

# **Essays on Irregular Regime Change**

Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der  
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

vorgelegt von

**Marcel A. Dirsus**

Kiel

Dezember 2017

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Christian Martin

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 24.05.2018

Durch den Prodekan für Studium und Lehre,

Prof. Dr. Ulrich Müller, zum Druck genehmigt:

05.07.2018

## Acknowledgements

Throughout the years, I've been taught by inspiring, passionate and caring people. I want to extend my thanks to Penny Bagust, Adam Darley and Mr. Williams at Corfe Hills School. You made me realise I wanted to stay. Graham Scammel helped me make it happen. From the bottom of my heart, thank you. Sam, you were important to me then and you are important to me now.

It would have been impossible for me to do my research without the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The financial support of the foundation through the Manfred-Wörner-Scholarship for Security Politics allowed me to concentrate on my work. More importantly, the foundation gave me unparalleled opportunities to learn, meet new people and see the world. From the temples of Jerusalem to the mountains of Georgia and the plains of northern Germany. I will never forget.

I cannot overemphasise how grateful I am to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Christian Martin. He took me seriously, let me explore my ideas and provided intellectually honest feedback when I steered off course. Whenever I needed him to step up to bat on my behalf, he did. Thank you for taking a chance. I owe a great deal to Prof. Krause. Thank you.

Dr. Wilhelm Knelangen was always there when I needed him. I was never really his responsibility, but he was always happy to help. Franca, you were just about the best colleague anyone could ever ask for. I'm glad to say that I was wrong when I said that we would always just be work friends. Thanks for tolerating my humour, rants and generally sunny disposition for three years. David Bencek, master of statistics and R, helped me more than once without getting much in return. Tim Kaiser was always a great colleague, trustee and friend.

Oxford would have been only half as fun without Taylor, Bas and Rowan. I really can't imagine the last couple of years without Brian and David. From Antony's to the Arctic Circle and Appalachia, I'll always be glad to have you on my team.

Nils, Basti, Leander, Sören, Freddi: You are family to me. Anneliese, Sonja and Heiner, thanks for having my back. Mom, you have worked hard for decades to give me the opportunities you've never had. I could not be more grateful. Thank you for everything.

# Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Abbreviations</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2 The Importance of Irregular Regime Change</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1 Interests . . . . .	5
2.2 Morality . . . . .	8
<b>3 The Nature of Irregular Regime Change</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1 Coups . . . . .	12
3.1.1 Frequency of Coups . . . . .	15
3.1.2 Coup Conditions . . . . .	16
3.1.3 Coup Attempts and Success . . . . .	21
3.1.4 Stopping Coups . . . . .	21
3.1.5 Coup Impact . . . . .	24
3.2 Uprisings . . . . .	27
3.2.1 Conditions and Skills for Success . . . . .	29
3.2.2 Irregular Regime Change Prediction . . . . .	31
<b>4 Domestic Effects of Irregular Regime Change</b>	<b>33</b>
4.1 Literature . . . . .	34
4.2 Theory . . . . .	36
4.3 Methods . . . . .	38
4.4 Results . . . . .	43
4.5 Conclusion . . . . .	48
<b>5 International Effects of Irregular Regime Change</b>	<b>51</b>
5.1 Literature . . . . .	52
5.2 Theory . . . . .	55
5.3 Methods . . . . .	58
5.4 Results . . . . .	74
5.5 Conclusion . . . . .	75
5.6 Appendix . . . . .	77
<b>6 Dealing with Distress</b>	<b>102</b>
6.1 Russia . . . . .	105



6.1.1	Russian Narrative . . . . .	105
6.1.2	Ukraine . . . . .	107
6.1.3	Colour Revolutions . . . . .	112
6.2	Germany . . . . .	121
6.2.1	Ukraine . . . . .	121
6.2.2	Colour Revolutions . . . . .	128
6.2.3	Threat to Germany . . . . .	128
<b>7</b>	<b>Policy Recommendations for Germany</b>	<b>130</b>
7.1	Coups . . . . .	130
7.2	Weaponising Dissent . . . . .	133
7.3	Defending Stability . . . . .	138
7.4	Golden Parachute . . . . .	140
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>147</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>German Summary</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>References</b>	<b>173</b>

## List of Figures

1	Coups and Coup Attempts 1950-2010 . . . . .	15
2	Physical Integrity Rights Levels . . . . .	50
3	Diffusion of Dissent and Repression . . . . .	56
4	Irregular Leadership Exit Map . . . . .	59
5	Post-Tenure Fate Map . . . . .	60
6	Repression 2010 . . . . .	61
7	Repression Mean over Time . . . . .	63
8	Repression Mean by Region . . . . .	64
9	Centroid Connectivity-Matrix . . . . .	67
10	Neighborhood Connectivity-Matrix . . . . .	68
11	Centroid Capital Distance Map . . . . .	69
12	Time-Matrix . . . . .	70
13	Pairwise Centroid Correlation Matrix . . . . .	71
14	Capital City Connectivity . . . . .	78
15	Pairwise Capital Correlation Matrix . . . . .	79
16	Pairwise Centroid Correlation Matrix Square . . . . .	80
17	Pairwise Centroid Capital Correlation Matrix Square . . . . .	81
18	Repression 1993 . . . . .	90
19	Repression 1994 . . . . .	92
20	Repression 1995 . . . . .	92
21	Repression 1996 . . . . .	93
22	Repression 1997 . . . . .	93
23	Repression 1998 . . . . .	94
24	Repression 1999 . . . . .	94
25	Repression 2000 . . . . .	95
26	Repression 2001 . . . . .	95
27	Repression 2002 . . . . .	96
28	Repression 2003 . . . . .	96
29	Repression 2004 . . . . .	97
30	Repression 2005 . . . . .	97
31	Repression 2006 . . . . .	98
32	Repression 2007 . . . . .	98
33	Repression 2008 . . . . .	99
34	Repression 2009 . . . . .	99
35	Irregular Regime Change as Warfare . . . . .	107

36	Map Russian Near-Abroad . . . . .	108
37	Map of Languages in Ukraine . . . . .	109
38	Russian Exports 2010 . . . . .	110
39	Map of Colour Revolutions . . . . .	113
40	Freedom in the World Decline . . . . .	114
41	Collective Security Treaty Organisation . . . . .	120
42	German Federal Elections and Governments . . . . .	126
43	International ODA to Ukraine 2015 . . . . .	126
44	International ODA by Germany 2015 . . . . .	127
45	Map of Zones of Control Libya, December 2016 . . . . .	145

## List of Tables

1	Coup Definitions (Powell and Thyne; 2011) . . . . .	12
2	Coups 2005-2015 (Powell and Thyne; 2011) . . . . .	16
3	Coup Triggers & Conditions (Belkin and Schofer; 2003, 601-604) . . . . .	17
4	Coups and Uprisings 1989-2009 . . . . .	41
5	Fixed Effect Linear Regression Results . . . . .	44
6	Fixed-Effect Linear Regression Results Coups . . . . .	45
7	Probit Model Global and Coups . . . . .	46
11	Model 2 (900km Centroid Distances) . . . . .	73
13	Model 9 (Continuous Capital Distance Fate) . . . . .	73
14	Model 1 (Continuous Centroid Distances) . . . . .	78
15	Model 3 (Neighborhood) . . . . .	82
16	Model 4 (Continuous Capital Distances) . . . . .	83
17	Model 5 (900km Capital Distances) . . . . .	84
18	Model 6 (Continuous Centroid Distance Fate) . . . . .	85
19	Model 7 (900km Centroid Distances Fate) . . . . .	86
20	Model 8 (Neighborhood Fate) . . . . .	87
21	Model 9 (Continuous Capital Distance Fate) . . . . .	88
22	Model 10 (900km Capital Distance Fate) . . . . .	89
25	Arms Imports from Russia (SIPRI; 2017) . . . . .	118

## **Abbreviations**

AI - Amnesty International

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

CIRI - Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Set

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organisation

EU - European Union

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

GDPC - Gross Domestic Product per Capita

HRW - Human Rights Watch

IRC - Irregular Regime Change

ODA - Overseas Development Aid

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development

PTS - Political Terror Scale

RT - Russia Today

SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

SED - Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei)

UN - United Nations

# 1 Introduction

The Arab Spring arrived in Syria on a Friday in March 2011. Protestors in the southern city of Deraa called for freedom. They were met by the security forces of Bashar al-Assad (BBC; 2016b), who inherited the reigns of the Arab Republic from his father in 2000 (Ali and Addley; 2011). Three died. Protests against the regime spread nationwide (BBC; 2016b). Fast-forward seven years: Hundreds of thousands have died, millions have been displaced (BBC; 2016b). A refugee crisis fuelled by the civil war in Syria has gripped Germany and Europe. The Syrian people have endured immeasurable suffering in this conflict that involves major powers, terrorist groups, freedom fighters and everything inbetween.

We are used to political leaders being changed through elections. But in much of the world, leaders are replaced through irregular means - often through coups and uprisings (Goemans et al.; 2009). When these irregular regime changes are attempted, they can bring people freedom or catastrophe. They are attempted against democrats and autocrats alike. Not all of them succeed in changing the regime, but even if they don't, they often have an outsized impact.

Irregular regime changes can take a variety of forms. An irregular regime change here is defined as an irregular change of leadership at the helm of a regime. Regime is used interchangeably with the word government. This work is mostly concerned with coup d'états and nonviolent uprisings. By extension, the focus of this research is not on insurgencies, civil wars or conventional warfare between states. Coups d'état are "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive" (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251).

Nonviolent uprisings have the aim of overthrowing the regime through peaceful mass dissent. In contrast to armed campaigns, these are movements led by "unarmed civilians" that don't "directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of their opponents" (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013, 418). These campaigns can include a large variety of non-violent tactics, many of which were outlined by Sharp (1973).

Irregular regime change attempts are frequent. Between 1950 and 2010, coup attempts occurred in 94 states (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 255). There were also 163 campaign-year cases of mainly nonviolent campaigns with the aim of changing a regime between 1945 and 2006 (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013). Otherwise put, there were 60 irregular leadership exits between 1993 and 2011 (Goemans et al.; 2016). Irregular leadership exits occur when a leader is "removed from office in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions" (Goemans et al.; 2016). Coups are often the most serious threat to political leaders - especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Klaas; 2016).

Chapter 2 provides an insight into the importance of irregular regime changes both with re-

gards to morality and national interests. Understanding irregular regime change matters. People die, men are forced to fight, women suffer, children become orphans. The consequences of coups and uprisings can be dire, or just the opposite. These are times of drastic change during which just about anything is possible. Peaceful uprisings played a large part in bringing down the Soviet Union. They brought freedom. They allowed people from the medieval spires of Tallinn to the Black Sea to throw off the yoke of their oppressors.

When Syrians rose up against the barbaric government of Bashar al Assad in the spring of 2011, they wanted much the same. Unfortunately, what they got is far from it. The uprising eventually turned into a civil war which continues to this day. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children have died (BBC; 2016b). Millions were forced to flee (BBC; 2016b). An entire region is in turmoil. Understanding what leads to attempts at destabilisation and irregular regime change, when they succeed and what their impact is can help us prevent such suffering in the future.

Importantly, coups, uprisings and assorted attempts at regime destabilisation have a direct impact on German national interests. Coups have hindered democratisation from Honduras to Madagascar for decades. Uprisings have ushered in the birth of dictatorships. They have also brought freedom to millions around the globe. Irregular regime changes can serve German interests or torpedo them.

Today, irregular regime change attempts have gained new relevance in the context of debates surrounding hybrid warfare and a resurgent Russia. Understanding how and why governments fall through coups and uprisings as well as the impact of their fall can help us calibrate our reaction. It can help Germany and the European Union to mitigate the negative externalities of these events such as a spread of human rights violations, human trafficking, illegal migration, illegal arms trade and so forth.

Chapter 3 explores the nature of coups and uprisings including the conditions under which attempts occur, when they are successful and what their impact is. The chapter is a summary of previous research findings that informs the rest of this work. Coups have been studied by political scientists with great interest. When analysing how coups occur, it makes sense to differentiate between three factors. Firstly, conditions which make coup attempts likely. Secondly, factors that can trigger coups. Thirdly, strategies that lead coup attempts to become successful coups.

Lastly, I use this chapter to outline some previous research findings on the impact of coups - for example on democratisation, transitions to civil wars and so forth. Coups and uprisings have much in common, but they also differ markedly. In this chapter, I also consider the conditions that lead to nonviolent popular uprisings and what makes or breaks these mass protest movements. The chapter ends with an outline of the research on the impact of these

uprisings.

In Chapter 4 & Chapter 5, I add to the previous research by analysing the impact of irregular regime changes on human rights violations. These two chapters are by far the most important parts of this work. There is research on irregular regime changes and research on the causes of repression, but not much that links the two. This thesis combines the two strands of literature. Political leaders are broadly rational. They decide to use repression or not use repression depending on the costs and benefits of doing so (Davenport; 2007). When a coup or uprising is attempted (and fails or succeeds), the costs and benefits of using repression change. Because of that, I posit that the occurrence of these events will have an impact on the level of repression in a given country. Chapter 4 is a quantitative analysis of the impact of irregular domestic regime changes on human rights violations. Using large-N linear regression analysis, I find that domestic coups are associated with higher levels of repression. The impact of uprisings on repression, on the other hand, is unclear.

In Chapter 5, I analyse whether irregular regime changes have an impact on human rights violations in a given country even if the irregular regime change is happening outside of it. In this Chapter, I argue that irregular regime changes in nearby countries create a range of negative externalities that can increase repression domestically. First and foremost, dissent in one country can make dissent nearby more likely (Danneman and Ritter; 2013). As a result of dissent becoming more likely, the benefit of repression is likely to increase. Using a diffusion of covariates spillover model, I find that irregular leadership changes abroad are associated with increased repression at home.

The last two chapters are practical. In Chapter 6, I outline how Germany and Russia have dealt with irregular regime changes in the past. Using the case of the Ukrainian revolution 2014, I find that these major powers have judged irregular regime changes very differently. Accordingly, they have also reacted very differently. The chapter links irregular regime change to hybrid warfare, and how these forms of conflict play out in practical terms. In particular, I discuss Colour Revolutions.

The last chapter of this work consists of a series of policy discussions and recommendations. Germany needs to find a way to deal with irregular regime changes. As a political and economic power with wide-reaching interests, coups and uprisings can and do impact the German national interest. At times they may serve German interests, oftentimes they do not. In Chapter 7, I prescribe a variety of policies in order to mitigate the negative effects of these drastic changes and maximise their positive impacts.

In particular, I discuss the weaponisation of dissent, automatic aid suspensions and golden parachutes. In the section on the weaponisation of dissent, I argue that we should only seek to stoke dissent offensively with the utmost consideration for other options and the potentially



devastating consequences. My opposition to the automatic suspension of development aid following an irregular regime change is outlined thereafter. Furthermore, I argue that Golden Parachutes for autocrats are not in the German national interest. Lastly, I outline how Germany ought to defend itself against the mobilisation of dissent within the country by other nation states - most notably Russia.

This work makes a contribution to the existing literature by exploring a relationship that is heavily under-researched: the nexus between irregular regime changes and repression. Beyond the contribution to the academic literature, it contains an analysis of the ways in which Germany has dealt with irregular regime changes in the past - as illustrated through the case of the Ukrainian revolution of 2014. Lastly, this work makes practical policy recommendations that can help equip Germany to deal with a challenging international environment.

## 2 The Importance of Irregular Regime Change

Understanding irregular regime change matters. To understand what is going on when a country is facing an uprising or a coup d'état means that policymakers can better adjust their foreign policy to manage the consequences of political instability. Interests aside, these periods of dramatic change raise many questions of great moral importance. Do we have an obligation to alleviate human suffering if we have the capacity to do so? To what extent are we responsible for the atrocities committed by recipients of our goods, arms or immaterial support?

### 2.1 Interests

Understanding irregular regime changes is important because they can impact core German interests. They raise questions highly relevant to German national security and foreign policy objectives.

Change brought about by coups and uprisings is drastic. There is an argument to be made that this is enough to be of interest to nation states, which are much better at dealing with predictability and incremental developments than with rapid change. Understanding is also the first step towards prediction. If one were able to predict regime change with some accuracy, it could lead to a much more effective foreign & security policy. It would be easier to decide which party to back in what country. It would be possible to respond to humanitarian crises before they even materialise.

The changes brought on by irregular regime changes are not just drastic, they are also catalysts for further change. Be it good or bad, they are not confined to their own localities, they are able to affect change elsewhere. Dissent in one place can make dissent nearby more likely (Danneman and Ritter; 2013). The Arab Spring is but one example for this effect. This means that understanding these irregular regime changes can help us make sense of future political developments.

It matters that irregular regime changes often have a negative impact on democracy - especially in the case of coups d'état. Germany has an inherent interest in defending existing democracies from the threat of authoritarians. At the same time, it is in the interest of Germany to expand the league of democracies around the world. The advantages of democracies have been discussed for hundreds of years. Kant, the great German philosopher, argued that a world of democracies would be a world at peace (Weart; 1998, 3). While autocratic governments have often demonstrated impressive economic growth rates, liberal democracies tend to be economically prosperous.

It's easier to forge alliances with democracies than it is with dictatorships. A political and

economic power like Germany has an intrinsic interest in supporting systems of government that lend themselves to a rules based global order. Liberal democracies tend to do so. This means that there is a double interest regarding irregular regime changes. On the one hand, the fall of an authoritarian at the hands of domestic opposition might be a welcome development. On the other hand, any such irregular regime change circumvents the established political process. This means that regime changes can be good or bad - and often both at the same time.

Irregular regime changes are also of interest because they can lead to a whole host of negative externalities. Both coups and uprisings have led to civil wars in the past.

The case of Ethiopia is instructive in this regard. Haile Selassie was a brutal dictator who ruled Ethiopia as Emperor with an iron fist for more than four decades. Hundreds of thousands died in famines while he ruled (Ross; 1983). The coup that deposed him removed this terrible man and replaced him with utter chaos. The coup d'état set off a conflict that was to last for nearly 17 years. Haile Selassie came to power through a coup, and he was deposed by a coup. The first half of 1974 saw widespread protests in the urban centres of Ethiopia (Tiruneh; 1990, 8). In 1974, his opponents launched a coup d'état against Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie (Whitman; 1975).

By September, the Emperor, self-styled as "Elect of God, King of Kings, and the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah" (Chege; 1979, 359), was overthrown. In place of him, General Teferi Benti became the leader of the country. He's killed within three years and replaced by another member of the military - Colonel Mengistu (Associated Press; 1991). The next decades are marked by a whole array of tragedies woven together into misery of epic proportions. Mengistu ruled with an iron fist (Krauss; 1991). Thousands are killed by the government in the "Red Terror" (HRW; 1999). Savage famines rage across the region (Ross; 1983). Wars are fought within the country (Kraft; 1988). The civil war alone left hundreds of thousands dead before it came to an end in the summer of 1991 (Sanchez; 1991). Even more perished because they had no food (Sanchez; 1991). The coup and subsequent political instability set an entire region ablaze.

Almost needless to say, the occurrence of civil war anywhere does not tend to be in the German national interest. Importantly, the occurrence of an irregular regime change in a country often makes it more difficult for Germany to be seen as dealing with that country. When a regime change happens in an allied country, the alliance may rupture. Even if it doesn't, continuing to work with it will be much more costly politically. Working with a government brought about through an irregular regime change means cooperating with a government that might have come to power undemocratically - especially in the case of a military coup.

This imposes political costs domestically as well as abroad, where the charge of hypocrisy is

easily leveled. This effect can also occur when an irregular regime change is merely attempted, but does not succeed. The recent case of Turkey is instructive. Following the coup attempt that Turkey experienced in the summer of 2016, the Turkish government commenced a massive crackdown on real and imagined opponents (AFP; 2017), many of which are unlikely to be involved in the coup attempt in any shape or form. This heavily impacted German-Turkish relations. Politically, any association with the Turkish government is now toxic in Germany - especially in an election year. 97% of Germans do not consider Turkey a trustworthy partner (Ehni; 2017).

One negative externality that is related to irregular regime changes is illegal migration. Few topics of national interest have been in the public spotlight in Germany in the last few years as the flow of refugees. The Arab Spring, with drastic consequences in Syria, has led to a surge in migration to Germany. This drastic increase has led to a temporary destabilisation of the German political system in which the right-wing populist AfD has temporarily become a credible political force on the right of the CDU. Following the German elections in September this year, the AfD has become the 3rd largest party in the German Bundestag (Stelzenmüller; 2017).

Beyond the push effect of the Syrian Civil War, Libya has turned from a horrendous, morally repugnant and reasonably stable dictatorship into a sea of chaos. There is no functioning state apparatus in Libya. As a result, the North African country has turned into a hub and staging point for sea crossings across the Mediterranean to Europe. In addition to migrants simply seeking a better life for themselves and their family, this same route can also be used by people with nefarious intentions - including those who have fought in the country's bitter civil war.

Illegal migration is not just controversial politically, it has also been linked to an increased risk of terrorism. The refugees and migrants arriving in Europe are predominantly young, male and Muslim. That means they "broadly fit the profile of those susceptible to radicalisation" (Funk and Parkes; 2016, 2). In the last years, refugees and migrants have been involved in a number of terror attacks, including in the terror attack on a Christmas Market in the heart of the German capital (Smale et al.; 2016).

There is also an obvious political interest by terrorist groups like ISIS in using migrants and refugees (Funk and Parkes; 2016). When terror attacks are carried out by migrants and refugees, it can lead to political and social reactions which play into the hands of fanatics (Funk and Parkes; 2016).

Ultimately, understanding how irregular regime changes work can also help to influence them in one way or another. The German government might be able to decrease the likelihood of these changes when it deems it to be in contradiction of their interest or vice-versa. Subject

to a thorough ethical discussion, this is a (hypothetical) ability that can increase leverage over competing actors. Even if Germany is not able to influence the occurrence or outcome of attempts at irregular regime change, a thorough understanding of their functioning may allow it to mitigate their negative impacts - some of which are described above.

Beyond the obvious importance that irregular regime changes have in relation to German and European interests, they are also of importance to us because of our conception of morality.

## 2.2 **Morality**

Understanding irregular regime changes is important because they raise a number of moral issues that deserve attention. International relations revolve around interests. Nevertheless, a state with the capacity and power of Germany ought to concern itself with questions outside of its narrow national interest. There is no trade-off between values and interests: standing in for values ultimately serves interests.

Irregular regime changes often have decidedly negative moral consequences. To start with, irregular regime changes are not the preferable way for political leaders to change. They are in many ways undemocratic by definition. The leadership change is not achieved through a democratic election, but in contradiction to the laws and conventions of a given country (Goemans et al.; 2016).

The changes themselves often involve violence, or at least the threat thereof (Goemans et al.; 2009). Attempts at coups d'état and uprisings often lead to violence and repression directly when the government is fighting to stay in power. When a new government comes into power through an irregular regime change, it might also use violence in order to quell opposition to its new, often illegitimate, rule. That in and by itself is enough for it to be important. When the innocent get tortured, jailed without cause, killed or simply disappear, one ought to take note.

Coups and uprisings can also create a whole host of other negative externalities like economic turmoil. Most importantly, history is full of examples of coups d'état and uprisings leading to civil wars. The Syrian Civil War is a case in point. The Assad family has ruled Syria since 1970, when Hafez al-Assad took power (Ali and Addley; 2011). The Arab Spring began in the deserts of Tunisia. It arrived in Syria in March 2011 after “the arrest and torture of some teenagers who painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall” (BBC; 2016b). Protests broke out in Deraa, a city in southern Syria (BBC; 2016b). They were put down brutally by security forces. As protestors were killed, more took to the streets - nationwide. Protestors were demanding that Assad step down. A mere three months later, hundreds of thousands were protesting across the country (BBC; 2016b). Assad was not going to step down, so he decided to use violence in order to suppress the protests.

As more people died, people protesting turned into people fighting security services. At first, people fought to protect themselves (BBC; 2016b). Ultimately, the peaceful uprising has turned into the bloodiest civil war of the century. Hundreds of thousands have been killed (BBC; 2016b). More than 10 000 000 people have been forced to flee their home (BBC; 2016b), many of them to another country, or even another continent. Dozens of armed groups are involved in the fighting.

An entire region is destabilised as the spillover effects of the country are impacting countries from Turkey to Iraq to Lebanon. Even further afield, the risk of terrorism in Europe and in Germany have increased as a result of the fighting. The tragedy and suffering of this civil war is impossible to quantify. An entire generation has been lost. There is a straight chain of causality from the attempted uprising to the civil war. Evidently, we have to attempt to understand irregular regime changes and their consequences. It's too important a topic not to. Syria is testament to the unthinkable horror that can result from attempts at irregular regime change. That's not always the outcome. Although both coups d'état and uprisings are attempts to change the polity irregularly, they musn't be morally undesirable. Quite the opposite. We should care about irregular regime changes because they can be a way to improve the lives of people around the globe - at least under certain conditions.

When citizens of a democracy are unhappy with their political leadership, they can simply vote in a new leader. People have fought and died for the right to do so. Across the world, most people simply don't have that opportunity. In sub-Saharan Africa, it's not unusual for leaders to stay in power for decades. Robert Mugabe, for example, has ruled Zimbabwe since 1980 (BBC; 1980). Across the Middle East, individual families have sometimes ruled for decades. Faced with a lack of opportunity to participate in the political process through free and fair elections, people can use irregular ways in order to hold their government accountable or change it altogether.

In this way, coups, and particularly uprisings, can be a way in order to set people free. Germans know this better than most. The Soviet Union, resisted by the Western alliance for decades, eventually collapsed as hundreds of thousands of everyday Germans, Poles, Bulgarians, Czechs, Romanians and others decide to work around the system - not within it.

At the beginning of 1989, Erich Honecker, the leader of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) proclaimed that the Berlin Wall would stand for another 50 or 100 years (Ide; 2014). He was wrong - but so were many others. Very few in 1989 thought it possible that the GDR would collapse anytime soon (Neubert; 2009, 7) even though "there had been signs of crisis for years" (Neubert; 2009, 7). But freedom had powerful opponents in the mighty military and security services of the Soviets and their satellites (Neubert; 2009, 7). In September 1989, the underlying "conflict between the ruling SED and society broke out openly" (Neubert; 2009, 16). Freedom won. Within a year, the peaceful protests in the GDR led to German Reunification. Germans were not alone in their call for self-determination and democratic change. To the east in Czechoslovakia, ordinary people used nonviolent resistance in order to fight their oppressors and occupiers. There were mass demonstrations. General strikes. It all started with a peaceful protest commemorating International Students' Day (BBC; 2014). The Velvet Revolution in 1989 was sudden. In Romania, protestors determined to change

their life for the better withstood brutal repression (Roberts; 1991, 25). They stood up to tanks (Roberts; 1991, 25) and came out en masse to demonstrate to Ceausescu that his tyranny had come to an end.

These mass protests, strikes and civil resistance campaigns were not the only factor that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But they were a part of the fight that brought down the communist behemoth that had oppressed hundreds of millions from Vladivostok to Berlin. After these periods of volatility, many of the Eastern European nations in question became democratic, fully sovereign members of the European family. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary became part of the European Union. Since then, they have prospered.

By just about any account, the uprisings on 1989 have led to an improvement in the life of many, many Eastern Europeans. As free people, do we not have a moral obligation to concern ourselves with the ways and means which others may use in order to set themselves free, too? I would argue that we do. Because of that, understanding irregular regime changes is important. They can help us understand how people in the past have achieved liberty. Doing so is the first step in helping others do the same.

Overall, irregular regime changes are of concern because they impact German national interests as well as the values it seeks to promote. It would be arrogant to presume that Germany, a regional power, would be able to influence the occurrence or outcome of irregular regime change attempts in far-flung places around the globe. Nevertheless, Germany can have an impact - even if it is just after regime changes have already happened. If nothing else, the Federal Republic often has leverage because it provides a large amount of aid to far flung places around the globe. According to the OECD, Germany is the third-largest provider of overseas development aid in the world (OECD; 2016).

In the next chapter, I will provide an outline of the already existing research on irregular regime changes. These include findings on the reasons for the occurrence of irregular regime change attempts - both coups d'état and nonviolent uprisings. In addition, I will discuss the factors that differentiate failed attempts at regime change from attempts that ultimately succeed in replacing the government. Lastly, I'm going to analyse what we already know about the impact of these changes.



### 3 The Nature of Irregular Regime Change

We know a great deal about irregular regime changes, but there is even more that we don't know. A regime is a government in power (Merriam Webster; 2017b). The word itself is derived from French, which itself has derived it from Latin (Merriam Webster; 2017b). In public discourse, the word regime has connotations of authoritarianism. It is associated with governments led by strongmen, dictators or kings that you find in countries like Russia, Syria or Saudi Arabia. In this work, the word regime will be used without the negative connotations it has in mainstream use.

This work deals with the change of leadership at the helm of regimes - in particular the cases in which this leadership change is irregular. Beger et al. (2014, 1) define irregular leadership change as "the sudden removal of a sitting leader by means outside of the normal range of political competition." This is a situation in which the most important political leader is removed 'through means that contravene a state's conventions and laws' (Beger et al.; 2014). In practise, this mainly refers to mass protests, coup d'états and armed insurrections that bring down political leaders. This form of regime change is as old as time: there are many, many examples for these events.

In recent years, the ousting of Tunisian dictator Ben Ali in 2011 serves as an example of the power of mass protest. He wasn't brought down by tanks, fighters jets or bombs. His reign was ended when ordinary Tunisians up and down the country took to the streets in defiance of an oppressive state. Coups happen all the time. In Thailand, the most recent coup occurred in 2014 when the Royal Thai Armed Forces forcibly removed the leader of the caretaker government and replaced it with a junta that controls the country to this day (Thepgumpanat and Tanakasempipat; 2017). Similarly, a number of armed insurrections are ongoing, some of which may succeed in their aim to replace their government. Examples for these ongoing insurrections are the Maoist-Naxalite insurgency (BBC; 2011b) in India and the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

These events stand in stark contrast to the type of regime change most often experienced in the Western world: regular regime changes. These regime changes occur when one leader is replaced by another following the laws and conventions of a given state. An example of this would be the replacement of Gerhard Schröder by Angela Merkel in Germany. As regulated by law in Germany, Schröder stood in a free and fair election against his political competitors and lost. He was duly replaced by Merkel in 2005 (DW; 2005).

This book is mostly concerned with two types of irregular regime change: those resulting from coups d'état and peaceful uprisings. I have chosen to focus on these events because they are relatively frequent. Most of the irregular leadership changes are the result "of the threat

or use of force as exemplified in coups, (popular) revolts and assassinations and occur at the hands of domestic opponents” (Goemans et al.; 2009). Civil wars and armed rebellions are at times considered in this analysis, but they are not the pivotal focus of this work. This chapter outlines what we already know about irregular regime changes, especially coups d’état and popular protests as a means to change a regime. How often and where do these events occur? Why do they happen? What makes an attempted regime change a successful regime change? The first section deals with coups, the second section deals with mass protests.

### 3.1 Coups

*Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* - Juvenal<sup>1</sup>

Coups used to be considered a “hot topic” amongst political scientists until interest waned somewhat (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 249). In recent years, the topic of coups has been discussed more frequently again by political scientists - and with good reason. Coups are amongst the most frequent ways in which political leaders are forced from office irregularly (Goemans et al.; 2009, 9). Coups d’état have probably occurred for as long as human societies have existed. Nevertheless, the first use of the word only occurred in 1646 (Merriam-Webster; 2017a).

The first step to understanding the nature and impact of coup d’états is to define them. As it turns out, defining coups is not that easy. Welch (1970, 1) has provided an early definition as early as 1970. According to Welch, a coup d’état is a “sharp, clear event” that is “easy to date and possible to document” (Welch; 1970, 1). Later scholars have provided their own definitions of coups. Powell and Thyne (2011, 250) provide an overview of existing definitions that divides them across three classifications:

Table 1: Coup Definitions (Powell and Thyne; 2011)

Source	Target	Perpetrator	Tactics
Banks (2001)	‘top government elite...nation’s power structure’	undefined, includes revolutions	‘forced changes’
Belkin and Schofer (2005)	‘regime’	‘small military coalitions’	undefined
Ferguson (1987)	‘government’, ‘establishment’	‘soldiers, politicians, mercenaries’	undefined

<sup>1</sup>Juvenal, Satires VI, 347 ”Who is to guard the guards themselves”

Source	Target	Perpetrator	Tactics
Finer (1988)	'civilian authorities'	'armed forces'	'sanction (or threat of)'
Janowitz (1977)	'existing regime'	'organized factions'	undefined
Kennedy (1974)	undefined	'regular armed troops'	'use or threat of use of armed forces'
Lunde (1991)	'regime'	'military or security forces'	undefined
Luttwak (1969)	'government'	'segment of the state apparatus'	'conspiracy'
McGowan (2003)	'national government'	'military, security, and/or police'	'violence... may be negligible'
O'Kane (1987)	'government'	civil or military	'threat or use of violence'
Thompson (1973)	'chief executive'	'regular armed forces'	'use or threat of force'

The three classifications are “Target”, “Perpetrator” and “Tactics” (Powell and Thyne; 2011). There is relatively little discussion surrounding the target of coups - most political scientists focus on the principal leader of any given state (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 250). Defining the perpetrators of coups is much more difficult. Some scholars believe that the perpetrators should be limited to the armed forces, while others have used much broader definitions. As Powell and Thyne (2011, 250) point out, these broader definitions can include “non-military elites, civilian groups” and even “mercenaries” as coup perpetrators. One example for these broader definitions is provided by Janowitz, who argues that perpetrators must simply be “organised factions” (Janowitz; 1977, 49).

In contrast, Powell and Thyne (2011, 250) define the perpetrators as “any elite that is part of the state apparatus”. This approach is advantageous for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is narrow enough to exclude other forms of irregular regime change, such as civil wars or revolutions (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251). Secondly, it avoids a bias in favour of successful, as opposed to failed, coup attempts by including actors beyond the military (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251). One of the reasons why coups can and do fail is because the perpetrators are unable to convince the military to aid them. Lastly, Powell and Thyne (2011, 251) point out that limiting the perpetrators to actors from within the state excludes regime changes carried out

exclusively by foreign powers.

A foreign power using force in order to remove a principal leader abroad is not a coup. If the power aids domestic forces in removing a leader, it might fall under the definition of a coup. A good example for this would be the 1953 Iranian Coup. The coup is “unlikely to have happened without CIA influence, but it was ultimately Iranian actors who overthrew Mossadeq” (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251). That sets the coup apart from the fall of Idi Amin in 1979 orchestrated by the military of Tanzania (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251). With regards to tactics, it’s important to note that only events which are illegal can be considered coups because otherwise attempts at simply exerting political pressure will falsely be included (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251).

Importantly, “violence does not have to be present” (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251) for an event to be considered a coup. This definition is consistent with much of the literature, in which others have already pointed out that the shedding of blood is no necessity for an event to qualify as a coup (Finer; 1988, 23). Coups work because the threat of force is present, not necessarily because violence is used. Adding this rule is useful because it helps to separate coups from civil wars - which are often sparked by coups (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251). Their final definition of a coup is the following (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251): A coup attempt includes “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.”

It also makes sense to differentiate between failed coup attempts and successful coup attempts - as various datasets on coups now do. Failed coup attempts can be as consequential as successful coup attempts. When a coup attempt fails, it can provide the principal leader with an opportunity to vanquish his foes. The current political developments are a good example for the need to include failed coup attempts in any definition.

But what differentiates a successful coup attempt from a failed coup attempt? A common way to classify successful coups was first proposed by (Thompson; 1973). A coup, then, is not a “success” simply because a sitting leader is deposed. To be classified as such, the government put in place post-coup needs to last for at least seven days. Other scholars such as Jackman (1978) and McGowan (2003) have followed this approach, as have Powell and Thyne (2011, 252). To a certain degree, this cut-off is arbitrary.

Nevertheless, it makes sense to use it for two reasons. The first is empirics: it is relatively easy to determine whether coup-plotters have succeeded in deposing a sitting leader for seven days or more. This stands in contrast to other approaches, which are harder to test. One example would be the approach outlined by O’Kane (1987, 37-38). Using this approach, a coup is successful if the perpetrators of the coup are subsequently able to install a government of their choosing (O’Kane; 1987, 37-38). Ultimately, it is rather difficult to determine whether the

perpetrators succeed in fulfilling their wishes for a new government.

In this chapter, I will outline what we already know about coups d'état. More specifically, I will outline why it is important to understand coups and how often they occur. Beyond this, I will discuss some of the reasons for the occurrence of coup attempts. Thirdly, I will talk about the circumstances and methods that are needed to make a coup attempt successful. In a fourth step, I will talk about the methods that leaders can use in order to prevent coup attempts from occurring and succeeding. Lastly, I will outline what is already known about the impact of coup d'états.

### 3.1.1 Frequency of Coups

Coups d'état are a key feature of regime instability across the world. In Africa, for example, coups are “by far the most common challenge to the continuity of regimes” (Collier and Hoefler; 2005, 20). There are a variety of different datasets covering coups in one way or another (eg Powell & Thyne, 2011). By just about any standard, coup attempts are frequent. Between 1950 to 2010, there were 457 coup attempts out of which 227, roughly half, were successful (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 255).

One of the most widely used datasets is by Powell and Thyne (2011). The dataset denotes information on coup attempts between 1950 and 2010.




Figure 1: Coups and Coup Attempts 1950-2010

Source: Data: Powell, 2011, Graphic: Ulfelder, 2016

As Figure 1 shows, coups were not limited to a small area: they occurred from Asia to the Middle East to the Americas. Although in substantially lower numbers, coups also occurred in Europe. The highest number of coups occurred in Africa, closely followed by the Americas. The three letter abbreviations in the figure stand for individual countries. The shade of the colour denotes whether a coup attempt was successful or not. In 2010, coup attempts occurred in Madagascar, Guinea-Bissau and Niger. Only the coup attempt in Niger was successful.

Coups are closely identified with the Cold War period and Western support for dictators in

Latin America. As Figure 1 shows, the number of coup attempts did indeed peak during the Cold War, in the 1960s. Since then, the number of coup attempts has decreased, albeit with temporary surges. Most notably, there was an increase in coup attempts in the 1970s and another one around 1990 (Figure 1).

Since the end of the Cold War, this downward trend has continued. That doesn't mean that coup attempts don't occur anymore. There are still plenty. As Table 2 shows, there were 13 coup attempts between 2005 and 2010 alone.

Table 2: Coups 2005-2015 (Powell and Thyne; 2011)

<b>Country</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Type</b>
Fiji	2000	Attempt	CAR	2003	Attempt
Ecuador	2000	Coup	Mauritania	2003	Coup
Peru	2000	Coup	DRC	2004	Coup
Paraguay	2000	Coup	DRC	2004	Coup
Guinea-Bissau	2000	Coup	Mauritania	2005	Attempt
Ivory Coast	2000	Coup	Togo	2005	Attempt
Djibouti	2000	Coup	Thailand	2006	Attempt
Comoros	2000	Coup	Fiji	2006	Attempt
Ivory Coast	2001	Coup	Chad	2006	Coup
CAR	2001	Coup	Mauritania	2008	Attempt
Burundi	2001	Coup	Guinea	2008	Attempt
Burundi	2001	Coup	Guinea-Bissau	2008	Coup
Venezuela	2002	Coup	Honduras	2009	Attempt
Ivory Coast	2002	Coup	Madagascar	2009	Attempt
Sao Tome and Principe	2003	Attempt	Niger	2010	Attempt
Guinea-Bissau	2003	Attempt	Guinea-Bissau	2010	Coup
Madagascar	2010	Coup			

### 3.1.2 Coup Conditions

Given the high frequency of coups and the often consequential impact, it makes sense to ask ourselves why coup attempts occur. The literature provides a wide array of answers. Broadly speaking, these answers can be put into two categories. According to Belkin and Schofer (2003), a distinction that is commonly accepted in the literature on civil-military relations is that between the motives and opportunities for launching a coup.

Within the opportunities basket, we may wish to further differentiate between structural factors

and triggers. Structural factors make coups possible, as opposed to immediate triggers that spark any given coup (Belkin and Schofer; 2003, 598). Without the structural causes present, a coup will not happen. The same cannot be said for trigger events. If trigger events occur but structural causes are unfavourable to coups, a coup is unlikely to occur. Belkin and Schofer (2003, 600) have identified 21 causes for coups in the literature (Table 3, modified from the original for easier use):

Table 3: Coup Triggers & Conditions (Belkin and Schofer; 2003, 601-604)

<b>Causes of Coup</b>	<b>Background or Trigger</b>	<b>Source</b>
Regime Legitimacy	Background	Linz (1978)
Past Coups	Background	Londregan and Poole (1990)
Officer's political culture	Both	Huntington (1957)
Political institutions	Background	Huntington (1968)
Colonial legacy	Background	Finer (1970)
Economic development	Background	Janowitz (1964)
Export structure	Background	O'Kane (1987)
Officer's class composition	Background	Huntington (1968)
Military size	Background	Feit (1973)
Civil Society	Background	Hibbs (1973)
Political crisis	Trigger	Hibbs (1973)
Contagion Regional Coups	Trigger	Lieuwen (1962)
External threat	Both	Desch (1999)
Foreign veto power	Both	Zimmermann (1983)
National security doctrine	Both	Stepan (1978)
Officer's grievances	Trigger	Thompson (1973)
Military grievances	Trigger	Thompson (1973)
Military popularity	Trigger	Finer (1988)
Military cohesiveness	Trigger	Thompson (1976)
Economic decline/crisis	Trigger	Fossum (1967)

Some of the causes of coups are structural, others are merely triggers. Some can serve as both. Not all of the factors in the literature are convincing - both in terms of theory and empirical evidence. The factors are concerned with political institutions, the military, history and economics.

Generally speaking, potential coup plotters are broadly rational: they will only attempt a coup if they believe that the chances of success coupled with the expected reward are outweighed by

the potentially devastating consequences of a failed plot to overthrow the government (Powell; 2012, 1019). The various factors outlined here therefore influence the likelihood of success, the expected reward as well as the expected punishment in one way or another.

### **3.1.2.1 Political**

Since the aim of a coup is the unseating of the principal political leader of the state, it is no surprise that political factors should play a role. The principal political factor is legitimacy. Legitimacy is a much debated concept in political science. For the purpose of increasing or decreasing coup risk, it refers to the degree to which citizens, elites and organisations accept the state's role in making the rules (Belkin and Schofer; 2003, 606-607). When the legitimacy of a regime is high, grievances can be addressed within the system: there is no need to resort to extra-systemic ways to make one's voice heard (Belkin and Schofer; 2003, 607). The military, then, does not have to get involved in the political process. As Linz (1978, 17) rightly states, regimes vary widely in terms of legitimacy.

Democracies allow citizens to voice their concerns and redress their grievances through an institutionalised process that does not require violence. Autocratic systems, especially dictatorships, on the other hand, make it very difficult to influence policy through institutions. Unlike a democratic leader, the leader of an autocracy does not have to maintain the goodwill of a large number of people in order to maintain power (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith; 2012). This makes it easier for the autocrat to ignore the wishes of his population. A population habitually ignored within the system may decide to work outside of it to challenge the status quo.

Civil Society can be another bulwark against military intervention in politics. One scholar has gone as far as saying that very little stands in the way of coups without organisations like independent trade unions, political parties, or voluntary organisations (David; 1985, 5). These non-state actors can be a powerful force if they are critical of the military or openly mobilise against their intervention (Belkin and Schofer; 2003, 605).

This is an effect that is potentially relevant before the military decides to launch a coup, but also relevant once the coup attempt is under way. Finer (1988, 83-85) has pointed out that the 1920 Kapp Putsch failed because of the high level of organisation of German civil society and the support of the wider public.

### **3.1.2.2 Military**

Besides political factors, the military and its relationship with the civil command are another key point of investigation. Although coups are instigated by both military and non-military



factions, the military always plays a decisive role in any irregular regime change. Without the backing of (part of) the military, coups are almost inevitably bound to fail. It matters whether the military has the intent to work against the sitting leader, and whether they have the opportunity to do so. The reason for this is relatively straightforward: the military is usually the most powerful armed actor in a given country. The same weapons that are supposed to be used against external foes can also be turned against the government.

Although the theoretical link is disputed by some in the literature, such as Finer (1988), the size of the military has often been investigated as a possible determinant of coup-risk. The size (and power) of the military could have an influence either way: a small military will have a comparatively strong reason to challenge the status quo to become more powerful and receive a larger share of state resources. At the same time, a small military has relatively small means to make that change happen.

The converse effect is true for big and powerful militaries. A big military has the means to affect drastic change, but it might be happy with its position in society and therefore decide to defend the status quo. How powerful the regular military is in comparison to other armed factions becomes especially important in countries that have significant armed personnel outside of the regular forces, such as armed militia. As Geddes (1999) has pointed out, the military always wants to avoid having to fight another faction of the armed forces.

Collier and Hoeffler (2005, 20) have found that the effect could actually be the opposite: a larger military leads to a higher likelihood of coup attempts. Aside from the size of the military, spending is said to be relevant. Leon (2014), for example, finds that countries with low military spending as a share of GDP are more likely to experience coups. While size and spending do differ, it's worth pointing out that the findings of Collier and Leon are directly opposed to each other. Leon (2014) argues that coups are more likely when military spending is low because the military will use a coup in order to increase its funding.

### **3.1.2.3 Economics**

Economics seem to be key to understanding why countries are more prone to coups than others. Importantly, it makes sense to differentiate between current economic conditions and the direction in which the economy is moving. The current economic situation can be analysed through levels of gross domestic product per capita, average income, GINI coefficients and so forth. When observing the direction of the economy, growth becomes a focus.

“Economic backwardness” was recognised as a factor influencing coup-risk as early as the 1960s (Luttwak; 1969). It seems to be something of a structural pre-condition for coups, since they are almost “non-existent” in developed countries (Londregan and Poole; 1990, 151). The

positive relationship between low-levels of economic development and higher coup-risk are evident in the literature. Then again, this doesn't necessarily mean that poverty causes coups. It might just be that sound governance leads to prosperity.

The relationship between growth, and therefore economic transformation, and coup-risk, is contested. Huntington (1968, 41) famously argued that "modernity breeds stability, but modernisation breeds instability". Shortly beforehand, Olson (1963) contended that economic growth specifically was a destabilising force. According to this theoretical framework, economic growth might sow the seeds of dissent.

As people see that improvements are possible, they hunger for more, which their government is unable to deliver. Nevertheless, the exact opposite would also make sense theoretically: a government that delivers economic growth should not be overthrown because it is evidently effective.

In a more recent study of coups in Africa, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) find that low income and low growth rates are a consistent indicator for coup-risk. This effect could occur for a variety of reasons. Framed in their seminal framework of greed and grievance, low income and low growth may mean that there are few opportunities outside of controlling the state to generate wealth.

Beyond this, lack of income and low growth rates could indicate that a state is weak more generally, as Fearon and Stanford (2003) have done with regards to civil war. In this context, coup plots may simply happen when "the state is not sufficiently effective to prevent them" (Collier and Hoeffler; 2005, 19).

O'Kane (1993, 1) suggests that economic factors are more important than political factors when it comes to coup risk. According to her, world market trade creates uncertainties for governments that make them prone to be accused of corruption or incompetence - this effect is said to be more significant when a state primarily relies on primary commodities for export (O'Kane; 1993, 1).

Since many African countries are heavily reliant on exporting primary commodities (Collier; 2002) like copper, cobalt or gold, this would go a long way in explaining why Africa has experienced more coups than any other world region (Powell and Thyne; 2011).

#### **3.1.2.4 History**

Another key finding of the literature is the "coup trap". Coup traps are set to occur when a state experiences coups as a result of previous coups. Structural conditions and motivations form the basis of coup risk, but that risk can be restrained by legitimacy (Collier and Hoeffler; 2005, 9). Once a coup has occurred, this restraint will not cease to exist, but it will be weakened

(Collier and Hoeffler; 2005, 9). Because of this weakened restraint, one coup can lead to further coups even if the structural conditions that make coups possible remain the same.

Belkin and Schofer (2003, 605) point out that several theories linking colonialism to coups could be plausible. But they suffer from one weakness: colonial legacy might create a situation in which factors influencing coup-risk are higher, but it is not the colonial legacy itself which paves the way for coups. Examples for these factors include wealth, legitimacy and the strength of civil society (Belkin and Schofer; 2003, 605).

The literature has found a wide array of factors that can influence coup-risk in a given country. They range from politics, to economics to history and civil military relations. But what is necessary in order to turn a coup attempt into a successful coup?

### **3.1.3 Coup Attempts and Success**

There were 475 coup attempts between 1950 and 2010, but barely over 50% of them were successful (Powell and Thyne; 2011). A whole 236 coup attempts failed (Powell and Thyne; 2011). As we will see in later chapters, the consequences of a failed coup can be just as dramatic as the consequences of a coup that succeeds. A coup attempt is a “success” when the sitting leader is removed from power for a set period of time.

Whether that happens or not depends on a great number of variables. Edward Luttwak wrote the practical “how to” guide for would be coup plotters in 1968 (Luttwak; 1969). The book is extremely detailed. It’s a guide that helps coup plotters plan and execute an overthrow of the government (Luttwak; 1969). His work remains relevant to this day. Following the coup attempt in Turkey 2016, he wrote an article detailing what had gone “wrong”.

Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, coup plotters need to seize, “or at least kill” the leader they are trying to remove from power (Luttwak; 2016). That didn’t happen. Rather than being detained, President Erdogan was able to mobilise his followers through use of his phone and later an improvised television conference (Luttwak; 2016).

Secondly, it’s important to take mobile units out of play if they are not a part of the coup attempt (Luttwak; 2016). This certainly extends to fighter jets. It didn’t happen. If possible, top echelons of military power should be coopted or detained (Luttwak; 2016). Most of them were not.

Barracca (2007) finds that a key factor influencing the outcome of coup attempts is the degree of unity of the armed forces. He compares the failed coups in Ecuador (2000) and Venezuela (2002) with the successful coup of Pakistan in 1999. As broadly rational actors, military officers in Ecuador and Venezuela decided that anticipated international and domestic opposition to

military rule were too high for them to participate. As a result of their lack of participation, the coup ultimately failed. In Pakistan, the military was largely unified - partly because they expected a lower degree of opposition to military rule.

#### **3.1.4 Stopping Coups**

What can governments do in order to prevent coup activity, or at least prevent coup attempts from being successful? Principally, they can seek to amend structural conditions that make coups possible and attempt to diminish the motivation of potential coup plotters to carry out their mission. Principally, this means that governments can change one or multiple of these factors: likelihood of coup success, potential reward for a successful coup and potential punishment for a failed coup. This section outlines some coup-proofing strategies.

As previously noted, the military is the principal actor in most coups. Because of that, many “coup-proofing” strategies centre around the armed forces. When the interests and concerns of the military are taken seriously, they will have an incentive to defend the status quo, not drastic change. Huntington (1991) recommended that soldiers be paid more and be given “toys” in order to prevent them from intervening in politics. Increases in financial incentives or military spending in the short-term reduce the expected pay-off from a coup attempt, thereby making coups less likely (Powell; 2012, 1022).

As Geddes (1999) has pointed out, military coup-plotters want to avoid having to fight another armed group when they rise up. To prevent a coup attempt, governments must therefore ensure that any coup-plotter will be forced to do so. There are essentially two strategies to achieve this aim. The first involves a fractionalisation of the armed forces. A cohesive military that sticks together and is willing to overthrow their leader will do so. To prevent this, the government can counterbalance factions of the armed forces against each other.

Belkin and Schofer (2003, 596) find that regimes vulnerable to coup activity tend to separate their armed forces into multiple competing factions that can “check and balance” one another. This makes sense. Earlier research by Thompson (1976) had indicated that coup attempts were more likely to succeed if they were supported by a larger number of individual factions of the military. If these forces are set up to compete with each other for power and resources, if they are artificially divided, they will be less likely to conspire against their leader.

Quinlivan (2007) has provided an insight into the ways in which this counterbalancing of the military works in the Middle East, an area that is prone to coups. The “parallel military” doesn’t have to be able to defeat the regular army in an all-out war, neither does it have to be as large. It needs to be bound to the regime through special forms of patronage or loyalty and devoted almost exclusively to the protection of the ruling regime. The most important task of

the parallel military is to prevent regular forces from getting through to the key points of the regime.

Because of that, parallel military forces must be ground forces with a chain of command that exists outside of the ministry of defence (Quinlivan; 2007, 141). The parallel military should be equipped as well as the regular forces to make sure that the regular military considers them in balance-of-power considerations (Quinlivan; 2007, 141). Importantly, having the same equipment will also allow the parallel forces to believe that they would stand a chance against the regular forces (Quinlivan; 2007, 141).

This, in turn, is necessary for them to act as a suitable deterrent. The regular forces need to believe that the parallel military will fight them if they attempt to overthrow the regime. Quinlivan (2007) provides an insight into the way this balancing plays out in Saudi-Arabia.

Saudi-Arabia has a regular army and a National Guard, its parallel military. The purposes of the two are different: in 1974 a decision was made to place the regular army in key trouble areas and along possible invasion routes (Quinlivan; 2007, 144). The National Guard, on the other hand, was to be deployed to protect key oil-producing installations in the heavily Shia populated Eastern Province (Quinlivan; 2007, 144). Most importantly, a number of National Guards were to be deployed in tribal areas surrounding the capital.

In effect, this meant that Guard forces were standing between the capital, and therefore the heart of the regime, and the regular army (Quinlivan; 2007, 144). In addition, recruiting practises for the two were markedly similar, especially in terms of the ethnic makeup of the forces (Quinlivan; 2007, 143). The National Guard, the parallel military, are recruited heavily amongst tribes that have demonstrated loyalty to the royal family going back to 1929 (Quinlivan; 2007, 143).

A similar logic applies to the state security services. As Quinlivan (2007, 148) points out, state security services must be able to do their job in order for the regime to survive, especially in non-democratic states. A military that is too active is a threat; a security service unable to do its work is a threat as well. To maintain loyalty of these forces and prevent a unified front against the government, the security services can be divided with overlapping responsibilities. In Saudi-Arabia, for example, internal security is handled by the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard and the independent religious police (Quinlivan; 2007, 149). These are in turn divided into further sub-groupings.

By dividing these services, the government can create a market with “multiple sellers” of security services and a single, powerful “buyer” (Quinlivan; 2007, 149). It also makes it more difficult for the security services to mount their own challenges to the government. This was done in Iraq. In June 1973, the chief of the Baathist Party’s security chief, Nazim Kzar,

almost succeeded with a coup (Quinlivan; 2007, 150). Subsequently, the security services have multiplied and been shuffled constantly (Quinlivan; 2007, 150).

In addition, the Iraqi security services were bound to the regime literally to the death (Quinlivan; 2007). They were involved in the most heinous atrocities committed by the regime. They have no opportunity to change their allegiance because they are so loathed by others (Quinlivan; 2007). The behaviour of the secret services during peace-time therefore serve to create mutual fear between them and the wider population during times of crisis (Quinlivan; 2007, 151).

Powell (2012) finds that coup-proofing works when the parallel military is strengthened in relation to the regular armed forces. That said, leaders are not well served by too many competing organisations - both with regards to coup attempts (Powell; 2012, 1036), and because that can decrease overall military effectiveness (Pilster and Bohmelt; 2011). This is especially interesting given that most developing countries maintain “highly divided military and paramilitary structures” (Belkin and Schofer; 2005, 141-142) specifically for the purpose of preventing coups.

Long-term, a government can substantially reduce coup-risk by eliminating the structural factors that make coups possible. This would mean increasing the legitimacy of the government, raising income levels and strengthening civil society. Unfortunately, at least some of these policies are diametrically opposed to the perceived interests of those who rule coup-prone countries. Even if they were not opposed, any liberalisation brings risks in and of itself. If the leader of a very oppressive country decides to grant his people more freedom, they might just use that freedom in order to oppose him more effectively. Overall, leaders of coup prone countries who see regime survival as their primary objective should focus on the military and structural factors that incentivise political interventions.

### **3.1.5 Coup Impact**

Coups have an impact. They are periods of profound instability. Windows of opportunity in which things normally implausible can happen. Their impact is felt keenly whether the coup fails or succeeds. The failed coup in Turkey 2016 demonstrates this impact very clearly. The 15th of July 2016 will go down in Turkish history as a moment of schism: A faction of the military attempted to seize power (BBC; 2017b). Bridges were closed, special forces were sent to seize President Erdogan. Several F-16 very nearly shot down the presidential jet after Erdogan narrowly escaped a special forces raid in the coastal town of Marmaris (Pamuk and Coskun; 2017).

Parliament was bombed (Pamuk and Coskun; 2017). The coup attempt was suppressed

quickly - in part by ordinary people who took to the streets to stand in the way of tanks (Amnesty International; 2017, 367). More than 200 people died and in excess of 2000 people were injured (BBC; 2017b). Even though the coup attempt was quickly put down, the people of Turkey will have to bear the consequences of the coup and the subsequent wave of purges that was unleashed by the Turkish government for a long time to come.

Tens of thousands of people were taken into pre-trial detention during a period of emergency rule (Amnesty International; 2017, 367). The civil service was gutted as 90 000 civil servants were dismissed for their alleged role (Amnesty International; 2017, 367). Media outlets were closed in the hundreds and journalists were regularly detained (Amnesty International; 2017, 367). In 2017 Turkey, a NATO member and aspiring member of the European Union ranks 155th in the World Press Freedom Index - below countries like Belarus, Tajikistan or Russia (Reporters Without Borders; 2017). Newspapers have been closed, many journalists are imprisoned. There is evidence of the use of torture (Amnesty International; 2017, 367).

The coup attempt and the ensuing purge did not only create suffering for tens of thousands, it also impacted the foreign policy of Turkey. Germany and other European partners became increasingly critical of the overblown response of the Erdogan government. A Turkish accession to the European Union has moved from improbable to all but impossible within months. According to a recent poll, only 3% of Germans now consider Erdogan's Turkey to be a trustworthy partner (Ehni; 2017). Alongside Turkish EU aspirations, Turkish democracy has been shattered.

There is an obvious theoretical and empirical link between coups, both failed and successful, and political repression. This link will be explored in chapters 4 & 5. There is a large body of literature investigating the impact of coups aside from repression. Most importantly, the impact on democratisation has been discussed frequently in recent years. Intuitively, coups appear to be undemocratic in nature. After all, a coup is an intervention in politics outside of the established laws and conventions that govern the body politic.

Coups have long been treated as undesirable by policymakers (Thyne and Powell; 2014). And with good reason. Many coups upturn democracies. The Thai Coup of 2006 is just one example of many. It was the first irregular regime change in the country in fifteen years (Walker; 2006). After the coup, freedom in Thailand deteriorated rapidly (Marshall and Jagger; 2014). Nevertheless, scholars have recently written about the possible positive impact of coups on democratisation (see eg. Thyne and Powell (2014), Varol (2012)). A number of examples are cited to support these theories. One example is that of the Malian Coup of 1991 in which then-Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré ousted President Moussa Traoré (Powell; 2014, 2). Traoré had been in power for decades.

He not only led the country into an economic crisis but also repressed dissent. In March 1991 alone, this repression led to 150 civilian deaths (Powell; 2014, 2). After Traoré was removed, Touré withdrew the military from politics again, “allowing Mali to be guided to democratic rule within just a few years” (Powell; 2014, 2).

Another case that is cited in defence of the “good coup” is Niger. In August 2009, the Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja attempted a power grab by changing the constitution (Miller; 2011, 45). A group of military officers intervened. The junta, aptly named Conseil suprême de restauration de la démocratie (Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy) vowed to make the country an example of good governance and democracy (Miller; 2011). There were pro-coup demonstrations. Even some of Niger’s NGO were happy (Miller; 2011). A variety of international news outlets greeted the news enthusiastically (Miller; 2011).

Paul Collier went as far as calling for the West to support coups in countries such as Burma and Zimbabwe in an opinion piece he wrote for the Washington Post (Collier; 2008). In another piece, he asserts that “coups and the threat of coups can be a significant weapon in fostering democracy” (Collier; 2009). The arguments that link coups with democratisation have become prevalent after the end of the Cold War. And indeed, the nature of coups has changed. Between 1950 and 1989, just 14% of coups against dictatorships led to the creation of democracies within two years (Derpanopoulos et al.; 2016, 2).

A full 40% did so in the time-range 1990 to 2015 (Derpanopoulos et al.; 2016, 2). Marinov and Goemans (2013) find that the majority of coups after the end of the Cold War have led to competitive elections. According to them, coups are not desirable, but they are “better” than they used to be with regards to democratisation (Marinov and Goemans; 2013, 820). Thyne and Powell (2014, 1) have argued that empirical analysis shows that “coups promote democratisation, particularly among states least likely to democratise otherwise”. With a focus on Africa, Powell (2014) has also found that coups are often precursors to democratisation.

Nevertheless, the link between coups and democratisation is not uniformly accepted. There are countless examples for coups that have led to dictatorships. Oftentimes, one autocracy is simply replaced by another. The case of Egypt is instructive in this regard. Facing mass protest, the the Egyptian military defected in its entirety during the Arab Spring (Makara; 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood subsequently governed the country under Muhammad Morsi. Two years later, the Egyptian military intervened yet again. Instead of an autocracy ruled by Mubarak or Morsi, Egyptians now suffer under the iron fist of al-Sisi.

Derpanopoulos et al. (2016, 6) demonstrate that “coups are not systematically correlated with democratisation”. This is true for the Cold War period as well as the post-Cold War era. Even Marinov and Goemans (2013) concede that the coup d’état “has been (and still is) the single most important factor leading to the downfall of democratic governments”. Even when coups



do lead to brief periods of democratic governance, they don't necessarily create the conditions for long-term stability Miller (2011). The debate over the impact of coups on democratisation is far from settled, but at the very least it would be a mistake to assume coups are either never promoting democracy or always doing so.

Recent in-depth analysis has yielded evidence that the decisive factor might be the coup-type (Chin; 2015). Beyond repression and democratisation, coups also have an impact on civil military relations. In particular, Leon (2014) finds that coups, both successful and unsuccessful, can lead to changes in military spending. Even though both types of coup activity lead to higher spending, the spending increase following successful coups is far greater than the increase experienced after failed coups Leon (2014) . The link between actual coup activity and military spending matters because military spending, in turn, is a factor that influences future coup-risk.

Beyond this, history demonstrates that coups can also spark civil wars. The example outlined in the previous chapter of the 1974 Ethiopia coup d'état and the ensuing civil war are a case in point.

These regime changes can also have an impact on economic development. In many cases, that impact is not a positive one. Meyersson (2015, 1) finds that coups tend to have a "distinctly detrimental" effect on democracies. In the case of autocracies, the effect is mixed Meyersson (2015).

Klaas and Ulfelder (2016) find that economic impacts of coup d'états are often directly related to the strategic importance of given countries to the West as well as their ability to withstand the withdrawal of Western support should it occur. Countries that enjoy a close relationship with the West will be less likely to suffer economically as a result of a coup d'état than countries that do not. The 2006 coup in Thailand, for example, is unlikely to have affected economic growth negatively (Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016, 7). The reason for this is relatively straightforward: Thailand matters. Thailand is an important country - politically, militarily and strategically. It has the option of "defecting" to China should it wish to do so (Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016). For that reason, Western governments chose not to impose high costs on the military junta that came to govern Thailand after the coup.

For Madagascar, the situation could not have been different. Madagascar is a small island nation off the eastern coast of Africa home to around 25 million people (CIA; 2017). Known principally for lemurs and a rich fauna, it is incredibly poor. Unlike Thailand, the country possesses very little strategic significance (Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016, 12). Importantly, the country is also heavily dependent on Western aid (Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016). When a coup in Madagascar did occur in 2009, the results were catastrophic. Western countries withdrew large portions of their aid, the economy collapsed (Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016). One of the

poorest countries in the world became poorer still.

### 3.2 Uprisings

*When people decide they want to be free...there is nothing that will stop them.* - Desmond Tutu<sup>2</sup>

Coups and mass uprisings have many things in common, but they also differ markedly in a number of areas. In this section, I'm going to outline a selection of the things we already know about mass uprisings. It will deal with the conditions that lead to mass uprisings, the frequency with which they occur, what makes an attempted uprising successful and how governments can attempt to stop them. Lastly, the section will outline the impact of these uprisings.

I'm defining uprisings as political campaigns with the aim of overthrowing the principal leader of a given country. Like the "campaign" defined by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013), an uprising is a "series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactic in pursuit of a political objective." In this case, the purpose of the campaign is the overthrow of the regime. Continuous means that an uprising is not a one-off event, unlike a spontaneous, single protest on any given day. These campaigns have "discernable leadership" and "organisational and operational names" (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013, 416).

I will focus almost exclusively on non-violent uprisings in this work. The reason for this is simple: they work. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) have demonstrated, non-violent resistance campaigns are exceptionally effective when it comes to regime change. In addition, non-violent uprisings, as compared with violent uprisings, tend to produce more desirable outcomes post regime change. In particular, authoritarian regimes that fall due to nonviolent uprisings "are much more likely to transition to democracy and civil peace" (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 2) than those who are overcome with violence.

Unlike violent campaigns, which may simply seek to overcome the agents of the state by force, the main mechanism used in uprisings is to separate the regime from its pillars of support (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 2). No leader is able to govern by himself. To remain in power and govern, leaders rely on a host of elites in business, the security services and civil society. The goal of any such campaign is therefore to ensure that a leader cannot rely on their support and obedience. Ultimately, uprisings are a challenge to the legitimacy of government. They don't involve territorial control or military skill - they are about shifting loyalties (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 2).

---

<sup>2</sup>Tutu, D. (1999) A Force More Powerful, Interview with Steve York in Atlanta, August 27. Cited by Ackerman (2007)

Mass mobilisation is absolutely critical (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 2). With more participants, a campaign can leverage increased resources and ideas. More strategies can be put into action. It is this diversity of tactics and skills that can ultimately be decisive for success or failure of an uprising. If mobilisation is key to victory, nonviolent uprisings have a key advantage: they are better at attracting participants to its cause. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that “physical, informational, commitment, and moral considerations” mean that nonviolent campaigns have an advantage over violent campaigns when it comes to mobilisation.

Physical barriers to nonviolent participation are often low (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011): just about anybody can participate in a labour strike, sit in or attend a protest in one form or another. When that is not possible, strategic non-cooperation with the state authorities is still an option. This certainly differentiates a nonviolent campaign from a violent one. Not everyone can fight a guerilla war. Secondly, these campaigns have an informational advantage (Chenoweth and Stephan (2011)).

People are more likely to join a protest if they believe that large numbers of people are likely to attend (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). To attract protestors, the campaign must be able to inform the public of its goals and capabilities (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). Doing so is much easier in a nonviolent campaign than it would be in a violent one. In a violent campaign, the risks associated with informing the public are often exceedingly high. This makes it a lot more difficult to recruit.

Thirdly, nonviolent campaigns benefit from low moral barriers to entry (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). Few people would see the act of protesting against a government as morally reprehensible. Doing so will require some thought, but it is fundamentally more difficult morally to engage in violence against other human beings than not doing so. Most of us would attend a protest, but how many would shoot a policeman? Few. Lastly, nonviolent campaigns require relatively little commitment in comparison to more violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). When you want to participate in a nonviolent campaign, it can be as easy as simply not showing up for work. This sets nonviolent campaigns aside from violent campaigns. These may require some form of training before participation and a much higher tolerance for risk (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). After all, most regimes don't look kindly upon dissidents who attempt to bring them down through violence.

The sheer number of opposition involved in an uprising is not the sole determinant of the likelihood of a successful regime change, but it is critical (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). The Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 is a case in point for the power of nonviolent tactics and the impact that uprisings can have. That is not to say that uprisings don't fail. They do. One example for a (mostly) nonviolent uprising failing is that of Burma between 1988 to 1990 (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013).

The first assumption of scholars studying non-violent uprisings has been that their outbreak is caused by the same factors that lead to violent campaigns against the government (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013). Fearon and Stanford (2003) find that insurgents rise up against their government when they have the opportunity to do so. According to their analysis, countries are more likely to experience an insurgency when it has mountainous terrain or neighbouring countries which are too weak to combat a non-state opponent or are going through a civil war. Insurgencies, then, appear to “emerge where resistance is easy” (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013, 422). The opposite appears to be true for non-violent uprisings: they tend to appear under difficult, unfavourable circumstances (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013, 422). So what explains the onset of these uprisings?

There is a strong tendency in the literature to focus on agency over structure (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 3). According to agency based approaches, uprisings happen because campaigners are able to use a highly context specific tactics and methods in order to exploit the conditions on the ground to their advantage (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 3). Uprisings do not move in a straight line: obstacles can be overcome, even if the regime seems overwhelmingly powerful. Even simple, well executed tactics can change the “psychology of the population” and the “behaviour of the regime” (Ackerman; 2007, 3).

This is distinctly different from structural approaches to this question. Structural approaches assume that uprisings happen because of underlying structural conditions which may transcend individual localities. A number of structural conditions have been linked to the outbreak of uprisings. These include economic factors, political factors, the diffusion of dissent.

Concerning economic factors, Butcher and Svensson (2016) find that countries with a comparatively large manufacturing sector are more likely to experience nonviolent campaigns. There is evidence that structural conditions influenced the onset of protests during the Arab Spring (Costello et al.; 2015). Costello et al. (2015) find empirical evidence that political grievances, a structural factor, can play a strong role in the onset of these campaigns.

Both agency and structural approaches are theoretically sound. Empirically, however, the evidence in favour of structural conditions is at best mixed. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) investigated a wide array of structural conditions. They find that they “perform modestly” (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 21). In other words, they are not as convincing as agency based approaches. One possible reason for this is straightforward: the structural conditions can be difficult, but using the right tactics and mobilisation techniques, they can be overcome. Nothing is impossible.

### 3.2.1 Conditions and Skills for Success

So when are uprisings successful in achieving regime change? The strength of any uprising lies in its capacity to mobilise and to outmaneuver the regime. Ackerman (2007) has outlined three skills in order to be successful. The first thing needed is leadership that is able to sustain mass mobilisation in the face of an opposing regime that may resort to using violence to subdue protests. This requires leadership that is seen as legitimate by a wide swath of the population (Ackerman; 2007). Secondly, the campaign must be able to create the capacity to use the widest amount of tactics possible (Ackerman; 2007). These can include protests, labour strikes, sit ins and so forth. The goal should be the maximum degree of disruption of the current order without a sacrifice of the principle of non-violence (Ackerman; 2007). Ultimately, this can then lead to strategic dislocation: the separation of the ruler from his pillars of support (Ackerman; 2007).

Both regime and opposition are dynamic actors. Just like the opposition, the regime can maximise its chances for success. When faced with an uprising, a leader has a multitude of options available to him in order to tilt the balance in his favour. Principally, he can choose to accommodate the requests of the dissidents, attempt to co-opt his opposition and elites or use repression. Wise leaders attempt to choose a combination thereof.

The most immediate tool that can be used by leaders to maintain their grip on power in the face of an uprising is repression. When faced with a mass protest, for example, a leader may choose to order his security forces to utilise violence in order to disperse the opposition. In doing so, political leaders all face a degree of constraint - for example through laws. Some leaders are more constrained than others. Generally speaking, the leader of a Western style democracy faces more constraint in his choices to use repression than a Central Asian dictator. The degree to which repression is useful to quell dissent and hinder mobilisation is much debated.

Violent repression can raise the costs of participation and thereby make it less likely that people are willing to engage in it. The regime, a rational actor (Moore; 2000), can therefore employ it to its advantage. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 68) find that violent regime repression reduces the likelihood of campaign success (both violent and nonviolent) by nearly 35%. Repression by the state can be targeted or completely at random (see eg. Herreros (2006)). Effective repression is often targeted. If it is not, the deterrence effect of it is likely to be limited. If there is no benefit to not opposing the regime, repression is more likely to create new enemies than to stop old ones from acting (Bischof and Fink; 2015).

Violent repression can be a useful tool for dictators to survive in power when dealing with organised groups of dissidents (Escribà Folch; 2013). Repression must not be violent. There is empirical evidence to suggest that (nonviolent) restrictions on civil liberties are particularly

effective at preventing collective action in dictatorships (Escribà Folch; 2013).

Using violent repression can also backfire. The relationship between protest and repression is dynamic: protest can lead to repression and repression can lead to protest (Carey; 2006). This backlash has been observed in a variety of geographies. One of them is the West Bank. Khawaja (1993) asserts that repression has led to an increase in collective action in the West Bank with few exceptions. Leadership structures are often replaced quickly in order to coordinate a protest backlash.

Francisco (2004) finds that even the harshest forms of repression are often not enough to prevent continuing protest. The likelihood of protest backlash appears to be higher during a nonviolent uprising than a violent one (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011, 68). Using violence against violent dissidents can easily be packaged in terms of national security. Shooting those who themselves refrain from using violence seems outrageous to many. Hultquist (2015) finds that repression of civilians can actually lead to more opposition, rather than less.

Whether a regime responds to an uprising with repression or accommodation depends on a number of factors. One of them is the structure of the economy. Bueno De Mesquita and Smith (2009) find that economies reliant on labour intensive industries tend to respond to revolutionary threats by some way of accommodation. Economies that are not reliant on labour, such as those generating a large share of income through foreign aid or resource rents, are more likely to respond through the suppression of freedoms. Democracies are most likely to accommodate their opposition and less likely to use repression (Carey; 2006).

That is not to say that democracies didn't make use of "negative sanctions" when met with popular dissent (Carey; 2006). Overall, these negative sanctions are especially unlikely to move the opposition to cooperate in democracies (Carey; 2006). This makes sense. Democracies face bigger constraints on their behaviour. Because of that, repression is less likely to be credible and therefore effective than in autocratic systems.

We know a lot about irregular regime changes like coups and uprisings, but there is more that we don't know. We have some indications as to why they occur, what differentiates mere attempts from successful removals of political leaders. There is also empirical analysis that points us toward the impact that these events have - for example on democratisation.

### **3.2.2 Irregular Regime Change Prediction**

We have a reasonably good understanding of the causes and impact of irregular regime change. Ideally, we would not simply be able to explain regime changes once they have occurred but predict them before they do.

The Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump have demonstrated how difficult the prediction of political votes is. Predicting high-risk low probability events like irregular regime changes is even harder. When scientists have attempted to predict irregular regime change, their prediction suffered from a high number of false positives (Beger et al.; 2014). In other words, the prediction models predict changes where none happen.

The current state of art therefore allows us to identify countries in which irregular regime change is very possible, but not necessarily where it will occur. The prediction of regime change events is reliant on the quality of available data and the accuracy of the employed method. That's very encouraging. The availability of data is improving rapidly as the world is becoming more connected. In terms of data availability, three things will need to happen to help political scientists better predict these radical changes.

Firstly, the already available data will need to be available more quickly. The closer to real-time data can be made available for research, the more insightful the analysis will get. Secondly, the already available data points will need to be presented in a different format. The standard data-format is country-year. That's very useful in order to analyse long-running trends. It's not particularly useful in order to pinpoint triggers that may lead to drastic change.

In an ideal world, data would be available for sub-country level units for months or even smaller units. Lastly, new data points will have to be generated in order to improve the accuracy of forecasts. Recent use of night-time satellite imagery in order to predict insurgent activity (De Juan and Bank; 2015) is an example of the type of data generation that we need more of.

Quantitative methods are at the beginning of a new dawn. Machine learning will allow political scientists to see connections that we have previously simply missed. Prediction models of political instability of any kind will become more and more accurate. As these prediction mechanisms became more accurate, they might also begin to play a larger role in policy-making.

A great deal of research has already been undertaken with regards to irregular regime changes, in particular where coups are concerned. Political scientists have worked hard to establish what causes these irregular changes and under what conditions coup attempts and uprisings succeed in removing the political leadership of a given country. Importantly, work has also been done to establish the impact of both coups and uprisings on politics, conflict, democratisation and economics.

One field that has been heavily underresearched is causal mechanism between irregular regime changes and political repression. This is what is to follow in the next two chapters. In the next chapter, I analyse the link between domestic irregular regime change and political repression.

In the chapter thereafter, I examine the impact of irregular regime changes abroad and domestic political repression.



## 4 Domestic Effects of Irregular Regime Change

*How monotonously alike all the great tyrants and conquerors have been - C.S. Lewis<sup>3</sup>*

The 14th of August 2013 was a day unlike any other in the history of modern Egypt. On that hot summer day, public squares and streets in Egypt were quite literally awash in blood. The coup-regime of al-Sisi used the army, bulldozers and snipers to clear protestors from Rab'a Square in eastern Cairo. At least 817 died on that square alone (HRW; 2014, 11). Beyond the Rab'a Massacre, thousands were killed by security forces. Torture by the regime was routine and widespread (Amnesty International; 2015, 137).

With its history of Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt has never been a safe haven for human rights. Nevertheless, the human rights situation deteriorated dramatically after a military coup brought al-Sisi to power (Amnesty International; 2015, 137). The case of Egypt is extreme, but not unique. Coup governments often use heavy repression to secure their position. Regimes who have come into power through peaceful revolutions seemingly don't use repression to the same degree. Examples are aplenty: the peaceful revolutions of Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War didn't lead to mass executions, neither did the Rose Revolution in Georgia.

This chapter introduces a new variable that might explain the varying application of repression by states around the world: irregular regime changes. In particular, I examine the effect of successful coups d'état and peaceful popular uprisings on repression. This research is inspired by recent events around the world. Many coups around the world lead to heavy repression, while uprisings often cause the human rights situation in a country to actually improve. This study puts that sentiment to test.

In this paper, I stipulate that the kind of regime change that brings a government into power can explain the degree of repression it subsequently uses. I argue that leaders are broadly rational. They use repression when the benefit of repressing is higher than its cost. Coups and uprisings can influence both costs and benefits of repression and are therefore an important factor. This argument is tested using data on both irregular regime changes and repression.

Understanding why some governments violate these rights more often than others is important on the face of it: repression causes a great amount of suffering for a large number of people around the globe. Beyond that, repression is closely related to other phenomena of interest such as regime stability (Gartner and Regan; 1996) and democratisation (Regan and Henderson; 2002). As such, it is unsurprising that the study of state repression is a core part of political science.

---

<sup>3</sup>Lewis, C.S. (2015) HarperOne: San Francisco, 227

In a first section, this chapter outlines current theoretical approaches in the study of repression and the hypotheses I will test. In a second part, I present the data and methods used to test the hypotheses. The final section of the chapter deals with the results, their robustness and implications. Using a linear model, I find that coups explain increases in governmental human rights violation, even if they are just attempted coups.

## 4.1 Literature

Two parts of the political science literature are relevant for the questions at hand. The first relevant part of the literature concerns repression, the second part irregular regime changes. These are principally coups and uprisings.

The study of repression seeks to uncover why some governments violate basic human rights more than others (Hill and Jones; 2014, 661). Enjoying basic human rights means you are free from political imprisonment, torture, disappearance and killing by the hand of your government (Hill and Jones; 2014, 661). These are often referred to as physical integrity rights. A number of domestic and international political and economic factors have already been found to cause repression.

The first principal finding of the literature is so convincing that it has been coined a law. The law of coercive responsiveness describes the influence of a threat to the state. When an opposition threatens a state, they generally respond to that threat with some sort of repression. This finding is one of the most consistent in a discipline in which “very few relationships withstand close scrutiny” (Davenport; 2007, 8).

The other principal finding of the literature is the domestic democratic peace (Davenport; 2007). Democracy was an early factor in analysing the variance of state repression (Henderson; 1991; Poe et al.; 1994). Across time and space, researchers examining the relationship have mostly found that more democratic domestic institutions lead to less repression.

The main theoretical arguments for this relationship are relatively simple (Davenport; 2007): Firstly, democratic institutions raise the cost of using repression against opponents because democracies make it possible for citizens to vote out the government. If a government uses too much repression, they are likely to be voted out of government at the next election. Secondly, citizens of democracies may have certain values which make them particularly likely to disapprove of repression. They value communication over violence, deliberation over rash actions and indeed also a certain amount of tolerance for opposition. Lastly, democratic institutions provide a variety of different ways to defuse tensions, control citizens and to let opposition voice their frustration with the government. As such, grievances can be communicated more easily, but they are also less likely to occur than in other systems of governments.

Although the relationship has often been tested rigorously, the linearity of the relationship has been called into doubt. Fein (1995) showed that the relationship might be an “inverse-U” in which states in the middle use more repression than either full autocracies or full democracies. In her words, the reason behind this is the greater degree of opposition expected in more free societies (Fein; 1995, 184). In a completely unfree society, opposition is unlikely to form. As the state becomes less restrictive, discontent may turn into open opposition.

Beyond the law of coercive responsiveness and democracy, researchers have identified a large and growing number of factors that supposedly influence repression. These factors range from the structure of legal institutions, economic factors, and demographics to the adherence to international treaties. A focus on domestic legal institutions is relatively recent. These institutions are supposed to matter because they can limit the power of the government in relation to the opposition. Mitchell et al. (2013) found that common law countries experience less repression.

Powell and Staton (2009) have shown that judicial independence can reduce state repression. Numerous other scholars have examined the effect of constitutional provisions (Davenport; 1996). In line with what one might expect, the specific mention of press freedom in a constitution, for example, is associated with lower levels of repression (Davenport; 1996).

Economic factors have also been found to be significant. The idea is relatively simple: poverty creates discontent. Discontent may lead to dissent and is therefore threatening to incumbents. A negative relationship between high GDP per capita and state repression was found as early as the 1990s (Poe et al.; 1994). As Hill and Jones (2014) have outlined, other strands of literature deal with demographics and the importance of international treaties. Nordås and Davenport (2013), for example, have written about the relationship between repression and youth bulges. Youth bulges ordinarily refer to an especially high proportion of young males in a given country. Countries with youth bulges are said to be at higher risk for dissent and thus repression.

When applying pressure, political leaders are said to be broadly rational. According to this theory, they use repression in their interaction with their opposition because they want to stay in power. Davenport (Davenport; 2007, 4) summarises this approach well:

*When benefits exceed costs, alternatives are not viewed favourably and there is a high probability of success, repressive action is anticipated. When costs exceed benefits, alternatives exist, and the probability of success is low, no or little repression is expected.*

One way in which both costs and benefits of repression could be changed are irregular regime changes. Irregular regime changes occur when a political leader is removed from office in “contravention of explicit rules and conventions” of his country (Goemans et al.; 2016, 2).

Irregular regime changes have been studied for decades. An outline of the previous literature findings can be found in Chapter 3.

Irregular leadership changes are not elections in which one party gets replaced by another in an orderly manner. Irregular leadership changes are the result of coups d'état, peaceful revolutions and successful rebellions. Political scientists already know a lot about coups and revolutions, but they are rarely connected empirically to repression. An exception is the work of (Derpanopoulos et al.; 2016), which found a link between coups and an increase in repression. I test their findings using different data and a different method.

## **4.2 Theory**

In this paper, I apply a decision-theoretic approach (Hill and Jones; 2014, 663) to explain the decisions of political leaders who can influence how much repression is applied.

Applied to irregular regime changes, this means that the occurrence and type of change will influence the decisions of political leaders. In the case of my hypotheses, I consider the occurrence of an irregular regime change in comparison to the counterfactual of no regime change occurring. In their seminal work on non-violent conflict, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) examined the relationship between successful violent & non-violent campaigns and the subsequent development of democracy.

According to their theory, coming to power through violence establishes the norm that violence is acceptable and effective. Once in power, rulers are unlikely to deviate from these norms to establish democracy. I believe their reasoning extends to coups and subsequent repression. Increased repression following coups d'état makes sense from a theoretical perspective. Following many coups, the benefits of repression exceed the costs, alternatives are unlikely to be viewed favourably and the probability of success is high. As a result, repressive actions are anticipated. Post coups, the benefit of repression is high.

Coup leaders are not chosen by their citizens; they occupy the commanding heights of government not by choice but through brute force. As the expected opposition to their rule is likely to be high, repression can often have significant benefits. At the same time, costs are often low. Civilian governments have to worry about using too much repression. If they do, the military may not comply with their order and turn on the government instead.

This is rarely a relevant consideration for a military government which came to power through a coup because they are likely to be the most powerful force in a country. Beyond this, coup governments are rarely punished by the international community for using heavy repression. Even though the regime transition in Egypt in 2013 was a coup by every definition of the word,

the United States State Department refused to even call it that (Francis; 2015).

Instead of raising the costs for repression for al-Sisi and his regime by cutting aid or even orchestrating sanctions, the United States decided to send them Apache attack helicopters (Kalin; 2014). Military aid continued (Kalin; 2014). Even though Western nations often condemn coups, they often support coup governments. One of the reasons for this is an inherent preference of stability over instability. When coups do happen, they often restore “peace” by putting a lid on visible dissent. This lid often involves torture and killings.

Given these incentives, it is to be expected that repression occurs regularly after coups. Most coup leaders are military men. By their very occupation, they know how to solve issues using force. Because of this, they are unlikely to prefer other avenues to quell dissent. Lastly, the chances of success are high. Almost by definition, the military is often the most powerful and intimidating force in a country.

Although this has been debated as of late (Varol; 2012), the generally prevailing view in political science is that coups d'état are most often anti-democratic. When a coup does occur, military officers can use the opportunity to expand their personal power and profit. Many do. Examples for heavy repression following coups d'état are almost endless. One of these examples is Egypt under al-Sisi. The human rights situation in Egypt deteriorated “dramatically” after Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was ousted in a textbook coup d'état in July 2013 (Amnesty International; 2015, 137). Thousands were imprisoned for political reasons, torture was routine and security forces were regularly engaged in extra-judicial killings with impunity (Amnesty International; 2015).

The occurrence and type of irregular regime change is a factor in the decision-making process of a political leader. The established process of government has broken down; change is rapid. This breakdown of conventional order can have positive and negative effects on repression. In the case of a coup d'état, I expect that impact to be negative. This can be expressed as the following, empirically testable hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Coups lead to an increase in state repression

As violent transitions create the norm of using force to resolve conflict, non-violent transitions do the opposite. This argument is based on the work of (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). Their work is on the link between transitions and democracy, but the same logic applies here. A group of people who have resolved a conflict through non-violence are likely to try to replicate non-violent bargaining mechanisms thereafter. By their very definition, a popular uprising has at least limited support of the public. Because of that, the governments produced by uprisings are likely to have a much higher degree of legitimacy than those who have come into being through coups. In many cases, they might even have a higher degree of legitimacy than their

immediate predecessors.

The reason for this is simple: a non-violent uprising is only likely to overthrow a government if the number of people involved is large. Additionally, not using violence can confer legitimacy. After a successful peaceful uprising, the costs of state repression will often be high. Having built some legitimacy on public support and the refrain from violence, the violation of physical integrity rights could be counterproductive. In addition, the expected benefit will also be lower than following other irregular leadership changes because an uprising has to have broad support to even succeed.

A somewhat broad basis of support implies a lower degree of opposition. Because of this legitimacy, it's also likely that non-violent alternatives for voicing discontent exist. These can be used to defuse opposition instead of repressing it. Lastly, the intent to use repression is less likely to turn into actual repression following a peaceful uprising. Having had a successful non-violent uprising often means the security services previously refused to use significant violence against protestors. They may react the same way under the new regime.

The peaceful protests in Eastern Europe that led to the end of the Soviet Union are good examples for this. In December 1989, 42 years of communist rule came to an end in Romania. In the process of the peaceful protests known as the Romanian Revolution, hundreds were killed (Amnesty International; 1990, 200). Many were killed indiscriminately by government forces and others summarily executed by the security forces of the old regime (Amnesty International; 1990, 200). Censorship under the Ceausescu regime was equally severe (Amnesty International; 1990, 200).

After the former regime was overthrown, the new President Ion Iliescu announced the release of all political prisoners, the abolition of the death penalty and the repeal of a lot of laws restricting human rights in the country (Amnesty International; 1990, 200). I therefore also expect peaceful uprisings to have an effect on the level of state repression, albeit in exactly the opposite direction. This can be expressed as the following, empirically testable hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Peaceful popular uprisings lead to a decrease in repression

Once again, the Hypothesis is considered in comparison to the counterfactual of no peaceful popular uprising occurring. The type of regime change that brings a new government into power will influence their use of political repression. Leaders who have come to power through a coup use more repression than their predecessors. Leaders who have come into power through a peaceful revolution use less repression than their predecessors.

### 4.3 Methods

In this section, I describe the data and techniques used to analyse the impact of irregular regime changes on levels of political repression.

#### *Data*

This paper utilises a large-N quantitative approach to investigate the research question. Using statistical analyses to investigate the research question makes sense because it allows for consideration of a large number of cases. It also has the benefit of using existing data that had previously not been used for this purpose. An alternative to using a large-N analysis would have been elite-level interviews with political leaders around the world. I decided against this approach because of the sensitive nature of the topic. Talking about a political leaders' rationale for using repression against his own citizens would have been unlikely to yield valid and reliable results.

Using elite-level interviews would also have led to a narrowing of the number of cases I consider. Since I'm more interested in general trends than the specifics of single events, a large-N study is more suitable. On a very practical level, many of the countries which have experienced irregular regime changes in the last decades are dangerous for researchers; especially when investigating topics such as government repression. To tackle the questions at hand, I constructed a global dataset that covers coups, successful popular uprisings and physical integrity rights violations from 1989 to 2009. The dataset covers a total of 110 countries.

Small countries, OECD members, as well as countries of North America and Western Europe are excluded from the data. Small countries with a population below 500 000 are excluded because many of the source datasets do not cover them. This study excludes OECD members as well as countries from North America and Western Europe because these areas are extremely stable: irregular regime changes rarely occur in them. With 20 observations per country, the total number of units of observation is 2612. In these units of observation, I record 34 units in which coups took place, 95 for failed coup attempts and 16 for successful peaceful uprisings.

To account for repression, I make use of the Political Terror Scale by Wood and Gibney (2010). The two key global datasets in the field are the Political Terror Scale (Wood and Gibney; 2010) and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards; 2010). The Political Terror Scale (PTS) was one of the earliest quantitative datasets on state respect for human rights. It measures global integrity rights violations from 1976 onwards. Over the decades, it has become the most widely used source of data on the topic. It has been used in countless studies. PTS measures violations of physical integrity rights as opposed to overall coercive repression against citizens in a given country (Wood and Gibney; 2010).

In this way, a low score in PTS does not necessarily mean that a political system is not repres-

sive, but could also mean that a state is repressing its citizens so effectively that it does not need to torture, imprison or kill them. An example of this could be lagged repression, whereby a state previously used a high degree of political violence and consequently frightened its population into not resisting.

When measuring physical integrity rights violations, PTS is solely interested in violations for which the government is responsible. As such, it measures violations undertaken by the state and its agents, but will not reflect the level of violence in a given country perpetrated by private actors, insurgents or gangs (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 370). PTS coding is based on US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the Amnesty International Annual Report.

These reports are published every year and coders presume that the information in these reports is both accurate and complete. While there are some differences between the State Department and the Amnesty International reports, it's unlikely that the State Department reports have a significant bias (Poe et al.; 2001). PTS is coded on a 5-point scale originally derived from Freedom House (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 398):



The underlying logic of the coding is that levels of abuse can be measured along three dimensions: scope, intensity, and range (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 373). Scope refers to the type of repression undertaken by the government, intensity to the frequency with which it is applied. Range indicates what part of the country is affected by this repression. The second most important data set in the field is CIRI. CIRI is similar to the PTS in many ways. PTS and CIRI use the same sources.

They assign the level of human rights violations by the state on a categorical scale. Nevertheless, notable differences exist between the two. Most notably, CIRI disaggregates different kinds of repression, such as torture and political imprisonment, into separate categories. In addition, CIRI measures human rights violations against an absolute standard, not a relative one (Cingranelli and Richards; 2010, 402).

Because of this, even states with the very best human rights records will find it difficult to obtain a perfect or near perfect CIRI score. Both indices have advantages and disadvantages. Over the last decades, scholars have predominantly made use of the PTS scores. Recently, both indices have often been used in the same studies. In this study, I will focus on using only PTS scores. The data on coups is derived from the Center of Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall; 2017).

It distinguishes between successful coups, failed coup attempts, plotted coups and alleged coups. To account for successful uprisings, I use data from the Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions data set compiled by Geddes et al. (2013). It's worth pointing out that the GWF data is limited to the end of autocratic regimes. If a democracy breaks down due to peaceful uprisings, it will not be included in this analysis. Data points for population and GDP are from the World Bank. Table 4 shows all the coups and uprisings used in the analysis.

Table 4: Coups and Uprisings 1989-2009

<b>Country</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Type</b>
Haiti	1988	Coup	Qatar	1995	Coup
Myanmar	1988	Uprising	Burundi	1996	Coup
Myanmar	1988	Coup	Niger	1996	Coup
Czechoslovakia	1989	Uprising	Sierra Leone	1996	Coup
Paraguay	1989	Coup	Cambodia	1997	Coup
Romania	1989	Uprising	Congo	1997	Coup
Sudan	1989	Coup	Sierra Leone	1997	Coup
Bangladesh	1990	Uprising	Armenia	1998	Coup
Benin	1990	Uprising	Comoros	1999	Coup
Chad	1990	Coup	Guinea-Bissau	1999	Coup

Country	Year	Type	Country	Year	Type
Haiti	1990	Coup	Ivory Coast	1999	Coup
Suriname	1990	Coup	Ivory Coast	2000	Uprising
Albania	1991	Uprising	Nepal	2002	Coup
Mali	1991	Uprising	Guinea-Bissau	2003	Coup
Niger	1991	Uprising	Kyrgyzstan	2005	Uprising
Thailand	1991	Coup	Mauritania	2005	Coup
Afghanistan	1992	Coup	Togo	2005	Coup
Azerbaijan	1992	Uprising	Fiji	2006	Coup
Sierra Leone	1992	Coup	Nepal	2006	Uprising
Thailand	1992	Uprising	Thailand	2006	Coup
Nigeria	1993	Coup	Bangladesh	2007	Coup
Gambia	1994	Coup	Guinea	2008	Coup
Liberia	1994	Coup	Mauritania	2008	Coup

### Analysis

A great number of things can influence repression in a country. The initial model is the following:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 type + \beta_2 y_{i(t-2)} + \beta_3 pop + \beta_4 gdp + \mu_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{it}$  is the level of repression in a given country  $i$  at time  $t$ .  $\beta_1 type$  is a variable that denotes what type of regime change occurred at  $t-1$ .  $\beta_2 y_{i(t-2)}$  denotes a lagged dependent variable that specifies the level of repression in the country  $t-2$ .  $\beta_3 pop$  and  $\beta_4 gdp$  are the logged values of population and GDP per capita at time  $t$  in country  $i$ . They are both included as control variables. Country and time effects are fixed. The measure of repression as the dependent variable and the dummies for coups and uprisings are obviously included.

I also included a lag of repression in order to isolate the effect of coups on repression as opposed to just explaining high levels of repression more generally. I'm using a lag of two years instead of a one-year lag. This is somewhat unusual, but it makes sense theoretically and methodologically. To understand why this makes sense in the framework of my theory, consider the following example. Country A has a coup in June 2005. We want to explain the degree of repression in 2006. Conventional wisdom would mean including the degree of repression in 2005 ( $t-1$ ) as a lag.

This makes no sense here. Repression levels are given in country-year format. If we take

the repression level of 2005 as lagged variable, we will include a level that is based on 6 month of the pre-coup government, and 6 months of the post-coup government. If we take the repression level of 2004 (t-2) as a lagged variable, we can be sure not to include the effect of the coup of 2005.

*Logged GDP per capita* is included as a control in the initial model because it is known to have an influence on repression. Poverty can create conditions of dissatisfaction with the government, thereby raising opposition (Poe et al.; 1994). This opposition, in turn, will entice broadly rational leaders to utilise more repression. As such, I expect a high GDP per capita to be associated with low levels of repression. *Logged population* is also included as a control in the model. Countries with high populations tend to be difficult to govern.

Because of this, I expect countries with big populations to experience more repression than countries with small populations. I also included a binary in the model on the existence of both non-violent and violent resistance campaign to the new regime. Such resistance campaigns can obviously have an impact on the risk perception of a new leader and this may skew the results if not controlled for. I derived this data from the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013).

## 4.4 Results

Irregular regime change matters. Coups and failed coup attempts provide a valuable explanation of increases in political repression. The relationship between peaceful uprisings and repression is inconclusive.

The first interesting thing to note is that global mean repression didn't change significantly over time (Figure 3). The mean repression level in 1989 was not substantially different to the mean repression level twenty years later. The mean repression level was 3.39 out of a possible 5 in countries which experienced coups or coup attempts. The equivalent level was 3.06 for countries at the time of uprisings. Mean repression in the year following the regime change was lower for uprisings (2.87) and higher for coups (3.55). In the next section, I'll discuss the core results of my analysis.

### Core Results

The results are very clear. Coups at t-1 are associated with high levels of repression, even when lagged repression levels are taken into account. This directly supports Hypothesis 1. Somewhat surprisingly, the regression analysis did not yield a statistically significant correlation between peaceful uprisings and subsequently lower levels of repression. While this doesn't contradict Hypothesis 2, it does mean that the regression analysis doesn't support it

either. Beyond the two main explanatory variables, the control variables behave as expected. The regression analysis indicates that logged GDP per capita is associated with lower levels of repression. Higher levels of total population are associated with higher levels of repression. The two-year repression variable is also significant. This is unsurprising; the degree of human rights violations at t-2 is logically high related to the degree of repression two years later.

Table 5: Fixed Effect Linear Regression Results

	Repression	
	Without NAVCO (1)	With NAVCO (2)
Lagged Repression	0.589*** (0.016)	0.508*** (0.018)
Coup	0.544*** (0.132)	0.529*** (0.143)
Uprising	-0.049 (0.189)	-0.082 (0.192)
Log Population	0.121*** (0.011)	0.105*** (0.012)
Log GDP per capita	-0.094*** (0.012)	-0.085*** (0.013)
Non-Violent Campaign		0.085 (0.087)
Violent Campaign		0.644*** (0.048)
Constant	-0.093 (0.195)	0.225 (0.212)
N	2,220	1,851
R <sup>2</sup>	0.576	0.609
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.575	0.608
F Statistic	601.942*** (df = 5; 2214)	410.059*** (df = 7; 1843)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

I included other variables in multiple specifications. Most notably, I included a binary measure on violent and non-violent resistance campaigns from the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013). Even when controlling for these resistance campaigns against the post-coup regime, coups are still significant. The resistance campaigns themselves only have a significantly statistical influence when they are violent. Non-violent campaigns did not have an impact on repression levels in this model. Beyond successful coups and uprisings, a model that includes both successful and failed coups shows that both have a significant impact. Failed coups are coup attempts that do not lead to a change of government.

Table 6: Fixed-Effect Linear Regression Results Coups

	Repression	
	Without NAVCO (1)	With NAVCO (2)
Lagged Repression	0.586*** (0.016)	0.506*** (0.018)
Coup	0.497*** (0.132)	0.478*** (0.143)
Attempt	0.359*** (0.082)	0.316*** (0.086)
Log Population	0.126*** (0.011)	0.110*** (0.012)
Log GDP per capita	-0.088*** (0.012)	-0.080*** (0.013)
Non-Violent Campaign		0.081 (0.087)
Violent Campaign		0.632*** (0.048)
Constant	-0.213 (0.196)	0.109 (0.213)
N	2,220	1,851
R <sup>2</sup>	0.580	0.612
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.579	0.610
F Statistic	610.934*** (df = 5; 2214)	414.930*** (df = 7; 1843)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Interestingly, both successful coups and failed coups are associated with higher levels of repression. It's unsurprising that failed coups should have an impact. A failed coup increases the benefits of repression dramatically: it demonstrates dissent to the currently ruling regime. At the same time, it reduces the costs of using repression by allowing the leader to justify his actions under the guise of national security.

Everyone understands that a coup attempt cannot be left unanswered. The aftermath of the coup attempt in Turkey provides an illustration of this process at work. However, the impact of successful coups is even higher than that of failed coups. At first I also included plotted coups, but they are not significant. Plotted coups are registered when an opposition group planned a coup but didn't actually attempt to take over power.

When including the previously mentioned NAVCO variables, these results still hold. Apart from including different variables in the original model, I also ran the data with a different method to see whether my results hold.

Table 7: Probit Model Global and Coups

	Repression	
	Global (1)	Coups Only (2)
Coup	0.676*** (0.245)	0.614** (0.247)
Uprising	0.037 (0.385)	
Attempt		0.503*** (0.155)
Log GDP per capita	-0.077*** (0.025)	-0.067*** (0.025)
Log Population	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.040* (0.021)
Constant	0.488 (0.408)	0.300 (0.413)
N	2,229	2,229
Log Likelihood	-1,142.333	-1,137.195
AIC	2,294.666	2,284.390

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

In a first step, I created a new binary variable that indicates whether repression in a given year is higher than it was two years previously. Using this binary as my dependent variable, I ran a probit model. The results of the probit regressions can be seen in Table 7. The results of the probit model confirm the core results of the initial fixed-effect linear regression. As previously,

the occurrence of a coup in  $t-1$  is associated with an increase in repression. Uprisings don't have a significant effect. Unlike the earlier model, this one doesn't include lagged repression. In the earlier model, my dependent variable denotes the level of repression. In this one, it's a binary denoting whether the level of repression has increased. Since I'm only measuring the relative change as opposed to the absolute level, the previous levels of repression are not relevant. The direction of the effect of logged population has changed from positive to negative. This doesn't mean that anything is substantially different: the population of a given country is unlikely to change drastically from one year to the next. For that reason, the direction of logged population in the probit model is less informative than the earlier results from the fixed-effect linear model.

### Implications

As for coups, the implications of the regression results are very clear: coups lead to repression. This is true even when there were previously high levels of repression in a country. The results directly support Hypothesis 1. Beyond successful coups, failed coup attempts are also associated with higher levels repression. The results do not just hold once relevant control variables are included, but also across methods. The probit model confirms the core results of the earlier fixed-effect linear model. This makes sense from a theoretical point of view, and it also confirms earlier findings by Derpanopoulos et al. (2016). Coups lead to increased repression.

Their finding holds in my analysis even though I use a different sample, different data and a different method. The lack of a statistically significant link between peaceful uprisings and repression is surprising. Hypothesis 2 may not be false, but this analysis does not support it. This finding is perhaps even more interesting than the link I established between coups and repression.

This could be for a number of reasons. On a theoretical level, it might be that an incoming government will find it vastly more difficult to decrease repression than to increase it within a year. Since the hypothesis stipulates that uprisings would lead to a decrease, this may mean that the measured time period is simply not realistic.

Another possible reason for the lack of average decrease would be that at least some of the regimes which experienced peaceful uprisings were comparatively benign to begin with. This would make sense from a theoretical point of view because uprisings tend to happen in societies where at least some freedoms exist. That means there will be repression, but it won't be at the highest level.

When repression is severe, uprisings are unlikely to happen because the costs of participation are extremely high. For that reason, peaceful uprisings tend to happen in countries like Georgia

and not in North Korea. Once the uprising is done, the new regime may refrain from using heavy repression – but that doesn't necessarily lead to a decrease if repression wasn't heavy to begin with.

#### **Further research**

One of the greatest weaknesses of the repression literature is the lack of predictive power. Some existing models are reasonably good at explaining changes in repression which occurred in the past. Almost none of the models are actually useful to predict what will happen in the future. Given the severe impact of such changes, the ultimate goal should not be explanatory, but predictive power. Identifying variables like coups as influencing repression are a step in this direction. Further research ought to identify the exact circumstances under which coups produce detrimental outcomes. Combined with what political scientists already know about the onset of coups, this could prove powerful in helping people before they even need help.

## **4.5 Conclusion**

This chapter makes a contribution to the field by examining the link between irregular domestic regime changes and repression. Repression is a topic that has been studied extensively, but the link between irregular leadership changes and repression has been studied insufficiently. Repression is relevant beyond the immediate hardships that it brings to millions every day. It can have an effect on the stability of political regimes, economic growth and other challenges of concern to political scientists and policy makers.

This study utilises a large-N analysis to examine the relationship between irregular regime changes and repression. In particular, it deals with successful coups and peaceful uprisings and human rights violations. The theory behind these links is the assumption of the rationality of political leaders. They use repression when its benefits outweigh its costs and vice versa. Irregular regime changes modify their calculus. In the case of coups, the use of repression becomes more beneficial as the likely number of opponents grows. At the same time, the cost of using repression becomes lower: having come to power through violence or its threat via a coup establishes precedent.

When a new government is established following a peaceful uprising, the opposite occurs. The benefits of repression become smaller while the costs increase substantially. To test the theory, I created a dataset of irregular regime changes and repression in 110 countries between 1989 and 2009. Using fixed-effects panel regressions, I find that coups explain increased state repression. This is not only the case when they are successful, but also if they fail.

Whereas I can show a link between the occurrence of coups and increased repression, I am



unable to find a link between repression levels and peaceful uprisings. In this case, therefore, I am unable to support my initial hypothesis. My results hold despite the introduction of a number of control variables. More importantly, they hold across methods: a probit model confirms the earlier finding from the fixed-effect panel regressions.

This chapter presents an analysis of the impact of domestic attempts at irregular regime change on repression levels in a given country. In the next chapter, I'm going to examine whether irregular regime changes abroad can have an impact on domestic repression levels.

*Level 1: Countries... under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. ... Political murders are extremely rare. ...*

*Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, a few persons are affected; torture and beating are exceptional. ... Political murder is rare. ...*

*Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment. ... Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted. ...*

*Level 4: The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders disappearances, and torture are part of life. ... In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.*

*Level 5: The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population. ... The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.*

Figure 2: Physical Integrity Rights Levels

Source: Wood and Gibney 2010

## 5 International Effects of Irregular Regime Change

*“Any excuse will serve a tyrant” - Aesop<sup>4</sup>*

In December 2010, a vegetable vendor set himself on fire 300 km south of Tunis in protest at his treatment by the state (Amnesty International; 2011, 1). By January 2011, mass protests had led to the ousting of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the Tunisian dictator who had been in power for more than 20 years (Amnesty International; 2011, 1).

Protests quickly spread from Tunisia to other countries in the region. Soon, calls for freedom and change rang loud from the streets of Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Some states responded by reforming, others showered their people with gifts. Most opted to use violence instead. In al-Gaddafi’s Libya, the government launched a “full-scale military operation” that used anti-aircraft guns for crowd control (Amnesty International; 2011, 12-13). In nearby Egypt, where the vast majority of protestors were peaceful, more than 6 000 were injured, and “some 840” were killed (Amnesty International; 2011, 9).

Unrest spread from the Tunisian desert to the Arabian peninsula, as did political repression. This research investigates whether an irregular leadership exit in one country can lead to an increase in repression in nearby countries. I argue that this might be the case because there is a diffusion effect: when a leader is ousted through a revolution, coup or peaceful uprising in one country, it becomes more probable that this will happen in other countries nearby.

Opposition in nearby countries will be inspired. They will learn and make use of negative externalities resulting from the irregular change abroad. Ultimately, broadly rational political leaders will see that opposition at home becomes more likely as a result of drastic change abroad. As a result, they will use more repression - if possible before the anticipated diffusion of dissent actually materialises.

In addition to this, I am also testing the hypothesis that the post-tenure fate of deposed leaders makes a difference to nearby levels of repression. I postulate that a given leader will react differently to a deposed leader abroad if that leader is being treated nicely instead of being killed.

Knowing whether these hypotheses hold or not would be helpful for many reasons: Firstly, it could help human rights activists in predicting government repression using an obvious, and relatively simple indicator. Secondly, it could help other states calibrate their foreign and security policy to make it more effective. If we know that irregular leadership exits in one country lead to adverse affects in countries nearby, we can increase our investment to maintain stability.

<sup>4</sup>Aesop (2004) Aesop’s Fables, The Wolf and the Lamb, XVIII. New York: Signet

In particular, this research speaks to the current public debate that surrounds support and cooperation with autocratic regimes. Should Western states support groups pushing for democratisation in autocratic regimes? How should the international community respond to revolutions or uprisings in autocratic states? At a time when autocratic regimes continue to slaughter their own populations day in day out, these are timely questions. An often repeated argument is that cooperation with autocrats in countries like Egypt ultimately hurts Egyptians. That the West should support movements in autocracies to help them overthrow their dictators.

This research can shed light on some of the consequences of radical change. To test my hypotheses, I employ a spatial-lag model estimated through spatial ordinary least squares. The model draws on data from more than 140 countries from 1993 to 2011. The analysis yields evidence for a significant and positive effect of irregular leadership change abroad on increased repression at home. In other words, repression increases domestically if a leader is forced from power irregularly abroad.

The post-tenure fate of deposed leaders abroad, on the other hand, does not appear to make a significant difference to repression levels at home. This research fills a gap in the regime change and repression literature. It also provides insight to policy-makers: drastic change in one country can lead to adverse effects in others. Any intervention, for example in the name of democracy, should therefore be planned with the utmost caution.

## 5.1 Literature

Two strands of literature are relevant for the subject of inquiry: the literature on state repression and the literature on diffusion and spill-over effects. We already know a fair amount of things about both, but they have rarely been considered together.

### *Human Rights Violations*

State repression has been studied by political scientists for decades. Amongst human rights violations, repression is the most frequent object of study for cross-national studies (Hill; 2013, 1). At its most basic, the literature seeks to understand why “some governments violate basic human rights more than others” (Hill and Jones; 2014, 1). Violating human rights can take many forms, as can repression.

Much of the literature is concerned with the violation of physical or personal integrity rights. This is also the subject of inquiry here. These kinds of human rights violations include “extra-judicial killing, torture or similar physical abuse, disappearances and political imprisonment” (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 369).

Theory around repression has moved from “hard structuralism” to “soft rationalism” in the

last decades (Davenport; 2007, 3). The current literature seeks to shed light on the careful deliberations made by political leaders. In the words of Davenport (2007, 3): *“When benefits exceed costs, alternatives are not viewed favourably and there is a high probability of success, repressive action is anticipated. When costs exceed benefits, alternatives exist, and the probability of success is low, no or little repression is expected.”*

Movements in the level of repression are therefore caused by factors which change the cost-benefit analysis of political leaders and governments. A variety of causes of state repression have already been identified. Broadly speaking, these causes are political, economic, demographic and legal.

The first core finding of the literature on repression concerns coercive responsiveness. The relationship is so convincing that it has been called a law (Davenport; 2007, 7). At its most basic, it states that rulers have an incentive to use repression when the current order, and therefore their power, are threatened. The finding is highly consistent – something of a rarity in the field (Davenport; 2007, 8).

Another finding, albeit more contested than the first, is that the degree of democratisation has an impact on levels of state repression. The dominant finding is sometimes called “domestic democratic peace” (Davenport; 2007, 11). It stipulates that more democratic societies will be less likely to use repression. Leaders in democratic societies will face higher costs for using repression as they are accountable to their constituents and can be kicked out of office (Davenport; 2007, 11). At the same time, democracies provide avenues for opposition to the government that autocracies do not, thereby reducing the potential for “human conflict” and facilitating the “conveyance of grievance”. Put together, this reduces the incentives for leaders to use repression.

Nevertheless, the impact of democracy on repression is far from settled. Davenport (Davenport; 2007, 11-14) outlines several areas that are still under discussion. Fein (1995), for example, questions the linearity between more democracy and less repression. Instead, her research suggests that there is more murder in the middle. Aside from these two core findings of the literature, many other potential causes have been examined. Other factors thought to be relevant are legal, political, demographic and economic. A more detailed discussion of these factors can be found in the previous chapter.

### *Diffusion*

The first part of the literature concerns human rights violations. The second part is the diffusion literature. There are two parts of the diffusion literature that are relevant here. The first part is the general diffusion literature, the second part concerns the diffusion of dissent specifically. The general idea of the diffusion literature is that political entities are not entirely independent

of each other, but interdependent. Dobbin et al. (2007) postulate that:

*“Diffusion theorists of different stripes share the view that the policy choices of one country are shaped by the choices of others, whereas conventional accounts of policy choices point only to domestic conditions.”*

Generally speaking, the literature “distinguishes between four different mechanisms of diffusion: Coercion, emulation, learning, and competition” Martin (2010). Coercion is a process whereby the policies of one political entity are essentially forced upon another - potentially against their will. It can be exercised by governments, international institutions or even non-governmental organisations (Dobbin et al.; 2007). This coercion can be achieved through a variety of means such as sanctions or the imposition of heavy economic costs (Dobbin et al.; 2007) or outright physical force (Owen; 2002, 376).

According to Maggetti and Gilardi (2015, 5), learning can be defined as “a process where policies in one unit are influenced by the consequences of similar policies in other units.” In other words, policy makers look at the policies enacted elsewhere and determine whether they are successful or not.

Emulation differs markedly from learning - it is not concerned with the outcome of policies (Maggetti and Gilardi; 2015). Instead, emulation is about conforming to the normative environment in which political entities operate (Maggetti and Gilardi; 2015). That means that policies are not necessarily adopted because they “work”, as would be the case in the learning diffusion mechanism, but because others in the peer group have them or are adopting them. Greenhill (2010) finds that intergovernmental organisations can have a significant positive effect on their members by socialising them into norms that protect human rights.

The last commonly accepted diffusion mechanism is competition. In this view, a political unit adopts policies as a reaction to policies adopted by competing political entities. One example for this competition mechanism would be tax policy (Martin; 2010). In a simple example, Germany might seek to lower its corporation tax rate after competing economies have done the same.

#### *Diffusion and Human Rights Violations*

More recent research has made an attempt to combine the two strands of literature. Most notably, Danneman and Ritter (2013) have shown that states can decide to violate rights at home due to the internal politics of other states. In their paper, Danneman and Ritter (2013) postulate that states may anticipate negative externalities resulting from civil war in neighboring countries. Repression, then, is used pre-emptively to prevent instability and increased dissent from spilling over into their country.

There is a good degree of existing research on both repression and diffusion. There is not

enough that links the two strands of literature together.

## 5.2 Theory

Dissent leads to more dissent. Dissent leads to repression. Broadly speaking, political leaders are rational. First and foremost, they want to survive and stay in power. In many countries around the world, losing power often means losing one's life (Klaas; 2016). Repression is one of the ways in which political leaders can react to dissent in their country to maintain power.

I posit that political actions in nearby states have an impact on domestic political decisions regarding repression. Coups and Uprisings in a nearby country can lead to spill-over effects that make domestic dissent more likely. The prospect of likelier domestic dissent, in turn, makes it more likely that repression will be used. This relates to the law of coercive responsiveness (Davenport; 2007).

I argue that the two relevant diffusion effects are learning and emulation. At the same time, a change in domestic conditions is relevant. Domestic opposition can learn from opposition in neighbouring countries. Domestic opposition can see how the opposition has operated in nearby countries. They can see what tactics worked and which produced failures. They can gauge their own strategy accordingly. This learning mechanism therefore makes increased dissent at home more likely.

Just as importantly, emulation is at play. In addition to a repressive state apparatus, many potential dissenters face a high degree of uncertainty: they don't know whether their protest would be joined by others who also oppose the regime. Norms work in favour of the "accepted" status quo. When dissent in a neighboring country breaks out against a regime with similar characteristics as the domestic regime, it functions as a signal to let the domestic population know that the status quo is not accepted.

Because of irregular leadership changes abroad, conditions will change domestically in a direction that makes dissent more likely. Revolutions, coups and revolts in the neighborhood create negative externalities that will have a direct influence on the state. Instability in the neighborhood can increase refugee and migration flows to the state, offer terrorists a haven from which to conduct their operation or simply just hamper economic growth in an increasingly interconnected world. Negative externalities thus turn into grievances which make dissent at home more likely.

Overall, the diffusion mechanisms of learning and emulation will make effective dissent to the government at home more likely. The law of coercive responsiveness outlined above postulates that this increase in anticipated dissent or already materialised dissent will make repression more likely. But leaders will not wait for this dissent to materialise – they will try to counteract it before anticipated dissent turns into very real demonstrators in the streets or emboldened coup-plotters taking a chance. To do so, they will use more repression as soon as



they see instability in their neighborhood.




Figure 3: Diffusion of Dissent and Repression

Source: Map: Google Maps, Graphic: Author

An anticipated increase in dissent increases the benefit of using repression. Using repression in anticipation as opposed to waiting for the materialisation of dissent also increases the probability of success. Leaders will therefore use repression as soon as possible.

At the same time, nearby irregular leadership change lowers the costs of using repression. This is true because the international community and citizens domestically are more likely to forgive repression when a country is faced with instability in its neighborhood. There are plenty of examples for this effect. One is modern Egypt. Part of the reason why Egypt can use repression to the degree that it does is because it is not only engaged in a campaign against terrorists domestically, but is also faced with the failed state of Libya on its border.

These factors combined make it likely that an irregular regime change in the neighbourhood of a state will lead that state to use more repression. Figure 2 illustrates this process: A (hypothetical) Chad experiences an irregular leadership change. The governments of nearby countries like Niger and Nigeria will anticipate an increase in dissent in their own country. As a result of this, they are going to use repression. There is ample evidence for this effect.

The Arab Spring is the most obvious example: the ousting of a dictator in Tunisia spread throughout the region and eventually rulers from Morocco to Syria felt threatened. Many of them used heavy repression to deal with an increase in (anticipated) dissent across the region. Repression wasn't even subtle: live rounds were used to break up protestors, people were killed, jailed for peaceful protest or they simply disappeared.

In some cases, reaction went as far as actually intervening abroad militarily to maintain sta-

bility in the face of dissent. In March 2011, for example, Saudi Arabia went as far as sending 1000 troops in tanks and armored vehicles to nearby Bahrain - allegedly at the request of the Bahrainian government (Amnesty International; 2011, 17).

Beyond the Arab Spring, the Color Revolutions have left many post-Soviet autocratic governments scared. When the Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovich was overthrown following mass protests in the Ukrainian capital Kiev, the Russian government was very critical for a whole host of reasons. One of them is their fear that such a revolution could inspire a similar revolution in Russia.

Ukraine is not only close to Russia geographically, the two countries share a long history and many links ranging from trade to language to Christian Orthodoxy. Following the latest unrest in Ukraine, Russia has taken steps to prepare for effective and brutal repression at home in the event of a spread of unrest to Moscow or St. Petersburg. In Russia, wide-spread demonstrations against the regime (allegedly organised from abroad) are increasingly seen as a form of warfare to which a military response is adequate (Bouchet; 2016).

In addition to the type of leadership change having an impact on repression, I posit that the fate of political leaders abroad after their tenure will have an impact on repression at home. After a leader abroad is removed from office, regularly or irregularly, he can go on living without issue, be forced into exile, imprisoned or even killed.

In the case that the post-tenure fate is irregular in neighboring countries, I expect an increase in repression at home. The same two diffusion effects described above, emulation and learning, are also relevant here. Jailing, killing or exiling previous political leaders is a sign of instability that can create negative externalities and lead to further conflict, potentially even civil war. Such negative externalities in nearby countries can lead to more dissent at home, grown out of grievances.

When a leader is jailed or killed nearby, it also signals to domestic opposition that real change is possible and within reach. It could be seen as an inspiration. It will also demonstrate to the current domestic leader what is at stake: potentially, being removed from office could not just mean the end of a political career, but life itself. Given that staying alive is a key priority for just about anybody, this will increase the benefit of repression.

Irregular regime changes abroad tend to make domestic repression more beneficial and less costly. **It is my hypothesis that irregular leadership changes abroad will therefore cause a state to use increased repression at home.**

Secondly, irregular leadership changes after which the post-tenure fate of political leaders amounts to jail, exile or death will increase the benefit of using repression. **It is my hypothesis that an irregular post-tenure fate of political leaders abroad can cause an increase in**

**repression domestically.**

The next part of the chapter outlines how I have tested the hypothesis empirically.

## 5.3 Methods

### Data

All the calculations in this analysis are based on two datasets. Both datasets cover the time period 1993 to 2011. I would have been insightful to include more recent data to take full account of the Arab Spring, but more recent data is not fully available yet. Both datasets cover over 145 countries. The difference in the datasets stem from different calculation methods. One dataset is based on available information on country capital cities, the other one for country-centroids and neighbourhoods.

The number and countries included in the datasets are different for reasons of availability. A full list of the included countries can be found in the appendix (Table 16, Table 17). The centroid and neighborhood datasets include 155 countries. The capital city dataset includes 147 countries. Countries are excluded because they are historical (like East Germany) or because no key data is available for them. One example is the United States.

Since this research makes use of repression scores based on United States State Department Human Rights reports, there is no repression score for the United States. An alternative to discarding units with missing key variables would have been imputation of data. Using multiple imputation would not have been feasible in this case because missing data is often missing for units across the entirety of time.

For the United States, for example, there is no repression data for any year. If I had imputed the data, I would have had to draw on the distribution of repression scores solely from other countries. The results would have been too inaccurate to be useful. I'm making the assumption that data is missing at random and therefore won't influence the results of the analysis.

*Irregular Leadership Change.* The data on irregular leadership changes is derived from Archigos (Goemans et al.; 2009). Archigos is a dataset about political leaders (Goemans et al.; 2009). It includes a wide array of information on the de facto leaders of a given state. Primarily, the way that leaders lose power and what happens to them immediately after their tenure are relevant here. To account for the exit, I use the "EXIT" variable, in particular the coding for regular and irregular exits. It's coded as follows (Goemans et al.; 2016, 2):

*"Removal from office is coded as Regular when the leader is removed in accordance with explicit rules or established conventions of his or her particular country. Examples of Regular removal include voluntary retirement, term limits and defeat in elections. Removal*

*from office is coded as Irregular when the leader was removed in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions. Most Irregular removals from office are done by domestic forces. Irregular removal from office is overwhelmingly the result of the threat or use of force as exemplified in coups, (popular) revolts and assassinations.”*




Figure 4: Irregular Leadership Exit Map

Source: Data: Goemans 2009, Graphic: Author

Figure 3 shows where irregular leadership exits have taken place between 1993 and 2011. A dark colour indicates that an irregular exit has taken place, a light colour indicates that it has not. White symbolises that no data is available on a given country or that the data could not be matched to the map. The majority of the relevant countries are in Africa. While some have undergone multiple irregular leadership changes, others have just experienced it only once. In total, there were 60 irregular leadership exits between 1993 and 2011 (Goemans et al.; 2009). This stands in contrast to a total of 496 regular leadership exits in the same time (Goemans et al.; 2009). There is only one case in which a country experienced more than one irregular leadership exit within a year: Fiji in 2000 (Goemans et al.; 2009).

*Post-Tenure Fate.* Like the data on irregular regime changes, the data on post-tenure fate is derived from the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al.; 2009). The “Post-Tenure Fate” variable in the data denotes the fate of the leader in the year after he lost power. This time-frame is chosen very narrowly because the creators of Archigos attempted to account only for any punishment a leader may receive because of his behavior in office as opposed to any post-tenure activities




Figure 5: Post-Tenure Fate Map

Source: Data: Goemans 2009, Graphic: Author

(Goemans et al.; 2016, 4). I have made use of four options for this variable:

1. *OK*: Leader receives no punishment post-tenure
2. *Exile*: Leader is exiled post-tenure
3. *Imprisonment*: Leader is imprisoned post-tenure
4. *Death*: Leader is killed post-tenure

It's important to note that the worst punishment is recorded in cases where more than one punishment is meted out (Goemans et al.; 2016, 4). Figure 4 is an overview of the countries in which irregular post-tenure fates have occurred. Dark colour indicates that an irregular post-tenure fate has occurred, light colour indicates that it has not. White symbolises that no data is available on a given country or that the data could not be matched to the map. There were 450 cases in which leaders lived on post-tenure without an issue (*OK*), 27 cases in which leaders were exiled, 16 cases of imprisonment and 5 leaders who were killed (*Death*). In total, there were 47 cases of irregular post-tenure fates. That means that just 9.4% of post-tenure fates were irregular across the observed time-frame.

*Repression*. To account for repression, in this case more specifically the violation of physical integrity rights, this study utilises the Political Terror Scale, or PTS (Wood and Gibney; 2010). PTS measures the degree to which a government commits personal integrity rights violations on a 5-point scale, with one being the lowest and five being the highest. These violations

include, but are not limited to, political imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial disappearances and killings.




Figure 6: Repression 2010

Source: Data: Goemans 2009, Graphic: Author

Annual human rights reports by Amnesty International and the United States State Department form the basis upon which coding is decided. Coders are instructed to base their decision on the scope, intensity and range of physical integrity rights violations (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 373). Scope refers to the type of violence carried out, for example torture or political imprisonment (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 373). Intensity denotes the frequency of abuse that occurs, while “Range” denotes what portion of the population is subject to the violations (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 373). This is the 5-point coding scheme that PTS uses (Wood and Gibney; 2010, 373):

*Level 1: Countries ...under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views and torture is rare or exceptional...Political murders are extremely rare...*

*Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, a few persons are affected; torture and beating are exceptional...Political murder is rare...*

*Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment...Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted...*

*Level 4: The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life...In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.*

*Level 5: The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population...The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.*

This research makes use of the scores based on the State Department reports. State Department reports and Amnesty International reports differ. But unlike some may assume, prior research indicates that State Department biases have not affected their assessments (Poe et al.; 2001). It's worth noting what the Political Terror Scale measures and what it does not.

PTS measures actual physical integrity rights violations committed by the state or its agents. Gang violence, for example, is not carried out by the state or its agents and therefore wouldn't be covered. In addition, PTS is not a general measure of political repression; it's solely about physical integrity rights violations. A state with a low PTS score can still be incredibly repressive: a state might be so good at repressing its population with other means that it does not need to resort to killing, jailing or torturing its citizens. It might be that there are no real elections, that political parties are simply fake. It could also restrict freedom of the press or freedom of speech. In fact, it might just be that people are cowed into obedience to the state because the state has previously violated physical integrity rights heavily.

An alternative measure of repression that could have been used here is the CIRI-Index (Cingranelli and Richards; 2010). CIRI and PTS attempt to measure the same type of violence and their coding is based on the same sources: Annual Human Rights Reports by Amnesty International and the US State Department. Nevertheless, CIRI and PTS are different in many ways. Most importantly, CIRI doesn't guarantee the same degree of comparability between countries. CIRI measures countries against an absolute standard of not committing physical integrity rights violations. PTS, on the other hand, is a more relative measurement of the human rights practices of infidel countries. For this study, PTS is more suitable.

Figure 5 is a map of repression around the world. White symbolises that no data is available on a given country or that the data could not be matched to the map. The darker the colour, the higher level of repression. The five colours correspond to the five levels of repression of the Political Terror Scale. Very few countries in the dataset actually have a score of 5.

In 2010, for example, only the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, North Korea, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sudan had the highest possible score of 5. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the mean repression level worldwide has changed significantly over time. Nevertheless, it's important to note that mean repression has only changed within a




Figure 7: Repression Mean over Time

relatively narrow segment.

Figure 8 shows that mean repression levels are drastically different across world regions. Unsurprisingly, mean repression levels are lowest by far in Western Europe and North America. Mean repression levels are much, much higher in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the global mean therefore hasn't changed significantly, there are significant differences between world regions.

*Control Variables.* As part of the analysis, I control for GDP per capita, total population and internal armed conflict. To account for the existence of internal armed conflict, I use a variable from the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Pet et al.; 2002). This variable denotes the number of internal armed conflicts per country. Internal armed conflicts are conflicts in which the state is fighting against one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states. Civil wars are known to have an influence on repression (Danneman and Ritter; 2013) – therefore it makes sense to control for them. Data on total population and GDP per capita are from the World Bank. GDP per capita is held constant at 2005 US Dollars. All the control variables are derived from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (Teorell et al.; 2016). Population and state wealth are accounted for because they are known to influence respect for human rights (Danneman and Ritter; 2013, 264).

## Models






Figure 8: Repression Mean by Region

To test my hypotheses, I use spatial-weight models. Spatial-weights models are based on the idea that individual units are related to one-another based on a measure of proximity. In this case, both geographic distance and time are accounted for when creating spatial lags. The final matrix used to apply spatial-weights to the selected variables is the product of a distance-matrix and a time matrix.

As Ward and Gleditsch (2008, 19) point out, one of the most important steps in any spatial analysis is the development of a measure of proximity. At its most basic, proximity measures how distant units, in this case countries, are to each other. The most obvious form of proximity is geographic, but other forms of distance exist. The importance of geographic distance is somewhat obvious: countries that are geographically close to one another are likely to be connected in a myriad of ways compared to countries which are very far from each other. Geographic proximity simplifies trade, it means that the military actions of one state will always have an effect on another. Geographic distance, it turns out, is difficult to measure in a social context (Ward and Gleditsch; 2008, 19).

How distant are Germany and Russia for example, and how should one measure it? In terms of geography, it would make sense to consider whether Germany and Russia share a border. They do not. One could also measure the smallest possible distance between a German border

and the Russian border. Beyond that, it might also make sense to consider the distance between Berlin and Moscow. Alternatively, one may measure the geographic distance between the middle point (centroid) of Russia and that of Germany. All of these approaches have advantages and disadvantages that will be discussed in the next part of this research.

There are plenty of alternatives to measuring proximity using geographic distance. Proximity could be accounted for using the travel time between the countries, the number of phone conversations between them in a given time-frame or how many tourists a country receives from a given other country (Ward and Gleditsch; 2008, 22). Beyond these measures, it might also make sense to look at “soft” factors that might connect countries. Were two countries part of the same colonial empire? Are they both Christian or Muslim majority countries? Do they both speak English or Arabic? In this research, proximity is solely measured via geographic distance, operationalised through 5 connectivity-matrices.

I focus on geography because it is a highly significant factor in the impact of the negative externalities that result from irregular regime changes. Porous borders, increased illegal immigration and easier trade of weaponry are all influenced by geographic proximity. That is not to say that other proxies for proximity would be useless, they would simply be less useful than geographic distance in this case.

A connectivity-matrix denotes connections between countries. Ward & Gleditsch provide a simple illustration of the way in which a simple measure of proximity turns into a row-standardised connectivity matrix that can serve as the basis for applying spatial-weights (Ward and Gleditsch; 2008). Ward and Gleditsch (2008, 16-18) provide an example for a list, connectivity-matrix and a simple row-standardised connectivity-matrix of 8 European countries.

They define a connection as present if countries have borders within 200km of one another (Ward and Gleditsch; 2008, 16). In this case (Table 1) it is binary where a “1” denotes that a connection between two countries exists and a “0” denotes that it does not. It’s worth noting that there is a “0” diagonally: the relationship between Denmark and Denmark is a “0”, as is the relationship between Finland and Finland. This research is concerned with measuring the influence of other countries on a given unit.

Country	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Norway	Sweden	UK
Denmark	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
France	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
Germany	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Italy	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0

Country	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Norway	Sweden	UK
Norway	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Sweden	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
UK	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

Table 1: Binary Connectivity-Matrix

Depending on the goal of the research, it might also make sense to turn the connectivity matrix into a row-standardised connectivity matrix as seen in Table 2. Neumayer and Plümper (2016) discuss the merits of row-standardisation at great length in a recent paper. According to them, row-standardisation is “econometrically convenient” but often leads to “clashes with theories of spatial dependence” (Neumayer and Plümper; 2016, 13). This is because they predict heterogeneity in the exposure of subjects to spatial stimulus (Neumayer and Plümper; 2012). Row-standardisation, on the other hand, imposes a “homogeneity of total exposure to spatial stimulus” (Neumayer and Plümper; 2016, 13).

In this case, I believe this imposition of homogeneity is sensible. When taking domestic political decisions, leaders will pay attention to foreign influence amongst a variety of other factors. The total influence from abroad will not grow or diminish based on the number of countries that are connected to the country.

A row-standardised connectivity matrix is created by summing each row up to a 1. In theoretical terms, it means that France is not simply connected to Germany, but that France equates to a quarter of German connections (see Table 2). The total outside influence is constant.

Country	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Norway	Sweden	UK
Denmark	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{3}$	0	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0
France	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{3}$
Germany	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0
Italy	0	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	0	0	0
Norway	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{3}$	0
Sweden	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	0
UK	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

Table 2: Weighted-Connectivity Matrix

In this research, I’m using centroid distance, common borders and capital distance. Centroids are the geometric middle point of any given unit, in this case countries. After creating the

centroids, they are used in two ways in this research. The first connectivity matrix is based on the distance (km) between the country-centroids. The second matrix is based on a binary neighbourhood indicator, where a 1 stands for a distance under 900 km and a 0 stands for a distance larger than 900.

To a certain extent, any binary measure for this distance is arbitrary. I decided against using the 200 km cut-off used by Ward and Gleditsch (2008) because it would leave many larger states without proximate countries. This, on the other hand, would not accurately reflect the way that proximity is perceived in reality.




Figure 9: Centroid Connectivity-Matrix

Using country-centroids to account for proximity is neat because it captures the entire extent of a country. Countries are not just their capitals. To think otherwise is to underestimate the political importance of the hinterland, rural areas or other cities. Germany is not just Berlin, neither is it defined by the countries with which it has borders. Regions are hugely important for the decision making process in a great number of countries. Using centroid distance as opposed to capital-city distances or border distances captures some of that importance.

The second way used here to account for geographic distances employed here is based on common borders. Here, the existence or non-existence of common borders is used to measure geographic proximity. Figure 8 provides an illustration of this approach in practice. The theoretical justification for using borders is the following: centroid-distance is important, but so are shared borders. Shared borders mean that two countries are close to each other generally, but beyond that it also means that they have an influence on each other beyond simply being close.

When two countries share a border, they are forced to make military, political and economic decisions with the other country in mind. Chaos in Libya, for example, has led to a highly porous border with Egypt – that in turn can lead to an uptick in illegal migration, the transfer




Figure 10: Neighborhood Connectivity-Matrix

of weapons and so forth. Figure 8 provides an illustration of the border-matrix. The dots represent countries. Dots connected by lines indicate that two countries share a border. Russia is the country with the highest number of bordering countries. The distance-matrix based on shared borders is originally binary. A “1” indicates that common borders between two countries exist, a “0” indicates that they do not. Theoretical benefits aside, using a border-matrix also has downsides. In the connectivity-matrix resulting from this method, Germany and Norway are said to have the same level of geographic proximity as Germany and Papua-New Guinea – because they do not have common borders. That is simply nonsense. Additionally, this approach creates a methodological problem where islands are concerned.

As can be seen quite clearly in Figure 9, Australia and New Zealand (as well as others) do not have any connections. Water separates them from their nearest neighbor, so they count as not sharing a border. It’s not clear why this should mean that countries are not closely related just like two countries would be if they share a land-border. Water might have been an impediment in days gone by – in the 21st century it is not. The third way of measuring connectivity here is based on the distance between the capital cities (Figure 14, Appendix). Figure 10 illustrates the difference between using an approach based on country-centroids and one based on capital cities. In some countries, the centroid is close to the capital cities, in others its very far away. In some cases, the difference between centroid and capital city can amount to thousands of kilometres.

The advantage of an approach based on capital cities is clear: capital cities are the political centre of most countries. If we want to measure the geographic distance between Germany and Russia, for example, it surely makes more sense to measure the distance between Berlin and Moscow (capital cities) than between Thuringia and Siberia (centroids). In a number of countries, there is no significant distance between the centroid of a country and its capital city.



Figure 11: Centroid Capital Distance Map

Source: Author

In others, the difference can be huge. In Spain, Madrid is very close to the centroid. In Russia, the difference between Moscow and centroid is gigantic: thousands of kilometres and multiple time-zones. The larger the difference between capital and centroid, the larger the potential for a change in the results.

### **Time-Matrix**

Aside from accounting for geographic distance, this research also accounts for time. The final matrix used to apply spatial weights is the result of a combination of the distance and time matrices. The time-matrix used here is non-linear: not only do events have a smaller influence the farther they go back in time, the difference between now and a year ago is larger than the difference between two and three years ago. Figure 11 shows the matrix as used here: The real matrix is 19 by 19, where each number corresponds to one year in the dataset. The numbers above “1” are all “0” – they are in the future and therefore can’t have a weight. The numbers below “1” are the weights given to events in the past. From a theoretical point of view, this matrix means that a revolution this year is given a higher weight than a revolution that happened in the last year and so forth.

Before running the spatial regression models, the distance and time matrices need to be woven together. Since they are of different length, they cannot simply be multiplied. Instead, a

	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9
1	1.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000
2	0.7071068	1.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000
3	0.5773503	0.7071068	1.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000
4	0.5000000	0.5773503	0.7071068	1.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000
5	0.4472136	0.5000000	0.5773503	0.7071068	1.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000
6	0.4082483	0.4472136	0.5000000	0.5773503	0.7071068	1.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000
7	0.3779645	0.4082483	0.4472136	0.5000000	0.5773503	0.7071068	1.0000000	0.0000000	0.0000000
8	0.3535534	0.3779645	0.4082483	0.4472136	0.5000000	0.5773503	0.7071068	1.0000000	0.0000000
9	0.3333333	0.3535534	0.3779645	0.4082483	0.4472136	0.5000000	0.5773503	0.7071068	1.0000000
10	0.3162278	0.3333333	0.3535534	0.3779645	0.4082483	0.4472136	0.5000000	0.5773503	0.7071068
11	0.3015113	0.3162278	0.3333333	0.3535534	0.3779645	0.4082483	0.4472136	0.5000000	0.5773503
12	0.2886751	0.3015113	0.3162278	0.3333333	0.3535534	0.3779645	0.4082483	0.4472136	0.5000000
13	0.2773501	0.2886751	0.3015113	0.3162278	0.3333333	0.3535534	0.3779645	0.4082483	0.4472136
14	0.2672612	0.2773501	0.2886751	0.3015113	0.3162278	0.3333333	0.3535534	0.3779645	0.4082483
15	0.2581989	0.2672612	0.2773501	0.2886751	0.3015113	0.3162278	0.3333333	0.3535534	0.3779645
16	0.2500000	0.2581989	0.2672612	0.2773501	0.2886751	0.3015113	0.3162278	0.3333333	0.3535534
17	0.2425356	0.2500000	0.2581989	0.2672612	0.2773501	0.2886751	0.3015113	0.3162278	0.3333333
18	0.2357023	0.2425356	0.2500000	0.2581989	0.2672612	0.2773501	0.2886751	0.3015113	0.3162278
19	0.2294157	0.2357023	0.2425356	0.2500000	0.2581989	0.2672612	0.2773501	0.2886751	0.3015113

Figure 12: Time-Matrix

Source: Author

**Kronecker Product** is used:

$$A \otimes B$$

Where A is the time-matrix and B is the row-standardised distance-matrix. The result of the Kronecker Product is the spatial-weight matrix that is subsequently used to spatially-lag the independent variables.

#### 4.3 Analysis

After creating a distance matrix, time matrix and combining them into a spatial weight matrix, the relevant variables are spatially lagged. Using these lagged variables, I have run five spatial-models. A standard OLS regression takes the following form (Ward and Gleditsch; 2008, 39):

$$y_i = x_i\beta + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

**Hypothesis 1: Irregular Leadership Change** To test my hypothesis, I am using a spatial spillover-model. Spatial ordinary least squares (S-OLS) and spatial maximum likelihood (S-ML) are most commonly used to calculate spatial lag models (Böhmelt et al.; 2016, 402). Using an OLS model has the advantage of being easily accessible. In addition, it makes it easier to compare the results of the analysis to existing research - much of which uses the




Figure 13: Pairwise Centroid Correlation Matrix

Source: Author



same estimation. My spatial spillover-model takes the following form:

$$y_{i,t} = \beta_1 y_{i(t-1)} + \beta_2 x_{i,t} + \rho W \Lambda_{j,t} + \theta_t + \gamma_t + \epsilon \quad (3)$$

where  $y_{it}$  is the dependent variable (*Repression* in country  $i$  at time  $t$ ),  $\beta_1 y_{i(t-1)}$  is the time-lagged dependent variable and  $\beta X_{it}$  are non-lagged control variables defined above - *GDP per capita*, *Civil War* and *Population*.  $W \Lambda_{it}$  is the product of a spatial-weight matrix ( $W$ ) and an independent variable  $\Lambda$  for country  $i$  at time  $t$ . The independent variable used here is *Irregular Exit*. I had originally planned to include *Regular Exit* as an explanatory variable in the same models, but spatially lagged irregular exit is highly correlated to regular exit (Figure 11). For this reason, they should not appear in the same model together. Country and time effects are fixed to account for the endogeneity problems of using spatial OLS (Martin; 2010; Franzese and Hays; 2007). Depending on the model used, the spatial lags are done with one of the five spatial-weight matrices derived from the distance and time-matrices. The results vary according to the connectivity matrix that is used for the spatial-weights. The matrices are constructed using the process outlined above. In total, there are 5.

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Irregular Exit		+	+		
GDPc	-	-	-	-	-
Civil War	+	+	+	+	+
Population	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3: Regression Results Irregular Leadership Change

Table 3 shows the results of these models. Regardless of the connectivity-matrix used, the control variables always behave the same. There is a statistically significant and negative relationship between the GDP per capita and repression. The relationship between the civil war and repression is significant and positive. The same is true for the population variable. Table 3 shows the results of Models 1 to Model 5 based on model estimations which include control variables but no time-lagged dependent variable. As the table shows, the results regarding irregular leadership exits vary. In Model 2 and Model 3, irregular exits have a significant positive effect. As Table 11, irregular exits remain significant in Model 2 even when lagged repression is included. All the regression tables can be found in the appendix of this chapter.

### Hypothesis 2: Post-Tenure Fate

I had postulated that an irregular post-tenure fate in a nearby state would increase repression domestically. When a leader in the neighbourhood is killed, exiled or imprisoned, it can create

Table 11: Model 2 (900km Centroid Distances)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Irregular Exit	0.279*** (0.079)	0.262** (0.133)	0.227* (0.120)
GDPc		-0.330** (0.162)	-0.079 (0.149)
Civil War		0.177*** (0.055)	0.148*** (0.050)
Population		1.469*** (0.385)	1.053*** (0.352)
Lagged Regression			0.412*** (0.033)
Constant	4.888*** (0.139)	-11.807* (6.730)	-12.611** (6.112)
N	2,932	828	826
R <sup>2</sup>	0.768	0.874	0.897
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.754	0.851	0.877
Residual Std. Error	0.573 (df = 2758)	0.523 (df = 698)	0.474 (df = 695)
F Statistic	52.881*** (df = 173; 2758)	37.523*** (df = 129; 698)	46.440*** (df = 130; 695)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

negative externalities affecting others. Additionally, it shows the domestic leader how high the stakes of political survival are. After all, the end of a political career often equates to death in many parts of our world. To test **Hypothesis 2**, I'm using the same model outlined above. Only this time, the spatially lagged explanatory variables included are *OK* and *Death*. Although data for *Exile* and *Imprisonment* exists as well, these couldn't be included in the same models because they are highly correlated to with the other variables and therefore not included in these models (Figure 12).

As with the investigation into the role of irregular leadership change,  $W$  can take 5 forms - the spatial-weights matrix changes from Model 6 to Model 10. Table 4 provides a summary of the results across models. The control variables behave as expected across models. Higher levels of GDP per capita are correlated with lower levels of repression. Civil war is correlated with higher levels of repression, as are higher population levels. Death as post-tenure fate is insignificant across the board. OK has a significant and negative effect in Model 9 (Table 6).

Variable	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
OK				-	
Death					
GDPc	-	-	-	-	-
Civil War	+	+	+	+	+
Population	+	+	+	+	+

Table 4: Regression Results Irregular Post-Tenure Fate

Table 13: Model 9 (Continuous Capital Distance Fate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
OK	-0.297 (0.423)	-1.773* (0.924)	-1.163 (0.844)
Death	2.691 (6.360)	3.055 (12.756)	-0.642 (11.628)
GDPc		-0.390** (0.168)	-0.138 (0.155)
Civil War		0.160*** (0.061)	0.138** (0.056)
Population		1.318*** (0.400)	0.940** (0.367)
Lagged Repression			0.404*** (0.035)
Constant	4.973*** (0.151)	-7.564 (7.026)	-9.057 (6.409)
N	2,782	773	771
R <sup>2</sup>	0.758	0.867	0.890
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.742	0.841	0.869
Residual Std. Error	0.579 (df = 2615)	0.532 (df = 647)	0.485 (df = 644)
F Statistic	49.307*** (df = 166; 2615)	33.744*** (df = 125; 647)	41.443*** (df = 126; 644)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

## 5.4 Results

The results indicate a mixed picture. Two out of five models used indicate that the **irregular leadership change hypothesis** holds true. There is a connection between irregular leadership changes abroad and an increase in repression at home. The other three models don't contradict this finding - the results are simply not statistically significant. The testing of the **post-tenure fate hypothesis** yielded results that do not allow us to assume that the original hypothesis is correct.

Neither do we know whether the opposite effect might be true - the results are not significant. The control variables, on the other hand, behave as expected. Richer countries are less likely to experience high levels of repression than poorer countries. Countries who have a civil war at home are likely to be more repressive, as are countries with a higher population. These results are in line with my theory.

There are a number of possible reasons for the results not lining up with the theory regarding post-tenure fates. Firstly, it might be that the theory was not accurate. It could well be that the post-tenure fate of international leaders is simply not relevant to leaders in neighbouring countries when deciding whether to use more or less repression domestically. It's also possible that an impact exists, but that it is time-lagged. In other words, it might be that this effect does exist, but that rulers abroad are not able to act in anticipation.

Another theoretical explanation for the nature of the result would be the availability of multiple options to deal with an anticipated increase in opposition. One of those options is more repression; another is more co-optation. Instead of reacting with the stick, leaders might well choose to use the carrot to reign in opposition. This is a particularly attractive option for wealthy countries such as Saudi-Arabia. Lastly, it ought to be clear that the violation of physical integrity rights is always repression, but that repression does not always involve the violation of physical integrity rights.

Instead of killing or torturing opponents, a domestic leader may decide to use the judicial system to exclude opposing parties from upcoming elections. Beyond this, a leader might also curtail press freedom and so forth. The toolbox of an autocrat has more than one tool. Secondly, it might have something to do with the structure of the data itself. The data used to account for repression is a five-point index.

It's not a terribly fine-grained way to account for changes to the level of repression. When change does occur, the Political Terror Scale might not be able to actually account for it, either. Chad, for example, had the maximum possible score of 5 in 2010. Even if Chad used more repression as a result of an irregular leadership change in its neighbourhood, we would not be able to see this change because there is no way for the score to increase.

It is also possible that this analysis would have yielded different results if I had used CIRI data in place of the Political Terror Scale to account for physical integrity rights violations. It's less likely, but nevertheless possible, that a model using PTS Amnesty International scores instead of State Department scores could have produced differing results. Thirdly, it's entirely possible that different estimation, such as spatial maximum-likelihood, could have yielded different results than the S-OLS used here.

These results suggest that irregular leadership changes, for example as the result of a coup, can lead to increased repression in neighbouring countries. At the same time, the analysis does not support the hypothesis that an irregular post-tenure fate in a nearby country leads to increased repression domestically. In other words, it matters whether a political leader nearby gets removed from power irregularly, but it doesn't seem to matter what happens to that leader after the removal. He could be fine, he could be killed, he could be in prison: there is no clear relationship between the post-tenure fate abroad and increased repression at home. While the irregular leadership change hypothesis (**Hypothesis 1**) is therefore true, the same cannot be said for the post-tenure fate hypothesis (**Hypothesis 2**). The implications for the discipline are clear: drastic change in one country can lead to adverse effects in proximate countries. To find out under which conditions this holds, it would be interesting to examine interaction effects. It's possible, for example, that some of the effects would be more pronounced in autocracies than in democracies or vice-versa.

In policy terms, this research seems to suggest that countries should be very careful in supporting irregular leadership abroad - it might have the unintended effect of leading to an increase in physical integrity rights violations abroad. This is not to say that a support for democratic movements abroad is unwise as such, but it needs to be well thought out. It might be that an increase in repression nearby can be prevented. Or indeed, that (temporary) government repression in the region is seen as preferable to the continued existence of a dictatorship.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

This research suggests investigates the link between irregular leadership exists in one country and an increase of repression in nearby countries. Additionally, it is concerned with the effect that the nature of a post-tenure fate may have on nearby countries. In practise, this is about leaders being ousted by revolutions, coups or popular uprisings and the impact this may have on other countries. Political leaders are fundamentally rational: when a political leader is ousted irregularly in a proximate country, the domestic leader will anticipate an increase of dissent at home. To counteract this, he will use co-optation or repression.

Whether this is true or not matters greatly: it can help researchers to predict increases in

human rights violations using a relatively obvious indicator. It might also help governments in formulating foreign and security policy that takes into account some of the adverse effects that irregular leadership changes in one country may have on other countries in the region. This speaks to a wider debate around the kind of support Western governments ought to provide to democratic movements in staunchly autocratic regimes.

To test these relationships, I use a spatial lag model estimated with a S-OLS. The dataset used to test the model includes more than 140 countries from 1993 to 2011. The results suggest that an irregular leadership exit in one country does lead to increased repression in other countries.

What happens to leaders after their tenure, on the other hand, does not appear to have a significant impact on repression levels in nearby countries. States should be wary of supporting groups abroad who seek an irregular removal of their government, even if that government is autocratic. Drastic change always brings unintended consequences - one of those could be an increase in regional repression.

Knowing this is all the more essential when it comes to actually making policy in response to irregular regime changes. This is the topic of the next chapter. Whether they want to or not, policy makers are forced to act when irregular regime changes occur. The next chapter provides an overview of the way that great powers have reacted to these changes in the past. This topic is intrinsically linked to the debates surrounding hybrid warfare.

## **5.6 Appendix**



Figure 14: Capital City Connectivity

Table 14: Model 1 (Continuous Centroid Distances)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Irregular Exit	-2.579 (1.851)	-2.593 (3.236)	-2.488 (2.933)
GDPc		-0.345** (0.163)	-0.090 (0.149)
Civil War		0.166*** (0.055)	0.139*** (0.050)
Population		1.407*** (0.386)	0.996*** (0.353)
Lagged Regression			0.414*** (0.033)
Constant	4.965*** (0.145)	-10.321 (6.710)	-11.310* (6.091)
N	2,932	828	826
R <sup>2</sup>	0.767	0.873	0.896
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.753	0.850	0.877
Residual Std. Error	0.574 (df = 2758)	0.524 (df = 698)	0.475 (df = 695)
F Statistic	52.622*** (df = 173; 2758)	37.323*** (df = 129; 698)	46.229*** (df = 130; 695)

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01






Figure 15: Pairwise Capital Correlation Matrix

Source: Author




Figure 16: Pairwise Centroid Correlation Matrix Square

Source: Author




Figure 17: Pairwise Centroid Capital Correlation Matrix Square

Source: Author

Table 15: Model 3 (Neighborhood)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Irregular Exit	0.258*** (0.078)	0.233* (0.135)	0.178 (0.122)
GDPc		-0.337** (0.162)	-0.087 (0.149)
Civil War		0.173*** (0.055)	0.144*** (0.050)
Population		1.437*** (0.385)	1.025*** (0.352)
Lagged Regression			0.412*** (0.033)
Constant	4.903*** (0.139)	-11.105* (6.709)	-11.936* (6.095)
N	2,932	828	826
R <sup>2</sup>	0.768	0.874	0.897
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.754	0.850	0.877
Residual Std. Error	0.573 (df = 2758)	0.523 (df = 698)	0.474 (df = 695)
F Statistic	52.844*** (df = 173; 2758)	37.468*** (df = 129; 698)	46.332*** (df = 130; 695)

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

Table 16: Model 4 (Continuous Capital Distances)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Irregular Exit	0.029 (1.694)	-1.624 (3.170)	-1.139 (2.883)
GDPc		-0.389** (0.169)	-0.136 (0.155)
Civil War		0.166*** (0.061)	0.141** (0.056)
Population		1.282*** (0.399)	0.909** (0.365)
Lagged Regression			0.408*** (0.035)
Constant	4.935*** (0.143)	-7.186 (7.022)	-8.753 (6.393)
N	2,782	773	771
R <sup>2</sup>	0.758	0.866	0.890
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.743	0.841	0.869
Residual Std. Error	0.579 (df = 2616)	0.534 (df = 648)	0.485 (df = 645)
F Statistic	49.605*** (df = 165; 2616)	33.812*** (df = 124; 648)	41.700*** (df = 125; 645)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table 17: Model 5 (900km Capital Distances)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Irregular Exit	0.211*** (0.081)	-0.008 (0.146)	-0.049 (0.133)
GDPc		-0.388** (0.169)	-0.135 (0.155)
Civil War		0.165*** (0.061)	0.140** (0.056)
Population		1.278*** (0.399)	0.905** (0.365)
Lagged Regression			0.408*** (0.035)
Constant	4.924*** (0.141)	-7.162 (7.024)	-8.718 (6.393)
N	2,782	773	771
R <sup>2</sup>	0.758	0.866	0.890
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.743	0.840	0.869
Residual Std. Error	0.578 (df = 2616)	0.534 (df = 648)	0.485 (df = 645)
F Statistic	49.773*** (df = 165; 2616)	33.796*** (df = 124; 648)	41.699*** (df = 125; 645)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table 18: Model 6 (Continuous Centroid Distance Fate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
OK	-0.956** (0.433)	-0.497 (0.713)	0.463 (0.652)
Death	-28.789*** (7.308)	-12.378 (12.561)	-5.424 (11.408)
GDPc		-0.321* (0.165)	-0.107 (0.151)
Civil War		0.160*** (0.055)	0.137*** (0.050)
Population		1.374*** (0.388)	1.008*** (0.354)
Lagged Repression			0.416*** (0.034)
Constant	5.043*** (0.151)	-10.342 (6.713)	-11.231* (6.098)
N	2,932	828	826
R <sup>2</sup>	0.769	0.874	0.896
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.754	0.850	0.877
Residual Std. Error	0.572 (df = 2757)	0.524 (df = 697)	0.475 (df = 694)
F Statistic	52.745*** (df = 174; 2757)	37.027*** (df = 130; 697)	45.815*** (df = 131; 694)

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

Table 19: Model 7 (900km Centroid Distances Fate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
OK	0.037 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.040)
Death	0.120 (0.292)	-0.202 (0.508)	-0.096 (0.462)
GDPc		-0.351** (0.163)	-0.100 (0.149)
Civil War		0.165*** (0.055)	0.138*** (0.050)
Population		1.415*** (0.386)	1.005*** (0.353)
Lagged Repression			0.415*** (0.033)
Constant	4.906*** (0.139)	-10.371 (6.720)	-11.281* (6.099)
N	2,932	828	826
R <sup>2</sup>	0.768	0.873	0.896
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.753	0.850	0.877
Residual Std. Error	0.574 (df = 2757)	0.525 (df = 697)	0.475 (df = 694)
F Statistic	52.308*** (df = 174; 2757)	36.954*** (df = 130; 697)	45.787*** (df = 131; 694)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01



Table 20: Model 8 (Neighborhood Fate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
OK	0.054* (0.029)	0.0001 (0.051)	-0.024 (0.046)
Death	0.264 (0.295)	-0.059 (0.480)	-0.215 (0.436)
GDPc		-0.354** (0.163)	-0.097 (0.149)
Civil War		0.164*** (0.055)	0.137*** (0.050)
Population		1.424*** (0.386)	1.012*** (0.352)
Lagged Repression			0.415*** (0.033)
Constant	4.905*** (0.139)	-10.460 (6.728)	-11.486* (6.106)
N	2,932	828	826
R <sup>2</sup>	0.768	0.873	0.896
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.753	0.850	0.877
Residual Std. Error	0.574 (df = 2757)	0.525 (df = 697)	0.475 (df = 694)
F Statistic	52.372*** (df = 174; 2757)	36.945*** (df = 130; 697)	45.800*** (df = 131; 694)

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

Table 21: Model 9 (Continuous Capital Distance Fate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
OK	-0.297 (0.423)	-1.773* (0.924)	-1.163 (0.844)
Death	2.691 (6.360)	3.055 (12.756)	-0.642 (11.628)
GDPc		-0.390** (0.168)	-0.138 (0.155)
Civil War		0.160*** (0.061)	0.138** (0.056)
Population		1.318*** (0.400)	0.940** (0.367)
Lagged Repression			0.404*** (0.035)
Constant	4.973*** (0.151)	-7.564 (7.026)	-9.057 (6.409)
N	2,782	773	771
R <sup>2</sup>	0.758	0.867	0.890
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.742	0.841	0.869
Residual Std. Error	0.579 (df = 2615)	0.532 (df = 647)	0.485 (df = 644)
F Statistic	49.307*** (df = 166; 2615)	33.744*** (df = 125; 647)	41.443*** (df = 126; 644)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table 22: Model 10 (900km Capital Distance Fate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
OK	0.053* (0.030)	-0.053 (0.055)	-0.037 (0.051)
Death	0.173 (0.218)	-0.408 (0.353)	-0.205 (0.322)
GDPc		-0.358** (0.170)	-0.118 (0.156)
Civil War		0.162*** (0.061)	0.138** (0.056)
Population		1.211*** (0.401)	0.866** (0.368)
Lagged Repression			0.406*** (0.035)
Constant	4.929*** (0.141)	-6.715 (7.025)	-8.445 (6.402)
N	2,782	773	771
R <sup>2</sup>	0.758	0.867	0.890
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.743	0.841	0.868
Residual Std. Error	0.578 (df = 2615)	0.533 (df = 647)	0.485 (df = 644)
F Statistic	49.377*** (df = 166; 2615)	33.598*** (df = 125; 647)	41.357*** (df = 126; 644)

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01




Figure 18: Repression 1993

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale

Country	Country	Country	Country
Afghanistan	Cyprus	Kuwait	Poland
Albania	Denmark	Kyrgyzstan	Portugal
Algeria	Djibouti	Laos	Qatar
Angola	Dominican Republic	Latvia	Romania
Argentina	Ecuador	Lebanon	Russia
Armenia	Egypt	Lesotho	Rwanda
Australia	El Salvador	Liberia	Saudi Arabia
Austria	Equatorial Guinea	Libya	Senegal
Azerbaijan	Estonia	Lithuania	Sierra Leone
Bahrain	Fiji	Luxembourg	Singapore
Bangladesh	Finland	Macedonia	Slovenia
Belarus	France	Madagascar	Solomon Islands
Belgium	Gabon	Malawi	Somalia
Benin	Gambia	Malaysia	South Africa
Bhutan	Georgia	Mali	Spain
Bolivia	Germany	Mauritania	Sri Lanka
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ghana	Mauritius	Sudan

Country	Country	Country	Country
Botswana	Greece	Mexico	Suriname
Brazil	Guatemala	Moldova	Swaziland
Bulgaria	Guinea	Mongolia	Sweden
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	Morocco	Switzerland
Burundi	Guyana	Mozambique	Syria
Cambodia	Haiti	Myanmar	Taiwan
Cameroon	Honduras	Namibia	Tajikistan
Canada	Hungary	Nepal	Tanzania
Cape Verde	India	Netherlands	Thailand
CAR	Indonesia	New Zealand	Togo
Chad	Iran	Nicaragua	Trinidad and Tobago
Chile	Iraq	Niger	Tunisia
China	Ireland	Nigeria	Turkey
Colombia	Italy	Norway	Turkmenistan
Comoros	Jamaica	Oman	Uganda
Congo	Japan	Pakistan	Ukraine
DRC	Jordan	Panama	UAE
Costa Rica	Kazakhstan	Papua New Guinea	United Kingdom
Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya	Paraguay	Uruguay
Croatia	North Korea	Peru	Uzbekistan
Cuba	South Korea	Philippines	Venezuela
		Yemen	
n = 155		Zambia	
		Zimbabwe	

Table 16: Countries Centroid Neighborhood Dataset




Figure 19: Repression 1994

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 20: Repression 1995

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 21: Repression 1996

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 22: Repression 1997

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 23: Repression 1998

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 24: Repression 1999

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale






Figure 25: Repression 2000

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 26: Repression 2001

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 27: Repression 2002

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 28: Repression 2003

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 29: Repression 2004

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 30: Repression 2005

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 31: Repression 2006

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 32: Repression 2007

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 33: Repression 2008

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale




Figure 34: Repression 2009

Source: Author, Data: Political Terror Scale

Country	Country	Country	Country
Afghanistan	Denmark	Kyrgyzstan	Portugal
Albania	Djibouti	Laos	Qatar
Algeria	Dominican Republic	Latvia	Romania
Angola	Ecuador	Lebanon	Russia
Argentina	Egypt	Lesotho	Rwanda
Armenia	El Salvador	Liberia	Saudi Arabia
Australia	Equatorial Guinea	Libya	Senegal
Austria	Estonia	Lithuania	Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan	Finland	Luxembourg	Singapore
Bahrain	Gabon	Macedonia	Slovenia
Bangladesh	Gambia	Madagascar	Solomon Islands
Belarus	Georgia	Malawi	South Africa
Belgium	Germany	Mali	Spain
Benin	Ghana	Mauritania	Sri Lanka
Bhutan	Greece	Mauritius	Suriname
Bolivia	Guatemala	Mexico	Swaziland
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guinea	Moldova	Sweden
Botswana	Guinea-Bissau	Mongolia	Switzerland
Brazil	Guyana	Morocco	Syria
Bulgaria	Haiti	Mozambique	Taiwan
Burkina Faso	Honduras	Myanmar	Tajikistan
Burundi	Hungary	Namibia	Tanzania
Cambodia	India	Nepal	Thailand
Cameroon	Indonesia	Netherlands	Togo
Canada	Iran	New Zealand	Trinidad and Tobago
Cape Verde	Iraq	Nicaragua	Tunisia
Central African Republic	Ireland	Niger	Turkey
Chad	Italy	Nigeria	Turkmenistan
Chile	Jamaica	Norway	Uganda
China	Japan	Oman	Ukraine
Colombia	Jordan	Panama	UAE
Comoros	Kazakhstan	Papua New Guinea	United Kingdom
Congo	Kenya	Paraguay	Uruguay
DRC	North Korea	Peru	Uzbekistan
Croatia	South Korea	Philippines	Venezuela

---

Country	Country	Country	Country
Cuba	Kuwait	Poland	Yemen
		Zambia	
n = 147		Zimbabwe	

---

Table 17: Countries Capital Dataset

## 6 Dealing with Distress

Irregular regime changes like coups and uprisings can adversely impact the interests of a state. States can also use these episodes of drastic change in order to advance their interests. In some cases, they may even choose to fan the flames of instability themselves in order to achieve their aims. These destabilisation campaigns have been discussed extensively under the topic of hybrid warfare in the last few years - especially after the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014.

Using the case of Ukraine, I am going to outline how Russia and Germany have reacted to the challenges and opportunities inherent to irregular regime change and popular mobilisation. I am including Russia because the country is seen as an integral actor in the realm of hybrid warfare. Germany is my focus because it has reacted very differently to the crisis in Ukraine than Russia. In comparing the two, I can illustrate differences in perception and behaviour.

What is the Russian narrative on irregular regime changes? How has Russia utilised dissent as a weapon, how has it reacted to irregular regime changes in other countries? What has been the German position? How are the two countries dealing with real or imagined hybrid threats when it comes to the sponsorship of political instability? In a first step, this chapter deals with Russia before analysing the situation of Germany.

Irregular regime changes are periods of profound change. They can move time forward rapidly and lead to great progress, but they have also turned back the clock of humanity. Some of the best, and many of the worst things in history have happened as a result of these irregular changes.

It is no surprise that major powers such as Germany and Russia, or previously the Soviet Union, should concern themselves with these changes. Both countries have made traumatic experiences with mass mobilisation. The Soviet Union came into being as the result of twin revolutions which rocked the Russian Empire in 1917 (Service; 2009). The resulting creation of a communist state did not simply define the Soviet Republics for decades to come, it was also an event that influenced the history of the twentieth century like few others.

The Soviet Union ultimately disintegrated as masses of Georgians, Poles and Azeris called for freedom in the streets of their countries. They wanted freedom, and they waged their conflict peacefully against the occupying forces. In the newly born Russian Federation itself, a tale of protests, economic anxiety and political instability played out in the 1990s. After years of instability, part of Vladimir Putin's success is being seen as the man to bring order and stability to the country (Service; 2009, 553).

Germany is no stranger to calamity. The 20th century was especially tumultuous for the country that was first unified in the second half of the 19th century (Nonn; 2015, 208). On the



heels of the defeat in the First World War, the November Revolution rocked the country (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung; 2013). The monarchy was abolished, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated the throne (Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung; 2013). The Weimar Republic was established. The Weimar Republic itself was highly unstable, eventually paving the way for Nazism (Myerson; 2004). After the Second World War, Germany was divided for 45 years (Glass; 2012).

When it did become reunified in October 1990, it was at least partly the result of nonviolent dissent in the German Democratic Republic. With its experience of two World Wars, hyperinflation and division, modern Germany is prone to favour stability and incremental change over drastic change. Angela Merkel just won her fourth term after having been in office for nearly 12 years (Aisch; 2017).

Policy on irregular regime changes is determined by interests and capacity. Today, irregular regime changes are often discussed in the context of a debate surrounding hybrid warfare (see eg. Giles (2016); Bouchet (2016)). Hybrid Warfare is not a new term. Since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2014, the debate around it has been frenzied. Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz had famously described war as a “mere continuation of politics by other means” (von Clausewitz; 1989).

When we think about war, we tend to think about the kind of conflict what would have beset us if the Cold War had turned hot, or perhaps the Second World War. We might think of armoured groups pushing through the Fulda Gap or tank battles in the Lüneburg Heath south of Hamburg. In any case, we tend to imagine war as a confrontation of masses of people using heavy equipment like tanks, bombers and artillery.

Today, our traditional ideas about warfare are being challenged (Hoffman; 2014). There are many terms to describe the kind of conflict that we are currently engaged in: hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, political warfare, non-linear warfare, masked warfare, unrestricted warfare, unconventional warfare. The exact definition of these terms differ.

The terms themselves and their definitions are in turn also debated. What is clear is that our conceptions and doctrines of “war” are often too narrow to deal with the threats we face. Frank Hoffmann defined hybrid threats as “*any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the same time and battlespace to obtain their political objectives*” (Hoffman; 2014).

Critics have pointed out that the intellectual utility of these concepts is limited. After all, the phenomenon is not new. As Murray and Mansoor (2012) have forcefully demonstrated, wars in the past were by no means one-dimensional. Combatants have always attempted to combine political, economic and military means in order to force their opponents into submission. What

we understand as hybrid warfare goes back to the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century BC - at least (Murray and Mansoor; 2012, 3). Murray and Mansoor (2012, 3-4) recite a passage of the war:

*“During the conflict between Athens and Sparta, the Spartans recognized they needed to keep significant forces in Laconia and Messenia to prevent an uprising by the Helots, upon whose backs their agricultural and military systems rested. Athenians stratagems such as the move to build an expeditionary base at Pylos rested in part on the aim of creating the conditions for a Helot uprising, which would then add an irregular dimension to the conventional conflict. After Athenian forces fortified Pylos on the southwest coast of the Peloponnese in 425 BC, they garrisoned the outpost with Messenians of Naupactus, whose ancestors the Spartans had expelled from the area after the great Helot uprising of 464 BC. The Messenians began a series of incursions into Laconia, aided by their ability to speak the local dialect. Helots soon began to desert to Pylos, thereby creating a national emergency in Sparta. This insurgency represented a form of war for which the exceptional Spartan phalanxes were ill suited.”*

The Spartans were so worried about this that they decided to attempt to make peace (Murray and Mansoor; 2012, 4). Even conflicts which we think of as highly conventional, like the Second World War, had hybrid elements. One example is the German Eastern Front (Murray and Mansoor; 2012, 4). Fighting the might of the Soviet war machine, the Wehrmacht faced a formidable force behind the frontline. In particular, it “suffered continual disruptions to its lines of communication as a result of the activity of tens of thousands of Soviet partisans and other irregulars” (Murray and Mansoor; 2012, 4).

Many of them were left behind despite the brutal suppression of dissent by SS-Einsatzgruppen (Murray and Mansoor; 2012, 4). The impact of this was compounded by the fact that the Germany Army was unable to withdraw troops from the front to deal with this disruption because there was a regular enemy adversary to defeat (Murray and Mansoor; 2012, 4).

Hybrid Warfare is nothing new. Nevertheless, understanding the hybrid threats we are facing is an important endeavour. The threat is real. There is the continuing danger of a more conventional military conflict. But at the same time, the threat has changed. Firstly, adversarial governments are now contesting battlefield spaces which simply did not exist two decades ago. The Baltic states, for example, regularly experience cyber attacks (Jewkes and Vukmanovic; 2017). Just at the beginning of the year, Baltic energy networks were attacked (Jewkes and Vukmanovic; 2017).

Secondly, some tools have become more powerful with the advent of new technology, including the control of the information space. Propaganda has always existed. But now, states far, far away can utilise a variety of tools in order to influence foreign populations by influ-

encing social media. Russia, for example, is reportedly operating “troll factories” in which state-employed commentators attack supporters of the Russian government and attack its enemies (Hansen; 2017). These messages are subsequently amplified through the use of botnets, which automatically send messages in order to influence public debate (Hansen; 2017).

A key part of hybrid warfare is the creation of political instability abroad using a variety of tools. In the case of a Russian campaign against a Baltic state or perhaps even Poland, Russia might employ tools ranging from “conventional to irregular combat operations, sponsorship of political protests, economic coercion, and a powerful information campaign” (Cable et al.; 2015). It is this mobilisation of dissent or sponsorship of political protest that this chapter is most concerned with.

## **6.1 Russia**

Russia is the focus of much of the hybrid warfare debate. Russia has utilised a variety of hybrid means in order to accomplish its political objectives (Lanoszka; 2016). Much of these methods involve the fostering of political dissent abroad. These policies exist on a broad spectrum. They range from supporting pro-Russia organisations in the Baltics (Radin; 2017) to the use of proxy fighters in eastern Ukraine (Holcomb; 2017).

These methods can be used to either remove sitting governments or to paralyse them. In this work, I will focus on the nonviolent means of destabilisation. I will only concern myself with violent methods insofar as they are relevant to the effectiveness or suppression of the mobilisation of dissent.

### **6.1.1 Russian Narrative**

The Russian narrative surrounding irregular regime changes is vastly different from the Western view. Russia and its proxies continually accuse the West of using dissent as a weapon. The Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 is an example of this. In the West, we may see the revolution as an uprising of the decent, yearning to be free and part of Europe. In the narrative pushed by the government of Russia, the Ukrainian Revolution was a coup “incited and supported” by the United States and the European Union (Bouchet; 2016).

This narrative extends beyond Ukraine. When people have risen up against their ineffective or outright malevolent governments, Russia has been quick to point the finger at supposed involvement of the West. Part of a greater scheme, it is supposedly how Western warcraft operates after the Cold War (see eg Cordesman (2014)). This narrative is a neat way for the Russian government to link any sort of legitimate protest to a supposed puppet master in the

West. It links the Arab Spring to Coloured Revolutions to Yugoslavia and Iraq (Cordesman; 2014). It is a point of view that totally delegitimises opposition and dissent of any kind.

Protest in Russia is supposedly instigated by American politicians (Herszenhorn and Barry; 2011). Abroad, the narrative is currently at work in Syria. The forces opposing Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad are on a wide spectrum (Laub; 2017). Some of them are jihadists, but others are not. The Free Syrian Army, for example, has argued in favour of a democratic future Syria (Laub; 2017).

Russia has falsely lumped in rebel groups with jihadists (Spaulding; 2015). This helps the Russian government reinforce a narrative in which Russia fights terrorists while the West is aligned with extremists (Spaulding; 2015). Outside of the post-Soviet space, Russia uses a Westphalian model of sovereignty (Deyermond; 2016). When referring to the conflict in Syria, Russian government officials constantly refer to the importance of territorial integrity and sovereignty (Gvosdev; 2014).

Russia argues that states which have not been invited to intervene by the government of the Syrian Republic are in Syria illegally (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2017). Curiously, these arguments don't seem to apply to Russia, which is in territorial conflicts with the majority of its neighbours and occupies parts of Ukraine (Menkiszak; 2015) and Georgia (Tamkin; 2017). Moscow also maintains a military presence in Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova (Orttung and Walker; 2015). Understanding this grand Russian narrative is useful to understand Russian behaviour.

Western warfare is alleged to work something like this (Bartles; 2016): In a first step, the West creates political dissent through the use of its traditional media, NGO and social media. The situation on the ground becomes tense as the government is forced to react. In the next step, insurgents and rebels can be armed, supported or even created from scratch.

A mix of armed fighters from abroad, such as private military contractors or special forces can be inserted in order to exacerbate existing instability. The government is then faced with an impossible choice: not fighting back aggressively will lead to defeat. Fighting back aggressively, on the other hand, will give the United States an opportunity to justify involvement. This involvement might start with the imposition of sanctions, it can end with a fully blown occupation. Figure 35 provides a visual representation of the way this conflict is allegedly fought.<sup>5</sup>

This alleged strategy has surfaced as part of the “Gerasimov Doctrine”, especially after the Russian attack on Ukraine. Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov wrote an article in *Voyenno Promyshlenny Kuryer* in February 2013 (McDermott; 2016). Initially, the article

---

<sup>5</sup>This graphic is adapted from a series of graphics in Cordesman 2014




Figure 35: Irregular Regime Change as Warfare

Source: Cordesman, 2014

did not garner significant attention. All that changed when the Russian military seemed to follow a whole host of tactics he had described in the article. Much has been written about the Gerasimov Doctrine since the invasion.

Commentators suddenly had the impression that the events on the ground were following a script that had already been written, was just put into action. Much of the commentary on the “doctrine” misses the point: what Gerasimov outlined was not so much a coherent plan for the Russian military to act, it was more of a description of what he sees as the approach of the West.

### 6.1.2 Ukraine

Russia has used both violent and nonviolent ways to create dissent when it has suited their interests. Ukraine is a case in point. Ukraine is a country that is highly significant to Russia on just about any account. Ukraine and Russia share a common history that goes back more than a thousand years (Greven; 2014). Both Russia and Ukraine descend from the Kievan Rus (Greven; 2014), a federation of East Slavic tribes that lasted for hundreds of years until the mid 13th century. The eastern part of Ukraine was controlled by Imperial Russia as early as the 17th century (Conant; 2014). Peter the Great, much admired in modern Russia, once said that if the Russian Empire lost Ukraine, it would no longer be Russia (Kalb; 2014).

Hopes for a lasting independent Ukraine following the Russian revolutions were quickly squashed and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic joined the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in 1922. Ukraine became independent for the third time in its history after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Russia never quite viewed the country as independent in the same sense that it might view the independence of, say, Australia. Unlike Australia, Ukraine is seen as part of the “near-abroad” as a post-Soviet republic. Unlike Yeltsin, Putin is deeply concerned with the near-abroad (Erlanger; 2001). He sees the entire region as the Russian sphere of influence, as vitally important (Erlanger; 2001).

Politically, the domination of the near abroad is a key foreign policy objective for Russia. Although Russia likes to see itself as a major global power, it is mostly concerned with forcing its neighbouring states into accepting its will. Ukraine is a key part of its near abroad. As the biggest of the post-Soviet republics with a population of over 44 million (Central Intelligence Agency; 2017), Ukraine has continuously been the victim of Russian meddling - long before Viktor Yanukovich was forced from power through the Euromaidan uprising in 2014.

Russia has invaded Ukraine and annexed a part of it. It has used proxies in order to wreak havoc in the country. But even before that, the Russian Federation has interfered in Ukraine in a myriad of ways. Russia has interfered in elections, worked to manipulate the media and spread disinformation. Many in the West were surprised to see that Russia brazenly interfered in the US election. To Ukrainians, that’s old news.

Russian is widely spoken in the country - especially in the east of the country, in Crimea and in places like Odessa. In 2001, around 17% of the population was ethnically Russian (Central Intelligence Agency; 2017). Many people in Russia know people in Ukraine and vice-versa. At least until the crisis, a lot of the culture that people consumed, including on television, would have been watched by people on both sides of the border.

Russia and Ukraine are also bound by Christian Orthodoxy. This is especially significant because the Putin regime is increasingly attempting to project itself as the guardian of Christianity and Orthodox values (Higgins; 2016a). The Russian Orthodox Church is not just a religious actor but also an important political one. It is an important soft power tool

Beyond sentimental values, Ukraine pre-Euromaidan was a very important economic partner for the Russian Federation. In 2010, 5.7% of Russian exports went to Ukraine (Figure 38). The country is also a key transit country for Russian natural gas. Russian energy, in turn, has been a key source for Russian political leverage in Europe (Miller; 2016). Aside from numbers and facts, many Russians also attach a great deal of sentimental value to its relationship with Ukraine. This is all the more the case for Crimea.

The Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 was a geopolitical nightmare for the Russian govern-



Figure 36: Map Russian Near-Abroad

Source: Author




Figure 37: Map of Languages in Ukraine

Source: CNN, 2011




Figure 38: Russian Exports 2010

Source: Simoes and Hidalgo 2011

ment. The revolution was a clear rejection of the increasingly pro-Russian turn of Victory Yanukovich. To the Russian government, the revolution meant that it would “lose” Ukraine to the West. Losing Ukraine had economic, political and strategic implications. Stopping, or at least delaying, the expansion of NATO has been a key post Cold War objective of the Russian Federation. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has added 13 countries (O’Hanlon; 2017).

Amongst them are the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russia was increasingly apprehensive about a NATO expansion to Ukraine. That would have meant a reduced manoeuvrability in the near abroad for Russia as well as “hostile powers” at the border of Russia proper. Preventing this is one of the main aims of the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Beyond the strategic implications of losing Ukraine as a whole, there was also the possibility that the Russian-Ukrainian deal over Crimea might be in jeopardy.

Russian President Vladimir Putin says Crimea has always been an a part of Russia in the hearts and minds of the Russian people (Lee Myers and Barry; 2014). It is no coincidence that the peninsula has been host to a significant number of Russian military units. Sevastopol has been the principal base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet going back to 1783 (Flintoff; 2016).

The most important problem that the Russian regime had with the Ukrainian revolution is a different one. The Russian regime has no interest in a stable, prosperous, democratic and liberal Ukraine that is well integrated with the West. On the contrary. As Freeland (2015) said, what Putin needs “to show is that a democratic, rule-of-law Ukraine can’t work.” If it is possible for Ukraine to prosper under a democratic system closely aligned with the West, why would the Russian people continue to accept living in a poor, badly governed autocracy?



By one indictator, Russia is poorer than Romania (World Bank; 2017b). Canada has a larger economy than Russia (World Bank; 2017a), even though the population of Russia exceeds that of Canada by more than 100 million (World Bank; 2017c).

They might just decide that they won't. The Russian people and the Russian regime often have diametrically opposed interests, and in this case they do. The Russian people would profit from a well-run Ukraine. For that reason, the Putin regime has a strategic interest in Ukraine failing.

For all these reasons and more, Russia was outraged by the irregular regime change that unfolded in front of the world's eyes in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev. The Russian reaction to the uprising in Kiev was a campaign that included a variety of traditional military methods as well as political, economic and unconventional military strategies. The Russian campaign can be divided into 4 principle fields: information warfare, the organisation of dissent, irregular military means and regular military means.

Russian information warfare abroad in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has targeted two different audiences. The first is in Ukraine, where Russia has aimed to whip up dissent to the central government in Kiev amongst ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. The second is Europe and beyond. The overarching aim of Russian information warfare is not necessarily that Russian government talking lines are becoming accepted as fact. The much larger aim of this effort is to blur any meaningful distinction between the truth and all else. Current Russian information warfare is heavily influenced by earlier Soviet misinformation (Snegovaya; 2015, 13).

Within Ukraine, the aim of the Russian government was to turn as many people as possible against the central government. Russia used broadcasting tools in order to support the annexation of Crimea (Cable et al.; 2015). This was all the more effective because Ukraine had "largely ceded Russian-language information to Russian based outlets" after independence (Kofman et al.; 2017). As a result of that, Russian media completely dominated the media landscape (Cable et al.; 2015). Since most of Russian media is in no way shape or form independent, the Russian state was able to use it to further its cause (Cable et al.; 2015). Russia famously succeeded in obfuscating the deployment of troops to seize Crimea (MacFarquhar; 2016).

Russian media portrayed the uprising as very violent, which it wasn't. The Kremlin argued that the new government had come to power in a coup, that it was threatening ethnic Russians (Eitze and Gleichmann; 2014). The Kremlin's messaging got through to people in Crimea, although it was surprisingly ineffective in other regions of the country (Cable et al.; 2015). Although Russian state media held the attention of most of the Russian speaking populace in Ukraine, surveys show that Russia was unable to "persuade parts of the Eastern Ukrainian

Ukrainian population that had long been sympathetic to Russia to support the separatist cause” (Cable et al.; 2015).

Although Russia has used its state media previously, for example in the conflict with Georgia, the Russian information campaign caught Ukraine by surprise (Cable et al.; 2015). I personally experienced the power of this narrative when in Odessa. I was in the city to brush up on my Russian. My tutor, an ethnic Russian, was convinced that the “fascist junta” in Kiev was killing Russian speakers en masse because she had heard about it on TV over and over again. The ultimate aim of Russian information campaigns outside of Ukraine have been to shape perceptions of the conflict in order to compel them to remain passive while Russia intervenes in the country (Snegovaya; 2015). Snegovaya (2015, 7) outlines 5 key elements of the Russian information warfare campaign in the course of the Ukraine conflict:

- *\*Denial and deception operations to conceal or obfuscate the presence of Russian forces in Ukraine, including sending in “little green men in uniforms without insignia\**
- *Concealing Moscow’s goals and objectives in the conflict, which sows fear in some and allows others to persuade themselves that the Kremlin’s aims are limited and ultimately acceptable*
- *Retaining superficially plausible legality for Russia’s actions by denying Moscow’s involvement in the conflict, requiring the international community to recognize Russia as an interested power rather than a party to the conflict, and pointing to the supposedly-equivalent Western actions such as the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in the 1990s and the invasion of Iraq in 2003*
- *Simultaneously threatening the West with military power in the form of overflights of NATO and non-NATO countries’ airspace, threats of using Russia’s nuclear weapons, and exaggerated claims of Russia’s military prowess and success*
- *The deployment of a vast and complex global effort to shape the narrative about the Ukraine conflict through formal and social media*

Controlling the information space is key to mobilising dissent. Russia went further. In Eastern Ukraine, Russian secret services actually mobilised people in opposition to the government. They went as far as coordinating protests on the ground. In the Eastern Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, Russian special forces were deployed to act as trainers (Reisinger and Golts; 2014, 5). When the separatists were not enough in order to prevent the regular Ukrainian Army from advancing, Russia secretly sent conventional forces across the border (Reisinger and Golts; 2014, 5) to protect “ethnic Russians”.

There is overwhelming evidence for Russian military equipment and Russian forces in Eastern



Figure 39: Map of Colour Revolutions

Source: Author

Ukraine. And yet, throughout the conflict, Russia has refused to acknowledge that its troops are intervening in Eastern Ukraine. They have gone to bizarre lengths in their denial. When regular Russian soldiers were captured by the Ukrainian Army or ended up killed in action with their dog tags present, local leaders said they had decided to take their holiday fighting in Ukraine instead of at the beach (Walker, 2014).

### 6.1.3 Colour Revolutions

The Russian government was not simply concerned about the possibility of pro-Western, democratic and liberal governance in Ukraine because Ukraine matters to the Kremlin. It does. But just as importantly, they see the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 as a part of a much larger trend that has seen governments allied to Russia fall from Bishkek to Tiraspol.

Unlike Germany, the Russian government has no interest in economically prosperous, democratic and well-functioning states in its “near-abroad”. If such governance is demonstrably possible in countries like Ukraine or Belarus, the people of Russia would demand to get the same in their country. Unfortunately, these demands are diametrically opposed to the interests of the Russian regime. At the same time, many of the regimes that have fallen as a result of Coloured Revolutions, or more generally mass mobilisation, have been allies of the Kremlin.

That is unsurprising, since many allies of Russia are autocratic.

In its “near-abroad”, Russia “consistently strengthens autocrats’ coercive state capacity and destabilises democratising states in the region” (Tolstrup; 2009, 940). The Russian government has begun to see Colour Revolutions as a military threat (Bouchet; 2016). Russian Military Doctrine released in 2014 “placed emphasis on countering political subversion and regime change by foreign and domestic forces that would exploit protests” (Bouchet; 2016, 2). High ranking national security figures like President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, Minister of Defence Shoigu and Army Chief of Staff Gerasimov have all spoken about the threat of colour revolutions (Bouchet; 2016, 2-3).

Russia has reacted to the threat of Colour Revolutions both at home and abroad. As Figure 39 shows, freedom in Russia has declined dramatically over the last decade (Freedom House; 2017b, 10).

At home, the Russian regime has taken a variety of steps to reduce the likelihood of an outbreak of mass protests and to deal with them once they do occur. Russia has targeted civil society, the media and the wider political opposition to minimise the risk of mass protests. At the same time, the Russian regime has prepared its security services to be equipped to deal with the protests.

Russian civil society has been amongst the chief targets of the Russian regime in this context. Nongovernmental organisations are vital to vibrant, liberal societies. They are able to hold the government to account, channel interests and provide important expertise. In the Russian narrative, NGO are something rather different: a beachhead that allows the West to sow the seeds for an irregular regime change. The Russian government has tried hard to harass NGO and impede their efforts to change the country for the better.

Key to this effort is a law that labels NGO as “foreign agents” if they derive funding from abroad and are engaged in “political activity” (Amnesty International; 2016a, 1). Since it passed, the law has been amended and “political activity” has been codified more cleanly (Amnesty International; 2016a, 2). Amnesty International (2016a, 3) sums up the impact of the law: “The law is being implemented in such a way that almost any NGO that receives funds from abroad is likely to be placed on the register of foreign agents, irrespective of the nature of its activities.

The amount of funding and whether it was received directly as a grant from a foreign foundation or indirectly as a contribution from another NGO which has (or has had) foreign funding are irrelevant. In 2016, the Justice Ministry had listed 154 Russian organisations as “foreign agents” (Freedom House; 2017a).

NGOs face a difficult choice: to continue to accept funds from abroad and, therefore, be




Figure 40: Freedom in the World Decline

Source: Freedom House, 2017

labelled “foreign agents” or refuse foreign funding and rely exclusively on Russian sources. Domestic fundarising in Russia is “very difficult” (Amnesty International; 2016a, 3). The Russian government is unlikely to grant funding to an NGO critical of the regime. Private sources, on the other hand, are difficult to access for human rights NGO since they are “aggressively demonised” in domestic media (Amnesty International; 2016a, 3).

Lack of funding and demonisation are hitting NGO hard. In addition to such laws, NGO have become a frequent target of police raids. In one case this year, Open Russia was raided by riot police. Aside from being an attempt at intimidation, these raids also lead to the confiscation of equipment - for example IT systems.

Freedom of association and peaceful assembly are not simply restricted. The restrictions are actually increasing (Amnesty International; 2017, 305). As Freedom House (2016) reports, “the use of force, routine arrests, and harsh fines and prison sentences have discouraged un-sanctioned protests, though pro-Kremlin groups are able to demonstrate freely.”

The state of freedom of expression is no different. The government is going to absurd lengths to silence people who are in opposition to their politics. In one case, a shop assistant from Yekaterinburg was “found guilty of inciting hatred and enmity on the grounds of ethnicity” (Amnesty International; 2017, 307). Her crime: she criticised the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Russian military operation in the Donbass (Amnesty International; 2017, 307). She was sentenced to corrective labour (Amnesty International; 2017, 307). To add insult to injury, the judge ordered that “her computer must be destroyed as a crime weapon” (Amnesty International; 2017, 307). In Putin’s Russia, you can go to jail because you share an article online.

Russian media is heavily managed. There are independent journalists, but the main sources of information for Russians are controlled by the Kremlin. The most recent report on press freedom in Russia by Reporters Without Borders is damning (Reporters Without Borders; 2017):

*“...pressure on independent media has grown steadily since Validimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012. Leading independent news outlets have either been brought under control or throttled out of existence. As TV channels continue to inundate viewers with propaganda, the climate has become increasingly oppressive for those who try to maintain quality journalism...”*

This oppression extends beyond media organisations to individual journalists simply doing their work. Working in Russia is increasingly dangerous for journalists. Russia ranks 148th in the World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders - below the likes of Thailand, Venezuela and Pakistan (Reporters Without Borders; 2017). There are countless examples of

individual journalists being jailed, exiled, harrassed or killed.

At the same time, the internet is becoming increasingly restricted in Russia. According to Freedom House, internet freedom in Russia has “deteriorated steadily” over the last years (Freedom House; 2016). Social media users are being arrested for voicing opposition to Kremlin policies online (Freedom House; 2016). Authorities have “readily blocked” content opposed to the Russian annexation of Ukraine and its military engagement in eastern Ukraine (Freedom House; 2016).

Beyond official punishments that have occurred as a result of the peaceful use of the internet, internet users who are critical of the Russian government “have also faced a target campaign of physical violence and acts of intimidation, often perpetrated by unidentified assailants...”. Russian courts have gone as far as blocking websites for quoting a Crimean Tatar leader saying that Crimea should be returned to Ukraine (Freedom House; 2016).

Besides individual journalists, opposition politicians lead a dangerous life. These politicians matter because they would be able to lead mass protests and therefore pave the way for an irregular regime change. The most well known, and often harrassed and attacked, opposition politician is Alexander Navalny. Navalny is frequently arrested. Earlier this year, he was arrested after organising a rally against corruption. Aside from the public and “legal” harassment Navalny has to endure, he also suffers from attacks by “unknown assailants”. At the time of writing, he’s in jail yet again (Meyer; 2017).

This year, he was attacked twice using a green dye (BBC; 2017a). In the second case, his eye took damage (BBC; 2017a). He could have been blinded. The perpetrators were never caught. Some aren’t as lucky. Just hours after opposition politician Boris Nemtsov called on the Russian people to oppose its war in Ukraine, he was killed by shots to the head, liver, heart and stomach (Ioffe; 2015). He was killed in the immediate vicinity of the Kremlin (Ioffe; 2015).

To this day, the the murder remains mysterious. The murder of Boris Nemtsov is part of a larger number of “opponents” of the Putin regime that have died under suspicious circumstances - at home and abroad (Filipov; 2017). Some have been outright murdered. They include Anna Politkovskaya, Natalia Estemirova and Alexander Litvinenko (Filipov; 2017).

The Putin regime has also amended the structure of the security forces in order to deal with the prospect of mass protests, which could eventually lead to an irregular regime change of the country. Central to this reorganisation is the creation of the National Guard. The National Guard was established in July 2016, and Putin’s former bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov, was appointed its director (Klein; 2016). The reform places a significant number of units directly under the control of the President (Klein; 2016).

At its core, the creation of this unit serves a dual purpose (Klein; 2016). The first is obvious: the National Guard can deter or repress popular protest in the streets. Beyond that, the National Guard is a tool with which illoyal elites can be harrassed and intimidated. The existence of such a large force directly under the control of the President is also going to make it less likely that armed resistance, for example in the form of a coup, is going to occur.

The army, for example, now knows that a fight with another armed group is highly likely should they decide to remove the regime from power through force or the threat thereof. As outlined in Chapter 2, other non-democratic states such as Saudi Arabia are following a similar strategy to minimise threats to the regime (Quinlivan; 2007).

Why does all of this matter? All these restrictions and outright violations of personal integrity rights are a way for the Russian government to reduce the risk of an irregular regime change at home. The Russian government has narrowed the space for political opposition of any kind. They have raised the cost of opposing the regime through a mixture of these restrictions of civil liberties and repression. At the same time, the reorganisation of the security forces has prepared the regime for the day that mass protests will arrive. As early as 2015, Russian Defence Minister Shoigu ordered research into the best ways to prevent a mass upheaval at home (Tetrault-Faber; 2015).

Abroad, Russia has used a variety of ways in order to reduce the likelihood of colour revolutions. It has done so in three principal ways. Firstly, it provides assistance to autocratic regimes and thereby strengthens them. Secondly, Russia destabilises democratising regimes in order to make democratic modes of governance less attractive. Lastly, Russia has prepared for, and is willing to use, military means in order suppress colour revolutions when they do occur at home or abroad.

First and foremost, Russia is providing military, political and economic support to autocratic states in its near abroad - partly to insulate them from the threat of irregular regime changes. Russian military support for these regimes comes in a variety of ways: arms transfers, training and the stationing of Russian troops. As Table 25 shows, Russia often makes up a significant proportion of arms imports in its near-abroad.<sup>6</sup> Russia also provides critical political cover and economic help for autocratic allies in its near abroad.

Table 25: Arms Imports from Russia (SIPRI; 2017)

Country	Imports Russia	Imports Total	Import % Russia
Estonia	0	81	0%
Latvia	0	100	0%

<sup>6</sup>Values based on SIPRI Importer/Exporter TIV Tables. Authors calculations. IV in millions. Figures are rounded up or down.



Country	Imports Russia	Imports Total	Import % Russia
Lithuania	0	126	0%
Kazakhstan	841	1100	76%
Kyrgyzstan	13	13	100%
Tajikistan	8	11	73%
Turkmenistan	334	1113	30%
Uzbekistan	0	158	0%
Belarus	550	571	96%
Ukraine	0	19	0%
Armenia	142	152	93%
Azerbaijan	1916	2645	72%
Georgia	0	24	0%

Amongst other regimes, the Russian government is helping to insulate the last dictator of Europe, Belarusian President Lukashenko, from the threat of his own people. While the European Union has had an arms embargo on Belarus since summer of 2011, Russia continues to send arms to Lukashenko. Between 2010 and 2016, more than 96% of the arms imports of Belarus came from Russia (SIPRI; 2017). But Russian help for the prevention of an irregular regime change in Belarus goes way beyond arms transfers.

The Russian military has trained for the event of a “Maidan scenario” with forces from both Belarus and Serbia (Bouchet; 2016, 3). The exercises, which were held near Novorossiysk in the Southern Military District of Russia had the express purpose of preparing for an attempt irregular regime change in the participating countries (McDermott; 2015). The exercise, aptly named “Slavic Brotherhood” took place as recently as 2015 (McDermott; 2015). Belarus sent two companies of special forces (McDermott; 2015).

The aim was clear: to prepare the military of Belarus for mass protests. Coercive state capacity matters both before and during an attempted irregular regime change. By supporting the coercive state capacity of the Lukashenko regime, Russia is making it less likely that the regime will collapse.

Even though the relationship is never without trouble, Belarus is Russia’s closest international ally. Belarus is isolated. Frequently referred to as the last dictatorship in Europe, the country is heavily reliant on the Russian Federation for political support, especially when dealing with the European Union.

Given its political system, the economy of Belarus is almost always in a difficult situation. The economy of Belarus is heavily supported by Russia, most notably in the form of heavily

subsidised oil and gas. Russia supplies 100% of Belarus' natural gas imports and 90% of the oil consumed in the country (Kardaś and Kłysiński; 2017). The country is completely dependent on Russia for its energy. Subsidised energy imports from Russia are key to social stability in the country (Kardaś and Kłysiński; 2017).

Lastly, Russia is prepared to use its military in order to suppress colour revolutions abroad once they do occur. If dissent to autocratic governments abroad is a military threat, it demands a military response (Bouchet; 2016). The Russian government has used its rhetoric about colour revolutions as a way to justify military and non-military interventions abroad (Bouchet; 2016). This is somewhat ironic.

Russian insistence on non-interference abroad makes it possible for Russia to intervene abroad. In this narrative, any mass protest against an autocratic government is instigated from abroad, by the West. When Russia intervenes in support of that autocratic government, it does so to uphold the principle of non-intervention - by intervening. As the cases of Ukraine and Syria demonstrate, the threat of a Russian intervention abroad in this context is very real. There are multiple ways in which Russia might justify such an intervention in the face of mass protests (Bouchet; 2016).

The first is the justification outlined above. Intervention in order to defend the principle of non-intervention. In this scenario, Russia would most likely seek to receive an official invitation by the foreign government in question, as has occurred in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic under Assad. As Bouchet (2016) rightly points out, many countries will be reluctant to extend such an invitation to Russia unless they are "on the brink" because they are not keen on a large Russian security presence in their country.

Alternatively, Russia could also legitimise an intervention abroad to quell mass dissent through membership in international organisations like the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) or even the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Bouchet; 2016, 3).

It could also simply use the protection of ethnic Russians, or even simply Russian speakers, as a pre-text for invading its neighbouring countries when their governments are under pressure from mass protests. This is especially chilling in the context of the "Slavic Brotherhood" exercise referred to in cooperation with Belarus and Serbia (McDermott; 2015).

While Russia provides assistance to autocratic states like Belarus, Azerbaijan oder Uzbekistan in its near abroad, it destabilises countries on its path to democracy when they do attempt to change for the better. When we think of a Russian intervention abroad as the result of mass dissent we immediately think of Ukraine. The case of Ukraine is different than the cases outlined above. In Ukraine, Russia did not intervene in order to quell dissent - at least not within the country. Nevertheless, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its prolonged quest to



Figure 41: Collective Security Treaty Organisation

Source: Author

destabilise the new Ukrainian government serve as a warning to other states in the Russian near abroad.

Georgia is in many ways a similar case. Georgia has a long history of conflict with the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Under control from Moscow for decades, Georgia declared independence in 1991 (Clines; 1991). Independent Georgia, ruled by ex-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze wasn't always an easy ally, but it was a country Russia could deal with. Gradually, tensions rose. In November 2003, everything changed.

After tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets, Georgian President Shevardnadze was forced to resign after protestors had stormed the Parliament with Roses in hand (BBC; 2005). The Rose Revolution ultimately led to the ascend of Mikheil Saakashvili (BBC; 2005), a young reformer. From there on out, Russia has waged a relentless campaign in order to destabilise the country. This campaign includes the continued control of parts of the country by Russia (Higgins; 2016b), intense propaganda and widespread infiltration of key institutions.

One hundred years after Lenin ordered the seizure of key institutions in Petrograd, Putin's Russia is deeply skeptical of irregular regime changes that involve mass protests. This is not simply the case because popular protests are often a threat to autocratic allies the Putin regime. Most importantly, they are ultimately a grave threat to the regime itself. For that

reason, Russian reactions to irregular regime changes tend to be predictable. The German reaction to such events is somewhat more complex and nuanced.

## **6.2 Germany**

### **6.2.1 Ukraine**

The German reaction to the irregular regime change in 2014 in Ukraine differed markedly from the Russian one. Russia has argued that the Ukrainian Revolution 2014 was a coup (Eitze and Gleichmann; 2014). The German reaction has been much more positive. In a document given to key stakeholders by the Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office), the German government outlines the following view (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015): The Ukrainian revolution did not happen because of Western interference in the country, but because of the behaviour of the Ukrainian government under Yanukovych.

According to the German Foreign Office, protests in autumn 2013 started as a result of “surprising decision” of the Ukrainian government not to sign the EU Association Agreement (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015, 1). These widespread protests eventually turned into “mass protests” which had much broader demands such as the fight against corruption (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015, 1). With up to 2 million protesting across Ukraine, the German government concedes that extremists were involved (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015, 1).

Contrary to the Russian narrative, however, they were not part of the government that replaced the Yanukovych regime (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015, 1). The new government in Ukraine was far from fascist. At the Presidential elections held at the end of March 2014, the candidate of the “Right Sector”, Jarosch, received just 0,7% of the vote (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015, 1).

Since the German government holds a very different perspective on what transpired on the ground, it’s unsurprising that they also reacted differently to the uprising. From the very beginning of the protests, “Western politicians sought a peaceful solution” to the crisis (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015, 1). When the uprising was in full swing in late February 2014, the German government called on all sides to “distance themselves from violence and make the ceasefire a reality” with the brunt of the responsibility being on the “leadership of the state” (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung; 2014a). As the protest grew and grew, the German government worked to bring about a peaceful transfer of power. It ultimately failed.

Ultimately, much of German Ukraine policy in recent years hasn’t been a reaction to the irregular regime change in Kyiv, but a reaction to the way in which Moscow acted when they saw that their uneasy ally had been removed from power. Germany has been broadly supportive of the new Kyiv government - both economically and politically. Germany initially “struggled to

find a policy” in reaction to the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea (Härtel; 2014, 3). Eventually Germany came out strongly against the annexation of Crimea as well as Russian engagement in Eastern Ukraine.

Merkel called the annexation of Crimea a violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and illegal (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung; 2014b). The German government heavily criticised the referendum that was held (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung; 2014b). It does not accept the result (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung; 2014b).

Political support for Ukraine by Germany can be divided into three fields. Firstly, as demonstrated above, Germany has vocally supported a whole range of positions taken by the Ukrainian government. Amongst others, Germany has voiced the opinion that Russia is responsible for the escalation in Ukraine, that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is illegal. Germany has contradicted Russian talking points on its involvement in Eastern Ukraine and thereby amplified the voice of Ukraine internationally.

Secondly, Germany has been a vocal supporter of sanctions against Russia, thereby increasing the costs to Russia for their behaviour. The annexation of Crimea by Russia marked a turning point in international relations that even made some traditional allies of Russia in Germany lose faith in the Putin regime. Once the German government decided that something must be done in order to react, sanctions became a natural step.

Germany is loathe to consider military options in just about any international dispute, let alone in a dispute with Russia. Ukraine is not a NATO member and Germany is not legally obliged to support Ukraine. In the West, a military response to the crisis was “quickly discarded due to the underlying risks of a military escalation between the West and Russia (Galbert; n.d.). With the military option off the table, sanctions were an obvious way to impose costs on Russia for its disruptive behaviour.

In line with the thinking of then President Barack Obama, Merkel was determined to use Western financial might against Russian military muscle (Pond and Kundnani; 2015). Merkel was able to convince the traditionally pro-Russian German business lobby that short-term profit is not as important as European security and long term stability (Pond and Kundnani; 2015). Once Germany had decided that Russia’s actions were unacceptable, Merkel attempted to convince her European counterparts to take action (Pond and Kundnani; 2015). Few doubt that she was the key to European sanctions against Russia.

The German response can be summarised into two fields: political cover in the form of continued negotiations and the support for sanctions to back up diplomacy. The German foreign policy machine, including both Germany’s Foreign Minister and Chancellor, consistently at-

tempted to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. This effort began as the uprising was playing out and it continues to this day. The cornerstone of German diplomatic initiatives is the Minsk process.

The first Minsk Agreement was hastily concluded in September 2014 (The Economist; 2016) in order to halt the fighting between Ukrainian forces and Russia backed separatists. The agreement broke down quickly and the fighting continued. To stop the bloodshed, Minsk II was negotiated and signed in February 2015 (The Economist; 2016). The agreements include a variety of military and political measures that are meant to de-escalate the conflict.

Germany took a key part in facilitating the Minsk Agreements. The process is far from perfect. People continue dying in Eastern Ukraine. The ceasefire doesn't hold. At the same time, it is sensible to assume that the Minsk Process has contributed to a de-escalation of the conflict. At one point in time, it looked as if Russia and its proxies would push further into Ukraine. At one point, Putin himself told a European official that he could take the Ukrainian capital Kiev in two weeks if he wanted to (Roth; 2014).

For better or worse, the Minsk Process appears to have contributed to the status quo on the ground. It might not have made things significantly better on the ground, but it prevented the conflict from totally spiralling out of control. That has got to be worth something.

At the same time, Germany has pushed for sanctions. The first round of sanctions by the European Union came into force on the 17th of March 2014, a day after the Crimea referendum (Vasovic and Croft; 2014). Since then, the European Union has used diplomatic measures, asset freezes, travel bans and economic sanctions in order to increase costs to Russia.

Crozet and Hinz (2016, 8) summarises the sanctions as follows: "The first and second wave of EU sanctions consisted of travel bans and asset freezes on several officials and institutions from Russia and Ukraine. In a third wave, trade sanctions were imposed and" existing financial restrictions further expanded."

As of May 2017, 150 persons are subject to a visa bans by the European Union and 37 entities are subject to an asset freeze (European Union; 2017). These are "...persons and entities responsible for action against Ukraine's territorial integrity, persons providing support to or benefitting Russian decision-makers..." as well as entities directly linked to Crimea. The list of persons subjected to visa bans is a who-is-who of persons responsible for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the separatists in Donbass. Amongst them, for example, are high-ranking members of the Duma, military commanders, separatists, members of the Russian government and former members of the Ukrainian government (Council of the European Union; 2017).

Most visible amongst the diplomatic measures taken against Russia, the country has been excluded from G8 meetings beginning in June 2014, when a planned G8 summit in Sochi,

Russia, was held as a G7 summit in Brussels (Borger and Watt; 2014). In addition to the change from G8 to G7, a whole range of EU-Russia negotiations have been put on ice.

Most importantly, the EU has imposed economic sanctions on Russia. In EU-speak, these are referred to as “measures targeting sectoral cooperation and exchanges with Russia”. At its core, these sanctions make it more difficult for key Russian entities in banking, energy and defence to do business - specifically by restricting their access to financing. In addition, the European Union has also targeted Russia through an embargo on various military goods and made the provision of services to the Russian energy industry more complicated.

Over time, the sanctions have become more comprehensive. The sanctions are currently in place until September 2017 - at which point they will have to be extended or they will run out. By just about any account, Germany has been a key player in establishing and maintaining the sanctions regime against Russia. And Russia has paid dearly as a result of them.

Crimea is still occupied by Russia, Russia is still engaged in creating mayhem in Eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the international sanctions had an impact on the country. Russian Prime Minister and ex-President Medvedev admitted as much in an interview in December 2014 when he said that “our economy, probably, has lost tens of billions of dollars” as a result of Western sanctions (Golubkova and Baczynska; 2014). Russia was not a rich country before the sanctions, and it certainly isn't now.

The German commitment to sanctions has at times led to bizarre developments. After Donald Trump was elected President of the United States of America, it was the German government which appealed to the new administration to keep sanctions on Russia in place. This is highly unusual, given that American politicians are usually more inclined to take a tough line on Russia than Germany, long suspected of going out of its way to be friendly to Russia.

Overall, the political cover provided by Germany is a key part of the support that allowed Ukraine to freeze the status quo. Without it, it's likely that the already dire situation facing Ukraine would be much worse still.

The strong German opposition to Russia's behaviour was by no means a given. To understand why, it's useful to take a look at Germany's Soviet, and later Russia, policy over the last decades. The relationship between Germany and Russia has “always been a special one due to the strategic significance of Moscow for Berlin, the strong economic ties between both countries and the difficult common history of two major wars” (Härtel; 2014, 1). When Germany looks to the post-Soviet space, it tends to see Russia first (Härtel; 2014).

*Ostpolitik*, introduced under Chancellor Willy Brandt (Härtel; 2014, 1) continues to reverberate in Germany to this day. Although *Westbindung* continues to guide German foreign policy, the country has been something of an intermediary between the West and the

Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. While these fundamentals of German foreign policy have held for decades, individual governments in Berlin do matter.

Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) was incredibly close to Vladimir Putin, infamously calling him a “flawless democrat” (Iuprenreiner Demokrat) (Härtel; 2014, 3). While he was Chancellor, he sought to improve relations with Russia. Importantly, it was under his rule that Nord Stream was built to the chagrin of Germany’s immediate neighbours to the East, the Baltics and Poland.

Angela Merkel became Chancellor of Germany in 2005. Growing up in the German Democratic Republic, she had a vastly different experience of the Soviet Union than any of her predecessors. At first, however, “she seemed to continue the approach taken by Schröder. Although she did not get along with Putin as well as Schröder, and was more cautious in her approach to Russia than he was, she pressed ahead with Nord Stream, opposed extending NATO membership to Ukraine or Georgia, and pursued a partnership for modernisation with Russia (Kundnani; 2016).

Another important element is party politics. As Figure 41 shows, Merkel’s “Union” of CDU/CSU was governing with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the time of the Ukrainian Revolution. This matters because German politicians are often divided on their Russia policy along the political spectrum. The Conservative approach, as embodied by the CDU, is traditionally more confrontational with regards to Moscow. It emphasizes strength in relations with Moscow as well as an emphasis on “...human rights and necessary democratic changes alongside a strong partnership” (Härtel; 2014, 2). The Social-Democratic approach, on the other hand, is based on the idea that Russia’s behaviour can be modified successfully in the long-term by integrating it more closely through economic and political ties.

Even as the Ukrainian Revolution was underway in January 2014, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier (SPD) embodied this position by saying that “we need Russia for the solution of practically all security-related crises and conflicts of our time (Schmiese; 2014). If Russia had refrained from actually annexing Crimea, they might have gotten away with a relatively weak German response. But they did annex Crimea (Fischer; 2015). The annexation made it incredibly difficult for Western politicians to defend the Russian course.

In addition to the political cover Germany has provided to the new Ukrainian government, Germany has also assisted the country economically. Between 2013 and 2015, aid disbursements by Germany to Ukraine have increased more than six-fold from \$60 million to more than \$ 372 million per year (OECD; 2017a). As Figure 43 shows, Germany was by far the biggest individual donor to post-revolution Ukraine - by far succeeding the funds supplied by combined institutions of the European Union, for example. That’s extraordinarily high spending. To put it into context, it was the 8th highest aid disbursement to any country in that year






Figure 42: German Federal Elections and Governments

Source: Wikimedia 2013




Figure 43: International ODA to Ukraine 2015

Source: OECD, 2017




Figure 44: International ODA by Germany 2015

Source: OECD, 2017

by Germany (Figure 44).

As of now, Germany has maintained its determination to hold firm over Ukraine. Whether that will continue to be the case is largely a matter of electoral politics. The key to the German response to the sanctions have been economic sanctions. As outlined above, these sanctions have not led to the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but they have led to the imposition of costs to Russia for its behaviour. The sanctions have been called into question within Germany and across the European Union. Within Germany, the sanctions have been criticised from both left and right - even in mainstream, and governing parties. As Vice-Chancellor and head of the SPD, Sigmar Gabriel has called for an end to sanctions against Russia as early as autumn of 2015 (Zeit; 2015). Horst Seehofer, head of the CSU, has repeatedly called for economic sanctions against Russia to end (Zeit; 2017). He also wants to welcome Russia back into the G7 (Zeit; 2017).

All of this shows that Russia and Germany have a vastly different view of the irregular regime change that occurred in Ukraine in early 2014. Accordingly, they also reacted to it differently. From then on out, much of the German reaction has really been a reaction to the policies of escalation that Moscow has pursued in Ukraine.

### 6.2.2 Colour Revolutions

### 6.2.3 Threat to Germany

In recent years, Germany has become acutely aware of Russian attempts to incite protests and political instability abroad. Germany itself has become a victim. It was clear that Germany was not immune, but nevertheless Russian destabilisation campaigns surprised many.

As a strong proponent of sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine crisis, the German government under Merkel is a “core target of Russian disinformation” (Meister; 2016). Russia has attempted to shape German popular opinion through a variety of channels - for example through “media” organisations like Russia Today. The case of Lisa is but one example of many. Meister (2016) outlines why the case was different nevertheless. In January 2016, a 13 year old Russian-German girl went missing for more than 24 hours (Meister; 2016). First Russian TV reported that she had been raped by migrants (Meister; 2016).

The story was fake (Meister; 2016), but it serves to illustrate how the Russia government seeks to create instability in Germany. The fake story was carried by Russian news channels and disseminated through social media by right-wing groups. Demonstrations by the German-Russian minority were subsequently organised through Facebook. Once the demonstrations happened, Russian foreign media reported on the demonstrations. After that, the demonstrations got picked up German media. The effect of this bogus story was subsequently amplified because the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergej Lavrov made two public statements concerning the case in which he voiced concern that the German police and legal system would be unable to solve such cases because of “political correctness” (Meister; 2015).

It’s worth remembering that this occurred at the height of the refugee crisis that created a highly charged atmosphere in otherwise highly stable Germany. Although this targeted information campaign evidently did not have the aim of overthrowing the Merkel administration, it added another layer of tension in an already charged atmosphere. Perhaps more importantly, the Lisa case demonstrated that the destabilisation campaigns of the Russian government don’t stop at the German border.

When federal elections were coming up in Germany, there was a fear that such campaigns may also extend beyond Russian media companies to cyber attacks. The Bundestag, the federal parliament of Germany, was hacked in 2015 (Beuth et al.; 2017). German security services have identified a group affiliated with Russia as the culprit of these attacks (Beuth et al.; 2017). What began with a harmless email was serious enough for officials to discuss counter-attacks and launch an investigation on the suspicion of espionage (Beuth et al.; 2017). In connection with the incident, Merkel herself spoke about hybrid warfare.

Given the widely known attack on the heart of German democracy and a range of other less visible attacks on the country, Germany is rightly worried that Russia may use its offensive cyber capabilities to stir dissent and create instability. There is precedent. Most obviously, there is strong evidence that Moscow has interfered both in the French (Borger; 2017b) and American Presidential elections (Sanger and Shane; 2016). In the end, it is unlikely that Russian influenced played a major role in the outcome of the election.

## 7 Policy Recommendations for Germany

*While we should never give up our principles, we must also realise that we cannot maintain our principles unless we survive.* - Henry Kissinger<sup>7</sup>

Attempts at irregular regime change are not just symptoms of political instability. They can amplify it. When a coup attempt occurred in Turkey in July 2016, it was followed by a massive purge. The peaceful uprising that shook Syria in 2011 ultimately led to the Syrian Civil War that continues to this day.

In this chapter, I'm going to outline how Germany should deal with irregular regime change and popular mobilisation. Germany is a middle power with outsized influence in Europe. The country is the fourth largest economy in the world. Despite having the 8th highest military expenditure in the world (Tian et al.; 2017), Germany's military power is limited. Aside from capability, Germany is often unwilling to use its military. The Federal Republic is an integral part of the West, the European Union and NATO. German foreign policy tends to prize multilateralism.

Irregular regime changes and popular mobilisation present Germany with a range of challenges but also some opportunities. They impact German interests, they touch upon the values Germany seeks to uphold in the world. For that reason, policy makers and foreign policy elites must concern themselves with the best possible way of dealing with them. Is it in the interest of Germany that coups and uprisings are occurring? Does Germany have the capability to prevent them from happening?

In the first part of this chapter, I'm going to outline how Germany should best deal with coups d'état around the world. In a second part, I analyse the opportunities and risks associated with the weaponisation of dissent - both at home and abroad. Modern warfare doesn't necessarily involve shooting. Countries can attack others and defend themselves by generating and weaponising civilian dissent. In the last part of the chapter, I'm going to analyse arguments in favour of, and against, Golden Parachutes.

### 7.1 Coups

It's important to differentiate between individual coups and coup attempts and the more general use of force, or the threat thereof, to remove sitting leaders. Generally speaking, coups are not in the interest of Germany. Coups, by their very definition, circumvent the established order of a given country (Goemans et al.; 2009). As established in Chapter 4, they are not simply a symptom of political instability - they can also amplify political instability at home

<sup>7</sup>Kissinger, H. (1956). Reflections on American History, *Foreign Affairs* 35(1): 37-56

and abroad. Negative externalities that can result from coups d'état are aplenty: irregular immigration, civil wars, economic recession.

More often than not, stability in international relations is preferable to instability - even if the current state of stability is less than ideal. Germany should strive to deter coup plotters around the world from attempting to overthrow their government.

One way of doing so is by making it harder for coup governments to succeed. One policy that could potentially deter coups is an automatic suspension of development or military aid following a military coup. Coup plotters are said to be rational. They attempt to gauge whether their coup attempt would be successful. They are also interested in the benefits that they would derive from actually being in government after the coup. A great deal of countries prone to coups, such as Madagascar, are heavily dependent on development aid from the West (Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016), including the European Union and Germany.

If coup plotters knew in advance that their projected revenues would be lower if they putsched their way to power, they might be deterred from trying to do so. And even if a band of military officers gets together and plans to stage a coup, they would be less likely to convince others to join their efforts. This, in turn, would make it less likely that a coup attempt would actually be successful. The argument is therefore that the automatic suspension of aid post-coup would serve as a deterrent to coup plotters and thus make coups less likely. To pose a credible threat, the suspension of aid must be automatic, as opposed to discretionary. If the suspension is not automatic, coup plotters are more likely to believe that they will be able to circumvent it. This, in turn, makes the threat less credible. To act as an effective deterrent, the threat must be as credible as possible. This is an application of the rules and discretion debate that has been discussed extensively in economics (see e.g. (King; 1997; Alesina and Tabellini; 1987; Fischer; 1990).

The argument is not without merit. Nevertheless, it is not in the national interest to have a law that leads to the automatic suspension of aid in the event of a coup. Firstly, the entire proposal assumes that it would have an influence on prospective coup plotters. That requires that they would know and that they would care. Neither is assured. Such a law, if applied, would impose costs. But coup plotters may simply decide that the cost is not prohibitive. According to Powell (2012), “plotters must believe that the anticipated benefits of a coup are high”. It's logical to assume that (future) aid flows are relevant to this calculation, but they are far from the only factor that influences the decision to attempt a coup or not (Powell; 2012).

Importantly, it's not even clear that the coup plotters would even know of the existence of a such a law in the event that it were to be introduced. Secondly, we should be skeptical of any binary rules in the realm of international relations. Binariness is ill suited to complex problems, some of the most important of which can be found in foreign policy. The pieces, of which

there are many, are constantly moving.

In practise, any fixed law we have will be ignored when the stakes are high. For evidence of this effect, it's enough how these laws play out in practise. Consider the legal situation in the United States of America. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifies that the United States is obliged to cut aid to any country 'whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree' (Fisher; 2013a). Although the law is clear, the policy is not. In practise, aid is sometimes cut following a coup, but it is often also continued. The case of the 2013 Egyptian coups d'état is instructive. When al-Sisi came to power in Egypt, he came to power through a coup. Nobody seriously disputes this. The Obama administration never labelled the coup a coup (Ackerman; 2015).

Although the Obama administration did have an interest in denouncing this coup to deter future coups, it had a larger interest in maintaining aid to the Egyptian state, much of which goes to the military. Support for Egypt has been a cornerstone of US Middle East policy for decades since it was brokered as part of the Camp David accords in 1979. Maintaining peace between Israel and Egypt was more important than making an example of the Egyptian military. Egypt is also a key player in the fight against terrorism - a major priority in United States foreign & security policy in the region. Beyond this, it's unclear how much of an influence the United States has over Egypt (Hamid and Mandaville; 2013). According to conventional wisdom, it's minimal (Hamid and Mandaville; 2013). In the end, military aid was frozen for two years. Two years after the overthrow of the country's first elected President, the White House announced that military aid was to continue (Ackerman; 2015).

When the law does work, as it did in the case of the Mali military coup of 2012, it is usually because there are no superceding interests in play. When Mali, a country of limited strategic importance, experienced a coup, the Obama administration 'immediately froze about half of US aid to the country' (Fisher; 2013b).

In cases more comparable, where real interests were at stake, the law was circumvented. America never aids coup governments, except usually (The Economist; 2013). After the military coup in Pakistan in 1999 that brought General Pervez Musharraf into power, the law was triggered under the Clinton administration (Fisher; 2013b). Bill Clinton worked to lessen the impact of the law, but full aid was not reinstated until George W. Bush sought do so via Congress (Fisher; 2013b). The reason for it was relatively simple: the priorities of the United States had changed and Pakistan was seen as a crucial ally in the "War on Terror" that followed the 9/11 attacks (Fisher; 2013b).

Is having a law and ignoring it when it preferable to not having a law at all? Surely not. When a law exists and is not applied, it is not being taken seriously. In the best case, that single law may then become meaningless. In the worst, and more probable case, other international

actors will come to view any sort of “red line” with doubt. That, on the other hand, is a huge price to pay for a law that is well-meaning but of limited utility in this case.

In this case, what is true for the foreign policy of the United States also applies to Germany. Generally speaking, Germany should attempt to deter coups by making it harder for coup governments to succeed. Nevertheless, sometimes the German interest in preventing the occurrence of coups d'état is superceded by other, more important interests. Using force or the threat thereof is just a method to change a government. Many of the resulting governments do not act in our interest - some do. Most are somewhere inbetween.

In those cases, the German government can decide not to “punish” the coup government or potentially even to support it more than it supported the previous government. In many cases, the lure of the temporary stability of a coup government might simply be preferable to further instability.

Beyond the lack of effectiveness of laws of to deter coups, we should also ask ourselves whether a suspension of aid is warranted as a result of coups in all cases. Coups do not tend to take place in countries that are rich. Quite the contrary. Madagascar is a case in point. At the time of a military takeover in Madagascar in 2009, Madagascar was the 7th poorest country in the world (World Bank; 2017d). The impact was truly devastating (Dewar et al.; 2013, 7): *“The United States, the EU, Japan, the World Bank and the African Development Bank withdrew support (except humanitarian aid), which had previously accounted for about 75% of government spending. The United Kingdom cancelled debt relief and British aid to Madagascar fell from £15 million in 2007 to £2.5 million in 2010.”*

Do we really want to cut aid to countries that are desperately poor, highly reliant on foreign assistance and politically highly instable? In some cases we may choose to do so after having carefully considered the specifics of the case. In others we may come to the conclusion that doing so would not be in our best interest. Either way, we ought to have the choice.

For this reason, there should be no automatic suspension of aid in the event of an irregular regime change. The potentially positive effect of an automatic aid suspension, its deterrence value, is overshadowed by the negative impact such a rigid rule would have. In international relations, reducing room for manoeuvre is rarely a good thing. In the case of coups, it means that important questions of national interest and morality cannot be considered.

## **7.2 Weaponising Dissent**

Should Germany ever weaponise dissent in order to overthrow adversarial governments? I define the weaponisation of dissent as the creation and support of nonviolent political protests



with the aim of destabilising or even changing a regime. This part of my research deals with the practical implications of the things we know about nonviolent uprisings for German foreign & security policy. Should we ever actively create and direct dissent in order to advance our interests?

The short answer is no - which is not to say that there aren't good arguments in favour of doing so. One positive aspect of the hype around hybrid warfare has been the illustration of the power of non-kinetic methods to achieve political aims. The literature on uprisings links to this: nonviolent dissent can work and it often leads to desirable results (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). Provided that we judge it to be in our interest to do so, surely it would be more effective and less costly to remove an adversarial government by supporting dissidents than by using our military.

As the last two decades have shown, regime change through force is expensive, deadly and highly controversial. The removal of Saddam Hussein is perhaps the best example. The war that began in the spring of 2003 lasted well over 8 years. According to one study, the Iraq War cost the United States more than 2 trillion dollars (Trotta; 2013). The same study put the number of civilian deaths as a result of the war at 134 000 (Trotta; 2013). Some other studies have far exceeded that estimate. More than 4 000 US soldiers died in Iraq (Crawford; 2013). The Iraq War destabilised the country. American soldiers are still fighting and dying in Iraq (Cooper; 2017) 14 years after President Bush gave a speech in front of a "Mission Accomplished" aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (Wright; 2017).

The weaponisation of dissent can provide an alternative to brute force. Uprisings are also particularly effective in authoritarian countries (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011) - the kind of country that we usually find ourselves in conflict with. This also implies that there is a moral argument to be made in favour of weaponising dissent. If we can remove a sitting government peacefully by helping dissidents abroad, we could actually be doing the people of that country a favour.

Maybe we would, maybe we wouldn't. We don't know. Predicting political events is difficult in mature democracies. It's nearly impossible to predict them in situations as fluid and dynamic as during an uprising in a faraway country. We tend to overestimate the degree to which we understand what is happening in other countries. Any involvement can and will have unforeseen consequences. George W. Bush's Secretary of Defense famously said the following (Graham; 2014):

*"As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns — the ones we don't know we don't know."*

When countries aim to destabilise others it will inevitably lead to unforeseen consequences. They are likely to be violent in a situation that is difficult to control for both protestors and the government. Perhaps most importantly, the weaponisation of dissent, even if done once, could set back Western democratisation efforts by decades. Western non-governmental organisations are already under duress in many authoritarian states - if they are not banned outright. In Russia, for example, major German foundations like the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation were declared foreign agents and harassed (Fuchs; 2013). The same foundation was forced to leave Egypt (Gorzweski; 2016). Autocracies attempt to justify this by portraying non-governmental organisations as agents of foreign influence.

In practice, the weaponisation of dissent would likely involve non-governmental organisations. If Germany were to use those organisations to incite people to overthrow a regime, governments all over the world would make it harder for Western foundations and NGO to operate abroad. In the greater scheme of things, Germany has a greater interest in the functioning of independent NGO than in the overthrow of a single regime - even if it is evil, mistreating its own people or opposing our interests. Human rights defenders, Western political foundations and aid agencies are key to keeping the Western liberal order alive. Germany, in turn, profits vastly from this order that prizes rules above raw power.

Arguments in favour of the weaponisation of dissent also rely on two key assumptions: that Germany could employ those methods and that those methods have a decent chance of success. Neither is assured. Even if Germany wanted to mobilise dissent abroad, it might not be able to do so. A mature, liberal democracy like Germany faces very real legal and practical restraints. Autocracies might be able to report their media as directed. The German government cannot. The press, for example, cannot simply be directed to report a certain way. Moreover, it's not clear that an attempt at destabilisation abroad would succeed. Authoritarians are not static. They are dynamic players that can respond to the actions of other players, including foreign governments. They might, for example, simply smear all protestors as foreign agitators. For these very reasons, Germany generally shouldn't attempt to weaponise dissent abroad.

There are two exceptions. The first is the weaponisation of dissent employed defensively. We think of dissent as an offensive weapon used to bring about radical change. But the same methods used in an uprising to change a regime can also be used defensively in the case of an invasion or a subsequent occupation. We tend to think of opposition to an invading force as armed. It doesn't have to be. One way of deterring and defeating aggression from abroad is nonviolent dissent (Sharp; 1985).

As outlined in the previous chapter, the Russian government has used both violent and non-violent strategies in order to advance its goals - often in combination. Popular dissent can be a valuable part in a strategy that deals with both. King-Hall (1959) once wrote: "In war the

will to win is the first essential”. That is all the more true for nonviolent resistance, in which mass mobilisation is a key ingredient for success (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). Armies are trained to deal with enemies violently, usually because the enemy is also using violence. Having to deal with mass nonviolent dissent imposes costs and burdens on occupying regimes (Holst; 1990). There are many examples of effective nonviolent dissent, including in Nazi-occupied countries like Norway, the Netherlands or Denmark (Sharp; 1985).

In World War II, Danes “launched a campaign of total non-cooperation with the Nazi occupiers” (Bartkowski; 2015). Denmark had very little chance of fighting the powerful Nazi war-machine. Instead, they made it more difficult for Germany to exploit the country in aid of its war effort through strikes, boycotts and work slowdowns. The campaign was based on ten very concrete policies:

- “1. *You must not go to work in Germany and Norway*
2. *You shall do a bad job for the Germans*
3. *You shall work slowly for the Germans*
4. *You shall destroy important machines and tools (that are used by the Germans)*
5. *You shall destroy everything which may be of benefit to the Germans*
6. *You shall delay all transport (used by Germans)*
7. *You shall boycott German and Italian films and papers*
8. *You must not shop at Nazis’ stores.*
9. *You shall treat traitors for what they are worth*
10. *You shall protect anyone chased by the Germans”*

The Danes saved thousands of people, including 8000 Danish Jews (Bartkowski; 2015). Given that the Nazis responded with crackdowns, it makes sense to assume that the Danish dissent had an impact on the occupying force. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops in 1968 provides another example of the power of mass civilian dissent. The Soviet army originally planned to establish “unchallenged Soviet military and military control” within four days (Bartkowski; 2015, 13). Instead, it took the Soviets eight months to establish full control - something which would have been impossible through traditional military means (Sharp; 1990).

Wherever possible, the people of Czechoslovakia denied the invading force the use of national resources, whether it be personnel, technology or goods (Bartkowski; 2015, 13). It’s likely that this was vastly more effective than armed resistance could ever have been. The Soviet Army was vastly superior to any armed resistance Czechs and Slovaks could have mustered. An

armed resistance would have probably been met with a show of overwhelming force, ending in a brutal crackdown as in Hungary twelve years earlier (Bartkowski; 2015, 13).

It took the Soviet forces no longer than 6 days to crush the (armed) Hungarian uprising once they had been given the order to do so (Bartkowski; 2015, 13). There's little reason to expect that things would have gone differently in Prague.

There is an application for this today. NATO is designed to repel a Cold War style Russian invasion of the member states. It now has difficulty adjusting to Russian hybrid tactics. Mobilising dissent, NATO should focus on four goals to counteract these tactics (Bartkowski; 2015, 20):

- “1. *To prevent or delay the adversary from achieving its immediate campaign objectives on the territory of a NATO member state;*
2. *To undermine the adversary's capacity and willingness to continue its campaign on the territory of a NATO member state;*
3. *To build national unity, civic solidarity and discipline by planning organized nonviolent resistance of all citizens of externally stirred domestic unrest, or invasion and occupation;*
4. *To instill, protect or consolidate democratic practises while waging the struggle.”*

Preparing their populations to resist a hostile force on their own territory would be particularly useful for small states, in particular in the Baltics. Not only are the Baltic States at the forefront of Russian aggression, they are also highly skeptical of external promises of aid. It is in this context that the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence has released a manual entitled *Things to Know about Readiness for Emergency Situations and Warfare* (Bartkowski; 2015, 19).

The manual instructs civilians on ways to counter armed external aggression (Bartkowski; 2015, 19). Other NATO countries, including Germany, should follow suit. A well instructed population that knows how to react in the wake of external aggression would be costly for the attacking force. In anticipation of this cost, a potential attacker would be less likely to decide in favour of aggression. In this way, defensive mass dissent could complement more traditional forms of military defense (Holst; 1990).

Planning for this eventuality would also contribute to solving one of the biggest problems NATO currently faces. NATO deterrence works well when it comes to outright aggression: it is unlikely, although not inconceivable, that Russia will outright invade a NATO member. What is plausible, on the other hand, is that Russia will exploit the open nature of liberal Western political systems in order to create instability. One way to do so is the curation of mass protests. A well-informed and prepared population is more likely to be able to meet those types of threats effectively.

Mass dissent as a form of deterrence against a foreign invasion has been discussed extensively in Germany (Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie; 1981; Ebert; 1981b,a). During the Cold War, it was propagated as an alternative to traditional military defense and nuclear deterrence, especially in left-wing circles of the Federal Republic.

It was all the more attractive in the last two decades of the Cold War because the threat of nuclear annihilation seemed very real. Unfortunately, the proponents of this policy at the time often wanted to replace traditional military deterrence with mass civilian dissent. Even advocates of this policy concede that it isn't a "miracle weapon" without risk (Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie; 1981, 184). In reality, it is far from it. Defensively employed mass dissent can complement traditional forms of deterrence - it cannot replace them. Eliminating traditional methods of deterrence would drastically increase the risk of conflict and ensuing occupation.

Beyond the defensive use, we should only project dissent as a weapon of last resort. After a careful review of the possible consequences, when all other means short of outright war are exhausted, it can be in our interest to use these methods. That doesn't mean that these methods can replace traditional military force. The case of North Korea demonstrates how limited the sponsorship of dissent can be.

The country itself is almost completely closed off to the outside world. While it is possible to get information into the country from abroad, it is unlikely that open dissent would form on the streets of Pyongyang. The Kim dynasty has brutally repressed all forms of dissent for decades in the most brutal ways imaginable. The "Democratic People's Republic" is neither democratic, nor does it serve the people of North Korea. Repression is "extreme" (Amnesty International; 2017, 34). There is no independent media. Up to 120 000 are in prison camps where torture is widespread and routine (Amnesty International; 2017, 34).

Although it is hard to imagine, repression become more severe since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011 (Amnesty International; 2017, 34). This a regime that has reportedly executed senior officials using anti-aircraft guns (McCurry; 2016). One former defence chief was killed at least in part because he fell asleep in the presence of Kim Jong-un (McCurry; 2015). Under those conditions, the participation in open dissent would be incredibly costly - hence why it doesn't happen.

### **7.3 Defending Stability**

While Germany has the choice to weaponise dissent or not, it has no choice but defend itself against those who do. The term war is used too frequently today. When it is used indiscriminately, it minimises the loss and suffering of those who have had to endure it. Nevertheless,

the Federal Republic finds itself in a conflict with other nation states and their proxies in what has frequently been described as a hybrid form of warfare (Sahin; 2017; Amann et al.; 2016). The previous chapter has already outlined some of the ways in which foreign nation states, chiefly amongst them Russia, have meddled in Germany in order to destabilise it.

In this part of the chapter, I am going to discuss some of the policy options open to the German government in order to deal with attempts to destabilise the country from abroad. Free and fair elections are the key to stability in any democracy. The German people must be able to choose a government for themselves. Outside interference must be kept to a minimum.

To do that, Germany must deter outside powers from attempting to destabilise the country. Beyond that, Germany must reduce the likelihood that such an attempt would be successful should it occur.

Outside powers must know that the price of interference in Germany will be steep. It may sound like a given, but it is not. At this point, nobody serious is disputing that Russia brazenly interfered in the American election. According to American intelligence services, they did so with the explicit aim of strengthening the candidacy of Donald Trump (Entous and Nakashima; 2016). You'd expect that there would be grave consequences. There were not. It must be clear that Germany would react to such a violation of sovereignty very differently.

It should go without saying that the actual process of voting must be protected as well as possible. If it is not possible to defend digital infrastructure from outside attack, the voting process must remain as it is. In other key parts of our democracy, we have no choice but to defend the digital infrastructure as best as we can. Parliament, individual members of parliament, ministries and other institutions of the state must be protected.

Russia stands accused of supporting radical parties across the European Union (Wesslau; 2016). Clandestine funding, logistical support (Wesslau; 2016). Russia profits from parties on both the extreme left and extreme right. They legitimise Russian political positions and rally against those of the West (Wesslau; 2016). The aim of this support is simple: sow chaos, division. Undermine a Europe that is whole and free. Preventing this is challenging, but it must be a priority.

When deterrence fails and Russia decides to interfere, the response must be swift and clear. It would be a mistake to insist on a symmetrical response. Not everything that damages a democracy can inflict damage on an autocracy like Russia. The case of Russian interference during the American election is useful to illustrate this challenge.

A group affiliated with the Russian government illegally obtained the emails of John Podesta, Hilary Clinton's campaign manager (Lipton et al.; 2016). They then used a proxy, Wikileaks, in order to distribute the emails with the aim of discrediting Clinton (Borger; 2017a). These

emails were most certainly one of the key factors that led to Donald Trump's victory. What worked in the United States wouldn't work in Russia. The United States is democratic (Marshall and Jagger; 2014). The Russian system of government is a managed democracy. Lipman and McFaul (2011, 116) describe it as follows:

*"The system they seek to create will have all the formal institutions of democracy: elections, parties, media, civil society, and so on. But the real autonomy of these institutions and, therefore, their real capacity to influence the actions of the state will be severely limited."*

A symmetric response could never be as effective in Russia as it is in a pluralistic, open Western society. For that reason, a response to Russian interference must always be asymmetrical. In responding, Germany must play to its strength and its adversaries' weakness. That might mean sanctions, it might mean imposing political costs - for example through the exclusion of Russia from international forums like the G8.

Every response to outside attempts at political destabilisation must take into account how Western institutions in Russia will be affected. The response must be proportional. In the United States, there is now a massive focus on Kremlin channel Russia Today (RT) by think-tanks (Kirchick; 2017) and law enforcement (Wilson; 2017). Many have cautioned against overestimating the impact of the channel because it has miniscule rating numbers (Erlanger; 2017). By putting so much focus on RT, the American government may actually have elevated the channel instead of cutting it down to size.

An overly harsh response, especially where the media is concerned, also provides ammunition to autocrats the world over to restrict freedom. If the United States can register news outlets as "Foreign Agents" (Wilson; 2017), why shouldn't autocrats from Turkmenistan to Russia do the same?

At the very least, the German government would be well advised to avoid giving legitimacy to organisations like RT, the sole aim of which is the advancement of Russian interests. Sigmar Gabriel, the German Foreign Minister, recently gave an exclusive interview to RT (Gathmann and Weiland; 2017). That was a huge mistake that should not be repeated by anyone in power or close to it. Gabriel argued that he did it in order to reach people not reached when talking to the mainstream media (Gathmann and Weiland; 2017). That might well be true - but in the process he gave legitimacy to a Russian propaganda tool that is used day in day out by the Kremlin to hurt Germany and its allies. We need to convince people not to watch RT, not give them a bigger platform.

## 7.4 Golden Parachute

This research has brought up a whole host of questions, many of them related to policy. Amongst them is the question of “Golden Parachutes”. Autocracies often survive for extended periods of time. Eventually, however, they do break down. People start calling for change. These calls for change often lead to discontent and protests. When that happens, autocrats are faced with a series of impossible choices. The first, and often used option, is to coerce the opposition into submission.

The second is to make concessions or perhaps even step down. Unfortunately, stepping down from power is an incredibly dangerous thing to do in many parts of the world. Perhaps even more dangerous than attempting to put down mass protests through the use of force. Africa is a case in point. Since the Cold War has ended, “more than one in three Sub-Saharan leaders can expect not to be allowed to return home after leaving office, because they are killed, jailed or banished from the country they formerly ruled” (Klaas; 2016).

Faced with these odds for simple physical survival, it’s rational for political leaders in these instable countries to fight their people instead of acceding to their will. The West is able to offer a third option between coercion and acceding to the demands of the protestors to simply step down: a Golden Parachute.

In practise, such an offer of exile in comfort can mean many things. First and foremost, it means offering a political leader the option to relocate to a safe country, potentially with his family. In that country, the leader would be able to live without the fear of reprisal or death. Moreover, these exits abroad often mean that political leaders escape criminal prosecution.

Brian Klaas provides an example of a golden parachute in practise.<sup>8</sup> Haiti, a country of no more than 10 million people, has a long history of irregular regime changes - and punishing its leaders once they are removed from office (Klaas; 2016, 114). An incredible “two-thirds of presidents that left office in the last 115 years have been exiled, jailed, or killed” (Klaas; 2016, 114). Between 1971 and 1986, Haiti was ruled by Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. He is widely regarded as one of the most brutal despots to ever rule in the Americas.

By 1990, there was hope in the country for a genuine transition to democracy (Klaas; 2016, 114). Jean-Bertrand Aristide had just won an election on the promise to help the poor and reform the country (Klaas; 2016, 114). By the time Aristide was overthrown in a coup d’état, he had been in office for a mere 8 months (Klaas; 2016, 114). The leader of the coup was Raoul Cedras. He squashed any hope of a democracy. In the ten months after he came to power, “at least 1021 extra-judicial executions took place” (Klaas; 2016, 115). Perhaps more importantly, Haiti was becoming involved in the global drugs trade (Klaas; 2016, 115). Washington became

---

<sup>8</sup>The following paragraph is based on the work of Klaas 2017



convinced that Cedras needed to be removed from power, but there was little appetite for a full-blown invasion (Klaas; 2016, 115).

Eventually, Cedras was offered a sizeable sum of money and safe exile (Klaas; 2016, 116). He accepted. In the early hours of October 13th 1994, a United States military charter aircraft flew Cedras, some of his closest associates and their families to safety in Panama (Klaas; 2016, 117). Others were brought to Miami, where they received political asylum (Klaas; 2016, 117). Shortly thereafter, Washington declared that nearly \$80 million in previously frozen assets would be released (Klaas; 2016, 117). According to some, this was a success. After all, a brutal dictator had been removed without firing a single shot.

The same tool, the argument goes, could be used in cases where an irregular regime change is on the cards. Should the West, should Germany, provide this opportunity to political leaders from abroad? A part of the answer is very easy. When it comes to political leaders who are not guilty of any crimes, we should. It becomes more difficult when unsavoury characters are involved. Unfortunately, that is more frequently the case.

It's best to illustrate arguments in favour of and opposition to the policy using a current example. President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo was brought to power when his father was killed in 2001 (Reyntjens; 2001). Earlier, he had helped his father Laurent-Desiree Kabila get into power by fighting Mobutu, the previous dictator of the Congo. He was a guerilla commander (Burke; 2016). Since coming to power, the Kabila government has been responsible for a string of human rights violations including violent repression and attacks on civilians by the Congolese Army (Amnesty International; 2015). In many cases, Kabila's security forces have acted with impunity - including in cases of mass rape in the east of the country (Amnesty International; 2015).

Political opponents of all kinds have been harrassed. Some have been attacked. At best, Kabila is not in control of the Congo. At worst, he is a man who has actively sought out to hurt others. In addition to violating human rights with increasingly regularity, Kabila has overstayed his constitutionally mandated maximum term (de Freytas-Tamura; 2017). Last year, major protests erupted against the Kabila regime in cities across the country - most prominently in the capital Kinshasa and the south eastern mining hub of Lubumbashi (Burke; 2016). During the protests in Kinshasa, soldiers fired live ammunition (Burke; 2016).

It was a difficult moment for Kabila. In the end, he chose a mixture of coercion and accommodation of political demands in order to weather the crisis. Although many people lost their lives, the situation could have deteriorated much further. At the time, a Golden Parachute could have given Kabila a way out. Should we have given Kabila an easy way out? Should this be a more general policy?

There are good arguments in favour of doing so - both in the individual case of Joseph Kabila and beyond. All of them assume that a golden parachute can help improve the situation on the ground by removing an obstacle to positive change. When a political leader is given a viable option to exit and live in peace, he isn't "forced" to coerce his own people into submission when mass protests occur and an irregular regime change appears to be imminent without it.

The first line of argument is moral: if we can prevent the violent repression of a people and help them on their path to democracy, we surely ought to do so. This argument becomes even more forceful as we remind ourselves that uprisings often lead to even more serious political instability, including civil wars.

Beyond morality, it is simply not in the German national interest that autocrats suppress peaceful protests violently. The same is certainly true for civil wars. These periods of political instability and chaos directly affect our political and economic interests. In the case of a country like the Democratic Republic of Congo, the violent suppression of uprisings and mass protests can also create negative externalities for surrounding countries. The DRC borders on 9 countries (de Freytas-Tamura; 2017).

The recent past has demonstrated that instability in the Congo creates and amplifies instability in the wider region. While the DRC is without a doubt a special case, negative externalities in other countries often create spillover effects in the wider region. Even if political leaders succeed in putting down dissent against the regime, their "success" can only ever be temporary reprieve. We tend to think of autocracies as intrinsically stable, but that's often a fallacy. In early 1977, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research wrote the following about Iran: "Iran is likely to remain stable under the shah's leadership over the next several years" (Crist; 2012, 12).

At a New Year's Eve gala in December of the same year, Jimmy Carter famously said that "Iran is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas" (Crist; 2012, 12). It is difficult to overstate just how wrong he was. Just over a year later, the Shah fled to Egypt (Crist; 2012, 22). Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran from abroad (Crist; 2012, 23). The Islamic theocracy he created lasts to this day. We continue to misjudge the stability of autocracies to this day. Few saw the Arab Spring coming after decades of autocratic governance in North Africa. Autocratic stability is no more than a mirage. Autocracies are stable until they are not. When they do end, their end often comes with a bang, not a whimper.

This is the core argument in favour of Golden Parachutes: they do not only serve our interests, they can also make life easier for people on the ground.

This argument is based on a key assumption: that the parachute would actually improve the situation on the ground by removing the incumbent. Unfortunately, we don't know with cer-

tainty that this will be the case. The removal of the incumbent can lead to an improvement in the situation on the ground. After Cedras was enticed to give up power in Haiti, for example, the “death squads went away - at least for a while” (Klaas; 2016, 115). And while Haiti didn’t become a real democracy by any stretch of the imagination following the removal of General Cedras, it did improve the situation on the ground.

On the other hand, it could also have no net positive or net negative effect at all. It may even lead to a deterioration of the situation on the ground. Irregular regime change attempts and other mass protests are not a binary in which one player is the incumbent and another is the opposition. These are incredibly volatile, complex situations. Removing the incumbent may simply lead to a fracturing of the political landscape.

It is also highly possible that the removed incumbent would simply be replaced by another strongman from within the regime, such as a military figure. Even if we do assume that the removal of the incumbent will help the opposition, we simply cannot anticipate that their victory would be in our interest or a morally superior outcome. Recent events are instructive in this regard.

Before an uprising sought to remove the regime of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, the country was a difficult partner at the best of times. His was a dictatorial regime that mistreated Libyans and supported terrorists around the world. Now, the state of Libya is perhaps even more sorry. Protests in Libya spread quickly, especially after the Libyan Army massacred hundreds of peaceful protestors in Benghazi (BBC; 2011a).

Following a NATO intervention on the side of Gaddafi’s opponents (Daalder and Stavridis; 2012), the country continues to be mired in utter chaos. Years after Gaddafi’s dead body was dragged through the streets of the coastal town of Sirte (Gaynor and Zargoun; 2011), the country continues to be ruled by rival factions (Figure 45).

There is no monopoly of force in the country. The ongoing civil war has claimed the lives of thousands of people (Stephen; 2016). Tens of thousands have been injured. Between 2010 and 2011 alone, Libyan GDP more than halved (Fasanotti; 2016). Since then, things have gotten much, much worse. Such intense suffering combined with lack of political and military control have led to Libya becoming a central hub for illegal migration to Europe.

Gaddafi’s Libya was bad for Germany and the West. A Libya without any kind of functioning governance is intolerable, especially in light of the already existing immigration challenges caused by the Syrian Civil War.

In other words, its not clear that removing one bad actor will necessarily lead to a better leader or a preferable situation. What we do know for sure is that providing Golden Parachutes to autocrats and serial human rights violators like Joseph Kabila means giving terrible people a




Figure 45: Map of Zones of Control Libya, December 2016

Source: European Council on Foreign Relations 2016

free pass. That in itself should give pause to anyone advocating for the policy. More than that, it means that other political leaders will feel emboldened to treat their people badly.

At least in the context of African strongmen, there still is some deterrence effect to excessively bad behaviour as a result of the possibility of prosecution under international law. If unsavoury characters get to spend the end of their days in the south of France instead of a cell in The Hague, this deterrent will weaken.

Golden Parachutes also weaken the deterrence effect of the threat of mass revolt. Treating the populace badly works for a limited time, but there is always the threat of payback from an angered population. Once again, this deterrent is weakened through Golden Parachutes. For that reason, the use of Golden Parachutes is morally dubious at best. More importantly, providing comfortable exile to strongmen is simply not in our interest.

It will lead to the proliferation of autocratic politics. And even if that were not the case, the optics of Germany providing autocrats a comfortable life in the Black Forest or by the bridges of Hamburg would be prohibitively negative. It would reduce German soft-power and make it more difficult to act as a authoritative and moral voice on the international stage. Since neither is in our interest, we should refrain from using golden parachutes for autocratic political leaders.

Proponents of the limited use of Golden Parachutes, such as Klaas (2016) have suggested that the negative effects of the policy could be mitigated through the use of a tiered-system. Using this system, not everyone would be “eligible” for a peaceful exit. War criminals, in particular, would not be offered the chance to escape their country. There is some merit in this suggestion, but it suffers from the same weaknesses outlined above. Additionally, it’s difficult to draw the line. In the vast majority of cases in which a “parachute” would be necessary, the concerned leaders have behaved in contravention of political behaviour we could consider to be desirable. We shouldn’t protect autocrats - whether they commit war crimes, genocide, kill journalists or jail opposition leaders. Any such protection would simply lead to more of the same.

Even if one wanted to grant exile to a beleaguered autocrat for the greater good, it would be tough to do in practise. Exile for autocrats used to be the norm. Countries like France and Belgium used to argue that granting exile to tyrants would prevent bloodshed (The Economist; 2011). Nowadays, most places tyrants would actually want to live in “are bound by extradition treaties and human-rights conventions to bundle the big and bad back home or off to a trial in The Hague” (The Economist; 2011). It’s so difficult to square modern international law with Golden Parachutes that some proponents of the policy have argued that laws should be changed (Bueno De Mesquita and Smith; 2012).

Dealing with irregular regime changes or their threat is complicated. They can result in posi-

tive outcomes that actually help Germany. In many cases, they do not. A smart and effective approach to these events attempts to deter them in general while considering the specifics of every single coup and uprising.

## 8 Conclusion

In this work, I have advanced a number of arguments with implications for academic research as well as wider debates around policy.

Irregular regime changes happen when the de facto leader of a state is replaced by another in contravention of that state's laws or conventions. Such a change can take a variety of forms including civil war, insurgencies or invasions. In this work, I confine myself to coup d'états and nonviolent uprisings. These events matter. Irregular regime changes bring down governments aligned with German national interests, as well as those we would consider as adversaries.

They can sow chaos and create any number of negative externalities - political instability, economic turmoil, porous borders and so forth. They can have downright catastrophic consequences. History shows that there is often a narrow path uprisings and civil wars. The Syrian Civil War, for example, started out as a peaceful uprising (Wimmen; 2016). For that reason, states ought to concern themselves with these changes even if they don't appear to impact their national interest immediately. They often lead to tragedy and suffering for many, many people.

At the same time, it musn't be so. The same mechanisms that bring down democracies and replace them with dictatorships are also used to achieve the opposite. History is full of examples of people acting outside of the "laws and conventions" of their country (Beger et al.; 2014, 1) to hold their political leaders accountable for misery and incompetence. People assembling in the streets in the hundreds of thousands with a call for liberty.

Understanding how coups and uprisings function can help us influence these events in either direction: to facilitate it when it is in our interest to do so and to stop it from happening when the opposite is true. Understanding irregular regime changes is first and foremost about guarding interests, but it can never be viewed in separation of values and morality.

We know a great deal of things about both coups and uprisings but our knowledge of both is by far superceeded by the things we do not know. Political scientists have poured over the conditions that make these events possible as well as the triggers that ultimately set them off (Powell; 2012). Once an attempt occurs, we have a rough idea of the factors that influence whether an attempt becomes successful or not (Powell; 2012). There is also existing research on the impact of these events with regards to economics and politics - both at home and abroad (see eg (Powell; 2014; Marinov and Goemans; 2013; Svoblik; 2014; Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011)).

This is where I advance the argument that irregular regime changes impact human rights vio-

lations, and the level of physical integrity rights violations in particular. Political leaders are broadly rational (Davenport; 2007). They use repression when they believe that the cost of using repression is lower than benefit of doing so (Davenport; 2007). When a regime change occurs or is attempted, both benefits and costs of using repression are altered. Because of this, the application of repression also changes.

In Chapter 4, I analyse the effect of coups and uprisings on torture, disappearances, exiling and extrajudicial killing when the regime change attempt is made domestically. I find that there is a clear correlation between domestic coups d'état and an increase in these physical integrity rights violations. Chapter 5 explores whether irregular regime changes can have an impact on the level of these human rights violations even if the regime change does not occur domestically, but abroad.

Once again, I find that there is a connection between irregular regime changes and repression. This finding is remarkable. It means that irregular regime changes do not only have an impact in the country where they occur, but can have an impact across an entire region. To test my hypotheses and visualise the results, I use a variety of quantitative tools ranging from simple descriptive statistics to spatial econometrics. These empirical chapters are the most important part of this work. The next two chapters are practical: I outline and analyse the way in which Germany and Russia have dealt with irregular regime changes in the recent past, using the example of the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014. These two great European powers have not seen eye to eye: to Moscow, the revolution was no revolution at all, but a Western supported coup d'état (Eitze and Gleichmann; 2014) against a democratically elected government with which they could do business. Germany, on the other hand, saw a popular uprising based on calls for closer ties to Europe and a fight against corruption and the rule of law (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015). Their reactions to the revolution have differed greatly.

In the final part of this monograph, I engage with current debates surrounding irregular regime change policy. Decision makers are faced with difficult choices day in day out. Many of them are related to irregular regime changes or mass mobilisation in one way or another. I outline why it is a bad idea to suspend development aid automatically in the event of a coup d'état, uprising or other irregular regime change. Similarly, Germany should refrain from extending "Golden Parachutes" to autocrats abroad.

The weaponisation of dissent, is generally an undesirable policy. In the case that it is to be used offensively, utmost consideration must be given to all other options. Dissent, after all, is unpredictable. So is its consequence. The weaponisation of dissent for defensive purposes, on the other hand, is a much ignored and very powerful tool to help keep Germany its allies safe from international threats. Even if Germany does not seek to weaponise dissent offensively, others will. Deterring foreign actors from attempting to undermine domestic political stability



is imperative.

Ultimately, irregular regime changes are much misunderstood and too frequently ignored. The nature of conflict is changing. War is always going to involve shooting in one form or another. But it also includes the grooming of dissent, the support of rebels. That has been true in ancient Greece as much as it is the case in eastern Ukraine today. To stay safe, Germany must become more agile in responding to periods of political instability in Europe and beyond. Germany is simply too large and powerful to hide behind self-righteous non-interference.

## 9 German Summary

Im Dezember 2010 hat sich ein Gemüsehändler 300 km südlich von Tunis aus Protest selbst angezündet (Abouzeid; 2011). Einen Monat später war Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, der tunesische Diktator, der mehr als 20 Jahre an der Macht war, gestürzt (Amnesty International; 2012, 42-43). Die Proteste breiteten sich rasant aus. Innerhalb kürzester Zeit protestierten die Menschen in Ägypten, Libyen, Jemen, Syrien, Bahrain und Saudi-Arabien gegen ihre Regierungen.

Einige Machthaber reagierten mit Konzessionen. Die meisten reagierten jedoch mit Gewalt. Die libysche Regierung unter al-Gaddafi benutzte Flugabwehrkanonen (Amnesty International; 2012), um die Massen zu "kontrollieren". Im benachbarten Ägypten wurden tausende verletzt und hunderte von Sicherheitskräften getötet (HRW; 2014). Die ganze Region schien wie ein Pulverfass, das nach Dekaden schlussendlich explodierte.

In dieser Arbeit geht es um irreguläre Regimewechsel - insbesondere coups d'état und Aufstände. Irreguläre Regimewechsel sind weit verbreitet: zwischen 1950 und 2010 kam es zu Coup-Versuchen in 94 Staaten (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 255). Zwischen 1945 und 2006 kam es gleichzeitig zu 163 Fällen von friedlichen Kampagnen, deren Ziel der Sturz einer Regierung war (Chenoweth and Lewis; 2013).

In Kapitel 2 zeige ich auf, warum irreguläre Regimewechsel von großer Signifikanz sind. Ein Verständnis für irreguläre Regimewechsel ist wichtig - sie haben nicht nur Einfluss auf die Interessen der Bundesrepublik, sondern auch auf westliche Werte. Menschen sterben, Männer werden zum Kampf gezwungen, Frauen leiden, Kinder werden zu Waisen. Regimewechsel sind Zeiten drastischen Wandels. Friedliche Aufstände waren ein Teil dessen, was die Sowjetunion in die Knie zwang. Sie haben Freiheit gebracht. Millionen von Menschen zwischen den mittelalterlichen Türmen Talinns bis zum Schwarzen Meer konnten sich aus den Fängen ihrer Besatzer befreien.

Als Syrer im Frühling 2011 auf die Straße gingen, um gegen Bashar al-Assad zu demonstrieren, wollten sie dies auch. Sie bekamen etwas anderes: Bürgerkrieg, Fassbomben und Chemiewaffen im Einsatz gegen Zivilisten (Yan; 2017). Der Bürgerkrieg in Syrien dauert bis heute an. Hunderttausende Männer, Frauen und Kinder sind gestorben (McDowall, Angus; 2017) - Millionen geflohen (BBC; 2016b). Neben unvorstellbarem menschlichem Leid sind Jahrtausende alte Kulturgüter für immer zerstört. Die ganze Region liegt im Chaos. Ein Verständnis für irreguläre Regimewechsel und die Mobilisierung von Dissens erlaubt es, solch unmenschliches Leid in Zukunft zu verhindern oder zumindest zu mindern.

Neben dem Einfluss auf westliche Werte beeinflussen Coups, Aufstände und Destabilisierungskampagnen oftmals direkt die außenpolitischen Interessen der Bundesrepublik.

Coups haben die Demokratisierung von Madagaskar bis Thailand behindert (Klaas and Ulfelder; 2016). Aufstände haben brutale Diktatoren hervorgebracht, gleichzeitig aber auch Regierungen, die sich europäischen Interessen entsprechend verhalten haben. Irreguläre Regimewechsel können unseren Interessen dienen, diese aber auch torpedieren.

Heute stehen irreguläre Regimewechsel und Destabilisierungskampagnen wieder im Fokus der Diskussion. Die sich wandelnde Form des Krieges und ein aggressives Russland machen die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Themen zu einem Imperativ. Wenn wir wissen wie Coups und Aufstände funktionieren und welchen Effekt sie haben, können wir unsere Außenpolitik besser kalibrieren. Deutschland, die Europäische Union und unsere Alliierten können einen Beitrag dazu leisten, die negativen Effekte zu mitigieren. Im Idealfall bedeutet dies, dass weniger Waffen und Menschen gehandelt werden. Es bedeutet, dass nicht nur Menschenrechte sondern auch nationale Interessen gewahrt werden können.

In Kapitel 3 untersuche ich die Bedingungen unter denen Coups und Aufstände stattfinden und "erfolgreich" sind. Es geht um die Auswirkungen von irregulären Regimewechseln auf die betroffenen Länder. Das Kapitel fungiert als Zusammenfassung der bisher bekannten und relevanten Forschung. Zwischen 1950 und 2010 gab es 457 Coup-Versuche, von denen 227 "erfolgreich" waren (Powell and Thyne; 2011). Politikwissenschaftler befassen sich seit Jahrzehnten mit Coups. Beim Ausbruch von Coups macht es Sinn, zwischen drei Faktoren zu differenzieren.

Erstere sind Faktoren, die Coup-Versuche möglich und wahrscheinlich machen. Desweiteren sind es Faktoren, die unmittelbar zum Ausbruch von Coups führen. Zuletzt geht es um Strategien mit Hilfe dessen aus einem versuchten Coup ein erfolgreicher Coup wird. Darüberhinaus zeige ich auf, was wir bereits über die Effekte von (versuchten) Coups wissen - zum Beispiel in Bezug auf Demokratisierung und die Eskalation zu Bürgerkriegen.

Im letzten Teil des Kapitels befrage ich mich mit der existierenden Forschung zu friedlichen Aufständen und Destabilisierungskampagnen, deren Ziel die Absetzung einer Regierung ist. Ebenso wie bei Coups geht es mir hierbei um die Konditionen, die Aufstände ermöglichen und begünstigen. Abschließend geht es auch um den Effekt, den solche Aufstände haben.

In Kapitel 4 und Kapitel 5 trage ich direkt zur Forschung bei, indem ich den Einfluss von irregulären Regimewechseln auf Repressionen analysiere. Es gibt Forschung zu Regimewechseln und politischer Repression - aber wenig Forschung, die diese beiden Phänomene in Zusammenhang setzt. Machthaber sind weitestgehend rational. Es ist ihre oberste Priorität, an der Macht zu bleiben. Sie nutzen Repressionen gegen die eigene Bevölkerung, wenn sie meinen, dass die Vorteile der Nutzung die Nachteile überwiegen.

Wenn ein Coup oder Aufstand stattfindet oder vereitelt wird, ändern sich die zu erwartenden

Vorteile und Kosten. Aus diesem Grund haben irreguläre Regimewechsel einen Einfluss auf den Grad von politischer Repression in einem Land. Kapitel 4 beinhaltet eine quantitative Analyse des Einflusses von irregulären Regimewechseln auf Repressionen im Inland. Durch die Analyse eines von mir konstruierten Datensatzes finde ich heraus, dass es einen Zusammenhang zwischen Coups und einem höheren Maß von politischer Repression gibt. Der Einfluss von Aufständen im Inland auf Repressionen bleibt unklar.

In Kapitel 5 untersuche ich, ob irreguläre Regimewechsel Einfluss auf Repressionen im Inland haben können. Irreguläre Regimewechsel im Ausland können zu einer Reihe von negativen Externalitäten führen, die wiederum zu mehr Repression im Inland führen können. Dissens in einem Land macht Dissens in Nachbarländern wahrscheinlicher - der Arabische Frühling ist nur das aktuellste Beispiel dafür.

Durch die höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit von Dissens und Protesten im Inland wird auch der zu erwartende Vorteil durch Repressionen größer. Mit Hilfe eines "Diffusion of Covariates Spillover"-Modell finde ich heraus, dass irreguläre Regimewechsel im Ausland mit höherer Repression im Inland zusammenhängen.

Die letzten beiden Kapitel sind praktischer Natur. In Kapitel 6 geht es darum, wie Deutschland und Russland in der Vergangenheit mit irregulären Regimewechseln umgegangen sind. Anhand der Euromaidan Revolution 2014 in der Ukraine verdeutliche ich, dass diese beiden Mächte extrem unterschiedlich auf solche Regimewechsel reagiert haben. In diesem Kapitel untersuche ich den Zusammenhang zwischen irregulären Regimewechseln und hybrider Kriegsführung. Insbesondere geht es um Farbrevolutionen.

Im letzten Kapitel dieser Arbeit geht es um praktische Implikationen der Forschung und Handlungsempfehlungen für die deutsche Außenpolitik. Irreguläre Regimewechsel sind so alt wie menschliche Gesellschaften und Deutschland muss einen Weg finden, um mit ihnen umzugehen. Als politische und wirtschaftliche Regionalmacht hat Deutschland eine Reihe von nationalen Interessen, die von Coups und Aufständen beeinflusst werden.

Es gibt Zeiten, zu denen solche Regimewechsel im deutschen Interesse sind. Allermeistens ist das Gegenteil der Fall. Ich diskutiere Verhaltensweisen, die es uns erlauben, die negativen Effekte von irregulären Regimewechseln zu mitigieren und gleichzeitig die Vorzüge von organisiertem Dissens zu nutzen. Insbesondere geht es um die Benutzung von Dissens als Waffe, die automatische Suspendierung von Entwicklungshilfe und Goldene Fallschirme.

Die defensive Nutzung von Dissens ist begrüßenswert. Offensiv sollten wir Dissens als Waffe nur dann nutzen, wenn die Alternative eine direkte kriegerische Auseinandersetzung wäre. Ich spreche mich gegen einen automatischen Stop von Entwicklungshilfe im Falle von irregulären Regimewechseln aus. Zum Ende des Kapitels argumentiere ich, dass Goldene Fallschirme für

Autokraten nicht in deutschem Interesse sind.

Diese Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zur Forschung, indem sie einen Zusammenhang untersucht, der bisher weitestgehend ignoriert wurde: Irreguläre Regimewechsel und Repression. Neben der Kontribution zur akademischen Literatur leistet sie ebenfalls einen Beitrag zu aktuellen Diskussionen in der deutschen Außenpolitik.

## **1 Signifikanz irregulärer Regime-Wechsel**

Deutschland ist eine europäische Regionalmacht und Exportnation. Als solche hat es wirtschaftliche und politische Interessen auf der ganzen Welt. Neben den von Deutschland verfolgten Interessen, kann eine deutsche Außenpolitik nur dann effektiv sein, wenn sie westliche Werte stärkt. Ein Verständnis für irreguläre Regimewechsel ist wichtig, weil coups d'état und Aufstände oftmals deutsche Interessen und Werte beeinflussen.

### **Interesse**

Irreguläre Regimewechsel haben oft einen direkten Einfluss auf die Interessen der Bundesrepublik. Zunächst sind irreguläre Regimewechsel per Definition Zeiten drastischen Wandels. Mehr noch als andere Länder hat Deutschland ein verstärktes Interesse an einer regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung. Eben diese wird vorrangig von Demokratien aufrecht erhalten. Daher hat Deutschland auch ein Interesse an der Verteidigung der Demokratie. Coups sind weltweit die größte Bedrohung für demokratische Regierungen (Marinov and Goemans; 2013).

Ebenso kann die Unterstützung von Putschisten oder Revolutionären auch als Waffe eingesetzt werden. Dies war beispielsweise der Fall, als die Vereinigten Staaten 1953 einen Coup im Iran maßgeblich unterstützt haben (Kinzer; 2003). Heutzutage generiert das Putin-Regime künstlich Dissens im Ausland, um andere Länder zu schwächen. Insbesondere deshalb macht es Sinn, diese Ereignisse bestmöglich zu verstehen.

Darüber hinaus sind irreguläre Regimewechsel Symptom und Katalysator für politische Instabilität. In den letzten einhundert Jahren führten Coups und Aufstände immer wieder zu Bürgerkriegen. Das Gemetzel in Libyen und Syrien hat nicht als Bürgerkrieg begonnen, sondern als friedlicher Aufstand. Neben Bürgerkriegen können Coups und Aufstände noch zu einer Reihe von anderen negativen Externalitäten führen - illegale Migration, gedämpftes wirtschaftliches Wachstum oder die Proliferation von Waffen.

### **Werte**

Wenn Menschen sterben, leiden und von Autokraten beherrscht werden, sind nicht nur unsere Interessen sondern auch unsere Werte betroffen. Irreguläre Regimewechsel sind weder immer gut noch immer schlecht - es kommt auf den spezifischen Fall an. Nichtsdestotrotz beinhalten Coups zwangsläufig immer die Nutzung von Gewalt oder dessen Androhung. Coups und Aufstände sind immer auch ein Mittel außerhalb von etablierten Konventionen und Gesetzen, um eine Regierung auszutauschen (Beger et al.; 2014). Dies ist an und für sich schon relevant.

Vereitelte Coups und Aufstände können unerträgliches Leid auslösen - wie in Syrien und Libyen. Sie können allerdings auch dazu führen, dass sich Menschen von ihren Peinigern befreien. Deutsche wissen dies. Die Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, und

ihr Ende, ist geprägt durch friedlichen Widerstand. Zu verstehen wie irreguläre Regimewechsel funktionieren ist daher nicht nur interessant weil es uns hilft deutsche und europäische Interessen durchzusetzen. Es hilft uns ebenso dabei Leid von anderen abzuhalten und sie ggf. dabei zu unterstützen, sich zu befreien.

## **2 Forschungsstand Irreguläre Regime-Wechsel**

Wir wissen viel über irreguläre Regimewechsel, aber es gibt noch mehr, dass wir nicht wissen. In dieser Arbeit wird das Wort “Regime” anders als im öffentlichen Diskurs nicht wertend genutzt. In dieser Arbeit geht es um Wandel an der Spitze eines Regimes, also um politische Anführer. Ich definiere diesen irregulären Regimewechsel daher als das “plötzliche Entfernen des amtierenden Anführers durch Mittel außerhalb der normalen Mittel des politischen Wettbewerbs” (Beger et al.; 2014, 1).

Es geht also um Situationen, in denen der wichtigste politische Anführer eines Landes auf eine Art und Weise aus seinem Amt enthoben wird, die nicht im Einklang mit “Konventionen und Gesetzen” des Landes steht (Beger et al.; 2014, 1).

In der Praxis bedeutet dies meistens, dass Anführer durch coups d’état, Revolutionen oder Rebellionen und Bürgerkriege aus dem Amt gejagt werden. Diese Sorte des irregulären Regimewechsels ist so alt wie wir selbst. Diese Wechsel sind fundamental von den uns in Westeuropa heutzutage geläufigen Regimewechseln zu unterscheiden.

In dieser Arbeit geht es um zwei Sorten von irregulären Regimewechseln: Coups d’état und friedliche Aufstände. Der Fokus liegt auf diesen beiden Typen, weil sie oft vorkommen und besonders effektiv sind. Die Vielzahl irregulärer Regimewechsel resultiert aus “Gewalt oder ihrer Androhung in Form von Coups, (populäre) Revolten und Assassinationen durch die nationale Opposition” (Goemans et al.; 2009, 273). Auch wenn Gewalt bei den meisten irregulären Regimewechseln eine Rolle spielt, sind friedliche Massenproteste äußerst effektiv (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011)

Andere Formen von irregulären Regimewechseln wie Bürgerkriege und Rebellionen bleiben nicht unerwähnt, sind aber nicht der Fokus dieser Arbeit. Im Folgenden Kapitel gebe ich einen Überblick über die bereits bestehenden Forschungsergebnisse zu Coups d’état und friedlichen Aufständen.

### **Coups d’état**

Coups zu definieren ist schwerer als man annehmen sollte. In diesem Teil des Kapitels gebe ich einen Überblick über die gängigsten Definitionen. Es ist nützlich, Definitionen in Ziele, Täter und Taktiken zu gliedern (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 250). Ich halte mich an die Definition von (Powell and Thyne; 2011, 251): ein Coup-Versuch ist der “illegale und offene Versuch vom Militär oder anderen Eliten innerhalb des Staatsapparates” den amtierenden Anführer eines

Landes abzusetzen.

Wann ist ein Coup-Versuch erfolgreich? Um als erfolgreich zu gelten, muss ein Coup-Versuch dazu führen, dass die Coup-Regierung für mindestens sieben Tage an der Macht bleibt (Thompson; 1973). Wenn dies nicht der Fall ist, kann der Coup-Versuch als gescheitert angesehen werden. Darüber hinaus kann man auch noch zwischen tatsächlichen Coup-Versuchen und geplanten, aber nicht ausgeführten Coups unterscheiden.

In diesem Kapitel gebe ich einen Überblick über das Vorkommen von Coups und die Konditionen, unter denen Coups möglich sind. Des Weiteren zeige ich auf, wie aus einem Coup-Versuch ein erfolgreicher Coup wird, und wie man Coups verhindern kann. Im letzten Teil analysiere ich den Forschungsstand mit Bezug auf den Einfluss, den Coup-Versuche haben - wenn sie erfolgreich sind, und wenn sie scheitern.

### **Aufstände**

Coups und Aufstände sind sich in manchen Aspekten ähnlich, unterscheiden sich allerdings auch entschieden. In diesem Teil des Kapitels geht es um das Vorkommen von Aufständen und die Konditionen, in denen Aufstände sich entwickeln. Ebenso geht es darum, wann Aufstände erfolgreich sein können, und wie sie verhindert werden können.

Ich definiere Aufstände als politische Kampagne mit dem Ziel eines Regimewechsels. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) hat politische Kampagnen als eine "Serie von observierbaren, kontinuierlichen und zweckgebundenen Massentaktiken, die auf ein politisches Ziel hinwirken" definiert. Dies ist auch für einen Aufstand anwendbar. In diesem Fall ist das politische Ziel der Wechsel des Regimes.

Ich befasse mich in dieser Arbeit mit vorwiegend friedlichen Aufständen, weil sie schlichtweg effektiv sind (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011). Nicht nur sind Aufstände effektiv darin, eine Regierung zu Fall zu bringen. Ein durch einen friedlichen Aufstand zu Fall gebrachtes Regime wird mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit in Demokratie und sozialem Frieden münden, als ein durch Gewalt zu Fall gebrachtes Regime (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 2).

Während es bei anderen Arten von Regimewechseln um die gewalttätige Bekämpfung des Staates geht, ist das Ziel eines Aufstandes die Trennung des Regimes von den Akteuren, auf deren Unterstützung es angewiesen ist (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 2).

### **3 Nationale Auswirkungen**

Der 14. August 2013 wird als dunkler Tag in die Geschichte Ägyptens eingehen. Nachdem al-Sisi durch einen Putsch an die Macht kam (Freedom House; 2017b), nutzte er die Armee, Bulldozer und Scharfschützen, um Demonstranten zu bekämpfen. Nach Erkenntnissen einer Menschenrechtsorganisation kamen mindestens 817 Menschen alleine auf dem Rab'a Platz



im Osten von Kairo ums Leben (HRW; 2014). Unter dem Coup-Regime werden Gefangene immer wieder gefoltert (Amnesty International; 2016b).

Ägypten war unter al-Sisi's Vorgängern, Mubarak und der Muslimbrüderschaft, keinesfalls ein Hort der Glückseligkeit. Nichtsdestotrotz hat sich die Menschenrechtslage im Land nochmals dramatisch verschlechtert, als al-Sisi durch einen Militärputsch an die Macht kam (Amnesty International; 2015). Der Fall Ägypten ist extrem, aber nicht einzigartig.

Coup-Regierungen benutzen oftmals exzessive Repressionen, um ihre Position zu festigen. Regime, die in Folge von friedlichen Aufständen an die Macht kommen, haben sich in Vergangenheit oftmals ganz anders verhalten. Die friedlichen Aufstände in Osteuropa zum Ende des Kalten Krieges führten nicht zu Massenexekutionen.

In diesem Kapitel untersuche ich, ob irreguläre Regimewechsel einen Einfluss den Grad von Menschenrechtsverletzungen haben können. Insbesondere geht es um Coups und friedliche Aufstände.

### **Forschungsstand**

In der Repressionsforschung geht es darum, warum manche Staaten die fundamentalen Menschenrechte ihrer Bewohner mehr als andere Staaten verletzen (Hill and Jones; 2014, 1). Wer fundamentale Menschenrechte besitzt, wird nicht aus politischen Gründen inhaftiert, gefoltert oder außergerichtlich von seiner Regierung ermordet. Wer solche Rechte besitzt, "verschwindet" auch nicht einfach spurlos.

Die bisherige Forschung hat eine Reihe von wirtschaftlichen und politischen Faktoren analysiert, die den Grad von staatlichen Repressionen beeinflussen können (Hill and Jones; 2014). Der Zusammenhang zwischen irregulären Regimewechseln und Repressionen ist kaum erforscht. Eine Ausnahme ist die Arbeit von Derpanopoulos et al. (2016). Im Rahmen dieser Forschung wurde eine Verbindung zwischen Coups und einem Anstieg von Repressionen festgestellt.

Neben dem direkten Zusammenhang zwischen irregulären Regimewechseln und Repressionen sind laut der bisherigen Forschung vor allem zwei Faktoren relevant: der Grad der Demokratisierung in einem Staat und der zu erwartende Widerstand gegen das derzeit regierende Regime (Davenport; 2007). Seine Forschung hat in den meisten Fällen ergeben, dass ein höherer Grad der Demokratisierung einen signifikanten und negativen Effekt auf das Maß der Menschenrechtsverletzungen in einem Land hat (Davenport; 2007). Doch selbst dieser Effekt wird von Forschern debattiert (Fein; 1995).

### **Theorie**

Politische Machthaber sind weitestgehend rational. Ihre erste Priorität ist es, an der Macht zu

bleiben. Davenport fasst diese Strategie treffend zusammen (Davenport; 2007, 4):

*Wenn die Vorteile größer sind als die Kosten, die Alternativen nicht vielversprechend sind und die Repression mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit erfolgreich sein wird, sind Repressionen zu erwarten. Wenn die Kosten größer sind als die Vorteile, es Alternativen gibt und die Repression mit größer Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht erfolgreich sein wird, sind wenig oder keine Repressionen zu erwarten*

Ich nehme an, dass Coups im Inland zu mehr Repressionen führen. Coup-Regierungen haben oftmals wenig Legitimität, weil sie mit Gewalt an die Macht gekommen sind und nicht demokratisch legitimiert sind. Der zu erwartende Widerstand gegen solche Regierungen ist hoch. Gleichzeitig werden die meisten Coups vom Militär geplant und ausgeführt. Nicht nur ist das Militär darauf trainiert, Gewalt anzuwenden. Im Falle einer Forderung nach Gewalt durch eine vom Militär gestellte Regierung ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass sich Soldaten weigern, dieser Forderung nachzukommen.

Bei friedlichen Aufständen im Inland ist das Gegenteil der Fall: friedliche Aufstände sind in der Regel nur dann erfolgreich, wenn eine große Anzahl von Menschen mobilisiert werden kann (Chenoweth and Ulfelder; 2017, 2). Die friedliche Machtübernahme führt zu der Erwartung, dass die Regierung sich auch weitestgehend friedlich verhalten wird. Sich dieser Erwartung zu entziehen, ist schwierig. Unter der Führung einer solchen Regierung ist es außerdem wahrscheinlich, dass es Mittel und Wege gibt, innerhalb des Systems seinen Widerstand gegen die neue Regierung friedlich auszudrücken. Es ist schwer, seiner Bevölkerung zu verkaufen, dass friedlicher Widerstand hart bestraft werden sollte, wenn man selbst gerade durch friedlichen Widerstand einen vermeintlich positiven Wandel herbeigeführt hat.

### **Methode & Ergebnisse**

In diesem Teil des Kapitels benutze ich eine quantitative “large-N” Studie, um die Forschungsfrage zu beantworten. Die Studie basiert auf einem massiven Datensatz von 1989 bis 2009, der Informationen zu 110 Ländern beinhaltet. Der Datensatz enthält im Kern Informationen zu Coups, friedlichen Aufständen und Verletzungen von fundamentalen Menschenrechten. Die Daten stammen aus existierenden Quellen. Ich habe sie ins passende Format gebracht und in einem großen Datensatz zusammengefügt. Nachfolgend benutze ich eine Reihe von Methoden und Spezifikationen, um meine oben aufgezeigten Hypothesen zu testen.

Irreguläre Regimewechsel sind ein wichtiger Faktor, der das Level von staatlichen Repressionen erklären kann. Innerstaatliche Coups und versuchte Coups korrelieren mit einem Anstieg von Repressionen. Das Verhältnis zwischen friedlichen Aufständen und Repression bleibt ungeklärt.

### **Ausblick**

Insgesamt wurde der Zusammenhang zwischen irregulären Regimewechseln und Repression bisher zu wenig untersucht. In diesem Kapitel leiste ich einen Beitrag zur existierenden Literatur, indem ich den Zusammenhang mit neuen Daten und Methoden erforsche.

#### **4 Internationale Auswirkungen**

Im Dezember 2010 zündete sich ein Gemüsehändler 300 Kilometer südlich von Tunis aus Protest selbst an (Amnesty International; 2011). Bis Januar 2011 wurden aus diesem Zeichen des Protests gegen einen tyrannischen Staat Massenproteste. Von Tunesien schwappte der Protest über in andere Länder der Region. Innerhalb von Monaten hörte man die Rufe nach Freiheit in den Straßen von Ägypten, Libyen, Jemen, Syrien, Bahrain und Saudi-Arabien.

Einige Staaten reagierten mit Konzessionen. Die meisten Staaten reagierten mit Gewalt. Neben den Protesten verbreitete sich auch die Repression von Tunesien bis in die arabische Wüste. In diesem Kapitel geht es darum, ob ein irregulärer Regimewechsel in einem Land das Maß der politischen Repression in anderen Ländern beeinflussen kann.

Wenn ein irregulärer Regimewechsel in einem Land stattfindet, wird es wahrscheinlicher, dass dies auch in Nachbarländern passiert. Oppositionelle in den Nachbarländern lernen von ihren Nachbarn. Irreguläre Regimewechsel führen zu negativen Externalitäten, die oftmals Nachbarländer destabilisieren. Die erhöhte Wahrscheinlichkeit von irregulären Regimewechseln in den Nachbarländern führt dazu, dass die Machthaber in Nachbarländern mehr Repressionen nutzen. Dies liegt daran, dass Machthaber weitestgehend rational sind - ihr erstes Interesse ist der Machterhalt.

#### **Forschungsstand**

Staatliche Repressionen werden seit Dekaden von Politikwissenschaftlern erforscht. Im Kern geht es darum, warum manche Staaten stark repressiv sind, während andere sehr wenig Repressionen nutzen. Forscher haben eine Reihe von politischen, ökonomischen, demographischen und legalen Faktoren erforscht, die maßgeblich den Grad von staatlichen Repressionen beeinflussen (Hill and Jones; 2014).

Der Zusammenhang zwischen irregulären Regimewechseln im Ausland und Repressionen ist bislang nicht erforscht. Es gibt Forschung zum Einfluss von irregulären Regimewechseln im Inland auf Repressionen im Land. Der existierenden Forschung nach gibt es einen signifikanten Zusammenhang zwischen irregulären Regimewechseln im Inland und Repression (Beger et al.; 2014). Diesen Zusammenhang teste und bestätige ich in Kapitel 3 mit anderen Daten und einer anderen Methode.

Danneman and Ritter (2013) haben aufgezeigt, dass Staaten sich aufgrund von der internen politischen Situation in anderen Ländern dazu entscheiden, Menschenrechte im eigenen Land zu verletzen. Bürgerkrieg in einem Nachbarland macht es wahrscheinlich, dass auch im In-

land politische Instabilität ausbricht. Repression wird in einem solchen Szenario genutzt, um diesen “Spill-Over” Effekt zu verhindern oder zumindest abzuschwächen.

### **Theorie**

Ein irregulärer Regimewechsel im Ausland in der Form eines Coups oder Aufstands macht politische Instabilität im Inland wahrscheinlicher. Coups und Aufstände können zu einer Reihe von negativen Externalitäten führen, beispielsweise schlecht kontrollierten Grenzen, unkontrollierter Migration oder einer größeren Erhältlichkeit von Waffen. Protest in einem Land, wie beispielsweise in Tunesien während des Arabischen Frühlings, führt oftmals zu Protest in anderen Ländern. Dies geschieht durch Diffusions-Effekte und veränderte Konditionen in Form von negativen Externalitäten vor Ort.

Oppositionelle im Inland können von den Oppositionellen im Ausland lernen. Was hat funktioniert? Welche Strategien waren nicht erfolgreich? Emulation ist ebenso relevant. Regimegegner können sich oftmals nicht der Unterstützung ihrer Mitbürger sicher sein. Dies ist insbesondere in autokratischen Systemen der Fall, in denen offener Dissens rar ist. Wenn offener Widerstand in einem benachbarten Land ausbricht, signalisiert dies auch der heimischen Opposition das Wandel möglich ist.

Die negativen Externalitäten führen zu Unmut, der wiederum zu Dissens vor Ort führt. Machthaber können diesen erwarteten Dissens antizipieren, bevor er sich materialisiert. Wenn dies geschehen ist, können sie Repressionen benutzen um zu garantieren, dass der Dissens sich nicht materialisiert. Diese Faktoren führen dazu, dass der zu erwartende Vorteil von politischen Repressionen ansteigt.

Das oberste Interesse von Machthabern ist der Machterhalt. Dies macht insbesondere Sinn, da Machthaber in vielen Ländern nach ihrem Machtverlust mit teilweise drastischen Konsequenzen rechnen müssen. Dies ist insbesondere in Afrika der Fall. Seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges wurde jeder dritte ehemalige Machthaber in sub-Sahara Afrika getötet, eingesperrt oder ins Exil gezwungen (Klaas; 2016).

Gleichzeitig sinken die Kosten für die Benutzung von Repressionen. Für ein Land wie Deutschland wäre es politisch und wirtschaftlich extrem kostspielig, wenn die deutsche Regierung anfangen würde, seine politischen Widersacher einzusperren oder gar zu foltern oder zu töten. Bei anderen Ländern wird dies regelrecht erwartet. Ägypten ist ein passendes Beispiel. Innerhalb des Landes tobt ein Kampf gegen radikalen Islamismus.

In der Nachbarschaft liegt das Bürgerkriegsland Libyen. Dieses hohe Maß der politischen Instabilität in der direkten Nachbarschaft ist einer der Faktoren, der es der ägyptischen Regierung erlaubt, in hohem Maße Repressionen einzusetzen. Das Land wird im Westen oftmals als Bollwerk religiöse Extremisten angesehen. Deshalb erfährt die ägyptische Regierung große

Zustimmung, auch wenn sie seine Bevölkerung kontinuierlich malträtirt.

Ein irregulärer Regimewechsel in einem Nachbarland erhöht daher nicht nur die zu erwartenden Vorteile von politischer Repression, sondern senkt auch die zu erwartenden Kosten, die durch Repression entstehen. Insbesondere mit Blick auf die Reaktion von westlichen Partnerländern.

Es ist meine Hypothese, dass Coups und Aufstände in Nachbarländern zu einem Anstieg von Repression im Inland führen. Gleichzeitig gehe ich davon aus, dass der Grad der Repression auch davon beeinflusst wird, wie mit dem im Ausland abgesetzten Machthaber umgegangen wird.

### **Methode**

Ich habe einen Datensatz erstellt, der Daten zu Repressionen, irregulären Regimewechseln und einer Reihe von Kontrollvariablen enthält. Der Datensatz erhält Informationen zu über 145 Ländern im Zeitraum von 1993 bis 2011.

Um meine Hypothesen zu testen, benutze ich ein “Spatial-Weight”-Modell. Spatial-Weight-Modelle basieren auf der Annahme, dass einzelne Einheiten miteinander verbunden sind. Diese Verbindung wird durch Nähe angegeben. In diesem Fall wird Nähe durch geographische Distanz wiedergegeben. Geographische Distanz zu messen hört sich einfach an, ist aber schwierig. Was ist die Distanz zwischen Deutschland und Russland?

In diesem Fall wird die geographische Nähe durch die Distanz zwischen den Länder-Mittelpunkten (Centroids) und zwischen den jeweiligen Hauptstädten angegeben. Hinzu kommt eine Matrix, aus der hervorgeht, ob zwei Länder aneinander grenzen. Alle drei Herangehensweisen sind sinnig. Die Modelle basieren daher jeweils auf den drei verschiedenen Spatial-Weight-Matrizen.

Die finalen Spatial-Weight-Matrizen sind Produkt einer Zeit-Matrix und den oben beschriebenen Distanz-Matrizen. Die Zeit-Matrix ist dabei nicht linear. Irreguläre Regimewechsel, die weiter in der Vergangenheit liegen werden zunehmend niedriger bewertet als Regimewechsel, die vor kurzem geschehen sind. Der Unterschied zwischen diesem Jahr und letztem Jahr ist größter als der Unterschied zwischen dem letzten Jahr und dem vorletzten Jahr.

Ich analysiere die Daten mit Hilfe eines “Spatial-Ordinary Least Square”-Modells. Diese Berechnungsmethode ist in der Diffusionsforschung weit verbreitet.

### **Ergebnisse**

Die Ergebnisse der Analyse sind bemerkenswert: es gibt einen statistisch signifikanten Zusammenhang zwischen irregulären Regimewechseln im Ausland und einem Anstieg an Repressionen im Inland. Hypothese 1 ist damit bestätigt. Bei Hypothese 2 ist das Ergebnis nicht

aussagekräftig: es gibt keinen signifikanten Zusammenhang zwischen der Behandlung von politischen Anführern im Ausland in Folge von irregulären Regimewechseln und dem Maß von politischer Repression im Inland.

Die Kontrollvariablen verhalten sich wie erwartet. Im Schnitt ist der Grad der politischen Repression in reichen Ländern niedriger als in armen Ländern. In Bürgerkriegsländern ist der Grad der Repression im Schnitt höher als in Ländern, in denen kein Bürgerkrieg herrscht. Das gleiche ist auch der Fall bei Ländern mit einer größeren Bevölkerung. Die Ergebnisse gehen damit weitestgehend konform mit meiner Theorie.

### **Ausblick**

Dieses Kapitel zeigt, dass politische Entscheidungen im Ausland zu hoher Repression im Inland führen können. Irreguläre Regimewechsel können zu einem Anstieg von Repressionen führen, selbst wenn der Regimewechsel im Ausland geschieht. Um dies zu untersuchen, habe ich einen Datensatz konstruiert und mit Hilfe von S-OLS Modellen analysiert.

### **5 Radikaler Wandel und Reaktion**

In diesem Kapitel geht es um den Umgang großer Mächte, insbesondere Deutschland und Russland, mit drastischem Wandel im Rahmen von irregulären Regimewechseln. Die Revolution in der Ukraine 2014 und die darauffolgende Reaktion der russischen und deutschen Regierungen dienen als Beispiel anhand dessen viele der Unterschiede illustriert werden können.

Beide Länder sind von der Mobilisierung der Massen einschlägig geprägt. Die Sowjetunion ist aus zwei Revolutionen entstanden. Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges war Russland Schauplatz von Massenprotesten und einem versuchten Coup. Das 20. Jahrhundert in Deutschland war ebenso ereignisreich - oftmals auch aufgrund der Mobilisierung der Massen.

Derzeit werden irreguläre Regimewechsel und Massenproteste vor allem im Zusammenhang mit hybrider Kriegsführung diskutiert - nicht zuletzt seit der Invasion der Ukraine durch Russland. Politischer Konflikt kann nicht nur durch Kampfpanzer an der Suwalki Gap oder Flugzeugträger im Mittelmeer ausgetragen werden, sondern beispielsweise auch durch das Erzwingen von Regimewechseln.

Murray and Mansoor (2012) haben demonstriert, dass Elemente hybrider Kriegsführung nichts Neues sind, sondern mindestens bis zum Peloponnesischen Krieg zurückgehen. Ein Schlüsselement hybrider Kriegsführung ist die Mobilisierung von Widerstand und die Unterstützung von Protesten im Ausland.

In diesem Kapitel geht es um deutsche und russische Perspektiven auf irreguläre Regimewechsel und deren Zusammenspiel mit hybrider Kriegsführung.

**Russland**

Russland steht im Fokus der Debatten um hybride Kriegsführung in Deutschland. Die russische Perspektive auf irreguläre Regimewechsel unterscheidet sich sehr stark von der deutschen. Für uns war die Maidan Revolution in der Ukraine friedlicher Ausdruck eines Verlangens nach Freiheit und mehr Europa.

Im von Russland vorangetragenen Narrativ war die Revolution ein vom Westen orchestrierter Putsch von politischen Extremisten. Auch über die Ukraine hinaus war Russland in jüngster Vergangenheit sehr schnell darin, friedlichen politischen Protest als vom Ausland gesteuert darzustellen. In diesem Narrativ gibt es eine Linie zwischen dem Arabischen Frühling zur Ukraine und dem Irak (Cordesman; 2014).

Nach russischer Sicht funktioniert westliche "Kriegsführung" derzeit wie folgt. In einem ersten Schritt benutzt "der Westen" Propaganda und vom Westen kontrollierte NGO um Widerstand in einem Land zu kreieren. Danach werden Rebellen logistisch und durch Training unterstützt, vielleicht werden auch westliche Spezialkräfte verdeckt in den Kampf geschickt. Dies kann schon reichen, um die Regierung umzuwerfen.

Falls die Regierung dazu in der Lage ist den Protest niederzuschlagen, hat der Westen eine Rechtfertigung, um direkt militärisch zu intervenieren. Obwohl diese Art der Kriegsführung von Russland dem Westen zugeschrieben wird, ist es Russland, das so immer wieder vorgeht. Das prominenteste Beispiel für dieses russische Vorgehen ist die russische Intervention in der Ukraine.

Die russische Intervention hatte vier Elemente: eine Informationskampagne, die Organisation von Widerstand, irreguläre militärische Mittel und reguläre Truppen. Die Informationskampagne hatte neben den Menschen in der Ukraine auch explizit die Bürger von Drittstaaten zum Ziel. Innerhalb der Ukraine war es das Ziel der russischen Regierung, möglichst viele Menschen gegen die neue Zentralregierung aufzuwiegeln. Das unmittelbare Ziel dieser Kampagne waren die ethnische Russen und russischsprachige Ukrainer.

Ich persönlich habe gesehen, wie effektiv diese Kampagne teilweise war - meine Russisch-Lehrerin in Odessa war davon überzeugt, dass der ukrainische Präsident Petro Poroschenko das Oberhaupt einer faschistischen Junta ist. Im Ausland war das Ziel der Informationskampagne die anhaltende Passivität anderer Länder im Kampf zwischen Russland und der Ukraine (Snegovaya; 2015).

Die russische Regierung unter Vladimir Putin sieht den Fall der Regierung von Yanukovych in der Ukraine nicht in Isolation, sondern als Teil einer Reihe von "Farbrevolutionen" in der Verbündete Autokraten von Bishkek und Tiraspol ihre Macht verloren haben. Anders als die Bundesrepublik hat die russische Regierung kein Interesse an prosperierenden und freien

Demokratien in seiner Nachbarschaft.

Falls Demokratie und Wohlstand in Weißrussland und der Ukraine möglich sind, warum sollten sie dann nicht auch in Russland möglich sein? Leider stünden diese Forderungen diametral den Interessen des Putin Regimes gegenüber. Im russischen Narrativ sind Menschen, die in Autokratien für Freiheit und Demokratie demonstrieren, dann auch vom Ausland gesteuerte Marionetten.

Die russische Regierung hat auf die Gefahr von Farbrevolutionen im Ausland und Inland reagiert. Im Inland hat das Regime eine Reihe von Schritten unternommen, um die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Ausbruchs von Massenprotesten zu reduzieren. Für den Fall eines Ausbruchs von Massenprotesten hat sich die russische Regierung darauf vorbereitet, sie möglichst schnell und effektiv niederzuschlagen.

Zivilgesellschaft, Medien und politische Opposition werden von der Regierung drangsaliert, um Protest zu verhindern. Gleichzeitig wurden die Sicherheitsdienste umstrukturiert, um auf Proteste zu reagieren, zuletzt durch die Kreation der Nationalgarde im Juli 2016, welche durch Putins ehemaligen Sicherheitschef geleitet wird (BBC; 2016a).

Im Ausland unterstützt die russische Regierung benachbarte Autokratien - auch um sie vor Massenprotesten und irregulären Regimewechseln zu beschützen, die nach Russland überschwappen könnten. Russland exportiert Waffen in Länder wie Weißrussland oder Aserbaidschan (SIPRI; 2017), unterstützt sie politisch und ökonomisch.

Auf militärischer Seite trainiert Russland teilweise direkt mit anderen Ländern explizit für den Fall eines neuen Maidans (McDermott; 2015). Gleichzeitig arbeitet die russische Regierung gegen Regime in ihrer Nachbarschaft, die demokratisieren oder bereits Demokratien sind - wie beispielsweise die Ukraine oder Georgien.

Im russischen Narrativ wird Russland von einem dominanten Westen bedroht, für den Massenprotest eine Waffe ist.

## **Deutschland**

Die deutsche Perspektive auf die Ereignisse in der Ukraine ist grundverschieden vom russischen Narrativ. Laut dem Auswärtigen Amt waren die Proteste das Resultat der "überraschenden Entscheidung" von Yanukovych, das EU Assoziierungsabkommen nicht zu unterschreiben (Amt, Auswärtiges; 2015). Diese Proteste entwickelten sich in Folge zu Protesten mit viel breiteren Forderungen.

Die deutsche Regierung hat sich von Anfang an um eine friedliche Lösung für die Krise bemüht. Seit der Maidan Revolution hat Deutschland vor allem auch auf die Reaktion von Russland reagiert. Neben ökonomischer Unterstützung (Auswärtiges Amt; 2016) hat die Bundesre-



publik sich vor allem politisch für die Interessen der Ukraine eingesetzt.

Gleichzeitig ist Deutschland selbst ein Ziel von russischen Mobilisierungskampagnen geworden. Deutschland ist nicht immun. Als starke Fürsprecherin von Sanktionen gegenüber Russland im Zuge der Ukraine-Krise ist die Regierung von Angela Merkel ein Kernziel von russischen Desinformationskampagnen (Meister; 2016).

Der Fall Lisa demonstriert dies nur allzu gut. Russische Desinformationskampagnen stoppen nicht an der deutschen Grenze. Für Deutschland besteht die akute Gefahr, dass Russland beispielsweise Versuche unternimmt, um die russische Minderheit im Land aufzuwiegeln. Diese Befürchtung war insbesondere dann akut, als die Bundesregierung im Laufe der Flüchtlingskrise kurzzeitig die Kontrolle verlor.

## **6 Handlungsempfehlungen für die deutsche Außenpolitik**

Irreguläre Regimewechsel haben einen Einfluss auf deutsche Interessen und auf die Werte, die uns wichtig sind. Aus diesem Grund muss sich Deutschland positionieren - ob es will oder nicht. Ist es im deutschen Interesse, wenn in anderen Ländern Regierungen irregulär gestürzt werden? Falls ja, unter welchen Umständen?

Ist Deutschland, ggf. in Zusammenarbeit mit internationalen Partnern, überhaupt dazu in der Lage, diese Ereignisse vor Ort zu beeinflussen? Falls ein direkter Einfluss auf diese Regimewechsel nicht möglich ist, können wir dann zumindest bestmöglich die daraus resultierenden Probleme mitigieren und Chancen nutzen?

In diesem Kapitel geht es um konkrete Handlungsempfehlungen für die deutsche Außenpolitik. Die Handlungsempfehlungen sind Resultat der möglichen Optionen unter Berücksichtigung unserer Werte und Interessen. In der internationalen Politik gibt es komplexe Probleme, deren Lösung deutsche Interessen und deutsche Werte stärkt. Das ist der Idealfall. Ein aktuelles Beispiel ist der Pariser Klimavertrag. Deutschland und Europa haben nicht nur ein ureigenes Interesse an der Bekämpfung des Klimawandels, es ist auch ein Vertrag, der unseren Werten entspricht.

Die Reaktion auf politische Umstürze und Instabilität ist oftmals komplizierter. Es kommt oft zu Situationen, in denen es keine optimale Handlungsoption gibt, sondern nur solche, die Werte oder Interessen vernachlässigt. In solchen Fällen sollten wir uns vor Augen führen, dass wir unsere Werte nur dann verteidigen können, wenn wir noch leben (Kissinger; 1956).

Es gibt eine Reihe von Fragestellungen rund um irreguläre Regimewechsel. In diesem Kapitel befasse ich mich mit vier von ihnen. Im ersten Teil des Kapitels analysiere ich, wie Deutschland sich zu coups d'état positionieren sollte. Darauf folgend analysiere ich, inwiefern Widerstand von Deutschland als Waffe eingesetzt werden kann, und unter welchen Umständen dies ratsam ist. Bevor ich mich gegen die Nutzung von Goldenen Fallschirmen ausspreche, lege

ich da wie Deutschland sich gegen die Mobilisierung von Dissens aus dem Ausland wehren kann.

### **Coups d'état**

In den letzten Jahren wurde wiederholt argumentiert, dass coups d'état nicht grundsätzlich schlecht seien. Der bekannteste Unterstützer dieser These ist Paul Collier (Collier; 2009). Er liegt falsch. Es ist unerlässlich zwischen coup d'états ganz generell und spezifischen Coups zu unterscheiden. Generell sind Coups nicht in deutschem Interesse: sie sind nicht nur Symptom von Instabilität, sondern amplifizieren diese weiter. Ebenso sind sie nicht mit unseren Werten zu vereinbaren. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass einzelne Coups nicht im Interesse der Bundesrepublik sein können.

Eine Strategie, um potentielle Putschisten abzuhalten, ist eine automatische Terminierung von Entwicklungshilfe im Falle eines Coups. Eine Vielzahl an Ländern, in denen Coups stattfinden, sind in hohem Maße abhängig von westlicher Entwicklungshilfe. Für potentielle Coup-Planer ist Entwicklungshilfe relevant, weil sie eine Einkommensquelle darstellt. Wenn die Coup-Planer nun aber wissen, dass im Falle eines Coups mit deutlich niedrigeren Einnahmen zu rechnen ist, sinkt auch die Attraktivität des Coups. Dies kann wiederum die Wahrscheinlichkeit reduzieren, dass ein Coup stattfindet.

Nichtsdestotrotz ist solch eine automatische Terminierung keine gute Idee. Unterstützung für eine automatische Terminierung basiert auf der Annahme, dass unser Verhalten einen Einfluss auf das Verhalten von Generälen und Hauptmännern in Bissau oder Lahore hat. Das mag so sein, muss es aber nicht.

Solch eine Automatisierung würde die Attraktivität eines Coups verringern - aber vielleicht nicht in ausreichendem Maße, um ihn zu verhindern. In der realen Welt entscheiden sich Staaten meist für das Durchsetzen ihrer Interessen, wenn diese mit ihren Werten kollidieren.

Solch eine automatische Regelung, wie die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sie seit 1961 haben (Fisher; 2013a), ist keine Ausnahme. Als al-Sisi in Ägypten durch einen Coup an die Macht kam, unterstützten die USA auch weiterhin das Land - unter anderem mit schweren Militärgütern (Kalin; 2014). Im Falle eines Coups müsste diese Hilfe eingestellt werden.

Die Regierung ist allerdings nicht dazu gezwungen zu determinieren, ob ein Coup stattgefunden hat. Im Fall von Ägypten hat sich die US-Regierung augenscheinlich entschieden, dass der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus auf der Sinai wichtiger ist als die Durchsetzung von demokratischen Standards im Land.

Es gibt keinen Grund für die Annahme, dass eine ähnliche Regelung von Deutschland stringenter umgesetzt werden würde als von den Vereinigten Staaten. In diesem Fall wäre das Resultat in jeder Hinsicht ineffektiv. Effektive Außenpolitik lebt von Flexibilität. Es ist wichtig,

potentielle Putschisten abzuschrecken; manchmal ist Anderes aber schlicht wichtiger.

### **Widerstand als Waffe**

In diesem Teil des Kapitels geht es um den Einsatz von Widerstand als Waffe. Ganz konkret geht es beispielsweise um die Frage, ob Deutschland jemals friedlichen Widerstand gegen ausländische Regierungen kreieren sollte, um diese abzusetzen. Wenn hier von Widerstand die Rede ist, geht es ausdrücklich nicht um die Unterstützung von ganz generellen Demokratiebestrebungen im Ausland, wie beispielsweise durch die Arbeit deutscher Stiftungen. Es geht ganz ausdrücklich darum, Widerstand zu generieren um eine Regierung zu stürzen.

Diese Unterstützung von Widerstand könnte eine Reihe von Formen annehmen. Deutschland könnte beispielsweise logistische Unterstützung leisten oder Regierungsgegner gezielt dafür trainieren, ihre Regierung zu stürzen. Alternativ könnte man auch so weit gehen, bereits bestehende Proteste gegen eine ausländische Regierung zu amplifizieren. Deutschland tut dies nicht. Sollte es? Die kurze Antwort ist: Nein. Die längere Antwort beinhaltet bestimmte Konditionen, unter denen es sinnvoll sein kann, Widerstand zu generieren oder aktiv zu unterstützen.

Es gibt gute Argumente für die Benutzung von Widerstand als Waffe. Die Debatte um hybride Kriegsführung hat eindrucksvoll gezeigt, wie wirksam nicht-kinetische Mittel im Rahmen einer Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Ländern sein können. Friedliche Aufstände sind besonders effektiv darin, autokratische Regierungen zu Fall zu bringen (Chenoweth and Stephan; 2011).

Für den Fall eines ernsthaften Konfliktes mit einem anderen Staat wäre die Kreation von Widerstand eine geeignete Alternative zum Einsatz von Waffengewalt. Falls Deutschland im Konflikt mit einer Autokratie steht, könnte die Unterstützung von Dissidenten sogar zu einem Demokratisierungsprozess führen. In solch einem Fall täte man den Menschen des Landes gegebenenfalls sogar einen Gefallen. Nichtsdestotrotz ist generell von der Benutzung von Widerstand als Waffe abzusehen.

Je nach Art der Beeinflussung wirft diese Fragestellung riesige praktische und ethische Probleme auf. Darüberhinaus ist solch eine Herangehensweise immer gefährlich, weil Menschen eine Tendenz dazu haben, unser Verständnis von der Situation in anderen Ländern zu überschätzen. Ein Engagement in einer hoch volatilen Situation, in der Aufständische und Regierung dynamisch miteinander interagieren, kann und wird zu nicht vorhersehbaren Konsequenzen führen.

Abgesehen von den nicht vorherzusehenden Konsequenzen hätte jegliches Engagement in dieser Form gravierende Auswirkungen auf unsere Demokratisierungsarbeit, beispielsweise durch parteinahe Stiftungen. Autokraten rechtfertigen bereits jetzt Repressalien gegen

Nichtregierungsorganisationen damit, dass diese angeblich zu Aufständen anleiten.

Wenn Deutschland auch nur einmal solch einen Kurs verfolgen würde, würden es Deutschland eben diesen NGO weitaus schwieriger machen, ihrer Arbeit nachzukommen. Alle Argumente für eine Nutzung von Widerstand als Waffe basieren auf der Annahme, dass solch eine Herangehensweise eine realistische Chance auf Erfolg hätte. Das ist nicht garantiert. Als liberale Demokratie ist Deutschland zum Glück in vielerlei Hinsicht eingeschränkt - anders als Länder wie Russland oder China ist Deutschland beispielsweise nicht dazu in der Lage, den Medien zu diktieren, was sie zu berichten haben.

Selbst wenn wir Widerstand im Ausland generieren können, muss dieser Widerstand nicht zwangsläufig erfolgreich sein. Regierungen sind im Angesicht von Massenprotesten nicht statisch. Sie können beispielsweise auf vom Westen unterstützte Aufständische reagieren, indem sie sie als ausländische Marionetten diskreditieren.

Es gibt Ausnahmen. Eine davon ist der defensive Einsatz von Widerstand als Waffe. Widerstand kann nicht nur offensiv genutzt werden. Friedlicher Widerstand kann dafür genutzt werden, um die Kosten einer etwaigen Invasion in die Höhe zu treiben. Bartkowski (2015) demonstriert, wie man radikale nicht-Kooperation nutzen kann, um sich gegen hybride russische Kriegsführung zu wehren.

Eine Armee ist dafür trainiert mit bewaffneten Gegnern umzugehen, nicht mit friedlichen, unkooperativen Zivilisten (Bartkowski; 2015). Im 2. Weltkrieg haben Dänen eine Kampagne radikalen, friedlichen Widerstands gegen Nazi-Deutschland durchgeführt. Dänemark hatte keine Chance auf einen Sieg in einer militärischen Auseinandersetzung mit der deutschen Kriegsmaschinerie. Es war ihnen allerdings möglich, die Kosten einer Besatzung durch Nazi-Deutschland durch friedlichen Widerstand in die Höhe zu treiben.

Armeen sind dafür trainiert, eine bewaffnete Opposition zu bekämpfen. Stattdessen haben Widerständler gestreikt, boykottiert und ihre Arbeit so weit wie möglich verlangsamt (Bartkowski; 2015). Das gleiche Prinzip wurde während der sowjetischen Invasion in der Tschechoslowakei 1968 mit Erfolg angewandt (Bartkowski; 2015).

Heutzutage könnte man friedlichen Widerstand im Ausland nutzen, um einen etwaigen Angriff eines aggressiven Russlands zu erschweren oder im Idealfall sogar zu verhindern. Dies wäre insbesondere eine gute Option für die Staaten im Baltikum, die in einer direkten militärischen Auseinandersetzung mit Russland chancenlos wären.

Offensiv sollten wir Widerstand nur als Waffe benutzen, wenn die Alternative ein Krieg mit einem mächtigen Land wäre. Selbst dann ist Dissens nicht immer als Waffe geeignet. Der derzeitige Umgang mit dem atomar bewaffneten Nordkorea illustriert, wie limitiert die Optionen für die Mobilisierung von Dissens in vielen Ländern der Erde ist.

Nordkorea ist seit Dekaden so repressiv, dass die große Masse der Menschen wohl kaum zum offenen Widerstand gegen das Kim-Regime aufzubringen ist. Die offensive Nutzung von Dissens ist in den meisten Fällen ungeeignet, um deutsche Interessen voranzutreiben. Die Konsequenzen einer solchen Herangehensweise sind unabschätzbar.

Deutschland hat die Wahl, ob es selbst Dissens mobilisieren möchte - zu defensiven oder offensiven Zwecken. Wenn es zur Mobilisierung von Dissens in Deutschland durch andere Staaten geht, hat Deutschland keine Wahl. Es muss sich zur Wehr setzen.

### **Abwehr ausländischer Mobilisierung**

Deutschland ist immer wieder Ziel von ausländischen Akteuren, die sich nach einer politischen Destabilisierung der Bundesrepublik sehnen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird immer wieder auf Russland verwiesen. Die Destabilisierung der Bundesrepublik und anderen Ländern der Europäischen Union liegt im Interesse des Putin-Regimes. Insbesondere Angela Merkel ist aufgrund ihrer resoluten Haltung gegenüber Moskau ein attraktives Ziel. Ausländische Staaten können bestehende politische Divergenzen ausnutzen und diese noch weiter verstärken.

Dies ist beispielsweise im Rahmen der Flüchtlingskrise passiert, als Russland gezielt und systematisch Desinformationen in Deutschland verbreitet hat. Deutschland muss Desinformationen bekämpfen. Darüberhinaus ist es unabdinglich, kritische elektronische Infrastruktur zu beschützen, um die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Einflussnahme aus dem Ausland zu minimieren. Die Unterstützung von radikalen Parteien in Europa von außerhalb der Union muss eingedämmt werden. Allen ausländischen Akteuren muss klar sein, dass ein Versuch der Einmischung oder politischen Destabilisierung zu signifikanten Konsequenzen führt.

### **Goldener Fallschirm**

Autokratien sind nicht zwangsläufig instabil: manche Autokraten sind seit Dekaden im Amt. Irgendwann jedoch kommt für jede Autokratie der Zeitpunkt, an dem sie zerbricht. Wenn Menschenmassen auf der Straße sind um ihre Freiheit einzufordern, sind politische Anführer oft mit einer unmöglichen Wahl konfrontiert. Sie können entweder Gewalt einsetzen, um ihre Opposition auf die Knie zu zwingen. Alternativ können sie abdanken. Beides ist nicht ohne Risiko. Seit der Kalte Krieg vorüber ist, wurde mehr als jeder Dritte politische Anführer in sub-Sahara Afrika nach seiner Amtszeit getötet, eingesperrt oder ins Exil gezwungen (Klaas; 2016, 112).

Es ist daher in vielen Fällen bedauerlicherweise rational und demzufolge empfehlenswert für Anführer, Gewalt gegen die eigene Bevölkerung einzusetzen. Dies wiederum kann zu Bürgerkriegen und noch mehr politischer Instabilität führen. Um in diesen Situationen eine Eskalation zu verhindern, könnte Deutschland eben jenen Anführern einen Ausweg bieten: einen

Goldenen Fallschirm. Dies würde es Anführern erlauben, ihr Land in Sicherheit zu verlassen und ihr Leben unter angemessenen Konditionen mit ihrer Familie im Ausland zu verbringen.

Goldene Fallschirme sind aus vielerlei Gründen keine gute Idee. Insbesondere reduziert sie den Abschreckungseffekt, der von äußeren Einflüssen ausgeht. Das anvisierte Ziel dieser Herangehensweise ist die Reduktion von menschlichem Leid und politischer Instabilität in Entwicklungsländern. In Realität wird das Gegenteil der Fall sein: diese Policy wird dazu führen das Anführer von Bissau bis Bishkek weniger Angst davor haben werden, ihre Bevölkerung zu quälen. Aus diesen Gründen sollte Deutschland davon absehen, Goldene Fallschirme zu spannen.

### **Ausblick**

Diese Arbeit ist ein Beitrag zur akademischen Debatte mit klaren Handlungsempfehlungen für die deutsche Außenpolitik. Irreguläre Regimewechsel passieren, wenn ein politischer Anführer in Kontradiktion der Gesetze oder Konventionen eines Staates ersetzt wird (Beger et al.; 2014). Solch ein Regimewechsel kann eine Reihe von Formen annehmen - ein Bürgerkrieg, Invasion, Aufstand, Rebellion oder Coup. In dieser Arbeit beschränke ich mich auf Coups und friedliche Aufstände. Coups und friedliche Aufstände sind oft signifikante Ereignisse - sie bringen Alliierte und Rivalen der Bundesrepublik zu Fall und Sorgen für Instabilität.

Selbst wenn sie unsere nationalen Interessen nicht immer unmittelbar berühren, sollten wir uns für diese Ereignisse interessieren, weil sie oftmals zu unerträglichem Leid vor Ort führen. Dies ist insbesondere der Fall wenn aus Aufständen und Coups Bürgerkriege entstehen, wie wir es derzeit als Folge des Arabischen Frühlings in Syrien beobachten können.

Irreguläre Regimewechsel müssen nicht zwangsläufig negative Konsequenzen haben. Die Mechanismen die Demokratien zerstören, können auch dazu führen, dass Autokraten ihre Macht verlieren. Im 20. Jahrhundert haben sich Menschen immer wieder über die Gesetze ihres Landes hinweggesetzt, um inkompetente und tyrannische Machthaber abzusetzen. Hunderttausende auf der Straße, rufend nach Freiheit. Ein Verständnis für die Mechanismen von Coups und Aufständen ist der erste Schritt dahin, die Situation vor Ort beeinflussen zu können.

Deutschland und seine Partner können versuchen, diese Formen der politischen Instabilität einzudämmen, wenn dies in unserem Interesse ist. Für den seltenen Fall, dass wir von politischer Instabilität in einem Land profitieren, können wir diese anheizen. Irreguläre Regimewechsel zu verstehen dient in erster Linie unseren Interessen, aber wir können sie niemals losgelöst von Werten und Moralität betrachten.

Wir wissen bereits viel über Coups und Aufstände, aber es gibt noch viel mehr, das wir nicht wissen. Politikwissenschaftler haben nicht nur die Konditionen analysiert, unter denen es zu diesen irregulären Regimewechseln kommen kann. Sie haben sich auch mit den Auslösern

befasst, die letzten Endes zum unmittelbaren Ausbruch von Instabilität führen. Wir haben eine grobe Idee darüber, wann ein versuchter Putsch oder Aufstand zu einem erfolgreichen Putsch oder Aufstand wird.

Darüber hinaus gibt es bereits Forschung über den Effekt dieser irregulären Regimewechsel - innerhalb eines Landes und außerhalb. Diese Arbeit ist ein Beitrag zur Forschung zu den Effekten von irregulären Regimewechseln. Im Detail geht es um den Effekt von irregulären Regimewechseln auf Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Politische Machthaber nutzen Repressionen, wenn sie glauben, der Vorteil, der sich daraus ergibt, sei höher als die resultierenden Kosten.

Wenn ein irregulärer Regimewechsel passiert, ändern sich Kosten und Vorteile von politischer Repression. Aus genau diesem Grund ändert sich dann auch die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Repression durch Machthaber genutzt wird.

In Kapitel 4 analysiere ich den Effekt von innerstaatlichen Coups und Aufständen auf Folter, erzwungenes Exil und außergerichtliche Exekutionen. Meine Analyse ergibt einen klaren Zusammenhang zwischen innerstaatlichen Coups und einem Anstieg an politischer Repression. In Kapitel 5 analysiere ich, ob irreguläre Regimewechsel auch zu mehr oder weniger Verletzungen der physischen Integrität führen können, wenn die Regimewechsel im Ausland stattfinden.

Auch hier finde ich einen Zusammenhang. Diese Erkenntnis ist bemerkenswert. Es bedeutet, dass irreguläre Regimewechsel nicht nur im eigenen Land einen Effekt haben können, sondern in einer ganzen Region. Um meine Hypothesen zu testen, benutze ich eine Reihe von quantitativen Methoden von simplen deskriptiven Statistiken bis hin zu ökonometrischen Modellen.

Kapitel 6 ist praktischer. Ich analysiere anhand der Euromaidan-Revolution 2014 in der Ukraine wie Deutschland und Russland in jüngerer Vergangenheit mit irregulären Regimewechseln umgegangen sind. Für Russland war die Revolution in der Ukraine keine Revolution, sondern ein Coup gegen eine demokratisch gewählte Regierung, mit der man arbeiten konnte. Die Bundesregierung sah in der Maidan-Revolution einen friedlichen Aufstand von Menschen, die frei sein wollen, der Korruption überdrüssig sind und in einem Rechtsstaat leben wollen, der sich an Europa annähert. Die Reaktionen auf die Ukraine-Revolution 2014 waren dementsprechend sehr verschieden.

Im letzten Teil dieser Arbeit leiste ich einen Beitrag zu aktuellen Debatten zum Umgang mit irregulären Regimewechseln. Deutsche Entscheidungsträger müssen regelmäßig schwere Entscheidungen treffen. Nicht wenige dieser Entscheidungen haben mit potentiellen oder tatsächlichen irregulären Regimewechseln zu tun. Deutschland sollte darauf verzichten, im Falle von irregulären Regimewechseln automatisch Entwicklungshilfe zu kürzen oder einzustellen.

Goldene Fallschirme, wie sie von anderen Ländern gespannt werden, sind in den allermeisten Fällen nicht sinnvoll. Die Benutzung von Widerstand als Waffe kann unter bestimmten Bedingungen zielführend sein. Eine offensive Nutzung sollte nur dann ernsthaft bedacht werden, wenn die Alternative eine direkte militärische Auseinandersetzung wäre. Widerstand ist unvorhersehbar. Seine Konsequenzen ebenso. Die defensive Nutzung von Widerstand wird oft übersehen, kann aber Deutschland und seine Verbündeten sicherer machen.

Irreguläre Regimewechsel werden zu oft falsch verstanden und ignoriert. Konflikt verändert sich. Krieg wird immer auch kinetisch sein. Aber Krieg beinhaltet auch die Unterstützung von Widerstand, Dissidenten und Rebellen. Das war im antiken Griechenland der Fall, und es ist im Herbst 2017 im Osten der Ukraine der Fall. Um sicher zu bleiben, muss Deutschland agiler in seiner Reaktion auf Episoden politischer Instabilität werden. Deutschland ist schlichtweg zu groß und mächtig, um sich hinter einer selbstgerechten Politik der nicht-Einmischung zu verstecken.



## 10 References

## References

- Abouzeid, R. (2011). Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, *TIME* . 21 January [Online] Accessed 8 September 2017.  
**URL:** <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html>
- Ackerman, P. (2007). Skills or Conditions: What Key Factors Shape the Success or Failure of Civil Resistance? Remarks at the Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics at the University of Oxford. 15 March [Online] Accessed 16 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/skills-conditions-key-factors-shape-success-failure-civil-resistance/>
- Ackerman, S. (2015). Obama restores US military aid to Egypt over Islamic State concerns, *The Guardian* . 31 March [Online] Accessed 29 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/31/obama-restores-us-military-aid-to-egypt>
- AFP (2017). Turkey arrests 1,000 and suspends 9,100 police in new crackdown, *The Guardian* . 27 April [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/27/turkey-arrests-1000-suspends-9100-police-new-crackdown>
- Aisch, G. (2017). How Angela Merkel's Longevity Compares to 3 Decades of European Leadership, *The New York Times* . 24 September [Online] Accessed 13 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/24/world/europe/merkel-germany-election-twelve-years.html>
- Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1987). Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies, *Economic Enquiry* **25**(4): 619–630.
- Ali, N. and Addley, E. (2011). At home with the Assads: Syria's ruthless ruling family, *The Guardian* . 11 October [Online] Accessed 12 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/11/assads-syria-ruling-family>
- Amann, M., Becker, M., Bidder, B., Gude, H., von Hammerstein, K., Hock, A., Hoffmann, C., Knobbe, M., Maxwill, P., Müller, P., Repinski, G., Röbel, S., Sadovnikova, A., Schepp, M., Schindler, J. and Schult, C. (2016). The Hybrid War. Russia's Propaganda Campaign Against Germany, *DER SPIEGEL* . 5 February [Online] Accessed 13 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putin-wages-hybrid-war-on-germany-and-west-a-1075483.html>

- Amnesty International (1990). Annual Report 1990, *Amnesty International* . 1 January [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0003/1990/en/>
- Amnesty International (2011). Report 2011: State of Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, January to Mid-April 2011, *Amnesty International* . 13 May [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/012/2011/en/>
- Amnesty International (2012). Annual Report 2012: The State of the World's Human Rights, *Amnesty International* . 24 May [Online] Accessed 16 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/001/2012/en/>
- Amnesty International (2015). Annual Report 2014/2015: The State of the World's Human Rights, *Amnesty International* . 25 February [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2015/en/>
- Amnesty International (2016a). Agents of the People: Four years of Foreign Agents Law in Russia, *Amnesty International* . 17 November [Online] Accessed 25 August 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/agents-of-the-people-four-years-of-foreign-agents-law-in-russia/>
- Amnesty International (2016b). Annual Report 2015/2016: The State of the World's Human Rights, *Amnesty International* . [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2016/02/annual-report-201516/>
- Amnesty International (2017). Amnesty International Report 2016/2017, *Amnesty International* . [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2017/02/amnesty-international-annual-report-201617/>
- Amt, Auswärtiges (2015). Realitätscheck: Russische Behauptungen - unsere Antworten, *Auswärtiges Amt* . 18 February [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/downloads/11401948/1/dokumentaa.pdf>
- Associated Press (1991). Ethiopia: Decades of Strife, *The New York Times* . 28 May [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/28/world/ethiopia-decades-of-strife.html>
- Auswärtiges Amt (2016). Ukraine Action Plan, *Auswärtiges Amt* . 22 February [Online] Accessed 10 September 2017.

- URL:** <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/ukraine-node/supportukraine/-/228194>
- Banks, A. (2001). *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*, Computer Systems Unlimited, Binghamton.
- Barracca, S. (2007). Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela, *Third World Quarterly* **28**(1): 137–154.
- Bartkowski, M. (2015). Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter Russian Hybrid Warfare Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter Russian Hybrid Warfare, *JHU Center for Advanced Government Studies* . March [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://advanced.jhu.edu/academics/graduate-degree-programs/global-security-studies/program-resources/publications/white-paper-maciej-bartkowski/>
- Bartles, C. K. (2016). Getting Gerasimov Right, *Military Review* (January/February). [Online] Accessed 15 November.  
**URL:** <http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2016/>
- BBC (1980). Mugabe to lead independent Zimbabwe, *On This Day* . 4 March [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid\\_2515000/2515145.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid_2515000/2515145.stm)
- BBC (2005). How the Rose revolution happened, *BBC News* . 10 May [Online] Accessed 2 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4532539.stm>
- BBC (2011a). Libya unrest: Scores killed in Benghazi 'massacre', *BBC News* . 10 February [Online] Accessed 3 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12517327>
- BBC (2011b). Profile: India's Maoist rebels, *BBC News* . 4 March [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12640645>
- BBC (2014). Czech Republic Slovakia: Velvet Revolution at 25, *BBC News* . 17 November [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30059011>

- BBC (2016a). Putin creates new National Guard in Russia 'to fight terrorism'. 6 April [Online] Accessed 10 September 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35975840>
- BBC (2016b). Syria: The story of the conflict, *BBC News* . 11 March [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>
- BBC (2017a). Russia opposition leader Alexei Navalny attacked with "brilliant green" dye, *BBC News* . 27 April [Online] Accessed 2 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39735867>
- BBC (2017b). Turkey coup anniversary: Erdogan hails 'defenders of nation', *BBC News* . 27 April [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40616488>
- Beger, A., Dorff, C. L. and Ward, M. D. (2014). Ensemble Forecasting of Irregular Leadership Change, *Research & Politics* **1**(3): 1–7.
- Belkin, a. and Schofer, E. (2003). Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **47**(5): 594–620.
- Belkin, A. and Schofer, E. (2005). Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict, *Security Studies* **14**(1): 140–177.
- Beuth, P., Biermann, K., Klingst, M. and Stark, H. (2017). Merkel and the Fancy Bear, *ZEIT ONLINE* . 12 May [Online] Accessed 13 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.zeit.de/digital/2017-05/cyberattack-bundestag-angela-merkel-fancy-bear-hacker-russia>
- Bischof, D. and Fink, S. (2015). Repression as a Double-Edged Sword: Resilient Monarchs, Repression and Revolution in the Arab World, *Swiss Political Science Review* **21**(3): 377–395.
- Böhmelt, T. B., Ezrow, L., Lehrer, R. and Ward, H. (2016). Party Policy Diffusion, *American Political Science Review* **110**(2): 397–410.
- Borger, J. (2017a). To security establishment, WikiLeaks' CIA dump is part of US-Russia battle, *The Guardian* . 7 March [Online] Accessed 13 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/mar/07/wikileaks-cia-documents-us-russia-conflict>

- Borger, J. (2017b). US official says France warned about Russian hacking before Macron leak, *The Guardian* . 9 May [Online] Accessed 13 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/09/us-russians-hacking-france-election-macron-leak>
- Borger, J. and Watt, N. (2014). G7 countries snub Putin and refuse to attend planned G8 summit in Russia, *The Guardian* . 24 March [Online] Accessed 13 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/g7-countries-snub-putin-refuse-attend-g8-summit-russia>
- Bouchet, N. (2016). Russia's 'militarization' of colour revolutions, *Policy Perspectives* (January). January [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/118246/eth-49430-01.pdf>
- Bueno De Mesquita, B. and Smith, A. (2009). Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change, *Comparative Political Studies* **42**(2): 167–197.
- Bueno De Mesquita, B. and Smith, A. (2012). *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*, PublicAffairs, New York.
- Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (2013). Vor 95 Jahren: Kaiser Wilhelm II. dankt ab, *Hintergrund aktuell* . 27 November [Online] Accessed 2 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/173925/ende-des-kaiserreichs-27-11-2013>
- Burke, J. (2016). '20 Dead' in DRC protests after president's term expires, *The Guardian* . 20 December [Online] Accessed 13 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/20/drc-protests-grow-as-kabila-clings-to-power-despite-his-term-ending>
- Butcher, C. and Svensson, I. (2016). Manufacturing Dissent: Modernization and the Onset of Major Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **60**(2): 311–339.
- Cable, K., Kofman, B. M., Rojansky, M. and Cable, K. (2015). A Closer look at Russia's "Hybrid War", *Kennan Cable* (7). April [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no7-closer-look-russias-hybrid-war>
- Carey, S. C. (2006). The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression, *Political Research Quarterly* **59**(1990): 1–11.

- Central Intelligence Agency (2017). Country Profile Ukraine, *Central Intelligence Agency* . 6 November [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>
- Chege, M. (1979). The Revolution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974 - 9, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* **17**(03): 359.
- Chenoweth, E. and Lewis, O. A. (2013). Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset , *Journal of Peace Research* **50**(3): 415–423.
- Chenoweth, E. and Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why Civil Resistance Works*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Chenoweth, E. and Ulfelder, J. (2017). Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **61**(2): 298–324.
- Chin, J. J. (2015). Military Coups, Regime Change, and Democratization, *Presentation* . First presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference 2015. Chicago.
- CIA (2017). Country Profile Madagascar, *CIA World Factbook* . 6 November [Online] Accessed 4 October 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html>
- Cingranelli, D. and Richards, D. (2010). The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project, *Human Rights Quarterly* **32**(2): 401–424.
- Clines, F. X. (1991). Secession decreed by Soviet Georgia, *The New York Times* . 10 April [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:**  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/10/world/secession-decreed-by-soviet-georgia.html>
- Collier, P. (2002). Primary commodity dependence and Africa’s future, *World Bank* (April): 1–24. [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/514531468740135280/Primary-commodity-dependence-and-Africas-future>
- Collier, P. (2008). Let Us Now Praise Coups, *The Washington Post* . 22 June [Online] Accessed 21 September 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/19/AR2008061901429.html>

- Collier, P. (2009). In praise of the coup, *New Humanist* . 4 March [Online] Accessed 13 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/1997/in-praise-of-the-coup>
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2005). Coup traps why does Africa have so many coups d'Etat?, *Centre for the Study of African Economies* (Oxford University). [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:49097086-8505-4eb2-8174-314ce1aa3ebb>
- Conant, E. (2014). How History, Geography Help Explain Ukraine's Political Crisis, *National Geographic* . 31 January [Online] Accessed 3 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/01/140129-protests-ukraine-russia-geography-history/>
- Cooper, H. (2017). U.S. Service Member Killed by Roadside Bomb in Iraq, *New York Times* . 2 October [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/world/middleeast/american-service-member-killed-iraq.html>
- Cordesman, A. H. (2014). Russia and the Color Revolution: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US, *Center for Strategic and International Studies* . 28 May [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-''colour-revolution''>
- Costello, M., Jenkins, J. C. and Aly, H. (2015). Bread, Justice, or Opportunity? The Determinants of the Arab Awakening Protests, *World Development* **67**(2011): 90–100.
- Council of the European Union (2017). List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine, *European Union* . September [Online] Accessed 19 November 2017.  
**URL:** [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/pdf/20170313-list-of-designated-persons-and-entities\\_pdf/](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/pdf/20170313-list-of-designated-persons-and-entities_pdf/)
- Crawford, N. (2013). The Iraq War: Ten Years in Ten Numbers, *Foreign Policy* . 20 March [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/20/the-iraq-war-ten-years-in-ten-numbers/>
- Crist, D. (2012). *The Twilight War. The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran*, Penguin, New York.



- Crozet, M. and Hinz, J. (2016). Collateral damage: The impact of the Russia sanctions on sanctioning countries' exports, *CEPII* p. 59. June [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/publications/wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=9213>
- Daalder, I. H. and Stavridis, J. G. (2012). NATO's Victory in Libya: The right way to run an intervention, *Foreign Affairs* **91**(2): 1–7.
- Danneman, N. and Ritter, E. H. (2013). Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **58**(2): 254–279.
- Davenport, C. (1996). The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants of Political Repression, *Political Research Quarterly* **49**(2): 377–403.
- Davenport, C. (2007). State Repression and Political Order, *Annual Review of Political Science* **10**(1): 1–23.
- David, S. (1985). *Defending third world regimes from coup d'etat*, University Press of America, Lanham.
- de Freytas-Tamura, K. (2017). When Will Kabila Go? Congolese Leader Long Overstays His Welcome, *The New York Times* . 23 July [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:**  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/23/world/africa/congo-joseph-kabila-elections.html>
- De Juan, A. and Bank, A. (2015). The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war, *Journal of Peace Research* **52**(1): 91–104.
- Derpanopoulos, G., Frantz, E., Geddes, B. and Wright, J. (2016). Are coups good for democracy?, *Research and Politics* **1**: 1–7.
- Desch, M. (1999). *Civilian control of the military: the changing security environment*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Dewar, B., Massey, S. and Baker, B. (2013). Madagascar: Time to Make a Fresh Start, *Chatham House* (January): 1–19. 1 January [Online] 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/188849>
- Deyermond, R. (2016). The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty-first Century Russian Foreign Policy, *Europe - Asia Studies* **68**(6): 957–984.
- Dobbin, F., Simmons, B. and Garret, G. (2007). The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, *Annual Review of Sociology* **33**: 449–72.

- DW (2005). Angela Merkel Sworn in as German Chancellor, *Deutsche Welle* . 22 November [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:**  
<http://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-sworn-in-as-german-chancellor/a-1786512>
- Ebert, T. (1981a). *Soziale Verteidigung. Formen und Bedingungen des Zivilen Widerstands*, Waldkircher Verlagsgesellschaft, Waldkirchen.
- Ebert, T. (1981b). *Soziale Verteidigung. Historische Erfahrungen und Grundzüge der Strategie*, Waldkircher Verlagsgesellschaft, Waldkirchen.
- Ehni, E. (2017). Schulz unten, Merkel obenauf, *tagesschau.de* . 8 June [Online] Accessed 3 October 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend-809.html>
- Eitze, J. and Gleichmann, M. (2014). Ten Myths used to Justify Russian Policy in the Ukraine Crisis, *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* **149**(149). 23 June [Online] Accessed 15 November.  
**URL:** <http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.37844/>
- Entous, A. and Nakashima, E. (2016). FBI in agreement with CIA that Russia aimed to help Trump win White House, *The Washington Post* . 16 December [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-blames-putins-personal-grudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/16/12f36250-c3be-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.bbbd91cb6376](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-blames-putins-personal-grudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/16/12f36250-c3be-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html?utm_term=.bbbd91cb6376)
- Erlanger, S. (2001). The World; Learning to Fear Putin's Gaze, *The New York Times* . 25 February [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/25/weekinreview/the-world-learning-to-fear-putin-s-gaze.html>
- Erlanger, S. (2017). Russia's RT Network: Is It More BBC or K.G.B.?, *The New York Times* . 8 March [Online] Accessed 5 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/europe/russias-rt-network-is-it-more-bbc-or-kgb.html>
- Escribà Folch, A. (2013). Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy, *International Political Science Review* **34**(5): 543–560.

European Union (2017). EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis. [Online] Accessed 28 August 2017.

**URL:** [https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis\\_en](https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en)

Fasanotti, F. S. (2016). Making Libya's economy work again, *Brookings Order from Chaos* . 7 October [Online] Accessed 1 October 2017.

**URL:** <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/10/07/making-libyas-economy-work-again/>

Fearon, J. D. and Stanford, D. D. L. (2003). War Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, *The American Political Science Review* **97**(1): 75–90.

Fein, H. (1995). More Murder in the Middle : Violations and Life-Integrity Democracy in the World , 1987, *Human Rights Quarterly* **17**(1): 170–191.

Feit, E. (1973). *The armed bureaucrats: Military-administrative regimes and political development*, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston.

Ferguson, G. (1987). *Coup d'etat: A Practical Manual*, Sterling, New York.

Filipov, D. (2017). Here are 10 critics of Vladimir Putin who died violently or in suspicious ways, *The Washington Post* . 23 March [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.

**URL:** [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/23/here-are-ten-critics-of-vladimir-putin-who-died-violently-or-in-suspicious-ways/?utm\\_term=.346457e3088d](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/23/here-are-ten-critics-of-vladimir-putin-who-died-violently-or-in-suspicious-ways/?utm_term=.346457e3088d)

Finer, S. (1970). *Comparative government*, Allen Lane, London.

Finer, S. S. (1988). *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd edn, Allen Lane, Boulder.

Fischer, S. (1990). Rules versus discretion in monetary policy, in B. Friedman and F. Hahn (eds), *Handbook of Monetary Economics*, 2 edn, North Holland, Amsterdam.

Fischer, S. (2015). European Union Sanctions Against Russia. Objectives, Impacts and Next Steps, *German Institute for International and Security Affairs* . March [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.

**URL:** <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/eu-sanctions-against-russia/>

Fisher, M. (2013a). Law says the U.S. is required to cut aid after coups. Will it?, *The Washington Post* . 3 July [Online] Accessed 12 September.

- URL:** [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/03/law-says-the-u-s-is-required-to-cut-aid-after-coups-will-it/?utm\\_term=.10bbfad89e8b](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/03/law-says-the-u-s-is-required-to-cut-aid-after-coups-will-it/?utm_term=.10bbfad89e8b)
- Fisher, M. (2013b). U.S. has spotty record on law requiring it to cut aid after coups, *The Washington Post* . 5 July [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.
- URL:** [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/05/u-s-has-spotty-record-on-law-requiring-it-to-cut-aid-after-coups/?utm\\_term=.c94033713a71](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/05/u-s-has-spotty-record-on-law-requiring-it-to-cut-aid-after-coups/?utm_term=.c94033713a71)
- Flintoff, C. (2016). The View from a Russian Frigate in Crimea, *NPR* . 29 July [Online] Accessed 2 October 2017.
- URL:** <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/07/29/487620754/the-view-from-a-russian-frigate-in-crimea>
- Fossum, E. (1967). Factors influencing the occurrence of military coups d'état in Latin America, *Journal of Peace Research* 4: 228–251.
- Francis, D. (2015). When a Coup is Not a Coup, *Foreign Policy* . 21 January [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.
- URL:** <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/21/when-a-coup-is-not-a-coup/>
- Francisco, R. (2004). After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression, *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 9(2): 107–126.
- Franzese, R. and Hays, J. (2007). Spatial Econometric Models of Cross-Sectional Interdependence in Political Science Panel and Time-Series-Cross-Section Data, *Political Analysis* 15(2): 140–164.
- Freedom House (2016). Freedom on the Net: Russia 2016, *Freedom House* . [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.
- URL:** [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN 2016 Russia.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN%202016%20Russia.pdf)
- Freedom House (2017a). Country Profile Russia, *Freedom in the World 2017* . [Online] Accessed 25 August 2017.
- URL:** <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/russia>
- Freedom House (2017b). Freedom in the World 2017, *Freedom House* . [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.
- URL:** <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>
- Freeland, C. (2015). My Ukraine, *Brookings* .
- URL:** <http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/myukraine.html>

- Fuchs, R. (2013). Germany outraged over NGO raids in Russia, *Deutsche Welle* . 29 March [Online] Accessed 16 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-outraged-over-ngo-raids-in-russia/a-16709337>
- Funk, M. and Parkes, R. (2016). Refugees versus terrorists, *European Union Institute for Security Studies* (January): 1–2. January [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/greece/resource/static/files/refugees-versus-terrorists.pdf>
- Galbert, S. D. (n.d.). A Year of Sanctions against Russia: Now What?, *Center for Strategic and International Studies* . 1 October [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.csis.org/analysis/year-sanctions-against-russia-now-what>
- Gartner, S. S. and Regan, P. M. (1996). Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence, *Journal of Peace Research* **33**(3): 273–287.
- Gathmann, F. and Weiland, S. (2017). Gabriel gibt Merkel Mitschuld am Erfolg der AfD, *SPIEGEL ONLINE* . 14 September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/sigmar-gabriel-gibt-angela-merkel-mitschuld-am-aufkommen-der-afd-a-1167451.html>
- Gaynor, T. and Zargoun, T. (2011). Gaddafi caught like 'rat' in a drain, humiliated and shot, *Reuters* . 21 October 2011 [Online] Accessed 3 October 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-gaddafi-finalhours/gaddafi-caught-like-rat-in-a-drain-humiliated-and-shot-idUSTRE79K43S20111021>
- Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about Democratization after Twenty Years?, *Annual Review of Political Science* **2**(June): 115–144.
- Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E. (2013). New Data on Autocratic Breakdowns and Regime Transitions, *Perspectives on Politics* **12**(1): 1–50.
- Giles, K. (2016). Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power. 21 March [Online] 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-new-tools-confronting-west>
- Glass, A. (2012). West Germany, East Germany reunite, Oct. 3, 1990, *Politico* . 10 March [Online] Accessed 14 November.  
**URL:** <http://www.politico.com/story/2012/10/this-day-in-politics-081922>

- Goemans, H., Gleditsch, K. and Chiozza, G. (2009). Introducing archigos: A dataset of political leaders, *Journal of Peace Research* **46**(2): 269–283.
- Goemans, H., Gleditsch, K. S. and Chiozza, G. (2016). Archigos: A Data Set on Leaders 1875–2015 - Handbook. 28 February [Online] Accessed 19 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm>
- Golubkova, K. and Baczynska, G. (2014). Rouble fall, sanctions hurt Russia's economy: Medvedev, *Reuters* . 10 December [Online] Accessed 2 October 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-medvedev-sanctions/rouble-fall-sanctions-hurt-russias-economy-medvedev-idUSKBN0JO0SR20141210>
- Gorzweski, A. (2016). Naumann Foundation closure leads to political conflict between Berlin, Cairo, *Deutsche Welle* . 18 May [Online] Accessed 16 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.dw.com/en/naumann-foundation-closure-leads-to-political-conflict-between-berlin-cairo/a-19266935>
- Graham, D. (2014). Rumsfeld's Knowns and Unknowns: The Intellectual History of a Quip, *The Atlantic* . 27 March [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/rumsfelds-knowns-and-unknowns-the-intellectual-history-of-a-quip/359719/>
- Greenhill, B. (2010). The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms, *International Studies Quarterly* **54**(1): 127–145.
- Greven, L. (2014). Eine geteilte, leidvolle Geschichte, *Zeit Online* . 3 March [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-03/russland-ukraine-geschichte>
- Gvosdev, N. K. (2014). Russia and the Precedent Problem, *The National Interest* . 25 November [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-the-precedent-problem-11349>
- Hamid, S. and Mandaville, P. (2013). A Coup Too Far: The Case For Reordering A US Priorities in Egypt, *Brookings* . 5 September [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-coup-too-far-the-case-for-reordering-u-s-priorities-in-egypt/>
- Hansen, F. S. (2017). Russian Hybrid Warfare. A study of Disinformation, *Danish Institute for International Studies* . [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.diis.dk/en/research/russian-disinformation>

- Härtel, A. (2014). Germany and the crisis in Ukraine: Divided over Moscow, *Real Instituto Elcano* . 8 May [Online] Accessed 16 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/180209>
- Henderson, C. W. (1991). Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **35**(1): 120–142.
- Herreros, F. (2006). 'The Full Weight of the State': The Logic of Random State-Sanctioned Violence, *Journal of Peace Research* **43**(6): 671–689.
- Herszenhorn, D. M. and Barry, E. (2011). Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest Over Vote, *The New York Times* . 8 December [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/putin-accuses-clinton-of-instigating-russian-protests.html>
- Hibbs, D. (1973). *Mass political violence: A cross-national causal analysis*, John Wiley, New York.
- Higgins, A. (2016a). In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines With Firepower, *The New York Times* . 13 September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/russia-orthodox-church.html>
- Higgins, A. (2016b). In Russia's 'Frozen Zone', a Creeping Border with Georgia, *The New York Times* . 23 October [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/europe/in-russias-frozen-zone-a-creeping-border-with-georgia.html>
- Hill, D. W. (2013). The Concept of Personal Integrity Rights In Empirical Research, *Working Paper* . 14 February [Online] Accessed 19 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.concepts-methods.org/WorkingPapers/PoliticalConcepts>
- Hill, D. W. and Jones, Z. M. (2014). An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression, *The American Political Science Review* **108**(3): 661–687.
- Hoffman, F. (2014). On not-so-new warfare: Political warfare vs hybrid threats, *War on the Rocks* . 28 July [Online] Accessed 25 August 2017.  
**URL:** <https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/>
- Holcomb, F. (2017). The Kremlin's Irregular Army: Ukrainian Separatist Order of Battle, *Institute for the Study of War* . 7 September [Online] Accessed 17 November.

- URL:** <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin's-irregular-army-ukrainian-separatist-order-battle>
- Holst, J. J. (1990). *Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era*, Albert Einstein Institution, Cambridge.
- HRW (1999). Ethiopian Dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, *Human Rights Watch* . 24 November [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.hrw.org/news/1999/11/24/ethiopian-dictator-mengistu-haile-mariam>
- HRW (2014). All According to Plan The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt, *Human Rights Watch* . 8 December [Online] Accessed 19 November 2017.  
**URL:** [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0814web\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0814web_0.pdf)
- Hultquist, P. (2015). Is collective repression an effective counterinsurgency technique? Unpacking the cyclical relationship between repression and civil conflict, *Conflict Management and Peace Science* **34**(5): 507–525.
- Huntington, S. (1957). *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Huntington, S. (1968). *Political order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Huntington, S. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma, Norman.
- Ide, R. (2014). Der große Irrtum von Erich Honecker, *Tagesspiegel* . 18 January [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/die-mauer-steht-noch-50-und-auch-100-jahre-der-grosse-irrtum-von-erich-honecker/9352568.html>
- Ioffe, J. (2015). After Boris Nemtsov's Assassination, There Are No Longer Any Limits', *The New York Times Magazine* . 28 February [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/magazine/after-boris-nemtsovs-assassination-there-are-no-longer-any-limits.html>
- Jackman, R. W. (1978). The predictability of coups d'état: A model with African data, *American Political Science Review* **72**: 1262–1275.
- Janowitz, M. (1964). *The military in the political development of new nations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.



- Janowitz, M. (1977). *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Countries*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Jewkes, S. and Vukmanovic, O. (2017). Suspected Russia-backed hackers target Baltic energy networks, *Reuters* . 11 May [Online] Accessed 8 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-cyber-insight/suspected-russia-backed-hackers-target-baltic-energy-networks-idUSKBN1871W5>
- Kalb, M. (2014). A Tottering Ukraine - Putin's Nightmare As the Sochi Games Begin, *Brookings* . 6 February [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/02/06/a-tottering-ukraine-putins-nightmare-as-the-sochi-games-begin/>
- Kalin, S. (2014). Egypt receives 10 Apache helicopters from US, *Reuters* . 20 December [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-egypt-apaches/egypt-receives-10-apache-helicopters-from-u-s-sources-idUSKBN0JY0JS20141220>
- Kardaś, S. and Kłysiński, K. (2017). The story that never ends: A new stage in the energy dispute between Russia and Belarus, *OSW* . 17 May [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-05-17/story-never-ends-a-new-stage-energy-dispute-between-russia-and>
- Kennedy, G. (1974). *The Military in the Third World*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
- Khawaja, M. (1993). Repression and popular collective action: Evidence from the West Bank, *Sociological Forum* **8**(1): 47–71.
- King-Hall, S. (1959). *Defence in the Nuclear Age*, Victor Gollancz, London.
- King, M. (1997). Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in practice, *Journal of Monetary Economics* **39**(1): 81–97.
- Kinzer, S. (2003). *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken.
- Kirchick, J. (2017). Why Russia's RT should register as an agent of a foreign government, *Brookings* . 22 September [Online] Accessed 7 October 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/22/why-russias-rt-should-register-as-an-agent-of-a-foreign-government/>

- Kissinger, H. (1956). Reflections on American History, *Foreign Affairs* **35**(1): 37–56.
- Klaas, B. (2016). *The Despot's Accomplice*, Hurst & Company, London.
- Klaas, B. and Ulfelder, J. (2016). The uneven cost of coups: Why countries that can least afford recession are most likely to experience one after a coup d'état, *Working Paper* . Presented at the University of Kiel in Germany 27.01.2016.
- Klein, M. (2016). Putin's New National Guard. Bulwark against Mass Protests and Illoyal Elites, *German Institute for International and Security Affairs* . September [Online] Accessed 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/putins-new-national-guard/>
- Kofman, M., Migacheva, K., Nichiporuk, B., Radin, A., Tkacheva, O. and Oberholtzer, J. (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, *RAND Corporation* . [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** [https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/k/kofman\\_michael.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/authors/k/kofman_michael.html)
- Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (1981). *Frieden mit anderen Waffen*, Rowohlt, Reinbek.
- Kraft, S. (1988). Ethiopia Forgets Its Famine to Concentrate on Civil War, *The Los Angeles Times* . 30 May [Online] Accessed 20 November 2017.  
**URL:** [http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-30/news/mn-2395\\_1\\_civil-war](http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-30/news/mn-2395_1_civil-war)
- Krauss, C. (1991). Ethiopia's Dictator Flees; Officials Seeking U.S. Help, *The New York Times* . 22 May [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/22/world/ethiopia-s-dictator-flees-officials-seeking-us-help.html?pagewanted=all>
- Kundnani, H. (2016). Germany Is Rekindling Its Bromance With Russia, *Foreign Policy* . 7 July [Online] Accessed 28 August.  
**URL:**  
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/07/germany-is-rekindling-its-bromance-with-russia/>
- Lanoszka, A. (2016). Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe, *International Affairs* **92**(1): 175–195.
- Laub, Z. (2017). Who's Who in Syria's Civil War, *Council on Foreign Relations* . 28 April [Online] Accessed 8 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.cfr.org/background/whos-who-syrias-civil-war>

- Lee Myers, S. and Barry, E. (2014). Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West, *The New York Times* . 18 March [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html>
- Leon, G. (2014). Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d'etat, *Public Choice* **159**(3-4): 363–383.
- Lieuwen, E. (1962). Militarism and politics in Latin America, in J. Johnson (ed.), *The role of the military in underdeveloped countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Linz, J. (1978). *The breakdown of democratic regimes*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Lipman, M. and McFaul, M. (2011). Managed Democracy in Russia. Putin and the Press, *The International Journal of Press/Politics* **6**(3): 116–127.
- Lipton, E., Sanger, D. E. and Shane, S. (2016). The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S., *The New York Times* . 13 December [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html>
- Londregan, J. B. and Poole, K. T. (1990). Poverty, The Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power, *World Politics* **42**(2): 151–183.
- Lunde, T. (1991). Modernization and Political Instability: Coup d'Etat in Africa, 1955-1985, *Acta Sociologica* **34**(1): 13–32.
- Luttwak, E. (1969). *Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
- Luttwak, E. (2016). Why Turkey's Coup d'État Failed, *Foreign Policy* *Foreign Policy* . 16 July [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/16/why-turkeys-coup-detat-failed-erdogan/>
- MacFarquhar, N. (2016). A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories, *The New York Times* . 28 August [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:**  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html>
- Maggetti, M. and Gilardi, F. (2015). Problems (and Solutions) in the Measurement of Policy Diffusion Mechanisms, *Journal of Public Policy* **36**(1): 1–21.

- Makara, M. (2013). Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring, *Democracy and Security* 9(4): 334–359.  
**URL:** <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2013.802983>
- Marinov, N. and Goemans, H. (2013). Coups and Democracy, *British Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 799–825.  
**URL:** <http://www.nikolaymarinov.com/wp-content/files/GoemansMarinovCoup.pdf>
- Marshall, M. and Jagger, K. (2014). Polity IV Dataset and Users' Manual: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013. [Online] Accessed 23 August 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>
- Marshall, M. and Marshall, D. R. (2017). Coup d'état events, 1946–2016. [Online] Accessed 28 August 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>
- Martin, C. W. (2010). Interdependence and Political Ideology: The Conditional Diffusion of Cigarette Taxation in U.S. States, *World Political Science* 6(1): 253–277.
- McCurry, J. (2015). North Korea defence chief reportedly executed with anti-aircraft gun, *The Guardian* . 13 May [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/13/north-korean-defence-minister-executed-by-anti-aircraft-gun-report>
- McCurry, J. (2016). North Korea executes officials with anti-aircraft gun in new purge - report, *The Guardian* . 30 August [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/north-korea-reportedly-executes-officials-anti-aircraft-gun-purge>
- McDermott, R. (2015). Slavic Brotherhood 2015 Rehearses Anti-Color Revolution Operations. 9 September [Online] Accessed 10 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://jamestown.org/program/slavic-brotherhood-2015-rehearses-anti-color-revolution-operations/>
- McDermott, R. N. (2016). Learning from Today's Wars: Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?, *Parameters* 46(1): 97–105.
- McDowall, Angus (2017). Syrian war monitor says 465,000 killed in six years of fighting, *Reuters* . 13 March [Online] Accessed 8 September 2017.  
**URL:**  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-casualties-idUSKBN16K1Q1>

- McGowan, P. J. (2003). African military coups d'état, 1956-2001: frequency, trends and distribution, *The Journal of African Studies* 41(3): 339–370.
- Meister, S. (2015). Isolation and Propaganda: The Roots and Instruments of Russia's Disinformation Campaign, *German Marshall Fund* (6). 15 April [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/isolation-and-propaganda-roots-and-instruments-russia?s-disinformation-campaign>
- Meister, S. (2016). The "Lisa Case": Germany as a target of Russian disinformation, *NATO Review Magazine* . [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm>
- Menkiszak, M. (2015). Russia's Long War on Ukraine, *Transatlantic Academy* . 1 February [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/russia's-long-war-ukraine>
- Merriam-Webster (2017a). Coup d'état, *Merriam-Webster* . [Online] Accessed 4 October 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d%27état>
- Merriam Webster (2017b). Regime, *Merriam Webster* . [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regime>
- Meyer, H. (2017). Russian Opposition Leader Arrested Hours Before Latest Rally, *Bloomberg Politics* . 29 September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-29/russian-opposition-leader-arrested-hours-before-latest-rally>
- Meyersson, E. (2015). Political Man on Horseback Military Coups and Development, *Working paper* . 5 April [Online] Accessed 21 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.hhs.se/en/research/institutes/site/publications/2015-political-man-on-horseback/>
- Miller, A. C. (2011). Debunking the myth of the "good" coup d'état in Africa, *African Studies Quarterly* 12(2): 45–70.
- Miller, C. (2016). Why Russia's Economic Leverage Is Declining, *Transatlantic Academy* . 20 April [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.

- URL:** <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/why-russia's-economic-leverage-declining>
- Mitchell, S. M., Ring, J. J. and Spellman, M. K. (2013). Domestic legal traditions and states' human rights practices, *Journal of Peace Research* **50**: 189–202.
- Moore, W. H. (2000). The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **44**(1): 107–127.
- Murray, W. and Mansoor, P. R. (2012). *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Myerson, R. (2004). Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* **160**(2): 187–209.
- Neubert, E. (2009). Die Friedliche Revolution. Vom Herbst 1989 bis zur Deutschen Einheit, *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* . 4 June [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.16684/>
- Neumayer, E. and Plümper, T. (2012). Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence, *Comparative Political Studies* **45**(7): 819–849.
- Neumayer, E. and Plümper, T. (2016). W, *Political Science Research and Methods* **4**(01): 175–193.
- Nonn, C. (2015). *Bismarck - Ein Preuße und sein Jahrhundert*, C.H. Beck, Munich.
- Nordås, R. and Davenport, C. (2013). Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State Repression, *American Journal of Political Science* **57**(4): 926–940.
- OECD (2016). Development aid in 2015 continues to grow despite costs for in-donor refugees. 2015 Preliminary ODA figures, *OECD* . 13 April [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf>
- OECD (2017a). Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], *OECD* . 16 October [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=42231&lang=en>
- OECD (2017b). Data Lab, *OECD* . [Online] Accessed 3 October 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.oecd.org/statistics/datalab/>

- O'Hanlon, M. E. (2017). Beyond NATO: A new security architecture for Eastern Europe, *Brookings* . 15 August [Online] Accessed 3 October 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.brookings.edu/book/beyond-nato/>
- O'Kane, R. H. (1987). *The Likelihood of Coups*, Avebury, Aldeshot.
- O'Kane, R. H. T. (1993). Coups d'Etat in Africa: A Political Economy Approach, *Journal of Peace Research* **30**(3): 251–270.
- Olson, M. (1963). Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force, *Journal of Economic History* **23**(December): 529–552.
- Orttung, R. and Walker, C. (2015). Putin's Frozen Conflicts, *Foreign Policy* . 13 February [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-conflicts/>
- Owen, J. M. (2002). The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions, *International Organization* **56**(2): 375–409.
- Pamuk, H. and Coskun, O. (2017). At height of Turkish coup bid, rebel jets had Erdogan's plane in their sights, *Reuters* . 17 July [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-plot-insight/at-height-of-turkish-coup-bid-rebel-jets-had-erdogans-plane-in-their-sights-idUSKCN0ZX0Q9>
- Pet, N., Gleditsch, T. E. R., Eriksson, M., Strand, H., Sarkees, M. R. and Smith, D. (2002). Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset, *Journal of Peace Research* **39**(5): 615–637.
- Pilster, U. and Bohmelt, T. (2011). Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-99, *Conflict Management and Peace Science* **28**(4): 331–350.
- Poe, S. C., Carey, S. C. and Vazquez, T. C. (2001). How are These Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995, *Human Rights Quarterly* **23**(3): 650–677.
- Poe, S. C., Tate, C. N. and Texas, N. (1994). Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s : A Global Analysis, *The American Political Science Review* **88**(4): 853–872.
- Pond, E. and Kundnani, H. (2015). Germany's Real Role in the Ukraine Crisis, *Foreign Affairs* (March/April). [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/germany-s-real-role-ukraine-crisis>

- Powell, E. J. and Staton, J. K. (2009). Domestic judicial institutions and human rights treaty violation, *International Studies Quarterly* **53**(1): 149–174.
- Powell, J. (2012). Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **56**(6): 1017–1040.
- Powell, J. M. (2014). An assessment of the 'democratic' coup theory, *African Security Review* **23**(October): 213–224.
- Powell, J. M. and Thyne, C. L. (2011). Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset, *Journal of Peace Research* **48**(2): 249–259.  
**URL:** <http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022343310397436>
- Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2014a). Bundeskanzlerin Merkel telefonierte mit dem ukrainischen Staatspräsidenten Janukowitsch, *Die Bundeskanzlerin* . 23 January [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2014/01/2014-01-23-merkel-janukowitsch.html>
- Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2014b). Bundesregierung verurteilt Referendum. 18 March [Online] Accessed 28 August 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2014/03/2014-03-17-krim-statement-sts.html>
- Quinlivan, J. T. (2007). Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East, *International Security* **24**(2): 131–165.
- Radin, A. (2017). Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses, *RAND Corporation* pp. 1–37. [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1577.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1577.html)
- Regan, P. M. and Henderson, E. A. (2002). Democracy , threats and political repression in developing countries : are democracies internally less violent?, *Third World Quarterly* **23**(1): 119–136.
- Reisinger, H. and Golts, A. (2014). Russia's Hybrid Warfare - Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence, (105): 1–12. November [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/185744>



- Reporters Without Borders (2017). 2017 World Press Freedom Index, *Reporters Without Borders* . [Online] Accessed 25 August 2017.  
**URL:** <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>
- Reyntjens, F. (2001). Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila, *African Affairs* **100**(399): 311–317.
- Roberts, A. (1991). *Civil resistance in the East European and Soviet revolutions*, Albert Einstein Institute, Cambridge.
- Ross, J. (1983). Famine, War Threaten Thousands in Ethiopia, *Washington Post* . 26 June [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/21/AR2006072100838.html>
- Roth, A. (2014). Putin Tells European Official That He Could 'Take Kiev in Two Weeks', *The New York Times* . 2 September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/world/europe/ukraine-crisis.html>
- Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's interview with NBC, *Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs* . 21 July [Online] 8 November 2017.  
**URL:** [http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/news/-/asset\\_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2821758](http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2821758)
- Sahin, K. (2017). Germany Confronts Russian Hybrid Warfare, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* . 26 July [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/07/26/germany-confronts-russian-hybrid-warfare-pub-72636>
- Sanchez, C. (1991). A Victory Tempered by Sorrow, *The Washington Post* . 26 May [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/05/26/a-victory-tempered-by-sorrow/1a9b998a-0b1c-43e7-9c9c-4c4a2898412e/?utm\\_term=.61a3fd5bc7c6](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/05/26/a-victory-tempered-by-sorrow/1a9b998a-0b1c-43e7-9c9c-4c4a2898412e/?utm_term=.61a3fd5bc7c6)
- Sanger, D. E. and Shane, S. (2016). Russian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump in Election, U.S. Says, *The New York Times* . 9 December [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/obama-russia-election-hack.html>
- Schmiese, W. (2014). Steinmeier stellt sich gegen Merkel, *Cicero* . 29 January [Online] Accessed 28 August 2017.

- URL:** <http://cicero.de/aussenpolitik/russland-politik-putin-frank-walter-steinmeier-stellt-sich-gegen-merkel/56935>
- Service, R. (2009). *Russia. From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd edn, Penguin, London.
- Sharp, G. (1973). *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, Porter Sargent.
- Sharp, G. (1985). *National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense*, Association for Transarmament Studies, Omaha.
- Sharp, G. (1990). *Civilian-Based Defense*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Simoës, A. and Hildago, C. (2011). The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development, *Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*. [Online] Accessed 19 November 2017.
- URL:** <https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/WS/AAAIW11/paper/view/3948>
- SIPRI (2017). Importer/Exporter TIV Tables.
- URL:** <http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php>
- Smale, A., Gall, C. and Pianigiani, G. (2016). Ordered Deported, Berlin Suspect Slipped Through Germany's Fingers, *The New York Times*. 22 December [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.
- URL:** <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/world/europe/anis-amri-berlin-market-crash.html>
- Snegovaya, M. (2015). Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine, *Institute for the Study of War* (September): 28. September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.
- URL:** <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-origins-russias-hybrid-warfare>
- Spaulding, H. (2015). Russia's False ISIS Narrative in Syria, *Institute for the Study of War* pp. 1–6. 1 December [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.
- URL:** <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-false-narrative-syria-december-1-2015>
- Stelzenmüller, C. (2017). After the election, Germany's democracy faces its hardest test since 1949, *The Washington Post*. 25 September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.

- URL:** [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/09/25/after-election-result-germanys-democracy-faces-its-hardest-test-since-1949/?utm\\_term=.e0913debe55b](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/09/25/after-election-result-germanys-democracy-faces-its-hardest-test-since-1949/?utm_term=.e0913debe55b)
- Stepan, A. (1978). *The state and society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Stephen, C. (2016). Five years after Gaddafi, Libya torn by civil war and battles with Isis, *The Guardian* . 16 February [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/16/libya-gaddafi-arab-spring-civil-war-islamic-state>
- Svolik, M. W. (2014). Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation, *British Journal of Political Science* **45**(04): 1–24.
- Tamkin, E. (2017). Putin Heads to Occupied Georgia Territory on War Anniversary, *Foreign Policy* . 8 August 2017 [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/08/putin-heads-to-occupied-georgia-territory-on-war-anniversary/>
- Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Khomenko, A. and Svensson, R. (2016). The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, *University of Gothenburg* . January [Online] Accessed 17 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata>
- Tetrault-Faber, G. (2015). Russian Defense Ministry to Fund Prophylactic 'Color Revolution' Research, *The Moscow Times* . 21 June [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-defense-ministry-to-fund-prophylactic-color-revolution-research-47559>
- The Economist (2011). You can run. But can you hide?, *The Economist* . 19 May [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.economist.com/node/18709561>
- The Economist (2013). Coup-lio, *The Economist* . 23 July [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/07/americas-response-coups>
- The Economist (2016). What are the Minsk agreements?, *The Economist* . 14 September [Online] 28 August 2017.

- URL:**  
<https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economist-explains-7>
- Thepgumpanat, P. and Tanakasempipat, P. (2017). Three years after coup, junta is deeply embedded in Thai life, *Reuters* . 20 May [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-military/three-years-after-coup-junta-is-deeply-embedded-in-thai-life-idUSKCN18G0ZJ?il=0>
- Thompson, W. R. (1973). *Grievances of Military Coup-Makers*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills.
- Thompson, W. R. (1976). Organizational cohesion and military coup outcomes, *Comparative Political Studies* **9**: 255–276.
- Thyne, C. L. and Powell, J. M. (2014). Coup d'état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008, *Foreign Policy Analysis* **0**: 1–22.
- Tian, N., Fleurant, A., Wezeman, P. and Wezeman, S. (2017). Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016, *Technical Report April*, SIPRI2017.  
**URL:**  
<https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf>
- Tiruneh, A. (1990). The Ethiopian Revolution 1974 to 1984, *PhD Thesis* . London School of Economics and Political Science [Online] Accessed 19 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1115/>
- Tolstrup, J. (2009). Studying a negative external actor: Russia's management of stability and instability in the 'Near Abroad', *Democratization* **16**(5): 922–944.  
**URL:** <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510340903162101>
- Trotta, D. (2013). Iraq war costs U.S. more than \$2 trillion: study, *Reuters* . 14 March [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-war-anniversary/iraq-war-costs-u-s-more-than-2-trillion-study-idUSBRE92D0PG20130314>
- Varol, O. O. (2012). The Democratic Coup d'Etat, *Harvard International Law Journal* **53**(2): 292–356.
- Vasovic, A. and Croft, A. (2014). U.S., EU set sanctions as Putin recognizes Crimea "sovereignty", *Reuters* . 17 March [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSBREA1Q1E820140317>

- von Clausewitz, C. (1989). *On War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Walker, P. (2006). Thai military claims control after coup, *The Guardian* . 19 September [Online] Accessed 18 September 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/19/thailand>
- Walker, S. (2014). Ukrainian president: Russian troops have crossed border, *The Guardian* . 28 August [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/28/ukraine-accuses-russia-invading-south-east-help-rebels>
- Ward, M. D. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2008). *Spatial regression models. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences*, SAGE, London.
- Weart, S. (1998). *Never at War: Why Democracies Will not Fight One Another*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Welch, C. (1970). *Soldiers and State in Africa*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
- Wesslau, F. (2016). Putin's friends in Europe, *European Council on Foreign Relations* . 19 October [Online] Accessed 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** [http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_putins\\_friends\\_in\\_europe7153](http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153)
- Whitman, A. (1975). Haile Selassie of Ethiopia Dies at 83, *New York Times* . 28 August [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0723.html>
- Wilson, M. R. (2017). Russian network RT must register as foreign agent in US, *The Hill* . 12 September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/350226-russian-network-rt-must-register-as-foreign-agent-in>
- Wimmen, H. (2016). Syria's path from civic uprising to civil war, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* . 22 November [Online] 15 November 2017.  
**URL:** <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/22/syria-s-path-from-civic-uprising-to-civil-war-pub-66171>
- Wood, R. and Gibney, M. (2010). The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI, *Human Rights Quarterly* **32**(2): 367–400.
- World Bank (2017a). GDP (current US\$), *World Bank* . [Online] Accessed 8 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>

- World Bank (2017b). GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$), *World Bank Data* . [Online] 8 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD>
- World Bank (2017c). Population, total, *World Bank* . [Online] Accessed 8 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>
- World Bank (2017d). World Development Indicators, *World Bank* . 15 September [Online] 24 August 2017.  
**URL:** <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>
- Wright, J. (2017). 10 Years After 'Mission Accomplished', the Risks of Another Intervention, *The Atlantic* . 1 May [Online] Accessed 21 November 2017.  
**URL:** <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/10-years-after-mission-accomplished-the-risks-of-another-intervention/275446/>
- Yan, H. (2017). Why Syrian civilians get killed with barrel bombs and chemical attacks, *CNN* . 6 April [Online] Accessed 8 September 2017.  
**URL:** <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/06/middleeast/syria-weapons-against-civilians/index.html>
- Zeit (2015). Gabriel schlägt Ende der Sanktionen gegen Russland vor, *ZEIT ONLINE* . 25 September [Online] Accessed 14 November 2017.  
**URL:**  
<http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-09/sigmar-gabriel-russland-sanktionen-syrien>
- Zeit (2017). Seehofer fordert Ende der Russland-Sanktionen. 29 January [Online] Accessed 28 August 2017.  
**URL:** <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-01/horst-seehofer-bayern-csu-ende-sanktionen-russland-wladimir-putin>
- Zimmermann, E. (1983). *Political violence, crises and revolutions: Theories and research*, G.K. Hall & Co, Boston.

# MARCEL A. DIRSUS

Geburtsdatum: 24.09.1990 ◊ Staatsangehörigkeit: Deutsch

## BILDUNG

---

<b>Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel</b> Promotion in Politikwissenschaft Manfred-Wörner-Stipendium für sicherheitspolitische Studien, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Kiel, Deutschland 2014 - 2018
<b>University of Oxford, St. Antony's College</b> MSc Russian & East European Studies	Oxford, England 2012-2013
<b>Sciences Po Paris</b> Erasmus Internationale Beziehungen	Paris, Frankreich 2010-2011
<b>University of Warwick</b> BA Politics and International Studies	Coventry, England 2008-2012