations of the Scharff tactics outperformed the Direct Approach with respect to all important measures. That means, both combinations of the illusion of knowing it all tactic and confirmation tactic were fruitful in influencing the sources' perception of the interviewer's knowledge and in gathering new information. However, comparing the two Scharff versions no clear order effects of the tactics were found. Nevertheless, a closer review on the results proved to be worthwhile.

The confirmation tactic resulted in more new information than the specific questions only when it was presented before the initial open-ended question. This finding suggests that

the sources were more ambitious to take the first chance to comment on the claims and contribute with information. However, employing the confirmation tactic before (vs. after) the initial open-ended question did not reinforce the sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge to such an extent that they revealed more new information in response to this initial question. Possibly, the confirmation tactic needs to be used for more pieces of information in order to reinforce the illusion of knowing it all to a considerable extent.

Furthermore, the sources in both Scharff conditions perceived the interviewer to hold more information and revealed more new information in response to the initial open-ended question, compared to the sources in the Direct Approach. This indicates that the illusion of knowing it all tactic was successful in prompting sources to reveal new information. Differently put, the illusion of knowing it all tactic made the sources reveal new information that went beyond the information presented to implement the tactic. However, the sources overestimated the interviewer's knowledge mainly due to the pieces of information used in the confirmation tactic. That means, the illusion of knowing it all tactic as such failed to make the sources overestimate the interviewer's knowledge. This finding was the starting point for Study II.

Study II

This study focused on how to introduce the illusion of knowing it all tactic. For this purpose, Study II examined how two ways of introducing the illusion of knowing it all tactic affect the sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge (Experiment 1) and the sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge gaps (Experiment 2). In the *traditional condition* the interviewer introduced the presentation of the known information by stating: "I already possess most of the most important information, so let me just share that information first"; this introduction was similar to that used by Hanns Scharff (Toliver, 1997) and to that implemented in previous studies (e.g. May et al., 2014). In contrast, in the *just start condition* the interviewer

just started to present the known information without an explicit statement on the amount and relevance of the information that s/he held.

As outlined previously, the sources' perception of the interviewer's knowledge can be linked to research on social hypothesis testing. In general, humans prefer a diagnostic strategy to test social hypotheses, which includes the comprehensive analysis of the hypothesis and its alternatives (Bassok & Trope, 1984). However, humans also prefer a more positive test strategy when instructed to test an extreme (radical) hypothesis, in comparison to a more moderate hypothesis (Trope & Bassok, 1983). The positive test strategy refers to the preference of searching for hypothesis-consistent information and this testing *can* – but do not necessarily have to – confirm the hypothesis (Hodgins & Zuckerman, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1987). In contrast, a confirmatory test strategy describes that the hypothesis biases the search and interpretation of information in such a hypothesis-consistent way that inevitably results in a confirmation of the hypothesis (Skov & Sherman, 1986). It was expected that the extreme statement in the traditional condition may trigger alertness and the sources would test a more extreme (radical) hypothesis (e.g. “It is impossible that the interviewer holds all important information”). Thereby they were expected to use a positive test strategy to uncover information gaps in the interviewer's knowledge (in terms of “The interviewer said s/he holds all important information so I need to find information gaps”). In contrast, the sources in the just start condition were expected to be surprised by the known information and consequently test a more moderate hypothesis (e.g. “The interviewer already holds some important information”) and focus more on the known information possessed by the interviewer (in terms of “It is possible the interviewer holds further information”).

The sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge (Experiment 1) and knowledge gaps (Experiment 2) were examined separately in order to avoid order effects and confounds. For Experiment 1, it was predicted that the sources in the just start condition would test the interviewer's knowledge more for known information, and would infer the interviewer to hold

more knowledge, compared to the sources in the traditional condition. For Experiment 2, it was expected that the sources in the just start condition would test the interviewer's knowledge less for unknown information, and would infer the interviewer had fewer knowledge gaps, compared to the sources in the traditional condition.

General Method. The procedure of the two experiments differed only with respect to the post-interview questionnaire that measured the sources perception of the knowledge or knowledge gaps. In both experiments, the participants (N = 60 in each experiment) prepared for the role of a source calling a police contact. Therefore, they had to memorize case-related information about 14 themes concerning a terrorist group planning an attack, and were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too much or too little information. Then they called the police contact. Both interview conditions started with the friendly approach tactic, and then they differed with respect to the way of introducing the illusion of knowing it all tactic (described above). Next, for both conditions the interviewer presented the information on seven themes and interrupted the phone call. The rationale of this interruption was to avoid possible confounds which might arise when the sources would be allowed to reveal information. Finally, the participants filled out the questionnaire that differed between the two experiments.

Experiment 1. This experiment captured the sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge. Therefore, the participants were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived the interviewer already held information on the group and their activities. This question aimed to map the sources global perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge. In addition, they were asked to write down the information they believed the interviewer held, and rate the extent to which they thought during the phone call about which further information the interviewer could hold. These two questions aimed to measure the extent to which the sources tested the interviewer's knowledge for known information. For the written answers, the information was coded for predetermined themes.

The results gave mixed support for the predictions. The sources in the just start condition globally perceived the interviewer to hold more information, compared to the sources in the traditional condition. However, no differences were found between the two conditions with respect to the extent to which they tested the interviewer's knowledge for known information.

Experiment 2. This experiment measured sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge gaps. The participants were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived the interviewer had knowledge gaps in terms of the group and their activities. This question was asked in order to capture the source's global perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge gaps. Furthermore, participants were asked to write down the information that they perceived the interviewer did not know, and rated the extent to which they searched for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge. These questions aimed to map the extent to which the sources tested the interviewer's knowledge for unknown information. Again for the written answers, the information was coded for predetermined themes.

Unexpectedly, no difference was found between the two conditions with respect to the sources' global perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge gaps. However, as predicted, the sources in the just start condition tested the interviewer's knowledge less actively for unknown information than the sources in the traditional condition.

Discussion. Based on the research on social hypothesis testing, a link was expected between the extent the sources tested the interviewer's knowledge for known/unknown information and their global perception of the interviewer's knowledge/knowledge gaps. Unexpectedly, this link was not found. However, these experiments showed that the sources in the just start condition searched less actively for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge, and inferred that the interviewer held more knowledge, compared to the sources in the traditional condition. This suggests that in the just start condition the hypothesis could have been confirmed without searching comparatively more for known information. Furthermore, the sources in the traditional condition might have used a positive test strategy as they tested the

interviewer's knowledge relatively more for unknown information without drawing an inference in favour of the hypothesis. Overall, the present findings speak in favour of just starting the presentation of the known information when aiming to keep the sources' interests away from the interviewer's knowledge gaps, and to focus them on the interviewer's knowledge instead.

Study III

This study examined how to use evidence in order to elicit new information in suspect interviews. Two modes of evidence disclosure derived from the SUE-technique were compared against an early disclosure mode. All suspects were guilty and in denial (described in the method section below). The three interviews protocols consisted of four Phases (1, 2, 3 and 4; see Figure 1 of Publication III in the Appendix A for the processes of the three conditions). In the SUE conditions the interviewer elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies about the two crime phases s/he held evidence for (A and B) by asking specific and open-ended questions about it in two phases of the interview (2 and 3). The SUE conditions differed with respect to the way the interviewer introduced the interview (Phase 1), and disclosed the elicited in/consistencies (Phase 2 and 3). For the *SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) condition*, the interviewer started off in a business-like manner (Phase 1), and confronted the suspects with their in/consistencies without giving them the chance to comment on them (Phase 2 and 3). In contrast, for the *SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (IPR) condition*, the interviewer introduced the interview in a non-guilt-presumptive manner (Phase 1), presented the inconsistencies in a way that allowed the suspects to comment on these, and then responded to their comments (Phase 2 and 3); at all times in a non-judgemental manner. For the *Early disclosure condition*, the interviewer disclosed all the evidence at the outset of the interview (Phase 1) before asking open-ended questions on it (Phase 2 and 3). The final questioning (Phase 4) concerned the critical phase of the crime the interviewer lacked information on (Phase C) and was the same

for all three interview conditions. Here the interviewer made open-ended invitations and asked follow-up questions.

Based on previous research it was predicted that the SUE conditions (vs. the Early disclosure condition) would result in more statement-evidence inconsistencies, and more new information about the critical phase of the crime. Comparing the SUE conditions, it was predicted that the SUE-IPR condition would result in more new information. The rationale for this was that the non-judgemental approach used in SUE-IPR condition should increase the suspects' willingness to discuss the inconsistencies with the interviewer in Phase 3. Based on previous studies (Tekin et al., 2016), this in turn was expected to increase the amount of new information revealed during Phase 4. Furthermore, it was predicted that the suspects in the SUE conditions would overestimate the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime during the interview Phase 3 and 4 to a higher degree than the suspects in the Early disclosure condition. The rationale behind this was the way the interviewer used the evidence in order to elicit and disclose statement-evidence inconsistencies. Finally, it was predicted that the non-judgemental approach in the SUE-IPR condition would make the suspects perceive the interviewer's behaviour as being more respectful and friendlier than what the suspects in the SUE-C condition and the Early disclosure condition perceived.

Method. The participants (N = 88) conducted a mock crime – “preparing an attack” – that consisted of three phases (A, B and C). Simply put, they had to perform several tasks on a campus. After returning the participants were instructed that the police would interview them as a suspect, and they should imagine that they have consulted with their lawyer, who informed the police that his or her client was innocent and willing to make a statement. The interviewer held evidence on the suspects' crime Phase A and B which cast suspicion against the suspects but did not prove any criminal activity. This evidence was used differently in the three interview conditions (described above). When the interviews were finished the participants filled out a post-interview questionnaire. They were asked to rate how respectful the interviewer was

towards them and how friendly the interviewer was. Furthermore, the experimenter played back for each participant his or her audio recordings of the interview and paused it four times (after Phase 1, 2, 3 and 4). At each pause the participants used a checklist to report what information they perceived the interviewer held that they had not told him or her. This process provided insights about the influence of specific interview components on the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge in the course of the interview. The audio records were coded with respect to the new information revealed about the critical phase of the crime, and the statement-evidence inconsistencies.

Result. As predicted, both SUE conditions resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies in Phase 2 and 3, compared to the Early disclosure condition. Unexpectedly, in Phase 4 only the SUE-IPR condition resulted in more new information compared to the Early disclosure condition.

With respect to the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime, a significant increase during the interview was found for the SUE conditions but not for the Early disclosure condition (the suspects in the SUE conditions overestimated the interviewer's knowledge to a higher extent in Phase 3 compared to Phase 1, and in Phase 4 compared to Phase 1, 2 and 3). Furthermore, in Phase 4 the suspects in the SUE conditions overestimated the interviewer's knowledge to a higher extent, compared to the suspects in the Early disclosure condition. Hence, the predictions were partially supported.

The results concerning the perception of the interview atmosphere were partially in line with the predictions. The suspects in the SUE-IPR condition felt that they were treated with more respect and perceived the interviewer as friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-C condition. No differences were found between the Early disclosure condition and any of the two SUE conditions with respect to these two questions.

Finally, exploratory analyses examined the effects of the two ways of disclosing statement-evidence inconsistencies (SUE conditions) on the suspects' forthcomingness in

Phase 3. Here the SUE-IPR condition resulted in a larger proportion of forthcoming suspects² in Phase 3 compared to the SUE-C condition. Furthermore, it was found that across both SUE conditions the suspects who were forthcoming in Phase 3 revealed significantly more new information compared to the suspects who were withholding in Phase 3. This indicated that it was crucial that the suspects were forthcoming in Phase 3 in order to reveal new information subsequently.

Discussion. This study found that in both SUE conditions the interviewer elicited more statement-evidence inconsistencies (vs. the Early disclosure condition) and made the suspects overestimate the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime in the course of the interview. However, only the non-judgemental implementation of the SUE-technique resulted in more new information than the Early disclosure condition. A likely explanation for this was that the SUE-IPR condition resulted in a more positive interview atmosphere and more forthcoming suspects in Phase 3 compared to the SUE-C condition. Therefore, it seems that the SUE-IPR condition resulted in an interview atmosphere which fostered suspects changing from a less to a more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy in Phase 3 (i.e. before entering Phase 4). Explanatory analyses showed that this forthcomingness in Phase 3 was crucial in order to collect new information in Phase 4. Overall, these findings suggest that the non-judgemental way of disclosing the elicited inconsistencies was beneficial.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The principal goal of this thesis was to develop an interviewing framework for information elicitation, consisting of the conceptual and tactical tiers. Therefore, two sets of tactics were derived from the conceptual tier and examined in three studies. In the HUMINT context, the

² Forthcoming suspects were defined as participants who generated no inconsistency or explained a minimum of one inconsistency in Phase 3. In contrast, withholding suspects were described as participants who generated a minimum of one inconsistency without explaining at least one inconsistency in Phase 3.

Scharff-technique has been shown to be fruitful in eliciting new information. In the criminal context, the non-judgemental version of the SUE-technique has been shown to be promising in eliciting new information. Below, the outcome of the studies are discussed with respect to the Scharff and SUE tactics and explained by using the conceptual tier. Then, the conceptual tier will be extended for research and training purposes.

Scharff Tactics

In this thesis two studies examined how to use available information in order to influence sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge and the amount of new information elicited in a HUMINT interaction. For the Scharff-technique, the interviewer primarily used the available information in two tactics: employing the illusion of knowing it all tactic, where the interviewer is instructed to present the known information at the outset of the interview, and the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic, which instructs the interviewer to present claims that include specific pieces of information which s/he wants to have affirmed or negated. In the following the effects of these two tactics are discussed.

Illusion of knowing it all tactic. A goal of the illusion of knowing it all tactic is to collect new information by making the sources' overestimate the interviewer's knowledge (Granhag, 2010). In Study I, for the Scharff conditions the interviewer asked an initial open-ended question either (a) after using the illusion of knowing it all tactic and before the confirmation tactic, or (b) after using both the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation tactic. For both Scharff conditions the initial open-ended question resulted in more new information than the initial open-ended question in the Direct Approach (a combination of open-ended and specific questions). This finding is in line with several previous studies (e.g. Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Montecinos, 2014). It shows that employing the illusion of knowing it all tactic with an open-ended question is fruitful in collecting new information.

In line with previous studies (e.g. May et al., 2014), Study I found that the sources for the Scharff conditions perceived the interviewer to hold more information compared to the sources for the Direct Approach. However, Study I was the first to show that the sources overestimated the interviewer's knowledge mainly due to the confirmation tactic and not the illusion of knowing it all tactic. This finding suggests also that the illusion of knowing it all tactic made the sources "only" remember and perceive most of the actually presented information as known (instead of perceiving not presented information as known). Simply put, the illusion of knowing it all tactic resulted in an approximately correct perception of the interviewer's knowledge. However, the objective of the illusion of knowing it all tactic to make the sources overestimate the interviewer's knowledge was not accomplished.

To address this shortcoming, Study II focused on how to start the illusion of knowing it all tactic in order to make the sources focus on the interviewer's knowledge and steer away from the interviewer's knowledge gaps. Therefore, two ways of introducing the presentation of known information were compared: a way where the interviewer just started to present the known information without an introductory statement, and a more traditional way where the interviewer used an extreme introductory statement on the amount and importance of the known information. This study found that when the interviewer just started to present the known information without such an introductory statement the sources tested the interviewer's knowledge comparatively less for information gaps and generally perceived him or her to hold more information. That means, Study II offered a promising way for introducing the illusion of knowing it all tactic (i.e. just start the information presentation) in order to hide the interviewer's information objectives and make the sources focus on the interviewer's knowledge.

Confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. An interviewer holding information with uncertain reliability can use the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic in order to elicit new information (Granhag, 2010; May et al., 2014). Previous research has shown that the

confirmation tactic hides the interviewer's information objectives to a higher extent and makes the sources perceive the interviewer to hold more information compared to the disconfirmation tactic (May et al., 2014). Meanwhile, Oleszkiewicz, Granhag and Kleinman (2014) have found that using solely the confirmation tactic resulted in more new information compared to mixing the confirmation and disconfirmation tactic. Overall, these findings indicate an advantage of the confirmation tactic over the disconfirmation tactic.

Focusing in on the confirmation tactic, Study I found that the confirmation tactic resulted in more new information compared to the specific questions only when it was presented before the initial open-ended questions. A possible explanation for this finding is that the sources were more motivated to comment on the claims when they were presented before (vs. after) the initial open-ended question, as this was their first chance to contribute with information. This finding suggests that it is advisable to use the confirmation tactic before asking an open-ended question when it is crucial to obtain knowledge about the reliability of a specific piece of information.

As described above, Study I found that for the Scharff conditions the sources overestimated the interviewer's knowledge mainly due to the confirmation tactic. This indicates that sources confirming a claim were unaware that the interviewer was actually unsure of the reliability of the specific information. This implies also that the confirmation tactic hides the interviewer's information objective. Furthermore, it suggests that the confirmation tactic can contribute to reinforce the illusion of knowing it all tactic. However, in Study I the Scharff conditions resulted in a similar amount of new information revealed in response to the initial open-ended question when it was asked (a) after using the illusion of knowing it all tactic and before the confirmation tactic, or (b) after using the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation tactic. This suggests that the confirmation tactic did not reinforce the illusion of knowing it all tactic in a meaningful manner when it was used before the initial open-ended question. Possibly, in this study the illusion of knowing it all tactic was insufficiently reinforced

as the confirmation tactic was used only for three pieces of information. Future studies need to address this matter by presenting more claims. In general, the research on the confirmation tactic has shown its value in making the sources' overestimate the interviewer's knowledge, hiding the interviewer's information objectives and collecting new information.

Combining the Scharff tactics. Previously, the effects of two individual Scharff tactics were discussed. However, some findings cannot be viewed in such an isolated manner. For example, in line with previous studies (e.g. May et al., 2014), the combination of the Scharff tactics in Study I (i.e. the friendly approach-, the illusion of knowing it all-, the confirmation- and the not pressing for information tactics) made the sources underestimate the amount of new information revealed, whereas the sources in the Direct Approach overestimated it. It seems likely that this was the result of all Scharff tactics used, but particularly the confirmation tactic and the illusion of knowing it all tactic. However, further studies should examine the combination of the Scharff tactics in more detail in order to map the influence of specific tactics on the sources' estimations of the new information revealed. In general, the underestimation of the interviewer's knowledge is of particular importance when sources are about to be interviewed more than once. Specifically, sources who underestimate the amount of new information revealed may infer that they have achieved their interview goal (e.g. "I need the assistance of the police") without violating the conflicting goal (e.g. "I do not want to betray the terrorist group"). Therefore, the sources who underestimate the amount of new information revealed should be comparatively more motivated to talk to the interviewer again.

Furthermore, in several previous studies the combination of the Scharff tactics outperformed the Direct Approach with respect to the most important measure: the new information revealed during the full interview (e.g. May et al., 2014). While in some of these studies this was the case, the separate Scharff tactics however did not outperform the relevant interview components for the Direct Approach. For example, in the study by Oleszkiewicz, Granhag and Kleinman (2014) the confirmation tactic did not result in more new information

compared to the specific questions in the Direct Approach. However, in this study, the combination of the Scharff tactics still resulted in more new information during the full interview than the Direct Approach. This indicates that in order to collect new information it is advisable to use a combination of Scharff tactics.

Value of the Scharff-technique. So far, the presented studies on the Scharff-technique provide knowledge on the specific tactics. The Scharff-technique was examined in three further studies showing its applicability as a HUMINT interview technique. First, with varying sources' levels of cooperation and knowledge, Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, Strömwall and Kleinman (2015) found that the Scharff-technique generally outperformed the Direct Approach on all important measures and for all types of sources, especially for the less cooperative sources. Second, the Scharff-technique also outperformed the Direct Approach on most of the important measures when interviewing sources repeatedly (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2017b). Third, handlers who were trained in the Scharff tactics elicited more new information and were perceived by sources as less eager to gather information, compared to handlers who used the tactics they felt appropriate (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2017a). These studies show that the Scharff-technique can be trained and used successfully in different HUMINT scenarios.

Overall, the presented research has shown the value of the Scharff tactics in eliciting new information. The Scharff-technique extends the existing more traditional interviewing techniques which focus on questioning suspicious sources (e.g. the emotional approach; Evans et al., 2014) or fully cooperative sources (e.g. the cognitive interview; Leins et al., 2014). The Scharff-technique is of relevance for police or intelligence interviewers who interact with different types of sources who are willing to share a limited amount of information (e.g. persons with a link to terrorist/extremist organisations, organised crime, drug-related crimes, burglary gangs, counterfeit crime).

Explaining the Scharff Tactics with the Conceptual Tier

The general objective of the framework's conceptual tier is to explain the mechanisms of the tactics. In doing so, it helps to understand how to use the tactics effectively, which is crucial for training and research purposes. Therefore, in the following section the findings on the Scharff tactics are discussed in the context of the conceptual tier.

In Study I the sources pursued the conflicting goal of "I need help from the police" and "I do not want to betray the group, as I have sympathy for them and their interests". Thus, facing an information management dilemma they might have prepared moderately forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies such as "I will not say very much during the interview". Study I showed that the illusion of knowing it all tactic can be productive in such a situation.

The illusion of knowing it all tactic led the sources to perceive the interviewer's knowledge approximately correct (instead of underestimating it). This approximately correct estimation then led the sources to use their more moderately forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy (e.g. "I will not say very much during the interview") after the interviewer presented the already known information. That means, the illusion of knowing it all tactic prompted the sources to use their rather moderately forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies concerning the information the interviewer has not mentioned yet and hence the information unknown to the interviewer. Consequently, the open-ended question that was asked after outlining the illusion of knowing it all tactic resulted in new information. Differently put, if the interviewer starts with presenting the already known information, the sources cannot reveal this presented information as new afterwards. Instead the sources need to reveal unmentioned information that is actually new to the interviewer in order to show cooperativeness/willingness. In contrast, for the Direct Approach the interviewer kept the sources in the dark with respect to his or her knowledge, and the sources could decide freely which information to reveal (i.e. "sell as new to the interviewer"). Consequently, these sources revealed comparatively less new information (and more already known information) in order to show cooperativeness/willingness.

Facing the information management dilemma, the sources might have also developed counter-interrogation strategies like “It is meaningless to deny or withhold what they already know, hence I will reveal this information”. Derived from this, it is important for the interviewer to make the sources overestimate his or her knowledge.

Study I found that the confirmation tactic made the sources overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge concerning the unreliable pieces of information used within the claims. Accordingly, the sources used more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies with respect to this specific information and the confirmation tactic resulted in new information. In contrast, the specific questions did not make the sources overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge to a considerable extent (instead they rather pointed towards the knowledge gaps). Therefore, the sources chose more withholding counter-interrogation strategies and revealed comparatively little new information in response to the specific questions.

Overall, Study I showed that the interviewer can elicit new information from sources who are pursuing conflicting goals in two ways: (a) by making the sources estimate the interviewer’s knowledge approximately correct, and (b) by making the sources overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge. The Scharff-technique provides tactics that help the interviewer influence the sources’ perception of his or her knowledge in these directions.

Study II found that by just starting the presentation of the known information without an introductory statement hid the interviewer’s information gaps more effectively, compared to when using an explicitly convinced introductory statement on the amount and relevance of the known information. Hiding information gaps can be crucial when sources prepare counter-interrogation strategies such as “I will figure out what they are after, and then make sure not to give them what they want”. Furthermore, Study II showed that just starting the presentation of the known information led the sources to focus more on the interviewer’s knowledge, compared to when using the introductory statement. Although focusing on knowledge is not equivalent to overestimating knowledge, this could exploit sources’ counter-interrogation strategies such as

“It is meaningless to deny or withhold what they already know, hence I will reveal this information”. However, this study did not allow for a conclusion on how the sources’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge and knowledge gaps affect their verbal behaviours. Future studies are needed to examine this.

Overall, based on the presented studies it is fair to assume that, in support of Figure 2, sources’ conflicting interview goals affect their perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge, which in turn influences their choice of counter-interrogation strategies and verbal behaviours. The studies also showed that the interviewer can exploit these theoretical notions by interviewing the sources strategically.

SUE Tactics

In suspect interviews, evidence can be used in different ways aiming for different things. Study III examined three ways of using evidence by interviewing guilty suspects in denial in order to gather new information. This section discusses the findings in the context of the timing of the evidence disclosure and then the mode of disclosing statement-evidence inconsistencies.

Timing of the evidence disclosure. Study III compared two periods of evidence disclosure: before or after asking questions on the evidence. Specifically, for the SUE conditions the interviewer split the evidence in two groups and used them in two interview phases; in both phases the interviewer asked specific and open-ended questions about the evidence before disclosing it. For the SUE conditions, the interviewer aimed to elicit statement-evidence inconsistencies which can be used to affect the suspects’ choice of counter-interrogation strategies (described below). In contrast, for the early disclosure mode all evidence was disclosed at the outset of the interview before asking open-ended questions on it. A goal of the early disclosure is to demonstrate the strength of the evidence against the suspects already at the outset of the interview and that “It is meaningless to deny any wrongdoing” (Leo, 1996). Study III provided knowledge about how the two approaches achieved these goals.

First, in line with previous research (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), the SUE conditions resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies than the Early disclosure condition. That means, asking specific and open-ended questions without disclosing the evidence was useful when aiming for statement-evidence inconsistencies. In general, some research describes specific questions as inappropriate and which should be avoided when interviewing witnesses and suspects (e.g. Oxburgh et al., 2010). However, this study showed that using different types of questions (i.e. specific and open-ended) is valuable when aiming for statement-evidence inconsistencies.

Second, the novel way of mapping suspects' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge in the course of the interview resulted in a more detailed examination of the different interview phases. This has shown that in Phase 1 the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge did not differ between the Early disclosure condition and the SUE conditions. That means, Study III found no support that the early disclosure of all the evidence is more effective in demonstrating the strength of the evidence and that it is meaningless to deny at the outset (vs. withholding the evidence).

Mode of disclosing inconsistencies. For the SUE-technique the interviewer attempts to use the elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies in order to change the suspects' counter-interrogation strategies from less to more forthcoming. In doing so the elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies can be disclosed in different ways. For example, Tekin and colleagues (2016) showed that the confrontational mode of disclosing inconsistencies (where the suspects were confronted with their inconsistencies without having chance to comment on them) was generally beneficial, compared to the confrontational/demand mode of disclosing inconsistencies (where the suspects were confronted with the inconsistencies and explicitly asked to explain them). Study III compared the confrontational mode of disclosing inconsistencies against a non-judgemental mode of disclosing inconsistencies (where the suspects could decide whether they comment the inconsistencies or not and the interview was

generally conducted in a non-judgemental manner). In this study, four findings on the mode of disclosing inconsistencies are noteworthy here.

First, the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge increased only to a rather small extent when the interviewer elicited and disclosed inconsistencies. However, when subsequently asking questions without holding evidence (final interview phase), for the SUE conditions the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge increased significantly. A possible explanation for this finding is that for the SUE conditions the suspects were believed to have read the interviewer's tactic of eliciting and disclosing inconsistencies (i.e. asking questions about the evidence before disclosing it), and expected him or her to also use the same tactic in the final interview phase. This finding shows that the elicitation *and* disclosure of inconsistencies made the suspects overestimate the interviewer's knowledge over the course of the interview.

Second, the suspects interviewed with the non-judgemental SUE protocol felt that they were treated with more respect, and perceived the interviewer as friendlier, compared to when they were interviewed with the confrontational SUE protocol. That is, the non-judgemental disclosure mode resulted in a fostering interview atmosphere, which Evans and colleagues (2014) say "facilitates kindness, cooperation, and respect" (p. 871).

Third, the non-judgemental SUE protocol resulted in a higher proportion of forthcoming suspects before entering the critical interview phase, compared to the confrontational SUE protocol. This is crucial as previous studies have shown (Tekin et al., 2016) that the suspects needed to be willing to discuss the inconsistencies with the interviewer in order to subsequently collect new information.

Fourth, in the final and critical interview phase only the non-judgemental SUE protocol resulted in more new information, compared to the early disclosure mode. Contrary to previous studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), the confrontational SUE protocol did not result in more new information than the early disclosure mode. Taken together, both SUE versions made the

suspects overestimate the interviewer's knowledge. However, only the non-judgemental SUE protocol resulted in a comparatively more fostering interview atmosphere, in more forthcoming suspects before entering the critical interview phase and in more new information.

Value of the SUE-technique. Study III advanced the research on the SUE-technique by showing in detail the mechanisms and benefits of the non-judgemental presentation of the elicited in/consistencies when aiming for new information. This finding is of importance for several reasons. First, it provides a manageable way on how to use evidence in order to gather new information, which is generally required by practitioners (Smith & Bull, 2013). Specifically, the SUE-technique is designed for police suspect interviews, and can be integrated in more extensive information-gathering approaches such as for example the PEACE model (Clarke & Milne, 2001) or the Norwegian KREATIV model (e.g. Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009). Furthermore, the SUE-technique could also be feasible for investigative interviews outside the police context (e.g. judges, prosecutors or internal investigators). Second, it confirms field studies showing that a non-judgemental approach is associated with reduced suspect resistance and an increase in the amount of information gathered (Alison et al., 2013). Third, it shows that a non-judgemental approach that is explicitly in line with Human Rights Article 11 (1) ("Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence." The United Nations, 1948) can help to gather new information *even* from guilty suspects in denial. In general, the present research on the SUE-technique examining the disclosure of in/consistencies advances the general research on the use of evidence which focuses, if at all, on the timing of the evidence disclosure and not on its framing (e.g. Walsh & Bull, 2015).

Explaining the SUE Tactics with the Conceptual Tier

Next, we set off to discuss the present findings of the SUE tactics in terms of the conceptual tier of the developed interviewing framework. In Study III the guilty suspects pursued the conflicting interview goal of “I want to show my innocence”. Therefore, they faced an information management dilemma of needing to reveal some information in order to show their innocence but not too much information that would show their actual guilt. The suspects interviewed with the SUE protocols produced more statement-evidence inconsistencies, compared to the suspects interviewed with the early disclosure protocol. A likely explanation of this is that the suspects in the SUE conditions were unaware of the available evidence when asked questions on it, and consequently used more withholding counter-interrogation strategies during these phases (e.g. “I will not tell any information that might be incriminating”). In contrast, the suspects in the Early disclosure condition were aware of the available evidence when asked questions on it and used more forthcoming strategies (e.g. “I will reveal the information that is already known to the interviewer as it is meaningless to withhold this”).

A practical benefit of asking questions before disclosing the evidence is that by observing suspects’ verbal responses to these questions, the interviewer can estimate the suspects’ counter-interrogation strategy. Specifically, a statement-evidence inconsistency indicates that the suspect uses a more withholding counter-interrogation strategy, and a statement-evidence consistency indicates that s/he uses a more forthcoming strategy. If the suspect uses a less forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy the interviewer can attempt to use the elicited inconsistencies in order to make the suspect overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge and change his or her counter-interrogation strategy to be more forthcoming.

For the SUE conditions in Study III the interviewer disclosed the elicited inconsistencies in a confrontational or non-judgemental manner. Both modes of disclosing the inconsistencies made the suspects overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge. However, only the non-judgemental presentation of the in/consistencies resulted in more new information, compared

to the Early disclosure condition. In order to explain this finding it is worthwhile to dig deeper into the theory of self-regulation.

Carver and Scheier (2011) considered behaviour as reflecting processes of feedback loops. When pursuing a goal, the process of comparing the current position with the intended goal (as a reference value) follows a feedback loop pattern. If this comparison results in a discrepancy between the current position and the intended goal, humans implement counteractions in order to change the current position and approach the intended goal. Contrarily, if this comparison results in an overlap, no further actions will be initiated. That means, after the interviewer disclosed the elicited inconsistencies, the suspects in the SUE conditions might have compared their current position with their intended goal. In doing so they realized a discrepancy between their current position (e.g. “I just made an inconsistent and incriminating statement”) and the intended goal (e.g. “I want to make an exonerating statement to show my innocence”). However, when discovering this discrepancy, the suspects in the two SUE conditions differed in their counteractions. The suspects interviewed in a confrontational manner gave up as they saw no chance in convincing the interviewer of their innocence anymore. In contrast, the suspects interviewed in the non-judgemental manner still saw a chance to approach their intended goal by adjusting their counter-interrogation strategy to be more forthcoming.

A possible explanation for the different reactions when determining the discrepancy is the perceived interview atmosphere. The non-judgemental SUE protocol created a more fostering interview atmosphere, in which the suspects might have felt more free to change their counter-interrogation strategy (vs. the confrontational SUE protocol). In line with this the non-judgemental implementation of the SUE-technique resulted in more forthcoming suspects before entering the final interview phase, compared to the confrontational implementation of the SUE-technique. This was crucial, as Study III and the study by Tekin and colleagues (2016) have both found that in order to have suspects reveal new information at a later stage in an

interview, they have to be willing to explain the inconsistencies that occur early on in the interview. Overall, this explains why the non-judgemental implementation of the SUE-technique resulted in comparatively more new information elicited.

In general, this reasoning is in accordance with other research findings. For example, Evans and colleagues (2014) found that a fostering interview atmosphere resulted in an increasing amount of information elicited. Furthermore, Alison and colleagues (2013) found that adaptive interpersonal behaviour reduced the suspects' resistance and increased the amount of information gathered.

Based on these findings, the illustration of the conceptual tier in the developed framework was modified by adding the interview atmosphere and the feedback aspect (see Figure 6). These modifications help to explain why comparatively more suspects interviewed with the non-judgemental SUE protocol changed their counter-interrogation strategies (whereas the suspects in both SUE conditions overestimated the interviewer's knowledge). Simply put, the interviewer's disclosure of the inconsistencies initiated a feedback loop, which in turn changed the suspects' choice of counter-interrogation strategy when the interview atmosphere was fostering.




Figure 6. The modified illustration of the conceptual tier.

Finally, the findings for the early disclosure mode should be explained. In the initial phases of the interview, the suspects were aware of the evidence when asked questions on it. Consequently, they used more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies with respect to this

evidence (e.g. “I need to explain the evidence they hold in an exonerating manner”) and generated comparatively less statement-evidence inconsistencies. However, this discussion of the evidence did not make the suspects overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge meaningfully. Furthermore, after discussing the evidence with the interviewer they did not determine a discrepancy between their current position (e.g. “I explained all the disclosed evidence in an exonerating manner”) and their intended goal (e.g. “I want to show my innocence”), as the interviewer did not give them challenging feedback. Consequently, these suspects saw no need to hold to the more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies, and changed to less forthcoming strategies. Entering the critical interview phase with a less forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy, the suspects interviewed with the early disclosure mode revealed comparatively less new information.

Considering the findings of the Scharff and SUE tactics, the two interview techniques resulted in a different course of the interviewees’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge and use of counter-interrogation strategies. The Scharff-technique aimed to make the sources overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge already before the sources made their first case-related statement (i.e. after outlining the illusion of knowing it all tactic) in order to counteract their counter-interrogation strategies. In contrast, the SUE-technique aimed to make the suspects underestimate the interviewer’s knowledge first (by withholding evidence), and then making them overestimate it (by presenting the elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies) in order to change their counter-interrogation strategies. The presented modifications of the conceptual tier facilitated the illustration of the dynamic process of both interview techniques.

Extending the Conceptual Tier for Training and Research Purposes

The conceptual tier can help to train practitioners on how to elicit new information from sources/suspects who show a limited willingness to reveal information. However, for training

and research purposes it is useful to illustrate different interview interactions. Therefore, the conceptual tier of the interviewing framework needs to be extended regarding some notions.

In some situations, the interviewees' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge might be less relevant. Then the interview goal may primarily influence the interviewees' choice of counter-interrogation strategy. For example, imagine an informed source who has the exclusive interview goal "I need money from the police" (personal communication with police/intelligence service members, 2016; Scherp, 1992). This source should be willing to reveal all known information. Therefore, the interview goal directs the source to use a forthcoming counter-interrogation strategy, and share his or her complete knowledge.³ Similarly, a guilty suspect who has the sole goal "I want to get it off my chest" will likely use forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies and share his or her information (Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, 1994). Finally, an innocent suspect aiming to convince the interviewer of his or her innocence is also expected to use forthcoming strategies and reveal all available information. The rationale of this assumption is twofold (Kassin, 2005). First, innocent suspects are expected to be influenced by the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). That is, they trust in the fairness of the world and that they will be believed to be innocent when they "just tell it like it happened". Second, innocent suspects are expected to display an illusion of transparency (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). Based on this assumption, innocent suspects simply believe that the interviewer reads their thoughts and emotions and "sees their innocence". The previous examples provided justification to modify the illustration of the conceptual tier further (see Figure 7). Simply put, in some situations the sources'/suspects' interview goal predominantly determines their choice of counter-interrogation (and the perception of the interviewer's knowledge seems less important).

³ Also, fully forthcoming sources/suspects can generate omissions and contradictions due to normal memory processes of forgetting and misremembering. However, discussing these processes would be beyond the scope of this thesis.




Figure 7. The modified illustration of the conceptual tier aiming to help for training and research purposes.

To date, the gathering of new information with the Scharff and SUE tactics have not been examined by interviewing sources/suspects who are willing to share all their knowledge (i.e. fully forthcoming). However, it seems likely that no extensive strategic use of the available information is necessary in order to collect new information from fully forthcoming interviewees. Instead, when interviewing fully forthcoming interviewees it seems beneficial to use retrieval mnemonics (e.g. the cognitive interview). Nevertheless, future studies are needed to examine the effects of interviewing fully forthcoming sources/suspects when using the Scharff/SUE tactics.

An important aspect of interview training is also the demonstration of possible risks. Hence, a possible risk when interviewing suspects is exemplified next. Specifically, it will be described how the conceptual tier can be used to explain the formation of a coerced-compliant false confession (for a taxonomy on false confessions⁴ see Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). For this purpose, imagine an innocent suspect who enters an interview with the goal to show his or her innocence. In line with previous research, the suspect waives his or her right to silence and trusts that s/he will be believed if s/he “just tells it like it happened” (Kassin, 2005). Accordingly, the suspect is likely to employ forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies and reveal information. Now, consider an interviewer who is convinced of the suspect’s guilt and hence not pleased with the suspect’s verbal response. This interviewer might confront the

⁴ The conceptual tier should be also useful to explain coerced-internalized and voluntary false confessions. However, as it is not the main focus of this thesis it is not described here.

suspect with an accusation of guilt together with the available evidence in order to show that it is meaningless to deny. For the suspect, the interviewer's verbal response can initiate two processes. First, as the innocent suspect has not experienced the crime, the disclosed evidence is the (only) information s/he now holds about the case (presented as the suspect's perception of the interviewer's knowledge in Figure 7). Second, the suspect uses the interviewer's verbal feedback in order to compare his or her current position (e.g. "The interviewer believes me to be guilty") with his or her interview goal (e.g. "I want to show my actual innocence"). Based on this perception the suspect then attempts to reduce the discrepancy by continuing to deny the accusation and explain the evidence in an exonerating manner.

In the course of the interview, the interviewer still does not believe the suspect and continues to confront him or her with the accusation of guilt. For the suspect, this triggers further comparisons between the current position and the interview goal resulting in a perceived discrepancy, and that s/he continues to counteract his or her current position by denying. Carver and Scheier (2011) proposed that this *behaviour loop* (describing the comparison between the current position and intended goal) is assessed by an *affect loop*, which can result in an acceptable or unacceptable perception. That means, as the innocent suspect cannot achieve a reduction of the discrepancy between his or her current position (e.g. "The interviewer believes me to be guilty") and his or her interview goal (e.g. "I want to show my innocence"), with an increasing interview duration the suspect perceives the interview atmosphere as unacceptable/aversive. According to Carver and Scheier (2011) such negative feelings can affect action. Specifically, when the actions aiming to reduce the discrepancy between the current position and the focal goal seem futile, negative feelings can decrease the effort to reduce the discrepancy and lead to a shift in priority of the goals (i.e. one goal diminishes in priority, and another goal obtains priority). That means, based on the perceived aversive interview atmosphere and the perceived futility of denying, the suspect reduces his or her effort to approach the current interview goal (e.g. "I want to show my innocence").

Furthermore, the suspect diminishes the priority of this goal, and give priority to the goal “I want to stop this aversive situation as soon as possible”. In order to reach this focal goal, the suspect employs other counter-interrogation strategies such as “I will just tell the interviewer what s/he wants to hear”. Critically, in order to employ this strategy, the suspect uses his or her perception of the interviewer’s knowledge and finally makes a false confession. In doing so s/he approaches the new intended goal. This example shows how the conceptual tier of the interviewing framework can help to illustrate risks of suspect interviewing (i.e. gathering unreliable information).

In general, it is possible that the SUE-technique can decrease the risk of generating such coerced-compliant false confessions. Simply put, an interviewer disclosing the evidence already at the outset of the interview increases the risk of a false confession, as the innocent suspect could then integrate this evidence in his or her statement (e.g. Gudjonsson, 2003). In contrast, an interviewer using the SUE-technique discloses the evidence after asking questions on it. Hence, the innocent suspect cannot include this evidence in his or her initial answers, and the interviewer can compare the suspect’s statement with the available evidence. Therefore, it seems that the SUE-technique could decrease the risk of creating undetected false confessions. Future studies need to address these theoretical assumptions. Overall, the presented modifications of the conceptual tier prove useful for training purposes and initiating further research.

Ethical Considerations

In general, the Scharff and SUE tactics aim to influence the interviewees’ perceptions and verbal behaviours by using the available information strategically. Mainly due to this aspired influence, these interview techniques are part of a debate of whether it is fair to employ strategic interviewing or not (e.g. Hartwig, Luke, & Skerker, 2017; Sukumar, Wade, & Hodgson, 2016). Although this is more of a legal-philosophical question, three aspects will be commented here.

First, the Scharff and SUE tactics are for information-gathering but do not aim to influence the interviewees' basic decision of whether they should talk with the interviewer or not. In fact, the interviewer needs to consider the sources/suspects as conversational partners making their decisions autonomously, and accept if they are not willing to talk with him or her. Of note, Study III stipulated that all suspects waived their right to silence, as this was crucial for the sake of the experiment. However, in most European countries suspects can decide to use their right to silence (Walsh, Oxburgh, Redlich, & Mykleburst, 2016), and the interviewer needs to accept this without any further request of making the suspects talk. Second, both interview techniques are not designed to elicit the interviewees' entire knowledge. Instead the interviewer is directed to accept the interviewees' willingness to share only a limited amount of information. This includes that the interviewer should also accept if the sources/suspects want to stop talking about a specific topic or not participate in the full interview. Third, the interviewing framework developed in this thesis should clearly not be used with psychologically or physically coercive manipulation tactics (e.g. social influence, emotional persuasion). Even minimal coercive tactics are unethical, and increase the likelihood of obtaining unreliable information (e.g. Alison & Alison, 2017; Costanzo & Redlich, 2010). It is critical that the interviewer understands why it is important to refuse such coercive tactics. For example, they need to understand that misperception about sources' ground knowledge and suspects' ground truth can occur and have disastrous consequences. By illustrating potential risks of interviewing, the developed interviewing framework can help to give answers to these questions.

Overall, researchers' responsibility in the field of interviewing is twofold. First, they need to identify interview tactics that should be avoided because they are unethical and/or increase the risk of unreliable information. Second, they need to develop interview tactics that help the interviewer to collect new information in a conversational, human and respectful manner. This thesis aimed to contribute to the second area by examining strategic interview techniques in two different interview situations.

Limitations and Further Reflections

The present studies examined information elicitation by simulating important features of HUMINT and suspect interviews. Therefore, participants without a criminal background interacted shortly with an interviewer in rather low-stake situations. For this reason, one could criticise the studies due to a lack of generalizability. However, theoretically one can counter this in arguing that real-life sources/suspects facing an information management dilemma might be much more motivated to prepare and employ counter-interrogation strategies than in the studies discussed in this thesis. As the Scharff and SUE tactics are tailored to counteract these strategies, one can hypothesize that they are even more effective in real-life settings than in the lab environment. Certainly, these are theoretical considerations and in the future it is important to reflect on how to examine these tactics in the field.

All three studies focused on specific manipulations and controlled specific factors in order to draw clear conclusions. This comes along with some limitations within the individual studies. For example, in Study I and II the interviews were conducted via phone; Study II prohibited the participants from revealing case-related knowledge; Study III included only guilty suspects. The experimental studies must be seen as starting points and future studies should address these limitations. As a basis for this line of research, the present studies provided valuable insights on the mechanisms of the specific interview tactics by considering interviewees' perceptions. Study III, especially, blazed a novel path by analysing the interview records together with the participants afterwards. This procedure shows enormous potential for future studies. Finally, for the future it is also crucial to experimentally examine potential risks and limitations of the interview techniques (e.g. by interviewing unknowing sources or innocent suspects).

Finally, some reflections on the two interview techniques as such are needed. First, naming the Scharff-technique after a person who fought with National Socialists during World War II is problematic in Germany. This holds true even though Hanns Scharff behaved in a

friendly, respectful and conversational manner, and was respected by the POWs (Toliver, 1997). I share that view. However, the term Scharff-technique had been already defined at the start of this research, and this is in general considered less controversial abroad (e.g. in Sweden or England). Concerning the use of the Scharff tactics, in some situations it is a risk to present information to sources (e.g. the source could forward it to group members). Therefore, the interviewer needs to consider this risk especially when interviewing sources that are not in custody. A further risk could be that an interviewer employs the illusion of knowing it all tactic although s/he is unsure about the sources' interview goal and counter-interrogation strategies. After presenting the known information the interviewer would have no additional information to estimate the sources' counter-interrogation strategy. Here a possibility could be that the interviewer combines the Scharff and SUE tactics. The interviewer could implement the illusion of knowing it all tactic with some known information, and withhold some information in order to test the sources' counter-interrogation strategy. Future studies need to address this practically important aspect.

A limitation concerning the SUE-technique could be that the suspects receive knowledge on the evidence prior to the interview. This is for example the case when suspects receive inspection of files. However, the legal discussion about the right of inspection of files is beyond the scope of this thesis. Critically, in the past the SUE-technique has also been shown to be effective in eliciting other cues of deceptions (e.g. within-statement-inconsistencies). Future studies need to examine how different types of inconsistencies could be used to elicit new information.

Finally, a note on the terminology of the developed interviewing framework. During the time these studies were conducted, it became clear that it is advisable to change the term counter-interrogation strategy to *interview strategy*. As outlined, sources and suspects do not necessarily work against the interviewer. Hence, it is reasonable to move away from the

“concept of the enemy” (who counteracts) and consider sources and suspects as conversation partners.

Conclusions

The collection of information from sources and suspects is critical in preventing future crimes and solving criminal case. By developing the interviewing framework for eliciting information from sources and suspects, this thesis contributes to the research and practice of information-gathering in two broad ways. First, on the tactical tier it describes how to use available information in order to influence interviewees’ perceptions and collect new information. Simply put, it has shown that the Scharff and SUE tactics are fruitful in eliciting new information from sources and suspects who are willing to share a limited amount of information. Second, the conceptual tier of the interviewing framework was useful in explaining the mechanisms of the tactics and illustrating other interview interactions. This is helpful for training practitioners and initiating further research. Overall, this thesis speaks in favour of the interviewing framework’s tactical and conceptual tier for the examination and training of information elicitation.

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Lennart May

APPENDIX A: Publications

- I. May, L., & Granhag, P. A. (2016). Techniques for eliciting human intelligence: Examining possible order effects of the Scharff tactics. *Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law*, 23(2), 275–287. doi: 10.1080/13218719.2015.1054410

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- II. May, L., & Granhag, P. A. (2016). Using the Scharff-technique to elicit information: How to effectively establish the “illusion of knowing it all”? *The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context*, 8(2), 79–85. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpal.2016.02.001

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- III. May, L., Granhag, P. A., & Tekin, S. (2017). Interviewing suspects in denial: On how different evidence disclosure modes affect the elicitation of new critical information. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 8, 1–11. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01154

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Techniques for Eliciting Human Intelligence: Examining Possible Order Effects of the Scharff Tactics

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The present study examines non-coercive interview techniques aimed for eliciting intelligence from human sources. Two versions of the Scharff technique were compared against the direct approach (a combination of open-ended and specific questions). The Scharff conditions were conceptualised into four tactics and differed with respect to when the confirmation tactic was implemented: before or after an initial open-ended question. Participants ($n = 93$) took the role of a source in a phone interview and were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too little or too much information. In general, the Scharff technique outperformed the direct approach on all important measures. The sources in the Scharff conditions revealed more new information, and found it more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives. Importantly, the sources interviewed by the Scharff technique underestimated how much new information they revealed, whereas the sources interviewed by the direct approach overestimated the amount of new information revealed. Although no clear order effects of the Scharff tactics were found, we introduce an alternative method for implementing the confirmation tactic.

Key words: human intelligence gathering; information elicitation; interview technique; Scharff technique; direct approach.

Human intelligence refers to the gathering of information through an interaction between two or more individuals (Justice, Bhatt, Brandon, & Kleinman, 2010), typically an *interviewer* and a *source*. The gathered information may concern the past, the present or the future and is collected with the aim of contributing to national security (Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010). *Information elicitation* is a specific form of human intelligence gathering where the interviewer aims to obtain information without the source fully realising the true purpose of the interaction (Justice et al., 2010). More precisely, the goal is to gather information in such a manner that the source

underestimates how much new information she or he contributes and remains unaware of the interviewer's information objectives.

The scientific research on intelligence interview techniques is relatively meagre. However, in the last years researchers have begun to remedy this gap. Some have, for example, linked findings from social and forensic science to intelligence gathering (Borum, 2006; Loftus, 2011). Other researchers have surveyed experienced human intelligence interviewers on their techniques (e.g., Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2014) or examined the recollection of intelligence by cooperative sources (e.g., Leins, Fisher, Pludwinski,

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Rivard, & Robertson, 2014) or the gathering of intelligence in a traditional police interrogation setting (Evans, Meissner, Ross, Houston, Russano, & Horgan, 2013). The overall aim of the present study was to compare two intelligence gathering techniques: the Scharff technique and the direct approach.

The Scharff Technique

Granhag (2010) suggested a scientific elaboration of the Scharff technique; named after the German interrogator Hanns Joachim Scharff (1907–1992). Observing prisoners of war, Scharff took their perspective and identified the counter-interrogation strategies that they used to resist conventional interview techniques (Scharff, 1950; Toliver, 1997). On the basis of these observations Scharff developed his own interview tactics, which aimed to counteract the prisoners' strategies.

The Scharff technique rests upon the interviewer's ability to take the source's perspective. Perspective-taking relates to the 'cognitive capacity to consider the world from other viewpoints and allows an individual to anticipate the behavior and reactions of others' (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008, p. 378). Furthermore, the technique draws on theoretical notions from social cognition. Specifically, humans behave in a goal-directed manner (Aarts, 2012), which also holds true for sources in an intelligence interaction who may pursue specific goals (e.g., to obtain a privilege). In order to strive towards a goal, people develop strategies and plans (Fiske & Taylor, 2008), and by controlling their thoughts, emotions and actions they attempt to steer away from undesired outcomes and towards desired goals (Carver & Scheier, 2012; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). To give an example, a source aiming for the goal 'privilege' may develop and employ the counter-interrogation strategies 'I will not tell very much during the interrogation', 'I will try to figure out what they are after, and then make sure not to give them what they want', and 'it is meaningless to deny or hold back what they already know' (Toliver, 1997; for a

field analysis on counter-interrogation strategies, see Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib, Waring, & Christiansen, 2014). In order to employ such strategies the source may have to contemplate the interviewer's knowledge and information objectives (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Soufan, 2011). By taking the source's perspective, the interviewer may become aware of the source's goal and counter-interrogation strategies, and implement interview tactics in order to exploit these strategies. The Scharff technique is a collection of such tactics, four of which are used in the present study.

Scharff was known for his friendly and conversational approach (Toliver, 1997). He established a pleasant, conversational atmosphere, and rarely asked any specific questions. Hence, the *friendly approach* and the *not pressing for information* tactics are implemented throughout the interview and form the foundation of the Scharff technique. The third tactic is *the illusion of knowing it all*. Scharff typically opened the interview by telling a detailed story, based on already known information. In doing so he gave the source the opportunity to add details. Finally, by using the *confirmation/disconfirmation* tactic, Scharff was able to elicit specific pieces of information. In brief, he presented claims which included specific pieces of information that he sought to have affirmed (confirmation tactic) or negated (disconfirmation tactic; for a more detailed description on the Scharff tactics, see Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015; May, Granhag, & Oleszkiewicz, 2014).

The Direct Approach

The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 2-22.3, 2006) is, according to President Obama's Executive Order 13491 (2009), the government-wide standard for intelligence interrogations. The manual advises the interrogator to open with the direct approach, which is a combination of open-ended and specific questions. For example, the interviewer should start with initial questions ('who', 'what', 'where', 'when', 'how', and 'why'), and later

ask follow-up or repeated questions (U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, 2006). In line with these recommendations, 45% of civilians and 81% of military interrogators typically start an interrogation with the direct approach (Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2011). Military interrogators also believe that the direct approach is an effective interviewing technique (Semel, 2013). Based on its practical significance, the direct approach was considered to be a relevant point of comparison.

Previous Research on the Scharff Technique

To date there are five empirical studies on the Scharff technique. Granhag, Montecinos and Oleszkiewicz (2015) found that the Scharff technique, an open-question technique and a specific-question technique resulted in a similar amount of new information revealed. This result was attributed to a rather disorganised implementation of the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. Therefore, all later studies started by establishing the illusion of knowing it all, asking an open-ended question and subsequently employing the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic. This step-wise presentation of the Scharff tactics has resulted in promising outcomes. Importantly, the Scharff technique has proven to result in more new information compared to the direct approach (e.g., May et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014). Furthermore, sources interviewed by the Scharff technique tend to underestimate the amount of new information revealed, whereas the sources interviewed by the direct approach tend to overestimate the amount of new information revealed (e.g., Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2014). In addition, sources find it more difficult to read the interviewer's information objective when interviewed by the Scharff technique compared to the direct approach (e.g., May et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, &

Kleinman, 2014). Finally, May et al. (2014) showed that when implementing the confirmation tactic, the sources in the Scharff condition perceived that the interviewer knew more information prior to the interview, and found it more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives compared to a version of the Scharff technique employing the disconfirmation tactic.

Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, Strömwall, and Kleinman (2015) compared the two interview techniques by using four different types of sources varying in both their level of cooperation and their extent of knowledge. The Scharff technique resulted in more new information than the direct approach for sources who were less cooperative (with more and less knowledge), and for sources who were more cooperative and had more knowledge (but not for sources who were more cooperative and had less knowledge). Furthermore, all sources interviewed by the Scharff technique found it more difficult to read the interviewer's information objectives and underestimated the amount of new information revealed. That is, the Scharff technique outperformed the direct approach on the most important measures and this was particularly pronounced for less cooperative sources.

The Present Study

The current study extends previous work on the Scharff technique on several accounts. In the first study on the Scharff technique the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic was embedded into the illusion of knowing it all tactic, resulting in the Scharff technique did not lead to more new information in comparison to the open- and specific-question techniques (Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015). Hanns Scharff, however, elicited information effectively by combining the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation/disconfirmation tactic (Tolliver, 1997). The present study set out to examine when to implement the confirmation tactic. Specifically, we compared two versions of the

Scharff technique, which differed with respect to the order of an initial open-ended question and the use of the confirmation tactic. For one version the interviewer implemented the illusion of knowing it all tactic, asked the initial open-ended question then presented the confirmation tactic and finally asked a second open-ended question (the *Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition*). For the second version the interviewer established the illusion of knowing it all, presented the confirmation tactic and then asked the first and second open-ended questions (the *Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition*). We compared the two Scharff conditions against the direct approach. For the *direct approach*, the interviewer asked an open-ended question followed by three specific questions, which were repeated if the source failed to answer, and finished the interview with yet another open-ended question. Table 1 displays the structure of the different interview protocols.

Broadly speaking, we used the same experimental set-up as in similar previous studies (e.g., Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015). Participants took the role of a source holding information about an upcoming terrorist attack, and were instructed to try to strike a balance between not revealing too little or too much information in an interview with a police contact. However, the participants in the current study received less information about the upcoming attack in comparison to the previous studies (e.g., May et al., 2014), and thus needed to use this information in a very careful manner. In line with previous research on the Scharff tactics we formulated the following hypotheses.

New Information Revealed during the Interview

We predict that both Scharff conditions will result in more new information during the full interview than the direct approach (Hypothesis 1a), and that the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition will result in more new information compared to the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition (Hypothesis 1b). We predict that the participants in both Scharff conditions will reveal more new information in response to the initial open-ended question compared to the direct approach (Hypothesis 2a). The rationale behind this prediction is that the participants will aim to be perceived as cooperative and hence the participants for the Scharff conditions will need to provide information beyond the information stated when employing the illusion of knowing it all tactic. We also predict that the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition will outperform the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition with respect to the outcome of the first open-ended question (Hypothesis 2b). The reason for this is that for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the interviewer will reinforce the illusion of knowing it all by implementing the confirmation tactic before posing the open-ended question (May et al., 2014). This might result in the participants revealing relatively more new information in response to the initial open-ended question. With respect to the confirmation tactic versus specific questions, we predict that the confirmation tactic (in both Scharff conditions) will result in relatively more new information (Hypothesis 2c), as we expect that the participants will respond to

Table 1. Structure of the three interview conditions.

Scharff OpenQ/Conf	Scharff Conf/OpenQ	Direct Approach
Illusion of knowing it all tactic	Illusion of knowing it all tactic	
Open-ended question	Confirmation tactic	Open-ended question
Confirmation tactic	Open-ended question	Specific questions
Open-ended question	Open-ended question	Open-ended question

more claims (versus specific questions) in order to reach an adequate level of cooperation. Furthermore, we predict that when the confirmation tactic is implemented before the first open-ended question (Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition) this will result in more new information compared to when it is implemented after the initial open-ended question (Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition, Hypothesis 2d). The rationale for this is that for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the posed claims will be the participants' first chance to show their willingness to cooperate. In contrast, when the participants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition are facing the claims, they have already responded to the first open-ended question.

The Sources' Perception of the Interview

We predict that the participants in both Scharff conditions will perceive the interviewer to hold relatively more information prior to the interview (Hypothesis 3a). The basis for this prediction is that for the Scharff conditions the interviewer presents already known information when employing the illusion of knowing it all tactic. Furthermore, we expect that the participants in both Scharff conditions will have a less clear understanding of the interviewer's information objectives compared to the participants in the direct approach (Hypothesis 3b). The reason for this is that we expect that the participants presented with the confirmation tactic will find it more difficult to read the interviewer's information objectives compared with those who are asked specific questions. As we measure the participants' perceptions of the interview only after the full interview, we do not expect any difference between the Scharff conditions.

Relating Objective and Subjective Measures

We predict that the participants in the Scharff conditions will perceive that they revealed less new information than they objectively

did, whereas the participants in the direct approach will perceive that they revealed more new information than they actually did (Hypothesis 4). The rationale behind this prediction is that the Scharff tactics may result in the participants unknowingly revealing new information. In contrast, the participants in the direct approach are expected to reveal new and old information in response to the open and specific questions, and may estimate that the majority of the reported information will be new to the interviewer, as they are kept blind to his or her prior knowledge.

Method

Participants

Ninety-three undergraduate psychology students (76 females and 17 males) from the university in Kiel participated in exchange for partial course credit. The mean age was 22.60 years ($SD = 5.42$), with a range of 19 to 48. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the three interview conditions (32 for the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition, 30 for the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition, and 31 for the direct approach).

Procedure

Background and Planning

All students received background information to prepare for playing the role of a source in an upcoming phone conversation with a police contact. They were presented with 24 pieces of information about a radical political group planning a bombing in a shopping mall. This amount of information is smaller compared to the 33 to 36 pieces of information in previous studies (e.g., Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015; May et al., 2014). The interviewer already knew 12 of these 24 pieces of information. The participants did not know if the interviewer already held information. Critically, the participants were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too little information in order to get help from the police, and not revealing too much information as they had

sympathy for the group's members and interests. The students were informed that they would receive cinema tickets depending on their performance in striking this balance, but in fact all tickets were raffled. Moreover, the participants were instructed not to fabricate any information during the interview, as this allowed for a cleaner analysis. However, they were allowed to withhold information, which is a form of lying (Vrij, 2008). All participants took 15 to 20 minutes to prepare for the interview.

The Interview

During the phone conversation the participant was alone in a room and had all background information available. The interviews lasted between 2.06 and 9.26 minutes ($M = 4.88$, $SD = 1.87$). The Scharff OpenQ/Conf ($M = 5.76$, $SD = 1.32$, $p < .001$) and Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 6.00$, $SD = 1.34$, $p < .001$) were significantly longer than the direct approach ($M = 2.90$, $SD = 1.87$), $F(2, 90) = 60.207$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .572$. The main reason for this difference was that it took around 3 minutes to establish the illusion of knowing it all. No difference was found between the two Scharff conditions.

The Scharff OpenQ/Conf Condition

For the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition the interviewer answered the phone, asked about the source's well-being, and showed understanding of the source's situation (friendly approach tactic). Then the interviewer said that she or he wanted to make the outcome of the interview more effective by reporting known information (illusion of knowing it all tactic). She or he closed the presentation of the 12 already known pieces of information by again expressing sympathy for the source's situation (friendly approach tactic), and asked an initial open-ended question ('So how can you help us with additional information?'). When the source finished talking, the interviewer presented three

claims and noted whether the source confirmed them (confirmation tactic). The claims concerned the date of the attack ('They chose a date when they can attract a lot of attention, I am sure you also know that the date of the attack is the 27th of December...'), the education of a bomb expert, and the triggering of the bomb. All claims were made even if the source had already revealed the information during the interview. After the third claim the interviewer asked a second open-ended question ('Would you like to add something before we end this?'), and then finished the conversation. The interviewer never asked any specific question or pressed for any information (not pressing for information tactic).

The Scharff Conf/OpenQ Condition

For the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition the interviewer implemented the friendly approach, illusion of knowing it all and not pressing for information tactics in the same manner as in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition. She or he used the same claims and asked the same open-ended questions, but implemented the tactics in a different order. Directly after presenting the illusion of knowing it all tactic, the interviewer posed the three claims (confirmation tactic). Thereafter, she or he asked the two open-ended questions.

The Direct Approach

For the direct approach the interviewer opened the conversation by asking the source about his or her well-being, followed by the request, 'just tell me what you know about the situation!'. When the source finished responding, the interviewer asked three specific questions concerning the same information as in the Scharff conditions (e.g., 'At what date will the attack take place?'). If a source did not answer a specific question, the interviewer repeated the question once ('Just give me the exact date for when they are exploding the bomb'). Thus, the interviewer asked a maximum of six specific questions. All specific questions were asked

even if the source had revealed this information previously during the interview. Finally, the interviewer asked the same open-ended question as in the Scharff conditions and finished the conversation.

Interviewers

Four interviewers (two females and two males) were trained in conducting the interviews. They were instructed to follow the interview protocols and to use a few standard phrases to handle unanticipated situations. Each interviewer performed between 15 and 30 interviews, and conducted interviews in all three conditions.

Post-interview Questionnaires

After the interview the participants were given three sequential questionnaires. The first questionnaire concerned demographic information and a rating of how easy/difficult it was to understand the interviewer's information objectives (7-point scale: 1: *very easy to understand* to 7: *very difficult to understand*). The participants were also asked to rate their motivation to carry out 'their task as a source' (7-point scale: 1: *not at all motivated* to 7: *very motivated*). The second questionnaire consisted of a checklist with all 24 pieces of information, and the participants marked the information that they perceived they revealed during the interview. The third questionnaire contained the same checklist and the participants marked the information that they perceived the interviewer already held prior to the interview.

Coding of the Interviews

The interviews were coded in terms of the information the participant revealed during the full interview (range: 0 to 24 units). The new information revealed was identified and examined (range: 0 to 12 units). A piece of information was scored as 'new' if the interviewer did not hold it prior to the interview.

Next, we examined how much new information the participants revealed in response to the first open-ended question, the claims/specific questions, and the final open-ended question. A piece of information was counted only for the question/claim where it was mentioned first. Information was only scored if the participants clearly affirmed a claim (e.g., 'right') or clearly answered a specific question correctly (e.g., '27th of December').

Inter-rater Reliability

Two coders independently rated all 93 interviews. The inter-rater agreement was 98.97% (*Cohen's* $\kappa = 0.94$). Differences were resolved in a discussion between the two coders and the final agreed-upon scores were used for the analysis.

Results

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) concerning the participants' motivation did not result in any significant difference between the three conditions, $F(2, 90) = 1.311$, $p = .275$, $\eta^2 = .028$. The mean score of all participants was above the midpoint of the scale ($M = 5.46$, $SD = 0.94$).

Furthermore, we found no differences between the interviewers in terms of the objective or subjective measures. Finally, we counterbalanced the order in which the participants were presented the three claims/specific questions; the subsequent analysis did not show any order effects with respect to the new information revealed.

New Information Revealed During the Interview

A one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of the new information revealed during the full interview, $F(2, 90) = 16.229$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .265$. Pairwise Bonferroni tests showed that both the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 2.00$, $p < .001$) and the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 4.50$,

Table 2. Means (and SDs) for new information revealed in the three interview conditions for a) the initial open-ended question, b) the claims/specific questions, c) the final open-ended question and, d) the complete interview.

	Initial open-ended question		Claims/specific questions		Final open-ended question		Complete interview	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Scharff OpenQ/Conf	2.28 ^a	1.51	1.19 ^{a,b}	0.97	0.53 ^a	0.80	4.00 ^a	2.00
Scharff Conf/OpenQ	2.73 ^a	1.78	1.43 ^a	1.04	0.33 ^a	0.88	4.50 ^a	2.30
Direct Approach	0.58 ^b	1.12	0.65 ^b	0.66	0.61 ^a	0.84	1.84 ^b	1.46

Note: Different superscripts indicate that means are significantly different ($p < .05$).

$SD = 2.30, p < .001$) resulted in significantly more new information than the direct approach ($M = 1.84, SD = 1.46$). This confirmed Hypothesis 1a. As we found no significant difference between the two Scharff conditions, Hypothesis 1b was not supported. Table 2 presents the mean scores and standard deviations regarding the new information revealed.

We conducted three one-way ANOVAs in order to examine the outcome of the two open-ended questions and the claims/specific questions. First, we found a significant effect of the new information revealed in response to the initial open-ended question, $F(2, 90) = 17.853, p < .001, \eta^2 = .284$. Pairwise Bonferroni tests showed that the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition ($M = 2.28, SD = 1.51, p < .001$) and the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 2.73, SD = 1.78, p < .001$) generated more new information than the direct approach ($M = 0.58, SD = 1.12$). This was in line with Hypothesis 2a. The two Scharff conditions did not differ significantly. Thus, we failed to find support for Hypothesis 2b. Second, we found a significant effect of the new information revealed for presenting claims/asking specific questions, $F(2, 90) = 6.120, p = .003, \eta^2 = .120$. Here, the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 1.43, SD = 1.04$) resulted in significantly more new information than the direct approach ($M = 0.65, SD = 0.66, p = .003$). The Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition ($M = 1.19, SD = 0.97$) and the direct approach did not differ significantly. Thus, Hypothesis 2c was partially supported. There was no significant difference between the two Scharff conditions. This was not in line with Hypothesis 2d. Finally, we found no significant effect in terms of the new information revealed for asking the second (and final) open-ended question, $F(2, 90) = 0.884, p = .417, \eta^2 = .019$.

The Sources' Perception of the Interview

A one-way ANOVA concerning the participants' perception of the interviewer's knowledge prior to the interview showed a significant effect, $F(2, 90) = 83.534, p <$

.001, $\eta^2 = .650$. Pairwise Bonferroni tests revealed that the participants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition ($M = 11.56$, $SD = 2.94$, $p < .001$) and in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 11.13$, $SD = 2.37$, $p < .001$) perceived that the interviewer held more information before the interview than the participants in the direct approach ($M = 4.13$, $SD = 2.25$). No difference was found between the two Scharff conditions. This confirmed Hypothesis 3a. Examining this further, a one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of the information which the participants *incorrectly* believed the interviewer to have held prior to the interview, $F(2, 90) = 13.791$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .235$. The participants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition ($M = 3.16$, $SD = 2.08$, $p < .001$) and in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 3.03$, $SD = 1.71$, $p < .001$) misperceived the interviewer's prior knowledge to a greater extent than the participants in the direct approach ($M = 1.16$, $SD = 1.07$). No significant difference was found between the two Scharff conditions. Finally, we examined whether the participants incorrectly believed that the interviewer knew the three pieces of information, which the interviewer aimed to collect with the claims/specific question. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect, $F(2, 90) = 103.706$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 =$

.697. Bonferroni tests showed that the participants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition ($M = 2.09$, $SD = 0.73$, $p < .001$) and in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 2.07$, $SD = 0.78$, $p < .001$) perceived that the interviewer held significantly more of these particular pieces of information than participants in the direct approach ($M = 0.06$, $SD = 0.25$). No significant difference was found between the Scharff conditions.

A one-way ANOVA of the participants' perception of the interviewer's information objectives showed a significant effect, $F(2, 90) = 5.481$, $p = .006$, $\eta^2 = .109$. Pairwise Bonferroni tests revealed that the participants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 1.46$, $p = .013$) and in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition ($M = 4.47$, $SD = 1.70$, $p = .019$) found it significantly more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives than the participants in the direct approach ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.76$, $p < .001$). No significant difference was found between the Scharff conditions. Thus, Hypothesis 3b was supported.

Relating Objective and Subjective Measures

A mixed ANOVA with the three interview conditions as the between-subjects factor and the scores for the new information revealed during the interview and the perception of how much information they revealed as




Figure 1. The interaction effect for the subjective and objective scores of the new information revealed.

the within-subjects factor showed that the difference between the objective and subjective amount of new information revealed depended on the interview condition, $F(2, 90) = 34.266, p < .001, \eta^2 = .432$ (see Figure 1). Simple effect tests showed that the participants in the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition perceived that they had revealed significantly less new information ($M = 3.22, SD = 2.09$) than they objectively did ($M = 4.00, SD = 2.00$), $F(1, 31) = 4.973, p = .028, \eta^2 = .052$. Similarly, the participants in the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition believed that they had revealed less new information ($M = 3.20, SD = 1.88$) than they objectively did ($M = 4.50, SD = 2.30$), $F(1, 29) = 12.910, p = .001, \eta^2 = .125$. In contrast, the participants in the direct approach condition perceived that they revealed significantly more new information ($M = 4.39, SD = 2.22$) than they objectively did ($M = 1.84, SD = 1.46$), $F(1, 31) = 51.264, p < .001, \eta^2 = .363$. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported.

For the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition (68.75%) and the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition (66.67%) the majority of the participants *underestimated* the amount of new information revealed during the interview. In sharp contrast, for the direct approach the vast majority (87.10%) of the participants *overestimated* the amount of new information revealed during the interview.

Discussion

The present study examined the Scharff technique; a technique aimed for eliciting human intelligence. Specifically, we mapped possible order effects of the Scharff tactics. Hence, two different versions of the Scharff tactics were compared against the direct approach. The results allow for two general conclusions. First, both versions of the Scharff technique outperformed the direct approach on all the important measures of efficacy. Second, although we did not find any clear order effects, we introduced an alternative how to

combine the illusion of knowing it all-tactic and the confirmation-tactic.

Intelligence Gathering using the Scharff Technique

In line with our expectation and the outcome of previous work (e.g., May et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014), the Scharff technique resulted in more new information compared to the direct approach. Both versions of the Scharff technique resulted in double the amount of new information compared to the direct approach.

With respect to the response to the initial open-ended question, both versions of the Scharff technique resulted in comparatively more new information. For the Scharff conditions this held true independent of whether the first open-ended question was asked before or after implementing the confirmation tactic. We assume that this result is due to the illusion of knowing it all tactic. For the sources to reach their goal of getting assistance from the police, they had to be somewhat cooperative and reveal information that went beyond the information presented by the interviewer. Furthermore, the confirmation tactic resulted in more new information than the specific questions. Specifically, the Scharff Conf/OpenQ condition led to significantly more new information than the direct approach, and comparing the Scharff OpenQ/Conf condition and the direct approach, the difference was bordering on significance. Importantly, for the direct approach the interviewer repeated a specific question if it was not answered, and could thus ask specific questions up to six times (three questions asked two times). Our findings show the rather unobtrusive implementation of the confirmation-tactic outperformed the more obtrusive way of asking specific questions.

The sources interviewed by the Scharff technique perceived that the interviewer knew more information prior to the interview compared to sources in the direct approach. This finding replicates the outcome of previous

work (e.g., Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2014), indicates a successful implementation of the illusion of knowing it all tactic, and supports the idea that the sources interviewed by the Scharff technique felt prompted to reveal information beyond the already presented information. The illusion of the knowing it all tactic also aims to give the source the impression that the interviewer holds more information than she or he actually does. By employing the strategy that 'it is meaningless to deny or hold back what they already know' (Granhag, 2010), the source may strive to show his or her willingness to cooperate through providing the information that she or he believes is already known, but which is in fact new to the interviewer. For the present study this specific aim was not reached. The results showed that the information that the sources incorrectly believed the interviewer to have held was mainly attributed to the confirmation tactic and not the illusion of knowing it all tactic.

In line with previous studies (e.g., Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015), the sources in the Scharff conditions found it comparatively more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives. This finding highlights an important advantage of the Scharff technique. Our explanation for this is that when sources were presented with claims it was more difficult to read the interviewer's information objectives compared to specific questions (especially if the specific questions are repeated).

One of the most relevant measures for examining human intelligence interviewing techniques is the extent to which a source underestimates the amount of new information revealed (Justice et al., 2010). This is important since a source who perceives that they have revealed very little might be more willing to talk to the interviewer again. The present study showed that sources who faced the Scharff technique underestimated the amount of new information revealed. We believe that this was a result of all the Scharff tactics combined, but particularly the confirmation and illusion of knowing it all tactics. In contrast,

the sources interviewed by the direct approach overestimated the amount of new information revealed. That is, the sources who answered direct questions and who were in the dark with respect to the interviewer's prior knowledge perceived that almost all of the information they revealed was new to the interviewer. In general, this result is in accordance with previous findings (e.g., Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2014), and we interpret this as further support for the Scharff technique.

For the present study, we compared the Scharff technique against the direct approach by interviewing sources who held less information about an upcoming attack compared to sources in previous studies (e.g., May et al., 2014). That is, because the sources were less informed, they had to carefully decide what information to reveal during the interaction. Hence, we were able to show that previous positive outcomes for the Scharff technique also hold for sources that have access to comparably less information.

The present study is the first to examine possible order effects in the implementation of the Scharff tactics. Specifically, for one version the open-ended question was posed before the confirmation tactic, and for the other version the confirmation tactic was implemented before posing an open-ended question. Overall, we found no clear order effects. Nevertheless, we believe that our results are worthy of reflection.

First, the confirmation tactic resulted in significantly more new information than the specific questions, but only when the confirmation tactic was presented before the initial open-ended question. A possible interpretation of this is that the sources were more willing to confirm information during their first opportunity to contribute with any information.

Second, the sources revealed a low amount and not significantly more new information in response to the first open-ended question when this was asked after (vs before) the confirmation tactic. We believe that the interviewer failed to reinforce the illusion of knowing it all sufficiently by

presenting the confirmation tactic before asking the first open-ended question.

In brief, we found no clear advantage of one of the Scharff tactics over the other, but we found that both versions of the Scharff technique outperformed the direct approach on all the important measures. Importantly, we introduced a valuable alternative with respect to how an interviewer can combine the illusion of knowing it all tactic with the confirmation tactic. Based on these findings, future research could examine how to elicit information without asking any open-ended questions.

Limitations

The current study is based on a sample of students. Most real-life sources will be much more motivated to, for example, employ counter-interrogation strategies during the interaction, as they have a greater investment in the outcome of the interview. However, as the Scharff technique is tailored to counteract these strategies, we think it is possible that the technique might be even more effective in real-life settings than in the lab environment. Furthermore, the sources were interviewed over the phone, had all the background information in front of them, and were instructed not to fabricate information. Future research should remedy these restrictions by the sources meet the interviewer face to face, need to memorise the background information, and are allowed to fabricate information.

Conclusions

Research on intelligence interview techniques is still in its initial stage. The present study can be viewed as a further step in examining the Scharff technique as a non-coercive interview technique that draws on several different tactics. Two versions of the Scharff technique, which differed with respect to when the confirmation tactic was implemented, outperformed the direct approach on all critical measures. That is, sources

interviewed by the Scharff technique revealed more new information and found it more difficult to understand the interviewer's information objectives compared to the sources faced with the direct approach. Furthermore, the sources interviewed by the Scharff technique underestimated the amount of new information revealed, whereas the sources interviewed by the direct approach overestimated the amount of new information revealed. Although we found no clear order effect with respect to when the confirmation tactic was implemented (before or after an initial open-ended question), we illustrated a promising alternative how to directly combine the illusion of knowing it all tactic and the confirmation tactic. In sum, we believe that the combined evidence speaks in favour of the Scharff technique as a promising tool for eliciting human intelligence.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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APPENDIX A: Publications

- I. May, L., & Granhag, P. A. (2016). Techniques for eliciting human intelligence: Examining possible order effects of the Scharff tactics. *Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law*, 23(2), 275–287. doi: 10.1080/13218719.2015.1054410

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- II. **May, L., & Granhag, P. A. (2016). Using the Scharff-technique to elicit information: How to effectively establish the “illusion of knowing it all”? *The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context*, 8(2), 79–85. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpal.2016.02.001**

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- III. May, L., Granhag, P. A., & Tekin, S. (2017). Interviewing suspects in denial: On how different evidence disclosure modes affect the elicitation of new critical information. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 8, 1–11. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01154

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Using the Scharff-technique to elicit information: How to effectively establish the “illusion of knowing it all”?



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ABSTRACT

The Scharff-technique is used for eliciting information from human sources. At the very core of the technique is the “illusion of knowing it all” tactic, which aims to inflate a source’s perception of how much knowledge an interviewer holds about the event to be discussed. For the current study, we mapped the effects following two different ways of introducing this particular tactic; a traditional way of implementation where the interviewer explicitly states that s/he already knows most of the important information (the *traditional condition*), and a new way of implementation where the interviewer just starts to present the information that s/he holds (the *just start condition*). The two versions were compared in two separate experiments. In Experiment 1 ($N=60$), we measured the participants’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge, and in Experiment 2 ($N=60$), the participants’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge gaps. We found that participants in the just start condition (a) believed the interviewer had more knowledge (Experiment 1), and (b) searched less actively for gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge (Experiment 2), compared to the traditional condition. We will discuss the current findings and how sources test and perceive the knowledge his or her interviewer possesses within a framework of social hypothesis testing.

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La utilización de la técnica de Scharff para extraer información: cómo crear la “ilusión de saberlo todo” de un modo eficaz?

RESUMEN

La técnica de Scharff se utiliza para extraer información de fuentes humanas. En el meollo de la técnica está la táctica de la “ilusión de saberlo todo”, que apunta a engordar la percepción de una fuente sobre cuánto conocimiento posee un entrevistador sobre el hecho que se aborda. Para realizar este estudio cartografiamos los efectos derivados de la introducción de esta táctica particular, un método tradicional de aplicación, en el que el entrevistador afirma de modo explícito que ya conoce casi toda la información importante (la *condición tradicional*) y una manera nueva de implementación, en la que el entrevistador empieza a presentar la información que posee (la condición de *simplemente iniciar la condición*). Se comparó ambas versiones en dos experimentos distintos. En el experimento 1 ($N=60$) medimos la percepción que tenían los participantes de los conocimientos del entrevistador y en el experimento 2 ($N=60$) la percepción que tenían los participantes de las lagunas de conocimiento del entrevistador. Se halló que los participantes de la condición de “simplemente iniciar” (a) creían que el entrevistador poseía más conocimientos (experimento 1) y (b) buscaban de un modo menos activo las lagunas de conocimiento del entrevistador (experimento 2), en comparación con la condición “tradicional”. Comentaremos estos

Palabras clave:

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resultados y cómo perciben y ponen a prueba las fuentes los conocimientos de su entrevistador, en el marco de la prueba de hipótesis social.

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Human intelligence (HUMINT) is “a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources” (NATO, 2014, p. 115). Typically, in a HUMINT interaction an interviewer aims to collect information about past or future criminal activities (Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010; Vrij & Granhag, 2014). A specific form of HUMINT gathering is information elicitation, for which the goal is to collect information in such a manner that the sources remain unaware of the true purpose of the interaction (Justice, Bhatt, Brandon, & Kleinman, 2010). The main aims are here that the sources underestimate how much new information they have revealed and remain unaware of the interviewer’s information objectives.

Humans who strive toward goals develop strategies and plans (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, 2008). In the HUMINT context, sources often aim for a specific goal (e.g., money or protection from prosecution) and what they offer in return is information. Additionally, sources are often cooperative to some extent; they are willing to share some but not all information they hold. In order to pursue their goal, sources often use so-called counter-interrogation strategies; for example, “I will not say very much during the interrogation,” “I will try to figure out what they are after, and then make sure I do not give them what they want,” and “It is meaningless to deny or withhold what they already know” (Scharff, 1950; Soufan, 2011; Toliver, 1997). Recently, Alison et al. (2014) presented a field study in which they showed the relevance of such counter-interrogation strategies.

The Scharff-technique

The Scharff-technique aims to collect information from sources that are motivated to reveal some but not all information (Granhag, 2010). An interviewer taking the perspective of the source lies at the very core of the Scharff-technique. Perspective taking refers to the “cognitive capacity to consider the world from other viewpoints and allows an individual to anticipate the behavior and reactions of others” (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008, p. 378). Taking the perspective of others is effective in negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), and of importance for criminal and HUMINT interviewers (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Soufan, 2011).

The Scharff-technique is a collection of tactics that draws on the interviewer’s insights about the source’s goals and counter-interrogation strategies (Granhag, 2010). The *friendly approach tactic* stipulates that the interviewer establishes and maintains a pleasant, conversational atmosphere during the interview. When employing the *illusion of knowing it all tactic*, the interviewer presents already known information, makes clear that s/he is well-informed regarding the topic to be discussed, and gives the source the opportunity to add details. The *confirmation/disconfirmation tactic* aims to elicit specific pieces of information as the interviewer presents claims that s/he seeks to have affirmed or negated. The *not pressing for information tactic* requires the interviewer to collect information by asking very few, if any, questions. Finally, using the *ignore new information tactic* means the interviewer conceals his or her interest for information and treats the information that the source reveals as known or unimportant (for more detailed descriptions on the Scharff tactics, see Granhag, Montecinos, & Oleszkiewicz, 2015; May, Granhag, & Oleszkiewicz, 2014).

In a series of studies, the Scharff-technique has been compared to the Direct Approach, which is a combination of open-ended and specific questions (US Army, 2006). In accordance with the Field Manual 2–22.3 (US Army, 2006) and the Executive Order No. 13941 (US Government, 2009), the Direct Approach is the most commonly used intelligence interviewing technique in the field (Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, 2011; Semel, 2013). All previous studies have used an experimental paradigm mirroring important features of a typical HUMINT interaction (Granhag et al., 2015a). Simply put, participants received incomplete information on a planned attack and were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too much or too little information in a subsequent interview. In past studies, the Scharff-technique has outperformed the Direct Approach by all important measures. First, the Scharff-technique resulted in relatively more new information (e.g., May & Granhag, 2015; see Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, Strömwall, & Kleinman, 2015 for sources who varied in their levels of cooperation and knowledge). Second, the sources interviewed with the Scharff-technique underestimated how much new information they revealed, whereas the sources interviewed with the Direct Approach overestimated how much new information they revealed (e.g., May et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014). Finally, the sources interviewed by the Scharff-technique found it relatively more difficult to read the interviewer’s information objective (e.g., May et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2014).

In previous studies, the illusion of knowing it all tactic played an important role in terms of collecting new information. The presentation of known information (i.e., the illusion of knowing it all tactic) followed by an open-ended question resulted in more new information compared to simply asking an open-ended question (e.g., May et al., 2014; Oleszkiewicz et al., 2014a). That is, by presenting known information, the interviewer made the source to reveal information beyond what was disclosed by the interviewer. Another aim of the illusion of knowing it all tactic is to inflate the source’s perception of how much knowledge the interviewer holds about the event. Specifically, the interviewer steers the source’s focus towards his or her knowledge of the event and steers it away from his or her knowledge gaps. The current study is about the efficacy of different ways of introducing the illusion of knowing it all tactic aiming to inflate the source’s perception of the interviewer’s knowledge.

Sources Exploring the Interviewer’s Knowledge

Humans are naturally goal-oriented (Aarts, 2012), and in order to decide if and how to pursue a goal, they form and test hypotheses. Trope and Liberman (1996) presented a framework for social hypothesis testing that consists of five steps and can be applied to a source that tests the amount and relevance of an interviewer’s knowledge. At first, the source may formulate a hypothesis (e.g., “The interviewer holds some important information”). S/he may then derive if-then rules from stored knowledge in order to test the hypothesis (e.g., “If the interviewer holds important information, then s/he knows who founded the group”). In the third step the source searches for relevant information in his or her memory from past interviews or actively during an ongoing interaction with the interviewer in order to test these if-then rules (e.g., “The interviewer knows that a woman founded the group”). In accordance

with these if-then rules, the source may then interpret and categorize the collected information (e.g., “A woman founded the group” is categorized as important knowledge), and finally draw an inference by assessing the likelihood that the hypothesis is true or not (e.g., “The interviewer actually holds some important knowledge”).

Trope and Liberman (1996) distinguished between two broad hypothesis-testing methods. The *diagnostic testing* refers to a comprehensive analysis of the hypothesis and its alternatives. In contrast, the *pseudodiagnostic testing* refers to the neglect of the alternative hypothesis; persons search for hypothesis-consistent information, interpret information and/or draw inferences in favor of the hypothesis. Since the latter processes often lead to a confirmation of the focal hypothesis, it is also considered a *hypothesis confirmation strategy* (Skov & Sherman, 1986), or is referred to as a *positive test strategy*, as it can, but does not have to, confirm the focal hypothesis (Hodgins & Zuckerman, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1987). Studies show that humans generally prefer the diagnostic strategy to test social hypotheses (Bassok & Trope, 1984; Trope & Bassok, 1983), and this independent of whether or not they are instructed to test a specific hypothesis (Trope, Bassok, & Alon 1984). However, persons prefer the positive test strategy when presented with equally diagnostic hypothesis-consistent and alternative-consistent features (Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990; Skov & Sherman, 1986), especially when instructed to test an extreme (radical) hypothesis (e.g., “The interviewer holds all important information”) in comparison to a more moderate hypothesis (e.g., “The interviewer holds some important information”; Trope & Bassok, 1983). In brief, many interview situations (including HUMINT interactions) are characterized by the interviewer aiming at influencing a) the hypothesis that the source formulates about the interviewer’s knowledge, and how the source tests this hypothesis, and b) what inference the source draws from this testing (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Soufan, 2011).

The Present Research

The current paper examines two ways of introducing the illusion of knowing it all tactic. For the *traditional condition* the interviewer began presenting information in a fashion similar to that found in previous studies (e.g., May & Granhag, 2015), stating explicitly: “I already possess most of the most important information and let me just share that information first.” In contrast, for the *just start condition* the interviewer simply presented the known information without an explicit statement regarding the amount or relevance of known information.

The present research examines these two conditions in two separate experiments. In Experiment 1 we measured how sources perceived and tested the interviewer’s knowledge in terms of known information, and in Experiment 2 in terms of unknown information. We examined the different dependent variables in two studies in order to avoid order effects and confounds. In both studies the participants called an interviewer who then employed the illusion of knowing it all tactic and eventually interrupted the conversation. Participants were then asked to record their perceptions of the interview by filling out a questionnaire which differed between the two experiments.

Drawing on research on social hypothesis testing, we predicted that compared to sources in the traditional condition, sources in the just start condition would test the interviewer’s knowledge (a) more actively for known information (Experiment 1), and (b) less for unknown information (Experiment 2). The reason for this was that the sources in the traditional condition were presented with the interviewer’s statement to “possess most of the most important information.” In short, this statement may trigger alertness and we therefore expected the sources to test a comparatively more

extreme (radical) hypothesis, thereby using a positive test strategy to uncover information gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge. In contrast, the sources in the just start condition were not presented with a statement on the amount and relevance of the known information. Hence, we expected them to be surprised by all of the known information, and, accordingly, to test a comparatively more moderate hypothesis and focus more on the known information possessed by the interviewer. Consequently, we predicted that the sources in the just start condition would infer that the interviewer (a) held more knowledge (Experiment 1), and (b) had fewer knowledge gaps (Experiment 2), compared to the sources in the traditional condition. The rationale behind this was that in the traditional condition the interviewer gave the sources a point of reference for the amount of known information (“I already possess most of the most important information, so let me just share that information first”), and that they would focus more on the gaps in the interviewer’s knowledge. In contrast, we expected that the sources in the just start condition would be unsuspecting regarding the amount of known information, and that they would search more actively for information that the interviewer possessed.

Experiment 1

For this experiment we measured the participants’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge. We predicted that the participants in the just start condition would write down comparatively more information that was known to the interviewer (Hypothesis 1), and would think comparatively more about further information that the interviewer could have (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, we hypothesized that the participants in the just start condition would perceive that the interviewer held comparatively more information (Hypothesis 3).

Method

Participants

The study included 60 participants (49 female and 11 male; 42 psychology students, 16 other students, and two employees). The mean age was 23.55 years ($SD = 6.29$, ages ranging from 18 to 59), and they were randomly assigned to one of the two interview conditions (30 participants for each condition). The psychology students participated in exchange for partial course credit and the other participants received 10 Euros as compensation for their participation. Originally, 62 persons were recruited for this study, but two had to be excluded (one misunderstood the instructions, and one reported technical problems).

Materials

We produced a list containing of 14 themes on a terrorist group in order to prepare instructions for participants and protocols for the interviewers. Each theme consisted of two pieces of information with varying levels of specificity. For example, for the theme “date of the attack,” the *general* piece of information was “around Christmas,” and the *specific* piece of information was “the 27th of December.”

Procedure

Background and planning. Participants received basic instructions and information concerning the group and their activities in order to prepare the role of a source calling a police contact. Specifically, they had to memorize the specific information on all

14 themes, as they were not allowed to have notes available during the phone call. The participants were instructed to strike a balance between not revealing too much information (because they sympathized with the group), and not revealing too little information (because they needed help from the police). Furthermore, they were allowed to provide false information to the interviewer, and were not informed if the police contact already possessed any information. After 20 minutes of preparation time the participants were asked to fill out a memory test about the 14 pieces of background information (e.g., “On what exact date will the bomb attack take place?”). An identical memory test was filled out immediately after the interview. These two tests were scored and participants were only included in the analysis if they achieved a score of 11 or higher on both the pre and post-interview tests. In Experiment 1, all participants fulfilled the criteria. After checking the correctness of this test, the experimenter left the room and the participants called the interviewer via phone.

The interview. Three interviewers conducted the interviews (two female and one male), and all of them held approximately the same amount of interviews in each condition. They were trained in conducting the interviews and instructed to closely follow the two interview protocols.

(a) *Just start condition.* For the just start condition the interviewer made the phone call and started the interview by asking the source if everything was okay with the phone connection. Then the interviewer explained kindly that s/he might have to interrupt the conversation as s/he was expecting an important call from his or her boss. The interviewer continued by inquiring about the source's well-being. After the source finished answering, the interviewer showed understanding for the source's situation and explained that s/he knew about different options that could be used to help the source (friendly approach tactic). Then the interviewer employed the illusion of knowing it all tactic by stating the following: “I think it's really good that you are just contacting me now, so that I had a chance to familiarize myself with your situation, and also had time to think about MDA and their current planning” (MDA was the name of the terrorist group). The interviewer then presented information on seven themes with a general level of specificity (the name of the group, the number of members in general, their origins, the number of members planning the current attack, the extent of their knowledge on building bombs, how well the bomb could be concealed, and the location of the bomb's production). The interviewer ended his or her presentation by stating, “But I'm sorry, I think I should stop talking so much, so let's get back to the conditions of our deal and how you can contribute.” Next, the interviewer's phone rang loud enough for the source to hear and the interviewer explained that s/he had to take the phone call and would call the source back in 5 to 10 minutes. In reality, the interviewer did not call back.

(b) *Traditional condition.* The interview protocols in the just start condition and the traditional condition differed solely with respect to the introduction of the illusion of knowing it all tactic. For the traditional condition the interviewer stated: “I think it's really good that you are just contacting me now, so that I had time to familiarize myself with your situation. After thinking through the whole thing on MDA again, I'm convinced that I already hold most of the important information on the group and their planning, and I wonder if there is really additional information that we still need. Well, I mean, I already possess most of the most important information, so let me just share that information first.” The friendly approach tactic, the presentation of the known information, and the interruption of the phone call were implemented in the exact same manner as in the just start condition.

Post-interview questionnaire. Five minutes after the phone call was interrupted the experimenter came into the room and explained that the role-playing part was over. The participants were then asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning their perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge. The first relevant question sought to obtain a global perception of the interviewer's knowledge (“To what extent did you perceive that your police contact already had information on the group and their activities?”), with a scale ranging from 1 (*to a very low extent*) to 7 (*to a very high extent*). The next two questions regarded how actively the participants searched for information that was known to the interviewer. The participants were asked to write down all the information that the interviewer already knew (“What information on the group and their activities did your police contact already hold?”), and the final critical question was, “To what extent did you think during the phone call about what further information your police contact could have?” The scale ranged from 1 (*to a very low extent*) to 7 (*to a very high extent*). In addition, the participants were asked how motivated they felt to carry out their “task” as a source (1 = *not at all motivated* to 7 = *very motivated*), how difficult it was to understand the instructions of the study (1 = *not at all difficult* to 7 = *very difficult*), and how difficult it was to play the role of an informant (1 = *not at all difficult* to 7 = *very difficult*). The participants were then debriefed and discharged.

Coding. The participants' written answers about what information they perceived the interviewer already knew were coded. Since some participants listed information on a high level of specificity (e.g., “S/he knew that the attack would take place on 27th of December”), whereas others only mentioned the theme (e.g., “S/he knew the date of the attack”), we coded for a theme being mentioned or not. That is, the total amount of listed information ranged from 0 to 14.

Inter-rater reliability. Two persons coded 30% of the written answers from the open-ended question (nine for each condition), and the inter-rater reliability was calculated on the basis of these 30% (Cohen's $\kappa = .95$). The two coders discussed the results and resolved discrepancies and the final agreed-upon scores were used in the analysis. Then, one person coded the remaining 70% of the answers.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Overall, the participants were motivated to carry out their task as a source ($M = 5.30$, $SD = 1.45$), did not find it difficult to understand the received instructions ($M = 1.82$, $SD = 1.07$), and found it moderately difficult to take the role of a source ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.68$). No differences were found between the two conditions with respect to the participants' motivation, $t(58) = -0.708$, $p = .482$, $d = 0.18$, how difficult it was to understand the instructions, $t(58) = 0.846$, $p = .401$, $d = 0.22$, or how difficult it was to take the role of an informant, $t(58) = -0.612$, $p = .543$, $d = 0.15$.

Perception of the Interviewer's Knowledge

Known information. No difference was found between the just start condition ($M = 5.33$, $SD = 1.67$) and the traditional condition ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 1.13$) with respect to the written answers to the open-ended question regarding which information the participants believed the interviewer already knew, $t(58) = -0.724$, $p = .236$, one-tailed, $d = 0.19$. Thus, no support was found for Hypothesis 1.

Knowledge search. We found no difference between the just start condition ($M = 4.87$, $SD = 1.72$) and the traditional condition ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 1.97$) with respect to the extent to which participants

thought about further information that the interviewer could have, $t(58) = 1.189$, $p = .120$, one-tailed, $d = 0.31$. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Global perception. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, the participants in the just start condition ($M = 5.47$, $SD = 0.94$) perceived the interviewer to hold significantly more information compared to the participants in the traditional condition ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.07$), $t(58) = 2.692$, $p = .005$, one-tailed, $d = 0.70$.

Discussion

The results offered mixed support for our expectations. As predicted, the participants in the just start condition perceived the interviewer globally to have had more information compared to the participants in the traditional condition. However, no differences were found with respect to how actively the sources searched the interviewer's knowledge for known information (i.e., the listed information that was believed to be possessed by the interviewer, and the extent to which they thought about which further information the interviewer could hold). Before discussing the results in detail we examine how sources perceive and test an interviewer's knowledge in terms of unknown information.

Experiment 2

In this experiment we explored the participants' perception of the interviewer's knowledge gaps. We predicted that the participants in the just start condition would list comparatively less information that was unknown to the interviewer (Hypothesis 1), and that they, to a comparatively lesser extent, would search for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, we expected that the participants in the just start condition would globally believe the interviewer to have had comparatively fewer knowledge gaps (Hypothesis 3).

Method

Participants

The study included 60 participants (45 female and 15 male; 45 psychology students, 14 other students, and one employee) with a mean age of 21.73 ($SD = 3.98$, ranging from 17 to 37). They were randomly assigned to one of the two interview conditions (30 participants for each condition), and received course credit or 10 Euros as compensation for their participation. Originally, 62 participants were recruited, but two persons were excluded from the study (one did not fulfill the memory test criteria, and one misunderstood the instructions).

Materials and Procedure

The materials and the general procedure (background and planning, and conducting of the interviews) for Experiment 2 were exactly the same as those in Experiment 1. The two experiments differed only with respect to the post-interview questionnaire.

Post-interview Questionnaire

After the phone call was interrupted for 5 minutes, the experimenter asked the participants to fill out a questionnaire concerning their perception of the interviewer's knowledge gaps. The first critical question was about the participants' global perception of the interviewer's knowledge gaps ("To what extent did you perceive that your police contact had knowledge gaps in terms of the group and their activities?"); the scale ranged from 1 (*to a very low extent*)

to 7 (*to a very high extent*). The next two questions related to how actively the participants searched for unknown information in the interviewer's knowledge. They were asked to write down the information that they perceived the interviewer did not know ("Where did your police contact have knowledge gaps in terms of the group and their activities?"), and they rated the extent to which they searched for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge ("To what extent did you search for gaps in the knowledge of your police contact during the phone call?") on a response scale ranging from 1 (*to a very low extent*) to 7 (*to a very high extent*). As in Experiment 1, participants were then asked how motivated they felt to carry out their "task" as a source (1 = *not at all motivated* to 7 = *very motivated*), how difficult it was to understand the study's instructions (1 = *not at all difficult* to 7 = *very difficult*), and how difficult it was to play the role of an informant (1 = *not at all difficult* to 7 = *very difficult*).

Coding. The coding of the written answers was very similar to that in Experiment 1. The only difference was that the participants wrote down information that was unknown to the interviewer (i.e., listed knowledge gaps). As in Experiment 1, we coded answers if a theme was mentioned with no indication of its level of specificity (total range: 0 to 14 themes).

Inter-rater reliability. Two persons coded 30% of the written answers (9 for each condition), and these 30% were assessed for inter-rater reliability (Cohen's $\kappa = .92$). After discussing and resolving discrepancies, the final agreed-upon scores were used in the analysis, and one person coded the remaining 70% of the answers.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

The participants were motivated to perform their role as a source ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 1.41$), did not find it difficult to understand the instructions of the study ($M = 1.70$, $SD = .79$), and found it moderately difficult to take the role of a source ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.90$). No differences were found between the two conditions with respect to the participants' motivation, $t(58) = 0.548$, $p = .586$, $d = 0.14$, how difficult it was to understand the study's instructions, $t(58) = 0.652$, $p = .517$, $d = 0.18$, or how difficult it was to take the role of a source, $t(58) = -0.745$, $p = .460$, $d = 0.19$.

Perception of the Interviewer's Knowledge Gaps

Unknown information. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the participants in the just start condition ($M = 6.13$, $SD = 3.00$) wrote down significantly less information that they perceived as unknown to the interviewer compared to the participants in the traditional condition ($M = 7.70$, $SD = 3.06$), $t(58) = -2.000$, $p = .025$, one-tailed, $d = 0.52$.

Knowledge gaps search. In support of Hypothesis 2, the participants in the just start condition ($M = 4.70$, $SD = 1.75$) searched to a significantly lesser extent for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge compared to the participants in the traditional condition ($M = 5.63$, $SD = 1.59$), $t(58) = -2.168$, $p = .017$, one-tailed, $d = 0.56$.

Global perception. No difference was found between the just start condition ($M = 3.20$, $SD = 1.42$) and the traditional condition ($M = 3.20$, $SD = 1.38$) with respect to the participants' global perception of gaps in the interviewer's knowledge, $t(58) = 0.000$, $p = 1.00$, one-tailed, $d = 0.00$. This did not align with Hypothesis 3.

Discussion

The results confirmed two of our three predictions. As expected, we found that the participants in the just start condition listed comparatively less information that was unknown to the interviewer,

and searched to a comparatively lesser extent for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge. That means, the sources in the just start condition searched comparatively less actively for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge information. However, no difference was found between the two conditions with respect to the sources' global perception of gaps in the interviewer's knowledge. Below we discuss the results of Experiment 1 and 2 in an integrated manner.

General Discussion

The present research examined two ways of introducing the Scharff-technique's illusion of knowing it all tactic. For the traditional condition, the interviewer began presenting known information with a statement on the amount and relevance of known information. In contrast, for the just start condition, the interviewer started presenting information without such a statement. In two separate experiments we compared these two conditions and mapped how sources tested and perceived the interviewer's knowledge in terms of known (Experiment 1) and unknown information (Experiment 2).

In Experiment 1, no difference was found between the two conditions with respect to how actively the sources tested the interviewer's knowledge. However, the sources in the just start condition perceived that the interviewer possessed a larger amount of knowledge compared to the sources in the traditional condition. In Experiment 2, we found that the sources in the just start condition tested the interviewer's knowledge less actively for unknown information compared to the traditional condition. However, the two conditions did not differ in terms of the sources' global perception of gaps in the interviewer's knowledge. In sum, the sources in the just start condition tested comparatively less actively for gaps in the interviewer's knowledge, and inferred that the interviewer held comparatively more knowledge.

The results confirmed some but not all of our predictions. Based on the framework for social hypothesis (Trope & Liberman, 1996), we expected to find a link between (a) how actively the sources tested the interviewer's knowledge in terms of known/unknown information and (b) how they—on a global level—perceived the interviewer's knowledge/knowledge gaps. Unexpectedly, we did not find this link. However, we found that in Experiment 1, the sources in the just start condition perceived the interviewer to have had a greater extent of knowledge without searching more actively for known information (vs. the traditional condition). This suggests that the hypothesis could have been confirmed without searching more actively for known information and a hypothesis confirmation strategy could have therefore been used accordingly. In Experiment 2, the sources in the traditional condition might have used a positive test strategy as they searched more actively for unknown information, but did not perceive the interviewer to have more knowledge gaps (vs. the just start condition). However, further research is needed to examine these hypothesis test strategies. Overall, in the present experiments, the just start condition outperformed the traditional condition in terms of maximizing the sources' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge and minimizing their focus on information that was unknown to the interviewer. The relevance of this becomes particularly obvious when linking these findings to the sources' counter-interrogation strategies (a) to reveal only information that is already known to the interviewer, and (b) to refrain from filling in crucial gaps in the interviewer's knowledge (Soufan, 2011; Toliver, 1997).

The present study came with a number of limitations as well as some fruitful input with respect to directions for future research. A rather general limitation of the illusion of knowing it all tactic is that in order to implement it, prior information is required. Furthermore, in certain situations presenting information to a source

poses a risk (e.g., if a source is not credible). That is, the illusion of knowing it all tactic should only be implemented in certain situations. A limitation concerning the current study was that it was a role-play based on a student sample. However, we believe that real-life sources, who are in an information management dilemma similar to the one examined in the present study, would be comparatively more motivated to explore the interviewer's knowledge. This could mean that the just start condition may be even more effective in real-life situations. Furthermore, we decided to conduct the interviews via phone, to prohibit the participants from revealing any case-specific information, and to give them no chance to ask any questions, as this could have influenced our manipulations. However, we view the current research as a first step in examining sources' perceptions of the illusion of knowing it all tactic and future studies should address these issues. For future studies it might be also worthwhile to vary the introductory statement (e.g., "to have some important information") and the specificity and amount of presented information. Also, we believe that there is room for future research on how to elaborate the presented information presentation. For example, the interviewer could add in ambiguous information, as several studies have shown that such information is likely to be interpreted in favor of the hypothesis (Darley & Gross, 1983; Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974; Schulz-Hardt & Köhnken, 2000). Finally, it might also be worthwhile to examine how to introduce evidence in police interviews.

Conclusions

The present study examined two versions of how to introduce the illusion of knowing it all tactic. This tactic specifies that an interviewer presents already known information and is at the very core of the Scharff-technique. In conclusion, we have demonstrated that sources who were not presented with an explicit introductory statement on the presented information (a) searched less actively for information unknown to the interviewer, and (b) perceived the interviewer to have held a larger amount of prior knowledge, compared to sources who were presented with an interviewer's statement implying that s/he already had most of the important information. Further research is needed to examine more closely how to introduce and present known information in order to inflate sources' perceptions of how much knowledge the interviewer holds about an event to be discussed.

Conflict of Interest

The authors of this article declare no conflict of interest.

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APPENDIX A: Publications

- I. May, L., & Granhag, P. A. (2016). Techniques for eliciting human intelligence: Examining possible order effects of the Scharff tactics. *Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law*, 23(2), 275–287. doi: 10.1080/13218719.2015.1054410

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- II. May, L., & Granhag, P. A. (2016). Using the Scharff-technique to elicit information: How to effectively establish the “illusion of knowing it all”? *The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context*, 8(2), 79–85. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpal.2016.02.001

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- III. May, L., Granhag, P. A., & Tekin, S. (2017). Interviewing suspects in denial: On how different evidence disclosure modes affect the elicitation of new critical information. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 8, 1–11. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01154**

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Interviewing Suspects in Denial: On How Different Evidence Disclosure Modes Affect the Elicitation of New Critical Information

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This study examines how different evidence disclosure modes affect the elicitation of new critical information. Two modes derived from the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) framework were compared against an early disclosure mode (i.e., the evidence was disclosed at the outset of the interview). Participants ($N = 88$) performed a mock crime consisting of several actions before they were interviewed as suspects. In both SUE conditions the interviewer elicited and disclosed statement-evidence inconsistencies in two phases after an introductory phase. For the SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) condition, the interview was introduced in a business-like manner, and the interviewer confronted the suspects with the in/consistencies without giving them a chance to comment on these. For the SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (SUE-IPR) condition, the interviewer introduced the interview in a non-guilt-presumptive way, presented the in/consistencies and allowed the suspects to comment on these, and then responded to their comments; at all times in a non-judgmental manner. Both SUE conditions generated comparatively more statement-evidence inconsistencies. The SUE-IPR condition resulted in more new critical information about the phase of the crime for which the interviewer lacked information, compared to the Early disclosure condition. A likely explanation for this was that (for the SUE-IPR condition) the interviewer used the inconsistencies to create a fostering interview atmosphere and made the suspects overestimate the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime. In essence, this study shows that in order to win the game (i.e., obtaining new critical information), the interviewer needs to keep the suspect in the game (i.e., by not being too confrontational and judgmental).

Keywords: suspect interview, information elicitation, information gathering, counter-interrogation strategies, strategic use of evidence

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INTRODUCTION

One important aim of a suspect interview is to collect new case-related information (Memon et al., 2003). Ethical interviewing approaches suggest gathering this information in an open minded-manner (e.g., the PEACE model; Bull, 2014). Furthermore, the research literature shows that ethical and humane interviewing approaches are associated with forthcoming suspects (Holmberg and Christianson, 2002; Kebbell et al., 2010; Snook et al., 2015). In suspect interviews, the use of

evidence is often at the core. Unfortunately, to date only few studies have provided knowledge on the link between evidence disclosure and information elicitation (e.g., Tekin et al., 2015; Walsh and Bull, 2015). Therefore, this study was designed to examine how different evidence disclosure modes affect the elicitation of new critical information.

The Strategic Use of Evidence Framework

The Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) framework consists of general principles that can be used to obtain diagnostic cues to deceit (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2014), and to elicit new information (e.g., Tekin et al., 2016). At the core of the SUE framework is the suspects' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge, and how these perceptions affect the suspects' counter-interrogation strategies, and in turn their verbal responses (Granhag, 2010; Granhag and Hartwig, 2015).

Research has shown that innocent and guilty suspects aiming to convince the interviewer of their innocence differ with respect to their counter-interrogation strategies. Broadly speaking, innocent suspects have seldom something to conceal, they trust that they will be believed if they "just tell it like it happened" (Kassin, 2005), and hence employ forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies (Hartwig et al., 2010). In contrast, guilty suspects are typically motivated to conceal crime-relevant information. Therefore, they commonly prepare for the interview (Hartwig et al., 2007), and reflect on the interviewer's possible knowledge (e.g., Moston and Engelberg, 2011). If they estimate that the interviewer does not hold specific information, they will likely use withholding strategies with respect to this information ("I will not tell any information that might be incriminating"). However, if a guilty suspect believes the interviewer holds specific information, s/he will likely employ forthcoming strategies with respect to this particular information ("It is meaningless to withhold what the interviewer already knows"). Therefore, an interviewer might profit from having the suspect overestimate how much information s/he holds.

An interviewer who aims to elicit new information on a phase of a crime for which s/he lacks information can exploit the knowledge about suspects' counter-interrogation strategies by using the available evidence strategically. For example, the interviewer may elicit statement-evidence inconsistencies by asking questions about the available evidence without disclosing it. Guilty suspects will likely produce statements that are inconsistent with the evidence, as they are unaware of the interviewer's knowledge and therefore tend to use withholding strategies. Next, the interviewer may disclose these inconsistencies to the suspect. This may result in the suspects realizing that the interviewer held more knowledge than first thought. Furthermore, the suspect may rethink his or her perception of the interviewer's knowledge concerning the information that have not yet been discussed ("S/he may hold information also on other aspects"). Basically, the interviewer wants to achieve two things by eliciting and disclosing inconsistencies: (1) to reveal his or her interview tactic to the suspect (i.e., asking questions about the evidence before disclosing it), and (2) to make the suspect overestimate his or her knowledge. Critically, this in turn may result in the suspects

changing from less to more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies. Finally, the interviewer asks questions about the part of the crime for which s/he lacks information. If a guilty suspect now uses more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies, s/he will reveal new information.

In contrast, innocent suspects are expected to typically use forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies throughout the interview. Therefore, the innocent suspects will likely provide statements that are consistent with the evidence (when asked questions about the evidence) and reveal new information (when asked questions about the part for which the interviewer lacks information).

Research on the SUE Framework

In the first study examining how the SUE framework could be used to elicit new information from guilty suspects, a SUE confrontation condition was compared against an Early disclosure condition (Tekin et al., 2015). To illustrate the implementation of the SUE protocol, consider a crime that can be divided into three different phases (A, B, and C). The interviewer holds evidence about Phase A and B indicating the suspect's possible involvement in the crime. However, the interviewer lacks information about the critical phase (Phase C). The interviewer starts by asking questions about Phase A without disclosing the evidence on this phase (in order to generate statement-evidence inconsistencies), and confronts the suspect with these statement-evidence inconsistencies. The interviewer then repeats this procedure for Phase B. Finally, the interviewer asks about Phase C, for which s/he lacks information. Importantly, in the study by Tekin et al. (2015), for the SUE confrontation condition, the suspects were not given any opportunity to comment on their in/consistencies. For the Early disclosure condition, the interviewer disclosed the evidence about Phase A and Phase B before asking questions about it. The SUE confrontation condition resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies, more new information, and that the suspects perceived the interviewer to have held more information about the critical phase of the crime compared to the Early disclosure condition.

In a second study, two SUE conditions were compared against the Early disclosure condition (Tekin et al., 2016). The two SUE protocols were implemented as described above and differed only with respect to the way in which the statement-evidence in/consistencies were handled. For the SUE confrontation condition the suspects were not given any opportunity to comment on the in/consistencies. In contrast, for the SUE confrontation/explain condition, the interviewer explicitly asked the suspects to explain their inconsistencies. Both SUE conditions generated more statement-evidence inconsistencies compared to the Early disclosure condition. However, only the SUE confrontation condition resulted in more new information compared to the Early disclosure condition. This was unexpected as the suspects in both SUE conditions perceived the interviewer to hold comparatively more information about the critical phase. Further analysis showed that a small group of suspects in the SUE confrontation/explain condition were reluctant to explain their inconsistencies, and these suspects revealed less new information compared to the suspects who did explain their inconsistencies.

Differently put, some suspects seemed to have given up trying to explain their inconsistencies, and therefore continued to use a withholding strategy also when questioned about the critical phase. This shows that in order to have suspects reveal new information at a later stage in an interview, they have to be willing to explain the inconsistencies that occur early on in the interview.

The Present Study

The present study advances research on the SUE framework by examining the effects of three different modes of evidence disclosure. Two modes derived from the SUE framework were compared against a mode for which the evidence was disclosed early in the interview. All interview protocols were divided into an introductory phase (Phase 1) and three questioning phases (Phases 2, 3, and 4). For the *Early disclosure condition*, the interviewer disclosed all the evidence at the outset (Phase 1), and then continued with open-ended invitations asking the suspect to explain the disclosed evidence (Phases 2 and 3). In both SUE conditions the interviewer attempted to elicit statement-evidence in/consistencies for Phases 2 and 3 (by asking questions about the evidence without disclosing it). The SUE conditions differed with respect to the way the interviewer (a) introduced the interview (Phase 1) and (b) disclosed the in/consistencies to the suspects (Phase 2 and 3). For the *SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) condition*, the interviewer introduced the interview in a business-like manner (Phase 1), and confronted the suspects with their in/consistencies without giving them any chance to comment on them (Phases 2 and 3). In contrast, for the *SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (SUE-IPR) condition* the interviewer introduced the interview in a non-guilt-presumptive way (Phase 1), presented the statement-evidence in/consistencies in a manner that allowed the suspects to comment on these, and then responded to their comments (Phases 2 and 3); all these steps were implemented in a non-judgmental manner (see detailed descriptions below). Phase 4 of the interview concerned the actions for which the interviewer lacked information. This phase was approached in the same manner for all three interview conditions: The interviewer began with an open-ended invitation, and if the suspects revealed information the interviewer asked follow-up questions. Compared to previous studies (Tekin et al., 2016) the SUE-IPR condition is novel, whereas similar versions of the SUE-C condition and Early disclosure condition were also used before.

As in previous studies using the SUE framework to elicit new information (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), all mock suspects in this study were guilty. The rationale behind this was that previous studies using a similar design have shown innocent suspects to be forthcoming to a very high extent (Luke et al., 2014; Tekin et al., 2014), and we had no reason to assume that innocent suspects would be less forthcoming in the present study. Furthermore, we mapped only the incriminating information that the suspects revealed during the interview and which was new to the interviewer. We used the term “new information” (instead of “admissions” as used in previous studies; e.g., Tekin et al., 2016) as in some countries admissions refer to suspects’ statements in court.

In the present study, we introduced a new way to capture the course of the suspects’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge. That is, the participants listened to the audio recordings of their interviews once the interview was over, and used a checklist to report their perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge at four different points of the interview (after Phase 1, 2, 3 and 4). This procedure enabled us to examine—in a more detailed manner—how specific interview phases affected the suspects’ overestimations of the interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime.

On the basis of previous research and the arguments outlined above, we predicted that both SUE conditions would result in more statement-evidence inconsistencies compared to the Early disclosure condition (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we predicted that the SUE conditions would elicit more new information about the phase for which the interviewer lacked information, compared to the Early disclosure condition (Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, we predicted that the SUE-IPR condition would result in more new information compared to the SUE-C condition (Hypothesis 2b). The rationale for this was that we expected the non-judgmental approach (used for the SUE-IPR condition) to increase the suspects’ willingness to explain the inconsistencies to the interviewer in Phase 3. In turn, this forthcomingness during Phase 3 was expected to be associated with the suspects’ forthcomingness during the critical Phase 4, and consequently the amount of new information elicited.

Furthermore, we predicted that during interview Phase 3 (Hypothesis 3a) and Phase 4 (Hypothesis 3b) the suspects in the SUE conditions would overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime to a higher degree than the suspects in the Early disclosure condition. Finally, we predicted that the suspects in the SUE-IPR condition would perceive that the interviewer had behaved more respectful (Hypothesis 4a), and friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-C condition and the Early disclosure condition (Hypothesis 4b). These expectations were based on the non-judgmental approach used for the SUE-IPR condition.

METHODS

Participants

The study included 88 participants (50 females and 38 males; 69 students, 13 employees and six unemployed persons). The participants’ mean age was 27.91 years ($SD = 9.45$; ranging from 18 to 66), and the participants were randomly assigned to one of the three interview conditions (30 for the SUE-C, 29 for the SUE-IPR, and 29 for the Early disclosure). The participants’ age, gender and occupation did not differ across the three interview conditions. Originally, 92 participants were recruited, but four had to be excluded as they misunderstood the instructions of the study (three did not follow through with the mock-crime and one used the first possibility to make a full confession). The participants received compensation in the form of course credit or €10. Ethical approval was not required for this study in accordance with the national and institutional guidelines.

Procedure

The Mock Crime

Participants received information that the study was about security measures and detection of criminal activities. They were instructed to imagine themselves being a member of a criminal group, which had to perform a mission consisting of three phases (A, B, and C) in order to prepare an attack. First, the participants left the building at the forecourt Habelschwerdter Allee, had a brief dialog with an accomplice, and received a paper from her with a code for a locker (Phase A). Second, after returning to the building they entered the library, opened a locker with the code, and took out a cloth bag. The bag contained a book (which they could use to disguise him or her as a student) and a key for a lockbox that had been stolen by an accomplice (Phase B). Third, they walked further inside the building to Street-29, opened a lockbox with the key, and collected a mobile phone and a small box. They were told that an accomplice had prepared the mobile phone for the attack and had stolen the vials inside the box from a chemical lab. Next, the participants walked via a ramp to a notice board on the first floor from which they took a booklet with the label “do not remove.” The booklet included building plans of the target location. Finally, they left the building at the forecourt Fabekstraße, followed a path next to the building, and deposited all the materials under a ventilation machine (Phase C). During the full mock crime, the participants had the written instructions and a map of the premises with them.

After returning to the lab, the participants were asked to sketch their route on a map in order to check if they performed and remembered the actions correctly. They then received written instructions that a suspicious bag has been found and break-ins and thefts have been reported, that the police were investigating this case and that they had been invited to an interview as a suspect. Furthermore, they were instructed to imagine that they had consulted with their lawyer, who informed the police prior to the interview that the client was innocent and willing to make a statement. In order to increase their motivation, the participants were informed that they would receive their compensation only if they convinced the interviewer of their innocence, but in fact all participants received the compensation. The participants took 10 to 15 min to prepare for the interview.

The Interviews

One male and one female interviewer were trained in conducting the pre-scripted interviews. They were blind to the hypotheses, and conducted approximately the same number of interviews in each condition. All interviews were audio-recorded and their mean duration was 6.93 min ($SD = 1.56$); no difference was found between the interview conditions with respect to the duration of the interviews, $F(2, 85) = 1.68, p = 0.19, \eta_p^2 = 0.04$.

The interviewer held evidence on the crime Phases A and B; that information casted suspicion on the suspect, but did not prove any criminal activity. Specifically, the police had eyewitness evidence regarding Phase A stating that the suspect had (1) been at the forecourt Habelschwerdter Allee, (2) talked to a woman there, and (3) received something from her. The interviewer also had a video from a witness' smartphone about Phase B showing that the suspect had (4) been at the library,

(5) opened a locker, and (6) taken out a cloth bag. All interview protocols were divided into four phases: an introductory phase (Phase 1) and three phases of questioning (Phases 2, 3, and 4). See **Figure 1** for an illustration of the interview protocols.

SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) Condition

In this condition, the interviewer started the interview by outlining the suspicion against the suspect, and explained the format of the interview in a business-like manner (Phase 1): “Your lawyer informed us that you are willing to make a statement and that you say you are innocent. I want to ask you a couple of questions about this matter, and it is very important that you answer my questions in as much detail as possible.” The structures of Phases 2 and 3 were identical: The interviewer first asked a specific question about the suspect's whereabouts (e.g., “Have you been outside the building at the forecourt next to the Habelschwerdter Allee?”). If the suspect confirmed being there, the interviewer continued with an open-ended invitation (“Please tell me everything you have done there outside; start with your arrival at the forecourt.”), followed by a follow-up question. Then, depending on the suspect's response, the interviewer disclosed the evidence. Specifically, if the suspect's statement was consistent with the evidence, the interviewer disclosed this statement-evidence consistency in a neutral manner (e.g., “What you say fits well with the statement of a female witness who said that you have talked to a woman outside the building and that she has given something to you. Moving on to my next question now.”) If the suspect's statement was inconsistent with the evidence, the interviewer confronted him or her with this inconsistency by emphasizing the seriousness of this (e.g., “Well, but we have a female witness, who said that you talked to a woman outside the building and that she has given something to you. It is obvious that you are withholding information from me. This is serious and we will return to this later. But now I will move on to my next question.”) Importantly, the interviewer gave the suspect no chance to comment on the in/consistency, instead she continued immediately with posing questions. If the suspect disconfirmed the initially asked specific question about his or her whereabouts, the interviewer directly confronted him or her with the statement-evidence inconsistency. The interviewer used the evidence pertaining to Phase A in Phase 2, and the evidence about crime Phase B in Phase 3. For Phase 4, the interviewer began with an open-ended invitation about the suspect's further actions (“Tell me everything you have done after leaving the philological library and before arriving to the laboratory.”) If the suspect volunteered a clue, the interviewer then invited him or her to explain this in more detail (“You mentioned that you have been on the first floor; tell me everything you have done there.”) Finally, the interviewer asked a follow-up question and closed the interview.

SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (SUE-IPR) Condition

The SUE-IPR condition differed from the SUE-C condition with respect to the introduction (Phase 1) and the disclosure of the statement-evidence in/consistencies (Phases 2 and 3).




FIGURE 1 | Process of the three interview conditions.

Specifically, the interviewer introduced the interview in a non-guilt-presumptive and non-judgmental manner (Phase 1): “Your lawyer informed us that you are willing to make a statement and that you say you are innocent, and if this is true, you should of course not be here. I am really interested in your point of view in this matter as it is my task to solve this case, and if you are innocent then it is certainly my duty to show this, but then I need your assistance; it is important that you present your account and explanations, and answer and comment on everything as detailed as possible, and that you dispel the existent suspicion and uncertainty, OK?” In Phases 2 and 3, the interviewer presented the in/consistencies in a non-judgmental manner: if the suspect’s

statement was consistent (e.g., “What you say fits well with the statement of a female witness, who said that you have talked to a woman outside the building and that she has given something to you.”) or inconsistent with the evidence (e.g., “Well, but we have a female witness who said that you have talked to a woman outside the building and she has given something to you.”) Then the interviewer paused for a few seconds to give the suspect the chance to comment without putting pressure on him or her. The interviewer noted the suspect’s comment and responded still in a non-judgmental manner if the suspect’s explanation was consistent with the evidence (e.g., “OK, now what you say fits well with the witness statement.”) or if it was still inconsistent (e.g.,

“OK, we might have to look at this more thoroughly then.”). The questioning procedure of Phase 4 was identical to that used for the SUE-C condition.

Early Disclosure Condition

In this condition, the interviewer started the interview exactly as in the SUE-C condition in a business-like manner. However, before posing any questions, the interviewer disclosed all the available evidence (Phase 1): “Ok, we have a female witness, who said that you have been outside the building at the forecourt next to the Habelschwerdter Allee, and she said also that you talked to a woman and she has given something to you. Also, we have a male witness, who said that you were at the philological building and that you opened a locker there and gathered a cloth bag.” For Phase 2, the interviewer began with an open-ended invitation about the evidence pertaining to the suspect’s crime Phase A (e.g., “Please tell me everything you have done at the forecourt next to the Habelschwerdter Allee. Start with your arrival at the forecourt.”), and a follow-up question. For Phase 3, the interviewer asked questions about the evidence pertaining to the suspect’s crime Phase B. The procedure of Phase 4 was identical to those used for the SUE conditions.

Post-Interview Questionnaire

After the interview, the experimenter came into the room, explained that the role-play was over and asked the participants to fill out a questionnaire. The first part of the questionnaire consisted of questions about demographic information (age, sex, and occupation). Then, the participants rated on 7-point scales how motivated they were to carry out their role as a mock criminal during the crime and interview (1 = *Not at all motivated*, 7 = *Very motivated*), and how difficult it was to understand the instructions of the study (1 = *Not at all difficult*, 7 = *Very difficult*). Next, they answered the following two questions about their perceptions of the interview on 7-point scales: “How respectful was the interviewer to you?” (1 = *Not at all respectful*, 7 = *Very respectful*); and “How friendly was the interviewer?” (1 = *Not at all friendly*, 7 = *Very friendly*).

Afterwards the experimenter played to each participant the audio recording of the interview conducted with him or her. The recording was paused four times: (1) after Phase 1, (2) after Phase 2, (3) after Phase 3, and (4) after Phase 4/ the full interview. At each pause, the participants were asked the following question: “When you think back at this point of the interview and consider the interviewer’s case-related knowledge, did you think that the interviewer held information that you had not told him or her?” If the participants confirmed this, they were asked to mark, on a checklist with 17 pieces of information, the pieces they perceived the interviewer to know at that specific point of the interview. Six of these 17 pieces were the evidence held by the interviewer (about Phases A and B of the crime). The remaining 11 pieces of information concerned the critical phase of the crime that was actually unknown to the interviewer and which were coded as new information (see below). For the analysis, we used only the participants’ perceptions of the interviewer’s knowledge about the critical phase of the crime. As the interviewer actually lacked

any information of this critical phase of the crime, the suspects could only overestimate the interviewer’s knowledge (and not underestimate it).

Codings

The suspects’ statements were coded concerning the number of *statement-evidence inconsistencies* in Phases 2 and 3. Contradictions and omissions were counted as inconsistencies. The number of inconsistencies with the evidence for both Phases 2 and 3 varied between 0 (no inconsistency) and 3 (inconsistent with all 3 pieces of evidence); thus, the total number of inconsistencies was between 0 and 6. Two persons blind to the experimental hypotheses coded a random 33% of the interviews and on this basis the inter-rater reliability was calculated (Cohen’s $\kappa = 0.907$). Furthermore, for the SUE-IPR condition, the two persons coded these interviews with respect to the number of inconsistencies that were explained by the suspects (explaining means that the suspect clarified the presented inconsistency); inter-rater reliability was assessed (Cohen’s $\kappa = 0.696$).

To measure *new information* the interviews were coded with respect to the information revealed for the critical phase. The actions that each suspect had performed during this particular phase were broken down into a total of 11 pieces of critical information. These 11 pieces of information were: (1) walking through Street-29; (2) standing at the lockboxes; (3) taking something from a lockbox; (4) walking over a ramp; (5) being on the first floor; (6) standing at a bulletin board; (7) taking something from the bulletin board; (8) walking over the forecourt Fabekstraße; (9) walking on a path next to the building; (10) standing next to a ventilation machine; and (11) depositing something under the ventilation machine. Hence, the total number of new pieces of information that a suspect could reveal could vary between 0 (no new information revealed) and 11 (all new information revealed). The same two coders who were blind to the experimental hypotheses rated the 33% of the interviews with respect to the new information revealed and inter-rater reliability was calculated (Cohen’s $\kappa = 0.879$). All disagreements were discussed, and then one of them coded the remaining interviews.

RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses

The participants were highly motivated to perform their role as mock criminals ($M = 5.92$, $SD = 1.05$); no difference was found between the three interview conditions, $F_{(2, 85)} = 1.63$, $p = 0.202$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.04$. Furthermore, the participants reported that it was rather easy to understand the experimental instructions ($M = 2.28$, $SD = 1.24$); no difference was found between the three interview conditions, $F_{(2, 85)} = 0.87$, $p = 0.421$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$.

Statement-Evidence Inconsistencies

A mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Interview condition as the between-subjects factor and Phase (2 and 3) as the within-subjects factor was conducted (see **Table 1** for the

descriptive statistics of the suspects' verbal responses). We found a main effect of Interview condition, $F_{(2, 85)} = 6.10, p = 0.003, \eta_p^2 = 0.13$. In line with Hypothesis 1, Bonferroni tests showed that the SUE-C condition, $p = 0.009$, and the SUE-IPR condition, $p = 0.011$, resulted in more inconsistencies compared to the Early disclosure condition. No difference was found between the two SUE conditions. There was a significant main effect of Phase, $F_{(1, 85)} = 15.12, p < 0.001, \eta_p^2 = 0.15$, indicating that Phase 2 ($M = 1.17, SD = 0.09$) resulted in more inconsistencies compared to Phase 3 ($M = 0.78, SD = 1.00$). Examining this further, we found that the SUE-C condition, $F_{(1, 85)} = 4.64, p = 0.034, \eta_p^2 = 0.05$, and the SUE-IPR condition, $F_{(1, 85)} = 12.85, p = 0.001, \eta_p^2 = 0.13$, resulted in more inconsistencies in Phase 2 compared to Phase 3. No such difference was found for the Early disclosure condition, $F_{(1, 85)} = 0.99, p = 0.322, \eta_p^2 = 0.01$. Finally, no interaction effect was found, $F_{(2, 85)} = 1.69, p = 0.192, \eta_p^2 = 0.04$.

New Information Elicited

A one-way ANOVA with Interview condition as the factor showed a significant effect on the amount of new information elicited during Phase 4, $F_{(2, 85)} = 3.60, p = 0.032, \eta_p^2 = 0.08$. Bonferroni tests revealed that the SUE-IPR condition resulted in more new information in comparison to the Early disclosure condition, $p = 0.037$. No significant differences were found between the SUE-C condition and the Early disclosure condition or between the two SUE conditions.

Next, we combined the two SUE conditions (hereafter SUE combined). A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference between the SUE combined ($M = 4.88, SD = 2.82$) and the Early disclosure condition ($M = 3.79, SD = 2.48$) with respect to the new information revealed, $F_{(1, 86)} = 3.12, p = 0.081, \eta_p^2 = 0.04$. Overall, Hypothesis 2a found partial support; Hypothesis 2b found no support.

Suspects' Overestimations of the Interviewer's Knowledge

We conducted a mixed-design ANOVA with Interview condition as the between-subjects factor and Phase (1, 2, 3, and 4) as the within-subjects factor. The test of sphericity was significant; hence, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied (see Table 2 for the descriptive statistics on the suspects' overestimations). There was no significant interaction effect, $F_{(3,24, 137.84)} = 2.18, p = 0.088, \eta_p^2 = 0.05$. Furthermore, no main effect of Interview condition was found, $F_{(2, 85)} = 1.80, p = 0.171, \eta_p^2 = 0.04$.

TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for the suspects' verbal responses.

Condition	Statement-evidence inconsistencies			New information Phase 4 M (SD)
	Phase 2 M (SD)	Phase 3 M (SD)	Phase 2 + 3 M (SD)	
SUE-C	1.37 (0.93)	1.00 (1.05)	2.37 (1.59)	4.20 (2.54)
SUE-IPR	1.48 (0.91)	0.86 (0.83)	2.34 (1.47)	5.59 (2.97)
Early disclosure	0.66 (0.81)	0.48 (0.83)	1.13 (1.55)	3.79 (2.48)
Total	1.17 (0.95)	0.78 (0.93)	1.95 (1.63)	4.52 (2.75)

However, there was a significant main effect of Phase on the suspects' overestimations indicating that the extent to which the suspects overestimated the interviewer's knowledge about the critical and unknown phase of the crime changed during the course of the interview, $F_{(1,62, 137.84)} = 45.54, p < 0.001, \eta_p^2 = 0.35$. Figure 2 illustrates that the suspects' overestimations of the interviewers' knowledge about the critical phase of the crime increased slightly in Phases 1, 2, and 3, and more markedly so in Phase 4. Furthermore, it shows that for the SUE conditions the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime (a) were higher at each interview phase, and (b) increased to a higher extent during the course of the interview, compared to the suspects in the Early disclosure condition.

Next, combining the two SUE conditions, we conducted a mixed-design ANOVA with Interview condition (SUE combined vs. Early disclosure condition) as the between-subjects factor and Phase (1, 2, 3, and 4) as the within-subjects factor. Again, the test of sphericity was significant, and we therefore used a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There was a marginally significant main effect of Interview condition, $F_{(1, 86)} = 3.64, p = 0.060, \eta_p^2 = 0.04$, indicating that the suspects in the SUE combined ($M = 1.91, SD = 0.29$) overestimated the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase to a higher extent, compared to the suspects in the Early disclosure condition ($M = 0.96, SD = 0.41$). Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of Phase, $F_{(1,62, 139.70)} = 32.42, p < 0.001, \eta_p^2 = 0.27$. Finally, there was a

TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime.

Condition	Overestimation of the interviewer's knowledge			
	Phase 1 M (SD)	Phase 2 M (SD)	Phase 3 M (SD)	Phase 4 M (SD)
SUE-C	1.07 (2.83)	1.33 (2.95)	1.53 (3.13)	3.77 (3.65)
SUE-IPR	0.80 (1.50)	1.28 (2.42)	1.62 (2.58)	3.93 (3.45)
Early disclosure	0.55 (1.64)	0.66 (1.65)	0.72 (1.67)	1.90 (2.27)
SUE combined	0.92 (2.27)	1.31 (2.68)	1.58 (2.85)	3.85 (3.47)
Total	0.80 (2.08)	1.09 (2.40)	1.30 (2.54)	3.20 (3.25)




FIGURE 2 | The course of the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime.

significant interaction effect, $F_{(1.62, 139.70)} = 4.12, p = 0.025, \eta_p^2 = 0.05$. Simple effect tests showed that for the SUE combined the suspects' overestimations changed during the course of the interview $F_{(3, 83)} = 20.26, p < 0.001, \eta_p^2 = 0.42$. Specifically, the suspects overestimated the interviewer's knowledge to a higher extent during Phase 3 compared to Phase 1, $p = 0.013$, and during Phase 4 compared to Phase 1, 2, and 3, $ps < 0.001$. For the Early disclosure condition, no such change over the interview was found, $F_{(3, 83)} = 2.20, p = 0.094, \eta_p^2 = 0.07$. Simple effect tests at each Phase showed that only during Phase 4 the suspects for the SUE combined ($M = 3.85, SD = 3.47$) overestimated the interviewer's knowledge to a higher extent than the suspects in the Early disclosure condition ($M = 1.90, SD = 2.27$), $F_{(1, 86)} = 7.54, p = 0.007, \eta_p^2 = 0.08$. Overall, Hypothesis 3a was not supported, and Hypothesis 3b found support.

In general, the degree of the suspects' overestimation of the interviewer's knowledge was positively correlated with the amount of new information elicited ($r = 0.255, p = 0.016$). However, no significant correlations were found for the SUE-C condition ($r = 0.151, p = 0.427$), the SUE-IPR condition ($r = 0.248, p = 0.194$), the Early disclosure condition ($r = 0.281, p = 0.140$), or the SUE combined ($r = 0.199, p = 0.132$).

The Suspects' General Perceptions of the Interview

A one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of Interview condition on how respectfully the suspects felt that they were treated, $F_{(2, 85)} = 3.66, p = 0.030, \eta_p^2 = 0.08$. Bonferroni tests revealed that the suspects in the SUE-IPR condition ($M = 6.38, SD = 0.86$) felt that they were treated with more respect compared to the suspects in the SUE-C condition ($M = 5.37, SD = 1.88$), $p = 0.025$. No difference was found between the Early disclosure condition ($M = 5.79, SD = 1.37$) and the SUE conditions. Thus, Hypothesis 4a was partially supported.

A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Interview condition on the suspects' perceptions regarding the interviewer's friendliness, $F_{(2, 85)} = 3.50, p = 0.034, \eta_p^2 = 0.08$. The suspects in the SUE-IPR condition ($M = 5.07, SD = 1.41$) found the interviewer to be friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-C condition ($M = 4.07, SD = 1.62$), $p = 0.030$. No differences were found between the Early disclosure condition ($M = 4.62, SD = 1.32$) and the SUE conditions. Hence, Hypothesis 4b found partial support.

Exploratory Analysis

Previous studies have shown that suspect who were forthcoming before entering the critical interview phase revealed more new information subsequently (Tekin et al., 2016). Therefore, we examined the effects of the two ways of disclosing inconsistencies (SUE conditions) on the suspects' forthcomingness in Phase 3 more closely. Specifically, we mapped the suspects' forthcomingness in Phase 3 when responding to the interviewer's questions and when explaining the inconsistencies. Furthermore, we examined the influence of the forthcomingness in Phase 3 (i.e., "being in the game") on the new information revealed in Phase 4.

First, mapping the suspects' forthcomingness in response to the interviewer's questions in Phase 3, forthcoming suspects were defined as suspects who generated no statement-evidence inconsistency when asked questions on the evidence. Conversely, withholding suspects referred to participants who generated a minimum of one statement-evidence inconsistency in Phase 3. A pairwise z-test showed no difference in the proportions of forthcoming suspects between the SUE-C condition (40.0%; $n = 12$) and the SUE-IPR condition (37.93%; $n = 11$), $z = 0.16, p = 0.873$. This shows that the elicitation of inconsistencies resulted in a similar number of forthcoming suspects. Further analysis showed that across both SUE conditions, the suspects who were forthcoming at the time when responding to the interviewer's questions in Phase 3 revealed significantly more new information during Phase 4 ($n = 23; M = 6.22, SD = 2.88$) compared to the suspects who were withholding at that time ($n = 36; M = 4.03, SD = 2.47$), $t_{(57)} = 3.12, p = 0.003$.

Second, we mapped the suspects' forthcomingness in response to the interviewer's questions and when explaining the disclosed inconsistencies (i.e., during the complete Phase 3). Forthcoming suspects were defined as participants who generated no statement-evidence inconsistency or explained at least one inconsistency in Phase 3. In contrast, withholding suspects referred to participants who generated a minimum of one statement-evidence inconsistency without explaining at least one inconsistency in Phase 3. This procedure aimed to examine a possible influence of the two ways of disclosing inconsistencies on the suspects' forthcomingness. A pairwise z-test showed that the proportion of forthcoming suspects was significantly larger for the SUE-IPR condition (75.9%; $n = 22$) compared to the SUE-C condition (40.0%; $n = 12$), $z = 2.79, p = 0.005$. This shows that for the SUE-IPR condition the elicitation and disclosure of statement-evidence inconsistencies resulted in more forthcoming suspects compared to the SUE-C condition. Again, across both conditions, the suspects who were forthcoming during the Phase 3 ($n = 34$) revealed significantly more new information during Phase 4 ($M = 5.94, SD = 2.79$) compared to the suspects who were withholding during Phase 3 ($n = 25; M = 3.44, SD = 2.20$), $t_{(57)} = 3.72, p < 0.001$. This indicates that it was crucial that the suspects were "in the game" in Phase 3 in order to reveal new information in Phase 4.

DISCUSSION

This study was on guilty suspects in denial and examined the effects of three modes of evidence disclosure. Overall, we found that when the principles of the SUE framework were used in a non-judgmental manner comparatively more new information was elicited.

Suspects' Verbal Behavior

Evidence can be disclosed in different ways. An important factor is the timing of the evidence disclosure. It was found that asking questions about the evidence before disclosing it (SUE conditions) resulted in more statement-evidence inconsistencies compared to when the evidence was disclosed before asking

questions about it (Early disclosure condition). This result is in line with previous studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), and can be explained by acknowledging the SUE principles. The suspects in the SUE conditions initially employed withholding counter-interrogation strategies as they perceived the interviewer to be unaware of the evidence that s/he was asking about. In contrast, the suspects in the Early disclosure condition were made aware that the interviewer had knowledge about the evidence, and therefore used more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies. Also consistent with previous findings (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), for the SUE conditions the number of inconsistencies declined from Phase 2 to Phase 3. This suggests that after being faced with inconsistencies in Phase 2, the suspects in the SUE conditions might have been revising their perception of the interviewer's knowledge. Based on this revised estimation they might have decided to use a less withholding counter-interrogation strategy for Phase 3.

The elicited statement-evidence inconsistencies can be handled in different ways. This study examines two modes of how to introduce and disclose the in/consistencies. The first was a confrontational way, where the interviewer started in a business-like manner and disclosed the in/consistencies without giving the suspects the opportunity to comment on them (SUE-C condition). The second was a non-accusatorial way, where the interviewer started in a non-guilt-presumptive manner, presented the in/consistencies in such a way that the suspects could comment on them, and then responded to their comments; critically, all steps were used in a non-judgmental manner (SUE-IPR condition). This non-judgmental presentation of the inconsistencies (SUE-IPR condition) resulted in a higher proportion of forthcoming suspects during Phase 3, compared to the confrontational approach (SUE-C condition). This is important as previous findings have shown that suspects need to be willing to discuss the evidence with the interviewer in order for the interviewer to subsequently elicit new information (Tekin et al., 2016). Differently put, it was crucial that the suspects used more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies when discussing the evidence in Phase 3 before entering Phase 4, in which the interviewer asked about the critical phase of the crime.

The SUE-IPR condition resulted in significantly more new information about the critical phase of the crime compared to the Early disclosure condition. Differently put, for the SUE-IPR condition 48% of the suspects told half or more of all information they held on the critical phase of the crime (i.e., 6 pieces or more), whereas the corresponding figure for the Early disclosure condition was 27%. In contrast to previous studies (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016), the SUE-C condition did not result in more new information compared to the Early disclosure condition. A possible explanation for this is that the SUE-C condition resulted in a lower proportion of forthcoming suspects during Phase 3 compared to the SUE-IPR condition. In support of this reasoning, we found that across the two SUE conditions the suspects who were forthcoming during Phase 3 revealed more new information in Phase 4, compared to the suspects who had been withholding in Phase 3. This indicates that the non-judgmental interviewing style in the SUE-IPR

condition promoted (a) the suspects' forthcomingness to discuss the evidence with the interviewer in Phase 3, and (b) the amount of new information elicited in Phase 4.

Suspects' Perceptions of the Interviewer

In previous studies the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge about the critical and unknown phase of the crime were captured by Likert scale ratings (Tekin et al., 2015) or by completing a checklist (Tekin et al., 2016). These studies found that the suspects in the SUE conditions overestimated the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime to a higher degree than the suspects in the Early disclosure condition. For the present study the suspects' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase of the crime were captured at four points during the interview. This novel way of mapping suspects' perceptions resulted in a more detailed examination and advances our understanding of the effects of the SUE-tactics. Three outcomes are outlined below.

First, an argument for disclosing the evidence early in the interview may be to demonstrate the strength of the evidence and that "it is meaningless to deny any wrongdoing" already at the outset (Leo, 1996). This study found no support for such an argument, as in Phase 1 the suspects' overestimations in the Early disclosure condition were even slightly lower than the suspects' overestimations in the SUE conditions (see **Figure 2**). Second, in Phase 2 and 3 the suspects' overestimations in the SUE conditions increased slightly compared to the previous phases. This indicates that the disclosure of inconsistencies (SUE conditions) increased the suspects' overestimations to a rather small extent. Third, in Phase 4 the suspects' overestimations in the SUE conditions (a) increased significantly compared to the previous interview phases, and (b) were higher compared to the suspects' overestimations in the Early disclosure condition. An explanation for this is that in the SUE conditions the suspects are believed to have read the interviewer's tactic in Phase 2 and 3 (i.e., asking questions about the evidence before disclosing it). Based on this, the suspects in the SUE conditions might have anticipated the interviewer to use the same tactic also in Phase 4.

When relating the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge about the critical phase and the amount of new information elicited, we found a weak positive correlation over all conditions. In contrast to previous results (Tekin et al., 2016), no significant correlations were found within the individual SUE conditions. From this it seems that the suspects' overestimations about the critical phase of the crime were not the sole reason behind the amount of new information elicited. Instead, as outlined above, the suspects' forthcomingness during Phase 3 may also have played a crucial role.

Examining the suspects' general perceptions of the interview, we found that the suspects in the SUE-IPR condition felt that they were treated with more respect, and perceived the interviewer as friendlier compared to the suspects in the SUE-C condition. That is, the non-judgmental SUE protocol resulted in a fostering interview atmosphere. Evans et al. (2014) showed that such a fostering interview atmosphere "that facilitates kindness, cooperation, and respect" (p. 871) resulted in an increasing amount of information elicited. Critically, Alison

et al. (2013) also found that a neutral and non-judgmental disclosure of inconsistencies was positively associated with an adaptive interpersonal behavior, which in turn reduced the suspects' resistance and increased the amount of information gathered. This speaks to that the non-judgmental elicitation and presentation of statement-evidence inconsistencies (SUE-IPR condition) resulted in a fostering interview atmosphere that facilitated—for some suspects—a shift of counter-interrogation strategy from less to more forthcoming in Phase 3. The interviewer profited from this shift in Phase 4 by collecting new critical information.

Limitations and Future Directions

A non-judgmental interviewing style is particularly important in cases for which the evidence indicates (but does not prove) the suspects' involvement in a crime. Then the interviewer needs to be open-minded. However, a risk of an explicit non-guilt-presumptive approach could be that the interviewer only pretends to be open-minded in order to influence the suspect's decisions; for example, the decision to waive his or her right to silence. Importantly, we clearly distance ourselves from such manipulative use of the presented non-judgmental SUE protocol.

The present study comes with some limitations. First, we limited the sample to guilty suspects in denial and focused only on new incriminating information. For future studies, it may be worthwhile to examine the SUE framework (and especially the non-judgmental implementation of it) by interviewing innocent and guilty suspects mapping incriminating as well as exonerating new information. Second, the study is based on a sample that might not be representative of the usual suspects. We assume that in real-life guilty suspects in denial would be comparatively more motivated to develop and employ counter-interrogation strategies. In line with this, field studies have shown that real-life suspects devise and use verbal counter-interrogation strategies (e.g., "Providing well known information"; Alison et al., 2014), and do not generally deny everything. As the SUE tactics are tailored to counteract such verbal counter-interrogation strategies, they might be even more effective in real-life settings compared to laboratory settings. Third, the participants were stipulated that they would waive their right to silence and claim to be innocent after talking to their lawyer. According to the German Code of Criminal Procedure this process is practically possible. However, in real-life suspects can decide themselves whether they use their right to silence or not. The participants in this study did not have this chance, as for the examination of the interview protocols it was vital that all participants stated to be innocent. Fourth, in the present study both contradictions and omissions were counted as statement-evidence inconsistencies. For future, it may be worthwhile to examine the effects of contradictions and omissions on the suspects' perceptions and

verbal behavior separately. Fifth, we mapped the suspects' perceptions of the interviewer's knowledge by playing back the interview to the participants and asking them questions about their perceptions. In brief, such a method runs the risk that the participants are influenced by their previous verbal responses. We aimed to counteract this by carefully instructing them to answer the questions only based on their perceptions at that time of the interview. Overall, we consider this approach as a feasible way to map the suspects' overestimations of the interviewer's knowledge across an interview.

CONCLUSIONS

In suspect interviews the evidence can be used in different ways. This study showed that the interviewer can use the evidence to "keep the suspect in the game" and as a result of this collect new critical information at a later stage of the interview. However, this requires more than just disclosing evidence. In fact, the interviewer needs to elicit and present statement-evidence inconsistencies in a non-judgmental manner. In turn, this will foster a positive interview atmosphere, and affect the suspects to overestimate the interviewer's knowledge and to use more forthcoming counter-interrogation strategies. The non-judgmental SUE protocol can be described as an information-gathering interviewing style that views the suspect in a non-guilt presumptive manner, and thereby our information-gathering approach fits with more general frameworks for investigative interviewing such as the PEACE model (e.g., Milne and Bull, 1999).

ETHICS STATEMENT

Structurally similar studies have been conducted at the Psychology Department for 15 years (40 + individual studies), using—more or less—the same paradigm and experimental setup. The Regional Ethical Review Board in Gothenburg (Sweden) has explicitly and repeatedly informed us that we do not have to run each study (using this paradigm) via them. For those occasions where we submitted an application for a singular study, they have just returned the application with the response "We have received your application, but this study is not necessary to run through the Ethics Board".

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

PAG and LM planned the experiment. LM planned the experimental implementation and ST helped with this. LM collected and analyzed the data. LM wrote the manuscript and all authors (LM, PAG, and ST) revised it in cooperation.

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Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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APPENDIX B: German Summary (Deutsche Zusammenfassung)

Das Sammeln von Informationen in Befragungssituationen⁵ ist ein wichtiger Aspekt für die Aufklärung und Verhinderung von Straftaten (Memon et al., 2003; Redlich, 2007). Polizeiliche Beschuldigtenvernehmungen zielen oftmals darauf ab, Informationen über zurückliegende Straftaten zu erhalten, um den Verdacht einer Straftat gegen eine Person zu bestätigen bzw. zu beseitigen (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). Nachrichtendienstliche oder polizeiliche Befragungen von menschlichen Quellen zielen hingegen auf das Sammeln von Informationen zur Aufklärung von Straftaten und auch zur Gefahrenabwehr (Evans et al., 2010 Vrij & Granhag, 2014); menschliche Quellen sind dabei Personen, die eine Nähe zu terroristischen/extremistischen Vereinigungen, organisierter Kriminalität oder anderen Kriminalitätsfeldern aufweisen.

Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt eine bestimmte Form der Informationssammlung in Befragungen, nämlich das *Hervorarbeiten von Informationen*. Dabei handelt es sich um eine spezifische Art der Befragung, die neben dem Aussageverhalten der Befragten auch deren Ziele, Einschätzungen und Strategien berücksichtigt. Aufbauend auf diesen kognitiven und verbalen Prozessen der Beschuldigten/Quellen kann der Befrager seine bereits vorliegenden Erkenntnisse strategisch einsetzen, um neue sachverhaltsrelevante Informationen zu gewinnen. Denn während in Beschuldigtenvernehmungen per se belastende Erkenntnisse vor den Befragungen vorliegen (ansonsten sollte die Person nicht als Beschuldigter vernommen werden; Eisenberg, 2015), gibt es auch bei Quellenbefragungen oftmals Vorkenntnisse, die mittels anderer menschlicher oder technischer Quellen gewonnen wurden (persönliches Gespräch mit polizeilichen/nachrichtendienstlichen Mitarbeitern, 2016; Soufan, 2011).

⁵ Zur besseren Lesbarkeit wird für den Vernehmungskontext und die Interaktion mit menschlichen Quellen meist der Begriff Befragung verwendet (bzw. entsprechend Befrager und Befragter). Außerdem werden Personenbezeichnungen aus Gründen der besseren Lesbarkeit lediglich in der männlichen Form verwendet, schließen jeweils aber auch das andere Geschlecht mit ein.

Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, wie Befrager in polizeilichen und nachrichtendienstlichen Interaktionen solche bereits vorliegenden Erkenntnisse einsetzen können, um neue sachverhaltsrelevante Informationen zu gewinnen. *Neue Informationen* bedeutet, dass die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse dem Befrager zuvor nicht bekannt waren. Inspiriert von Granhag und Hartwig (2015) wurde deshalb in der vorliegenden Arbeit ein *zweistufiges Befragungsgerüst* zum Hervorarbeiten neuer Informationen entwickelt. Die *konzeptuelle Stufe* enthält Annahmen zu den kognitiven und verbalen Prozessen der Befragten in der Interaktion (siehe Abbildung 8). Durch Perspektivübernahme kann der Befrager Annahmen zu den kognitiven und verbalen Prozessen der Befragten machen und diese strategisch verwenden, um neue Informationen zu gewinnen. Die *taktische Stufe* umfasst dagegen konkrete Mittel, um Subziele in der Befragung zu erreichen. Befrager können die sich ergänzenden konzeptuellen und taktischen Stufen nutzen, um neue Informationen hervorzuarbeiten.




Abbildung 8. Kognitive und verbale Prozesse von Quellen/Beschuldigten in der Befragungsinteraktion.

Die konzeptuelle Stufe nimmt an, dass sich Quellen und Beschuldigte – wie Menschen im Allgemeinen (Arts, 2012) – zielorientiert verhalten. Dabei verfolgen manche Quellen und Beschuldigte konträre Befragungsziele; so etwa bei Beschuldigten: „Ich will meine Unschuld zeigen, obwohl ich die Handlungen tatsächlich begangen habe“ (Volbert et al., 2016). Ein konträres Befragungsziel für eine Quelle ist beispielsweise: „Ich brauche die Unterstützung der Polizei in einer Behördenangelegenheit, aber will meine Freunde in der [terroristischen] Gruppe nicht verraten“ (persönliches Gespräch mit polizeilichen/nachrichtendienstlichen Mitarbeitern, 2016; Scherp, 1992). *Konträre Befragungsziele* implizieren, dass die Befragten sich in einem Informationsdilemma befinden und einige Informationen verraten, um ein Teilziel zu erreichen

wie etwa „Unterstützung der Polizei“, dass sie aber auch nicht ihr gesamtes Wissen preisgeben können, um das andere Teilziel zu erreichen wie etwa „Freunde in der Gruppe nicht verraten“.

Allgemein zeigten Untersuchungen, dass sich Beschuldigte und Quellen im Vorfeld und während der Befragung mit den Sachkenntnissen des Befragers auseinandersetzen (bspw. Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Soufan, 2011). Diese Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers stellt eine wichtige Grundlage für das Entscheidungsverhalten von Quellen und Beschuldigten in der Befragung dar (Moston & Stephenson, 2011; Soufan, 2011). Im Einklang damit geht die vorliegende Arbeit mit ihrer konzeptuellen Stufe davon aus, dass Beschuldigte und Quellen, die konträrere Befragungsziele verfolgen und sich dadurch einem Informationsdilemma gegenübersehen, ihre Gegenstrategie entsprechend ihrer Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers auswählen.

Allgemein beschreiben *Gegenstrategien* in dieser Arbeit die von Quellen oder Beschuldigten kognitiv ausgearbeiteten und angewandten Verhaltensweisen, mit welchen sie ihre Befragungsziele erreichen wollen. Dies entspricht jüngeren Untersuchungen, die zeigten, dass Beschuldigte und Quellen sich zielgerichtet solche Gegenstrategien überlegen und diese in der Befragung anwenden (bspw. Alison et al., 2014; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Soufan, 2011). Gegenstrategien unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Ausmaßes, sachverhaltsrelevante Informationen zu verraten. Sie lassen sich auf einem Kontinuum von zurückhaltend (bspw. „Ich werde es vermeiden, Belastendes zu sagen“) bis mitteilend einordnen (bspw. „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen sagen“). Die konzeptuelle Stufe konzentriert sich auf verbale Gegenstrategien und geht davon aus, dass die Auswahl der Gegenstrategie das Aussageverhalten der Befragten beeinflusst (siehe Abbildung 8).

Aufgrund der beschriebenen kognitiven und verbalen Prozesse wird auf der konzeptuellen Stufe also angenommen, dass Quellen/Beschuldigte, die konträre Ziele verfolgen, die Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers zur Auswahl ihrer Gegenstrategien heranziehen. Davon lässt sich beispielsweise Folgendes ableiten: Eine Quelle

schätzt eine Information A als dem Befrager bekannt ein („Der Polizist spricht über B, somit weiß er auch von A“). Aufgrund dieser Einschätzung wird die Quelle bezüglich der Information A eine eher mitteilende Gegenstrategie wählen wie etwa „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen sagen“. Die Auswahl dieser eher mitteilenden Gegenstrategie führt dazu, dass sie Information A verrät. Ist diese Information A dem Befrager zuvor aber unbekannt, überschätzt die Quelle die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers und verrät ihm so neue Informationen. Im Gegensatz dazu könnte beispielsweise ein Beschuldigter eine belastende Information C als dem Vernehmer unbekannt einschätzen („Der Polizist spricht nicht über C, also weiß er es auch nicht“). Entsprechend wählt der Beschuldigte eine eher zurückhaltende Gegenstrategie wie etwa „Ich werde es vermeiden, Belastendes zu sagen“. Die Auswahl der eher zurückhaltenden Gegenstrategie führt wiederum dazu, dass der Beschuldigte Information C nicht erwähnt oder falsche Angaben dazu macht.

Auf der konzeptuellen Stufe wird weiterhin beschrieben, wie der Befrager die zuvor beschriebenen Annahmen über die kognitiven und verbalen Prozesse von Befragten strategisch nutzen kann. Hierzu soll er im Einzelfall versuchen, die Perspektive des Befragten einzunehmen, um so dessen Verhaltensweisen und Reaktionen zu antizipieren (Galinsky et al., 2008). Diese *Perspektivübernahme* kann dem Befrager helfen, die Befragung zu planen, durchzuführen und auszuwerten.

Die *taktische Stufe* des hier entwickelten zweistufigen Befragungsgerüsts beschreibt hingegen konkrete Mittel, die der Befrager nutzen kann, um Subziele zu erreichen. Sie hilft somit eine spezifische Befragung vorzubereiten und durchzuführen: Nachfolgend werden mit der Scharff-Technik zur Befragung von Quellen und Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)-Technik zur Vernehmung von Beschuldigten zwei Gruppen von Taktiken vorgestellt, die darauf abzielen, neue Informationen hervorzuarbeiten.

Die wissenschaftliche Untersuchung der Scharff-Technik knüpft an den freundlichen und gesprächsorientierten Befragungsansatz von Hanns Scharff (Toliver, 1997) und der zuvor

dargelegten konzeptuellen Stufe an. Die Scharff-Technik umfasst fünf Taktiken (bisherige Studien zur Scharff-Technik siehe bspw. Granhag et al., 2015). Die *Freundlich-sein-Taktik*⁶ gibt vor, dass der Befrager während der gesamten Befragung eine angenehme, respektvolle und gesprächsorientierte Atmosphäre herstellt. Die *Nicht-drängen-Taktik* instruiert den Befrager, nicht nach Informationen zu drängen, deshalb möglichst wenige Fragen zu stellen und wenn überhaupt, dann offene und nicht geschlossene Fragen zu verwenden. Die *Illusion-Taktik* gibt vor, dass der Befrager bereits vorliegende Erkenntnisse präsentiert und der Quelle dann die Möglichkeit gibt, Informationen zu ergänzen. Die *Behauptungen-Taktik* beschreibt, dass der Befrager unreliable Informationen in Aussagesätzen präsentiert und der Quelle dabei die Möglichkeit gibt, spezifische Informationen zu bestätigen oder zu widerlegen. Die *Neues-übergehen-Taktik* instruiert den Befrager, neu gewonnene Informationen zu übergehen, indem er sie als uninteressant oder bekannt abtut, nicht kommentiert und so allgemein seine Informationsabsichten verheimlicht.

Die SUE-Technik lässt sich in Frage- und Beweisdarlegungstaktiken aufteilen. Ein Vernehmer sollte verschiedene *Fragearten* wie beispielsweise offene Fragen oder Erzählaufforderungen (bspw. „Erzählen Sie mir alles, was Sie gestern gemacht haben.“) und geschlossene Fragen kennen (bspw. „Haben Sie gestern mit Ulf gesprochen?“). Außerdem sollte der Befrager wissen, dass verschiedene Fragearten unterschiedliche Antworten erwarten lassen. Beispielsweise wird mit Erzählaufforderungen eher ein freier Bericht gewonnen als mit geschlossenen Fragen. Die *Beweisdarlegungstaktiken* beschreiben, wann und wie der Befrager die vorliegenden Informationen offenlegt. Er kann Beweise beispielsweise früh, spät oder schrittweise in die Vernehmung einbringen. In Abhängigkeit des Zeitpunkts der Beweisdarlegung ändert sich auch deren Darlegungsform: Gibt der Vernehmer die Beweise preis, bevor er Fragen dazu stellt, werden die Beweise in einer eher reinen Form dargelegt

⁶ Zur besseren Lesbarkeit wurden die Taktiken sinngemäß und nicht wortwörtlich aus dem Englischen übersetzt.

(bspw. „Wir haben Videoaufzeichnungen, dass Sie gestern am Bahnhof waren“). Stellt der Vernehmer hingegen zunächst Fragen zu den Beweisen und gibt sie erst anschließend preis, werden sie zu „verstärkenden“ Übereinstimmungen (bspw. „Ihre Aussage, dass Sie gestern am Bahnhof waren, stimmt mit uns vorliegenden Videoaufzeichnungen überein“) oder „bestrafenden“ Widersprüchen (bspw. „Ihre Aussage widerspricht allerdings Videoaufzeichnungen, die zeigen, dass Sie gestern am Bahnhof waren“). In der Vergangenheit wurde mit der SUE-Technik versucht, Lügenhinweise in Form von Widersprüchen hervorzuarbeiten (siehe Meta-Analyse von Hartwig et al., 2014). Dabei erwies es sich als vorteilhaft, wenn der Befrager zunächst Fragen zu Beweisen stellt ohne diese offenzulegen. Jüngere Studien zur SUE-Technik zielen darauf, mittels dieser Widersprüche neue Informationen hervorzuarbeiten. Erste Untersuchungen zeigen, dass eine konfrontative Darlegung der Widersprüche, bei der die Beschuldigten die Widersprüche nicht kommentieren konnten, zu bevorzugen ist (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016).

Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit wurden zwei Untersuchungen zur Scharff-Technik (Studie I und II) und eine Untersuchung zur SUE-Technik durchgeführt (Studie III). Die Studien untersuchten einerseits spezifische Befragungstaktiken, lieferten aber andererseits auch allgemein Erkenntnisse zur Eignung der konzeptuellen Stufe.

Studie I untersuchte, wie sich die Illusion-Taktik und Behauptungen-Taktik der Scharff-Technik kombinieren lassen, um die Einschätzungen der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers und die Anzahl neu gewonnener Information zu beeinflussen. In zwei Scharff Bedingungen wurde deshalb nach der Illusion-Taktik (a) entweder zunächst eine offene Frage gestellt und dann die Behauptungen-Taktik verwendet oder (b) zunächst die Behauptungen-Taktik verwendet und dann die offene Frage gestellt. Als Vergleichsbedingung diente der direkte Frageansatz, der offene und geschlossene Fragen umfasste und in den USA angewendet wird (Redlich et al., 2011; Semel, 2013). Alle Versuchsteilnehmer (N = 93) nahmen die Rolle einer Quelle ein und verfolgten folgendes konträres Befragungsziel: „Ich brauche die Unterstützung der Polizei in

einer Behördenangelegenheit, aber will meine Freunde in der Gruppe nicht verraten“. Die Quellen befanden sich also in einem Informationsdilemma und sollten nicht zu viele, aber auch nicht zu wenige Informationen verraten. Insgesamt übertraf die Scharff-Technik den direkten Frageansatz bezüglich aller relevanter Maße: Die Quellen in den Scharff Bedingungen verrieten mehr neue Informationen, fanden es schwerer, die Informationsabsichten des Befragers zu erkennen, schätzten die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers größer ein und unterschätzten, wie viele neue Informationen sie verraten hatten. Weiterhin zeigte sich, dass in beiden Scharff Bedingungen die erste offene Frage, die unmittelbar oder verzögert nach der Illusion-Taktik gestellt wurde, zu mehr neuen Informationen führte als die erste offene Frage beim direkten Frageansatz. Die Behauptungen-Taktik führte hingegen nur dann zu mehr neuen Informationen als die spezifischen Fragen des direkten Frageansatzes, wenn sie vor der ersten offenen Frage präsentiert wurde. Schließlich zeigte sich, dass die Quellen die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers hauptsächlich aufgrund der Behauptungen-Taktik überschätzten und nicht aufgrund der Illusion-Taktik. Aus letzterem ließ sich ableiten, dass die Quellen durch die Illusion-Taktik die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers eher zutreffend einschätzten.

Beispielhaft soll mit der konzeptuellen Stufe nun erklärt werden, wie in Studie I die Behauptungen-Taktiken der Scharff Bedingungen zu mehr neuen Informationen als die spezifischen Fragen des direkten Frageansatzes führte: Die Quellen verfolgten ein konträres Befragungsziel und wollten einige Informationen verraten, um die Unterstützung der Polizei zu erhalten. Sie wollten aber auch nicht all ihr Wissen preisgeben, damit sie ihre Freunde in der Gruppe nicht verraten. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, überlegten sich die Quellen verschiedene Gegenstrategien und wählten diese dann entsprechend der Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers aus. Aufgrund der Behauptungen-Taktik überschätzten die Quellen in den Scharff Bedingungen die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers. Entsprechend wählten die Quellen in den Scharff Bedingungen eher mitteilsame Gegenstrategien aus wie etwa „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen sagen“ und verrieten als Reaktion auf die Behauptungen-Taktik neue

Informationen. Im Vergleich zur Behauptungen-Taktik, überschätzten die Quellen beim direkten Frageansatz die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers aufgrund der spezifischen Fragen eher nicht. Entsprechend wählten die Quellen beim direkten Frageansatz eher zurückhaltende Gegenstrategien und verrieten vergleichsweise weniger neue Information als Antwort auf die spezifischen Fragen. Die konzeptuelle Stufe erklärt somit, warum die Quellen mehr neue Informationen als Reaktion auf die Behauptungen-Taktik verrieten als in Reaktion auf die spezifischen Fragen.

Studie II untersuchte, wie bei der Scharff-Technik die Illusion-Taktik einzuleiten ist, damit Quellen sich auf die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers fokussieren und nicht auf seine Sachverhaltslücken. Hierzu wurden die vorliegenden Informationen entweder mit einem extrem überzeugten Einleitungssatz präsentiert („Also ja, was ich meine ist, dass ich die meisten, der für uns wichtigsten Informationen schon habe und ich möchte Ihnen diese zunächst einfach mal mitteilen“) oder im Gegensatz dazu unmittelbar und ohne Einleitungssatz dargeboten. In zwei Experimenten wurden diese beiden Einleitungen der Illusion-Taktik untersucht, wobei entweder die Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers (Experiment 1; N = 60) oder die Einschätzung der Sachverhaltslücken des Befragers erfasst wurden (Experiment 2; N = 60). Alle Versuchsteilnehmer nahmen wie in Studie I die Rolle einer Quelle ein, konnten diesmal aber keine Informationen verraten. Wenn die Informationen ohne Einleitungssatz präsentiert wurden, schätzten die Quellen die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers allgemein als größer ein und suchten weniger nach Sachverhaltslücken beim Befragter, als wenn die Informationen mit einem extrem überzeugten Einleitungssatz präsentiert wurden.

Wie beschrieben, wird auf der konzeptuellen Stufe angenommen, dass Quellen ihre Gegenstrategien entsprechend der eingeschätzten Sachkenntnisse des Befragers auswählen. Studie II lieferte Erkenntnisse dazu, wie Befragter mit der Illusion-Taktik die Einschätzungen der Quellen bezüglich der eigenen Sachkenntnisse beeinflussen können. Wenn der Befragter seine Sachkenntnisse ohne Einleitungssatz präsentierte, suchten die Quellen vergleichsweise

weniger nach Sachverhaltslücken. Dies könnte Gegenstrategien entgegenwirken wie „Ich werde versuchen herauszufinden, was er wissen will und es ihm dann nicht verraten“. Das Verzichten auf einen extrem überzeugten Einleitungssatz führte auch dazu, dass die Quellen das Sachwissen des Befragers vergleichsweise größer einschätzten. Dies wiederum könnte Gegenstrategien entgegenwirken wie „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen sagen“. Da die Quellen in dieser Studie allerdings keine Informationen verraten konnten, sind Rückschlüsse auf das Aussageverhalten nicht möglich.

Studie III untersuchte, wie man mit vorliegenden Beweisen in Beschuldigtenvernehmungen neue Informationen hervorarbeiten kann. Die zwei SUE Bedingungen unterschieden sich hinsichtlich der Einleitungsphase und der Darlegung der zuvor hervorgearbeiteten Übereinstimmungen/Widersprüche. Die konfrontative SUE Bedingung begann sachlich und die Beschuldigten wurden mit ihren Übereinstimmungen/Widersprüchen konfrontiert, ohne die Möglichkeit zu haben, diese zu kommentieren. Hingegen startete die unvoreingenommene SUE Bedingung mit einer nicht-schuldanehmenden Einleitung, dem Beschuldigten wurden die Übereinstimmungen/Widersprüche unvoreingenommen präsentiert und zudem hatte er die Möglichkeit, diese zu kommentieren. Als Vergleichsbedingung diente eine frühe Beweisdarlegung, bei der alle Beweise in der Einleitungsphase offengelegt wurden, bevor der Befrager offene Fragen dazu stellte. In allen drei Bedingungen stellte der Vernehmer am Ende der Vernehmung Fragen zu unbekanntem Tathandlungen. Alle Versuchsteilnehmer (N = 88) führten ein Scheinverbrechen durch und sollten in der Vernehmung folgendes konträreres Befragungsziel verfolgen: „Ich will meine Unschuld zeigen, obwohl ich die Handlungen tatsächlich begangen habe“. Die Beschuldigten befanden sich also in einem Informationsdilemma und sollten nicht zu viele, aber auch nicht zu wenige Informationen verraten. Die Beschuldigten in den SUE Bedingungen machten mehr Widersprüche und überschätzten die Sachkenntnisse des Befragers stärker als die Beschuldigten in der frühen Beweisdarlegungsbedingung. Allerdings verrieten nur die Beschuldigten in der

unvoreingenommenen SUE Bedingung mehr neuen Informationen als die Beschuldigten in der frühen Beweisdarlegungsbedingung. Vergleicht man die beiden SUE Bedingungen, schätzten die Beschuldigten in der unvoreingenommenen SUE Bedingung die Gesprächsatmosphäre als positiver ein und wählten eher mitteilsame Gegenstrategien aus, bevor sie zu den tatsächlich unbekanntem Verbrechenhandlungen befragt wurden.

Betrachtet man diese Ergebnisse auf der konzeptuellen Stufe, verfolgten die Beschuldigten ein konträres Befragungsziel und erarbeiteten sich Gegenstrategien für die Vernehmung, die sie entsprechend der Einschätzung der Sachkenntnisse des Befragers auswählten. Die Beschuldigten in den SUE Bedingungen waren unwissend bezüglich der vorliegenden Beweise, als ihnen Fragen dazu gestellt wurden, und unterschätzten das diesbezügliche Sachwissen des Befragers. Aufgrund dieser Unterschätzung wählten sie in den SUE Bedingungen eher zurückhaltende Gegenstrategien aus wie etwa „Ich werde es vermeiden, Belastendes zu sagen“. Infolgedessen führten die SUE Bedingungen zu mehr Widersprüchen als die frühe Beweisdarlegungsbedingung, bei der die Beschuldigten die dem Vernehmer vorliegenden Beweise schon seit Beginn der Vernehmung kannten und entsprechend eher mitteilsame Gegenstrategie bezüglich dieser Beweise auswählten wie etwa „Ich werde bereits bekannte Sachen sagen und entlastend darstellen“.

Aufgrund des Hervorarbeitens und Darlegens von Widersprüchen überschätzten die Beschuldigten in beiden SUE Bedingungen die Sachkenntnisse des Vernehmers. Allerdings verrieten nur die Beschuldigten in der unvoreingenommenen SUE Bedingung mehr neue Informationen als in der frühen Beweisdarlegungsbedingung. Eine Erklärung dafür ist, dass durch das Darlegen von Widersprüchen den Beschuldigten in den SUE Bedingungen ein Feedback vermittelt wurde, dass sie ihre Gegenstrategie ändern müssen, um ihr Teilziel „unschuldig zeigen“ zu erreichen. Daraufhin änderten aber mehr Beschuldigte in der unvoreingenommenen SUE Bedingung ihre Gegenstrategie hin zu eher mitteilsam (vgl. mit der konfrontativen SUE Bedingung), da nur sie aufgrund der positiver wahrgenommenen

Gesprächsatmosphäre überhaupt die Möglichkeit für eine solche Änderung sahen. Aufgrund dieser Änderung der Gegenstrategien verrieten die Beschuldigten in der unvoreingenommenen SUE-Bedingung anschließend vergleichsweise mehr neue Informationen. Die Ergebnisse von Studie III führten zur Aufnahme des Feedbacks und der Gesprächsatmosphäre in die graphische Darstellung der konzeptuellen Stufe (siehe Abbildung 9).




Abbildung 9. Modifizierte Darstellung der konzeptuellen Stufe.

Insgesamt liefern die drei Studien der vorliegenden Arbeit Erkenntnisse für beide Stufen des Befragungsgerüsts: Auf der taktischen Stufe konnten konkrete Mittel entwickelt werden, um Einschätzungen und Aussageverhalten von Quellen und Beschuldigten zu beeinflussen. Die konzeptuelle Stufe zeigte sich geeignet, die Studienergebnisse und Mechanismen der Taktiken zu erklären. Sie kann somit helfen, Befragungen strategisch zu planen und durchzuführen.

Das entwickelte Befragungsgerüst zum Hervorarbeiten neuer Informationen ergänzt bisherige Forschungen zu Befragungstechniken. Denn abgesehen von experimentellen Studien zur SUE-Technik (Tekin et al., 2015, 2016) wurde bisher in Feldstudien nur untersucht, wie sich der Zeitpunkt der Beweisdarlegung auf den Aussageumfang des Beschuldigten auswirkt (bspw. Walsh & Bull, 2015). Bei Quellenbefragungen gibt es – außer den Studien zur Scharff-Technik – keine Untersuchungen zur Verwendung vorliegender Informationen. Forschungsschwerpunkte sind in beiden Befragungskontexten bislang vielmehr Frageansätze wie das Kognitive Interview, das aus abrufunterstützten Taktiken zur Informationsgewinnung von völlig kooperativen Personen besteht (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992).

Außerdem wurden beispielsweise emotionsbeeinflussende, anklagend/vorwurfsvolle oder informationssammelnde Frageansätze bei der Befragung verdächtiger Personen untersucht (Evans et al., 2013; 2014).

Das entwickelte Befragungsgerüst zum Hervorarbeiten neuer Informationen kann somit das Repertoire von polizeilichen und nachrichtendienstlichen Befragern erweitern. Dabei lässt sich beispielsweise die SUE-Technik in umfassendere Vernehmungsansätze wie das PEACE-Modell integrieren (bspw. Milne & Bull, 1999). Eine solche Integration ist grundsätzlich auch für die Scharff-Technik denkbar; allerdings gibt es bis jetzt noch keine umfassenden Ansätze für die Befragung von Quellen. Die zweistufige Herangehensweise des entwickelten Befragungsgerüsts erscheint nützlich für Forschungs- und Trainingszwecke, da die konzeptuelle Stufe die Mechanismen der Befragungstaktiken erklären kann. Dies ist für eine strategische Verwendung der Taktiken sinnvoll.

Appendix C: Curriculum Vitae (Lebenslauf)

Lennart May

Geburtsdatum: 02.09.1986

Bildungsweg

Seit 2014	Gastwissenschaftler am Institut für Forensische Psychiatrie, Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin
2013-2017	Promotionsstudium in Psychologie an der Universität Kiel
2013	Diplom in Psychologie an der Universität Kiel
2009	Vordiplom in Psychologie an der Universität Tübingen
2006/2007	Zivildienst
2006	Abitur

Berufliche Tätigkeiten

Seit 2014	Vorträge und Lehrveranstaltungen zu Beschuldigtenvernehmungen, Zeugenvernehmungen und nachrichtendienstlichen Befragungstechniken
Seit 2015	Aussagepsychologische Sachverständigentätigkeit (Zentrum für Aussagepsychologie Berlin)
2013	Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Universität Göteborg, Schweden (Research unit for Criminal, Legal and Investigative Psychology)